Vytautas Landsbergis
Lithuania on the Threshold to the new Millennium
Lecture delivered at Washington (Seattle) University, November 16, 2000
Ladies and Gentlemen!
In a few years, Lithuania will celebrate her own millennium - a written testimony in European annals about a country under such name a thousand years ago.
Thus, before talking about the forthcoming thresholds, I would like to refer to what Lithuania is and where she is.
There were so many attempts to tear Lithuania from the map and from history. But she maintains to exist at the same place on the Eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. It is not a simple existence for her, but action and creation, which is worthy to present here, telling you about Lithuania's role in European history, as well as today and tomorrow.
This role was determined in part by geography and other circumstances, but, by a great part, it was also determined by political and cultural determination of Lithuanian rulers.
Western civilization has been the fundamental pillar and the main direction of self-determination of Lithuania since the mid-13th century, when Mindaugas, the first king of united Lithuania, accepted the crown blessed by the Roman Pope. Alas, the King was killed by his Pagan relatives. His son avenged them and afterwards retreated to an Orthodox monastery, where he was also killed.
So, for a hundred and fifty years more, Lithuania, the last pagan state in Europe, was balancing and struggling, having the will to accept the Western Christianity, but not the power of Western conquerors. This goal, i.e. a Christian but not enslaved state, was attained in the late 14th to early 15th century. Soon afterwards Lithuania became a promoter of the Western Christian civilization in the Eastern Slav territories ruled by her. In the towns and villages of the present-day Belarus, there can still be found remaining Baroque churches and historic remnants of Catholic cloisters and Jesuit colleges, knowledge about estates of Lithuanian nobles with manufactories, theaters and orchestras. The code of laws of Lithuania titled "The Statute of Lithuania" was first approved by the Parliament of Noblemen in Vilnius in 1529, and was later twice revised and amended for the following editions. It appeared earlier than similar codes of Russia and Poland; hence the Lithuanian code was widely accepted and used. Lithuania was promoting the unitary (or Greek Catholic) church and, later, traversed by the reformation waves. Finally, in 1791, the "Two-nations Republic" of Poland and Lithuania adopted the first Constitution in Europe. It reflected the ideas of the Enlightenment Age and the Declaration of Human Rights, the citizens bourgeoisie got their rights without any revolution. Unfortunately, the neighboring empires Russia, Prussia and Austria could not stand this. The Polish-Lithuanian confederation of two states was partitioned and annihilated without having enough time to accomplish reforms and to pool strength.
The 19th century was a trying ordeal to Lithuania. Under the ferocious oppression of repression, hard labor and gibbets, and at the same time under the social and cultural oppression, it had to safeguard its identity. The test was unbelievable but people passed it. Reborn after World War I, a nation state - the Republic of Lithuania - was again joining the European civilization and political structures. Its accession to the League of Nations was complemented by the rapprochement with Latvia and Estonia (Finland was considered the fourth Baltic state), sister states which endured the same fate. Before World War II, the idea of "Baltoscandia" - a wider idea of the Northern Dimension - appeared on the horizon. Unfortunately, relations with Poland remained frozen for eighteen years in state of war after Poland forcefully took Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. Lithuania recovered Vilnius after defeat of Poland, right before the annihilation of Lithuania itself. Lithuania was again occupied and annexed - in the summer of 1940, by the same old Russia, which renamed its Empire into the Soviet Union in the 20th century. Again decades of resistance and repression followed. The occupants were attempting once again to deprive Lithuania of her identity, thus cutting Lithuania away from the Western civilization not only politically, but also culturally.
I believe it is interesting and important to note that, despite of the forced unification by the USSR, three countries - Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia - managed to preserve a certain difference (from Russia) and mutual solidarity and affinity. It helped us to consolidate political and moral efforts in the 1988-1990 march towards peaceful restoration of independence.
It was absolutely natural that already in spring of 1990, after newly elected Parliaments of the three countries in one way or another had declared independence, the Council of the Baltic States was established straight off. It revived a tendency of the Baltic Concord of the three pre-war countries, and a valuable idea of "Baltoscandia" - the mentioned above broader northern regional unity. Simultaneously there was expressed interest in analogies with the structural experience of Benelux. Already in June of 1990, the Council of the Baltic States applied to Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with the request for guest status for its three countries, and in autumn that year, together with the Nordic Council delegation it signed a communiqué on cooperative relations with the Nordic Council; in spring of 1991 the leaders of the Baltic states took part as guests in the session of the Council of Benelux, while in spring of 1992 the Baltic Assembly endorsed an agreement on parliamentary cooperation with the Nordic Council. Thus it became possible to take concrete steps in seeking to create our own little "common market" (visa-free entry, customs union) and the three Baltic States on the eastern coast embarked upon that.
Lithuania’s activity to normalize relations with more problematic neighbors was even more successful; agreements or declarations, which she jointly signed with Russia (29 July 1991), Belarus (24 October 1991), and Poland (13 January 1992) consolidated peace and opened up new perspectives for regional and European cooperation. The turning back to, after all, western direction one could define it more exactly as reintegration, returning to traditional for Lithuania cultural space.
Eight years have passed since the liberation of Lithuania and the end of the first stage of her European reintegration. This first stage was the period of 1990-1992. Soon Lithuania, together with Estonia, were accepted to the Council of Europe in 1993 and assisted to Latvia, Moldova, the Ukraine, and the countries of the Southern Caucasus to be accepted there too (after we defended in Strasbourg, in cooperation. with other countries, the right of the Caucasus to belong to Europe). Lithuania was the first, which recognized in 1991 the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, and thus made her contribution to the extinction - transformation to democracies - of the minor empire of Communism in the Balkans. Today Lithuania herself is in the region. Together with the unifying Europe she guards the Balkan peace.
Lithuania has always been open and constructive in her foreign policy. The Northern Dimension, the unity of the three Baltic States, was extended with the Western Dimension - neighboring Sweden, and the Southern Dimension - neighboring Poland. Following Lithuania’s suggestion in 1997, the Lithuanian-Polish Parliamentary Assembly was established, which, in turn, intensified the bilateral cooperation. of the two Cabinets. The common objective - to belong together to the European Union and NATO - induced to consolidate bilateral relations between Poland and Lithuania as a strategic partnership. There is no secure Poland without secure Lithuania - this is obvious to everyone who recollects or looks up at the map. Supported by Poland, Lithuania strives after NATO membership, in order to slightly extend the Euro-Atlantic space of stability and welfare in 2002 - this time towards the North. Everyone knows that investment capital likes secure places. That is why we speak about NATO welfare.
This modern Lithuanian-Polish pragmatism is strengthened by historic memory about existence of the two nations in the commonwealth from the end of the 16th century to the end of the 18th century. It is now the rapprochement between Lithuania and Poland in a new context of unifying Europe. We categorically decline ideas propagating that Lithuania and Poland should be divided by any kind of "red" or Molotov's line.
Having made a difficult decision last year to gradually decommission her nuclear power plant, Lithuania was invited to enter into direct negotiations for the membership in the European Union. According to expert assessment Lithuania has chances to catch up with those candidate countries, which had started negotiations for the membership in the European Union a bit earlier. Newly elected Seimas of Lithuania adopted a resolution on 26 of October this year, which confirmed determination of the State to be prepared for the EU membership in 2004, as well as invitation to NATO in 2002. For the latter we have Membership Action Plan and for the first one we have the status of associated membership, which means, I could expect, "already in". The efforts of CIS leaders to stop it should be compared with territorial claims to European Union. (See the Statement of the Lithuanian Seimas of June 15, 2000).
Having enforced partnership and strategic partnership relations with the northern and southern neighbors, Lithuania became a connecting line between the eastern Baltic countries and the Vyshegrad countries. Lithuania is active in the Council of the Baltic Sea Countries thus making contribution to openness of the western regions of Russia to European cooperation. Here an urgent problem of the present and the future of Kaliningrad-Königsberg come into force. This is a European problem, and a problem of the future relations between the European Union and Russia, while people of that region are looking for greater autonomy and beneficial solutions. Lithuania displays a real goodwill by granting a visa-free entrance right for the residents of this region, by training its officials, and by making investments. 75 per cent of last year's investments there were made by Lithuanians. In the process of European integration it would be detrimental and ludicrous to leave the Kaliningrad-Königsberg region lagging behind in indigence, as if a hotbed of anachronistic anti-Western militarization, environmental contamination, AIDS concentration and social unstableness. For what sake they should suffer? The Kaliningrad-Königsberg region, people over there really need assistance, and Lithuania provides it.
Another western neighbor - Sweden - makes solid investments in Lithuania, extends non-governmental relations and assists in the field of national defense. Sweden has nothing against Lithuania’s membership in NATO, as it will only add security of the territory, waters, and investments of the Swedes themselves.
Belarus is the Lithuanian neighbor in the East. Although Lithuania does not support the domestic policies of the present regime in Belarus, she maintains constructive relationship with this country. We share a long land border and have rather extensive trade and transit relations. With Belarus’ political integration into Russia, it would be politically easier to say that Moscow is to be held responsible for what happens in Minsk. If Moscow considerably favored that the situation were different in Minsk, it would be different. However, Lithuania treats Belarus as a state (or its regime) which is responsible for itself and, therefore, opens for it some window to Europe thereby carrying out an individual international mission of this nature.
Nevertheless, it is not that easy. Lithuania still continues to be Europe’s ‘contact person’ in its relations with Belarus, despite certain unfriendly action, for instance, the appointment of a war criminal of the 1991 January killings to the Belarus government and regretful failure of our neighbor to accept Europe’s and US' proposal for holding democratic elections.
There is Russia behind Belarus, and Russia hardly predictable. Our relations are good, because numerous essential issues were resolved already between 1990-1992 when Russia itself probably considered that it would have been better to become a democratic and European-type country shortly.
Both countries have very nicely resolved many differences in that period: they signed and implemented treaties on the fundamentals of the inter-state relations and the withdrawal of Russia's military troops. In the first one of those treaties Russia condemned the annexation carried by the Soviet Union against Lithuania and agreed that Lithuania could freely choose the international security structures and alliances with which she wished to be associated.
Anyway, ever since Lithuania chose integration with the North Atlantic Alliance as her national aim, Russian politicians have forgotten about the signature of their President; they pretend to be angry, and exert pressure against and intimidate both Lithuania and the West. This is just one example of the difficulties that we encounter in the second stage of national self-determination.
Even if our trade and transit conditions were recently hardened by the Russian side, when Russian politicians want to press on the Latvians and Estonians they say that the Russians feel best in Lithuania comparing to the other Baltic States.
We neither count nor define small problems, yet two bigger ones will be solved either by time or by Russia’s political progress.
These two problems include unwillingness of the Russian leadership to see Lithuania joining NATO and Lithuania’s willingness to talk with them about the damage caused by the USSR occupation.
So, during the last decade, being "Independent again" (which is the title of my book presented here today), Lithuania went the way towards her national goals NATO and European Union as creative, cooperative and contributing member of regional community of nations. The "Second Europe" was being consistently created here, in advance to joining EU, and the time was spent not in the waiting- but in the working room.
Today, when we are swimming ahead in a little bit warmer Post-Cold War era, with the local war luckily finished in the Balkans, but still waged in the Caucasus, the Europe of democracies combines in itself eagerness and frustration about its forthcoming enlargement. Similar feelings, supposedly, may lead to and follow the forthcoming enlargement of NATO. My name for NATO is United Democracies, and Lithuania from 1992 was resolute to be "in".
Lithuania is an advanced applicant and candidate country to join NATO. Here, in the US, do exist firm opinions about her being number one or number two on the list of candidates. Therefore, swords will be crossed around her and also inside her. The Russian political elite with its prevailing mentality of yesterday will insist on allegedly heavy "confrontation" and will seek for more "Russia-firsters" in the West, at the same time encouraging anti-Western, anti-NATO and anti-military approach in the Lithuanian society. ("You yourselves will not want this membership", so explained to us the Russian ambassador in Vilnius his Government's recent tasks and expectations.)
Nevertheless, a possible division of our citizens into "pro-Russian" and "anti-Russian" groups would be neither correct nor fruitful.
A lot depends on what Russia you have in your mind. Is it that problematic "Russia of yesterday" or is it the desired (by all of us in the West) democratic Russia of tomorrow? Do you prefer the renewed Russian expansionism westwards, expressed by a desire at least to satelize or "finlandize" the former Baltic colonies, or would you rather prefer Russia's accommodation to reality, its ability to be cooperative indeed?
In a similar way we must elaborate and establish for ourselves an ideology of the benefits of cooperation. between Russia and NATO. What we must emphasize, are the benefits for Russia itself. The Russian political elite and military establishment both angrily protested against NATO actions toward the Belgrade regime. Nevertheless, the burden of Milosevic now seems to be lifted. The situation became easier for everybody. The Balkan Peace (called Balkan Stability Pact) will now work for Yugoslavia and, indirectly, for Russia, because the burden of its responsibility has diminished.
The membership of both Poland and Lithuania in NATO will work positively for Russia, first of all, in the psychological sense of accommodation and reconciliation. Of course, it is better for Russian foreign policy to work without the burden of old temptations. If Lithuania is able to contribute to reconciliation between Russia and NATO, exactly via her membership in NATO, it is a big deal, a new beautiful page of history.
Russia (i.e. its present authorities) tries to exert influence on other states so that Lithuania would not be invited to join NATO in 2002 or probably never. However, Russia has no valid and, especially, no pragmatic arguments. Since real arguments are not talked about openly in diplomacy, invalid ones for this case include alleged "danger" to Russia from NATO and Lithuania’s side and presupposed "right" to control the countries, which formally were given status of the "republics" of the USSR.
The negotiations on the payment of damage caused by the USSR occupation (which Lithuania strives for at the moment) will regulate the last problematic issue of bilateral relations and simultaneously eliminate any of the claims of Russia’s "rights" in relation to formerly occupied Lithuania. It will be totally absurd to call Lithuania "former soviet republic" in tackling such an issue as damage caused by occupation.
As far as the real dangers to Russia are under consideration, they originate neither in the West nor from NATO. Fighting a non-existing Western danger, Russia only waists its time. Therefore Lithuania’s invitation to the NATO would not manifest any hostile action against Russia (no matter how its diplomats are to interpret it), but serve as an encouragement to turn to the reality rather than live in the myths of the past. I wish to emphasize again that Lithuania’s input by such an action, ability to contribute willingly or unwillingly to rapprochement between Russia and NATO, would only be positive. Poland started the process and Lithuania should continue.
The accession of the three Baltic States to the European Union is of equal benefit to Russia. Russian politicians only waste their time also in this area while planning some ‘obstacles’ to the Balts or, for example, refusing to complete the border treaties. This resembles the policy of the past with the priority of dominance and confrontation rather than cooperation. It is harmful to Russia itself, therefore, Russia’s friends should warn this country on every occasion, especially when raising the issues of Western reintegration of the Baltic States (that the East makes efforts to oppose to) or continued bloodshed in the Caucasus for yesterday’s conquests.
I am a friend of a democratic Russia, therefore, I speak about that openly as I did a decade ago.
The real problem of Russia does not lie in the West, however, I repeat, that country wastes its time on diplomatic and economic battle for the Baltic States as its zone of influence and maintains unnecessary tension.
We take part in joint work in Europe. Its long agenda also includes Russia’s European cultural integration. Undoubtedly, political culture should also be included. And so should be a way of progress, whereas the alternative, which we will have to overcome, is Russia’s effort not to forget the "junior achievement" by Molotov and stop our legal and economic Euro-integration. The interests, priorities and visions of the future of the East and the West are still different. Such is the reality and there should be no fear in defining it as it is. Only in this way can both visions become less different.
Some time ago we thought that after the generation of Mikhail Gorbachev one more generation in Russia’s political elite would be enough for democratic changes to be irrevocable in the largest territory of the world. Now we see that it will take a longer period of time.
This time is approaching as the new millennium, which promises no immediate changes, but promises hard work indeed. Lithuania will work on her future and that of the whole Europe. We will go on insisting that our national goals are not separate from common goals of democracy as it is stated in our four-lateral US-Baltic Charter signed by four Presidents in 1998. We will insist basic idea, which I always keep for such political performances: indeed, Lithuania is the key to a large Baltic area, but it would be wrong to see only an object there. Lithuania used to be and still is a subject in history that a decade ago extensively contributed to extending and consolidating the area of democracy on the eastern coast of our sea - Northern Mediterranean - where the rule of law and market economy were given preference.
Once again I would like to generalize basic moral and pragmatic issues of our policy, both recent and future.
First of all, the stable independent Lithuania has crossed out by her self-restoration the results of criminal conspiracy and aggression of Hitler and Stalin regimes in 1939-1940, thus bringing back historical justice and belief in it. It is important to believe. International justice, if you like, is a way from the state of law towards something yet rather imagined as the Globe of Law. Thus, peaceful liberation of Lithuania based on international law, as well as on the methods of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, was our contribution to that still imagined future. We could give advice, mediate, assist in many conflicts that occur in the post-Soviet area. We have an experience, which makes us experts, if anyone wishes to use it.
Last but not the least, a secure, stable and prosperous Lithuania, as a democracy and free-market economy, will long serve the role of principal advantages for our Eastern neighbors consistently encouraging them to make right choices. (It is already an ongoing process, of which I know from my contacts in 1999-2000 with the colleagues from Ukraine and Georgia.) Similarly, a stable and secure Lithuania will serve well for Poland in our geopolitical South, to Latvia in the North, also Kaliningrad district and even Sweden in the West - for each of them in a different manner, but only positively. She can also serve for changing of political mind in Russia.
Today Russia is involved in a war, and people are killed, masses of civil population are left homeless, and this tragedy is not stopped despite formal Western demands. I remember one remark made to us, Lithuanians, in the West during Gorbachev's blockade on Lithuania: yes, he is wrong, but a big country has a big face and this is a much bigger problem than that when a small country loses face. You see, colleagues, sometimes the problem is in the size of face.
Anyway, we make headway in any possible area. As you know, all should change for the better in this best world of all possible worlds. To contribute to this is not an absolutely naive idealism.
Thank you.