Religiosity in Latvia and Lithuania: A Comparative Look

Amy Bruhn

SISRE465

June 12, 2003

INTRODUCTION:

Balts are quick to point out that they are three different countries with different cultures and ideology, and understandably so. One difference I noticed felt intriguing to me as I examined statistics one day. Lithuania, it appears, is one of the nations of the world that reports a very low rate of atheism. Its neighbor, Latvia, who shares, similar geography and a parallel history over the past two hundred years reported a rather high rate (1). Examining the World Values Survey (1997, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Reform)(2) for Latvia and Lithuania showed further evidence of higher religiosity for Lithuania. Nearly all of the indicators I could find that might point to religiosity were higher in Lithuania than in Latvia, such as whether people report religion as important in their lives and in their child rearing, whether they consider themselves religious, whether or not they believe in God, Satan, Heaven and Hell, whether they themselves were raised in a religious home and the regularity of their reported church attendance. Every one of these variables scored higher in Lithuania than in Latvia. Often the differences were small, but always statistically significant to a level of a less than 1% chance that the difference in the data was from random chance. This evidence is convincing that Lithuania is more religious thatn Latvia. The question remains, why? There have been some hypotheses put forward in the past several years that explain the religiosity of a nation’s population by the interactions of its political institutions. These theories, while intriguing and helpful in some respects don’t appear to explain the Baltic cases sufficiently. This paper will examine three different theories put forth by social scientists and then offer forth an historical explanation, not dependent upon institutional criteria. My goal is not to reject earlier work but to supplement it with historical perspective.

LITHUANIA’S RELIGIOUS HISTORY

First it may be helpful to summarize some relevant Baltic history. The crusades had a tremendous impact, both religiously and politically. German-led knights began the crusade in modern day Estonia and Latvia as early as 1180 CE, and by 1300CE the land was under Papal control. The crusaders utilized the mechanism of “divide and conquer”, but the Baltic lands were already divided into several territories that did not get along terribly well. The Germans were able complete the job fairly easily, and remained in control for centuries as the aristocratic landowning class, later converting the region to the Lutheran faith. This arrangement continued for several hundred years. Lithuania was able to fight off the Teutonic Knights under the direction of Duke Mindaugas, who eventually became a converted Christian and was assassinated.. Lithuania reverted to paganism, until the pressure from crusaders became too great to withstand alone. Grand Duke Jogaila agreed to make Lithuania Christian in exchange for the Crown of Poland. Lithuania was the last European nation to abandon paganism for Christianity. The alliance between Poland and Lithuania continued until 1795 when Poland, and therefore Lithuania, was annexed by the Russian Empire. Under the Tsars, all institutions became Russian, and the Catholic Church was severely repressed. World War I brought about the collapse of the German and Russian empires and Lithuania gained independence. Lithuania made great strides in literacy and political success despite something of a tumultuous beginning that included surprise coalitions and coup attempts, as well as the resurgence of the unfettered Roman Catholic Church, which claimed 85% of the population at the beginning of 1939. Late that same year Hitler and Stalin signed the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact and Lithuania was placed under Soviet rule. Religious activity of all kinds was repressed under Soviet rule. The Catholic Church in Lithuania was forced move some of its practices underground, such as the secret printing of Catechisms. In 1991 Lithuania, along with Estonia and Latvia, declared its independence from the disintegrating USSR and began the task, again, of finding political and social stability as an independent state; freedom of religious association and worship was one of many liberties established after 1991 (3).

LATVIA’S RELIGIOUS HISTORY

Latvia existed under the control of a series of rulers following the Crusades, including Denmark, Prussia, Lithuania/Poland, Sweden and Russia. German landowners controlled much of the money and the cultural influences, and their serfs, the Latvians, were automatically converted, first to Catholicism, then later to Lutheranism. Eventually Russia dominated political life and bureaucracy. During the Tsarist occupation a portion of Latvians became Orthodox. In the opening years of the 20th century Socialist ideas became popular in Latvian cities, as in much of Europe at that time. Socialism was often tied also to atheist ideology. In 1905 the Tsar forcibly squelched a peaceful labor demonstration, resulting in the deaths of 70 people. Rioting and looting ensued and 3000 Latvians were shot by the Tsar, and many more exiled to Siberia. This made the Tsar unpopular in Latvia, and, in combination with the labor mood in fashion at the time, Latvia was initially very receptive to the Socialist revolution. This support was short-lived, but some Latvians, specifically the Red Riflemen, fled to Russia with the Red Army after 1917, and did well in that structure until Stalin’s purges in the ‘30s, when they didn’t fare well at all. After independence in 1918, Latvia did well economically but experienced political upheaval similar to Lithuania. Religion experienced a resurgence during the first period of independence, and in 1935 evangelical Lutheranism was the most widespread creed (54% of the population), followed by Catholicism (25%). Then came 1939 and the Soviet invasion and official atheism, and finally the 1991 opportunity to find it’s own way as an independent Latvia (3).

THE CATHOLIC EXCEPTION EXPLANATION:

Next let’s deal with the existing theories. As previously stated, Latvia and Lithuania differ in the area of religion in interesting ways even though the political paths they have traveled have run in parallel lines for the last century. Stark and Ianconne argue that societies that are Catholic tend to be more religious than other countries. They argue that the hierarchy provided by the church is stabilizing and that they are part of a larger “world family” that is politically supportive and well-defined (4). This thesis would predict that Lithuania, a deeply catholic country would be more religious than Latvia, which shares many of the same historical attributes but is largely Lutheran and less homogeneous. This is in fact the case. This trend may be particularly helpful in understanding Lithuania. When the Soviet power structure was in place Lithuania’s close proximity to heavily Catholic Poland, with its affinity for the Polish Pope, may have intensified its connection to the Catholic world family Stark and Ianconne describe. It is a trend, and can be viewed as a likely contributing factor for the purposes of this paper.

THE PUBLIC WELFARE EXPLANATION:

Another theory by Anthony Gill and Erik Lundgaarde, argues that if a country begins to provide more in the area of social welfare for citizens they will choose to access these services through secular avenues and religiosity will decrease (5). This theory predicts that Lithuania would have a lower level of public services, and therefore a higher rate of religiosity as people look for those services within the church setting. The indicators of public welfare that were available showed the reverse of this trend. According to the 2002 Human Development Index , Lithuania and Latvia are actually very similar in public welfare spending, but the differences that do exist point to Lithuania as a provider of more public services than Latvia. Latvia rated 53rd on the country ordinals while Lithuania rated 49th. Lithuania spent more public dollars per capita on healthcare than did Latvia, and more on public school expenditures (6). Latvia had higher numbers reported for private funds, but these would not represent government welfare expenditure, and support the notion instead that it is Latvia, not Lithuania who must find services outside of the public purview. Yet, as stated above, Lithuania is more religious than Latvia, indicating that obtaining public services is not the primary goal for people to attend church in the Baltic States. I don’t know if this measure is adequate, but it is an indication that Gill and Lundsgaare cannot explain the difference in religiosity between Lithuania and Latvia.

THE RESTRICTIVE INSTITUTION EXPLANATION:

A third theory comes from Anthony Gill, working alone. He argues that the more restrictive government institutions are the less religious plurality will exist, but religiosity itself will increase (7). To test this theory we must look at the differences in how the Lithuanian and Latvian governments treat religious groups. According to the International Religious Freedom Report 2002 issued by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Latvia is somewhat more religiously free than Lithuania. Both are characterized as nations that practice religious freedom by the bureau’s standard, in that people are free to practice any religion privately that they may wish to, but in Lithuania nine religions are categorized as “traditional”, and these enjoy special privileges. They do not have to pay certain fees, such as health insurance for their employees, and utility taxes. Nontraditional religious groups may not buy land, although they can rent it, and in state run schools religious training is performed only by traditional faiths. Traditional clergy do not have to serve in the military in contrast to nontraditional clergy, who are not exempt from military service. Nontraditional churches cannot start up incendiary institutions while the nine traditional groups can (8).

Latvia also categorizes churches into traditional and nontraditional groups, but they are not treated differently in substantial ways. Certain privileges are awarded to groups who register, but any group of ten citizens or residents over the age of 18 can register as a church.

Gill’s theory would predict that Lithuania’s more stringent rules would indicate less plurality but greater religiosity than Latvia. In other words, it predicts more people belonging to a few big churches. This is, in fact, precisely what we do find in Lithuania. Its high rate of religiosity and dominance of the Catholic Church fit nicely into the conclusion of Gill’s work, and can be viewed by us as another factor.

THE HISTORICAL EXPLANATION

It is undoubtedly true that Lithuania’s choice to restrict religious institutions and their proliferation in their new government steers them toward a monopoly by a few powerful churches and cultural encouragement to participate in them, leading to greater religiosity. It also seems likely that the character of the Catholic Church does lend itself toward more religiosity within the country. These hypotheses move us toward a greater understanding, but feel unsatisfying in some basic way. Looking back over Baltic history in pursuit of more intuitive reasons, some earlier differences emerge that moved Latvia and Lithuania down different paths well before the 1991 institutions came into play. The three differences that I focused on that could have influenced the trends we see today are as follows: (1) Differences in the way conversion attempts took place (2) Differences in the places Latvia and Lithuania took in European power structure as national identity was being formed and (3) The events of 1905 and Socialism’s impact on Latvia as a religious entity.

HISTORICAL FACTOR 1: CONVERSION

When the Tsar first freed the serfs in 1861, the lives of the serfs did not change immediately. Actual de facto emancipation occurred in different places at different times. In Latvia the process occurred fairly rapidly, and as the peasants obtained the right to choose their own faith the Lutheran Church and the Russian Orthodox Church began to compete for their patronage. Attempts to interest the newly emancipated included printing religious readings in Latvian; Orthodoxy did win some converts. In Lithuania, the peasants were able to make choices about religion rather later, even extending into the beginnings of the twentieth century. By that time a nationalist movement had grown in the Russian Empire, and the Tsar had taken notice. Rather than convince peasants to join the Russian Orthodox Church he curtailed the rights of Roman Catholics in Lithuania. This tactic backfired, and the nationalist movement and the Catholic Church became more intimately tied than ever, and popular support for the church strengthened. This factor may have served to increase religiosity in Lithuania, as compared to Latvia.

HISTORICAL FACTOR 2: TOP DOG VS. UNDERDOG

Second, Lithuania was situated very differently from Latvia in the political arena before the Tsar appeared. Lithuania’s joint venture with Poland proved to be advantageous to it politically. It successfully gathered lands until it controlled a wide swath of Europe, including, for a time, Latvia. Other than Lithuania/Poland, Latvia came under the control of several other powers, and was not able to govern itself. The reason I think this difference may be important is because Latvia was demonstrated its durability in its flexibility, which allows for more acceptable choices than just one and leaves more room for people who may not want to participate. Even though at the time Latvians were not able to decide for themselves, they still were influenced by a variety of different caretakers, each of whom likely left some influence behind. Lithuania on the other hand successfully staved off the crusaders and was able to conquer other lands (9). The conqueror is the one who makes the rules, and in this case Lithuania, influenced by the circumstances surrounding its mass conversion, was able to adhere to its own political norms, resulting in a more rigid, less permissive religious atmosphere. These tendencies are reflective in the plurality and commitment level to religious freedom that each demonstrates.

HISTORICAL FACTOR #3: A TRAUMATIC EVENT DURING A FORMATIVE PERIOD:

The labor massacre that took place in Latvia in 1905, and subsequent repression of Socialism may have had an influence as well. The support for Lenin evaporated soon enough, but the event itself must have left a mark upon the nation. The Bolsheviks saw religion as a competitor with communism. By contrast the Tsar claimed to have been given his power by the hand of God. It certainly seems possible that, at this moment when the country, newly independent was making decisions about its future, it may have taken a more secular road than it would have otherwise. This leaning may be reflected in its high degree of religious freedom and lower religiosity today.

CONCLUSION:

The differences in the way Latvia and Lithuania experience and express their relative faiths can be explained in a number of ways that do not appear to me to be in conflict with one another. Lithuania’s greater religiosity can be explained in part by the fact that it is Catholic, and by its limits on religious freedom, both of which have been shown to be predictors in other places. The fact that the welfare spending model failed here is an indication that looking at categories to explain religious preferences is helpful but not enough. A look at the histories of Latvia and Lithuania shows that there are elements specific and special to them that influenced the paths they chose. These included the circumstances under which the government tried to draw them away from the religion that is dominant in each country today, where each fit into the political structure and what events may have influenced them at crucial moments of transition. The formation of a culture is deeply complex, and it should be noted that this was not an attempt to make a definitive summary of what influenced the Baltics religiously. Other factors, such as the move into urban areas over time, may also have had an influence; I hoped to highlight what I judged to be the most influential. Ultimately the Balts, like all of us, are too rich, too nuanced, too human to be described in fully in this kind of work. Approximation is the most we can attempt, and hopefully that has been achieved..

1. David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian, Todd M. Johnson World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Survey of Churches and Religions in the Modern World , Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2001

2. World Values Survey 1997 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/organization/index.html

3. Iwaskiw, Walter R, ed Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: Country Studies, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995

4. Deregulating Religion: The Economics of Church and State, Iannaccone, Lawrence R. and Rodney Stark, Economic Inquiry April 1997 v35 p350

5. Gill, Anthony, Eric Lundsgaarde, State Welfare Spending and Religious Participation: A Cross-National Analysis http://faculty.washington.edu/tgill/new_page_11.htm (this paper has not been published yet but can be accessed from the web page above.)

6. United Nations Human Development Reports, http://hdr.undp.org/default.cfm;

7. Gill, Anthony, The Political Origins of Religious Liberty: Initial Sketch of a General Theory

8. U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom Report 2002, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/

9. Urban, William, The Baltic Crusades, Northern Illinois University Press, 1975