

Part I**Subject: Andrew Schwartz (AS)****Date: November 4, 2010****Interviewer: Milli Lake (ML)****Transcribed by: Christina Corrales-Toy****Edited by: Kyle Dennison****Duration: 33:06****Note: Recorded in Café, severe background noise, very difficult to hear questions.**

ML: My name's Milli Lake, I'm a research assistant for the Brand Responsibility Oral and Digital History Project. Today is November the 4th, about 5 p.m., I'll first ask you if you can state your name and your position for the record and then if you could just start with telling me a little bit about what your position was during the period. We're documenting the Nike CGT settlement process in July 2010 and then the process leading up to that and particularly, we're interested in the University's decision to terminate the contract with Nike or allow the contract to expire. So if you could start with stating your name for the record and then tell us a little bit about what you were doing in that period, what your position was and what your involvement was?

AS: At the beginning of 2009, I was a student organizer with the Student Labor Action Project, the University of Washington chapter. Which was closely related with [USAS]. I was a student activist at that point, and then in the spring of 2009 I was appointed by the president to be the ASUW representative to the Advisory Committee on Trademarks and Licensing. So I was one of three student voices on that advisory committee.

ML: Okay, could you tell me a little bit about how the Nike issue first came to your attention personally?

AS: Prior to 2009, well prior to my appointment, I had worked with Student Labor Action Project beginning in January 2008. So I had known about Nike for a while in several capacities all of which were relatively negative, but also dealing with business contracts with the University of Washington. So we had kept a pretty close watch on Nike's operations in relationship to the University of Washington since 2008 primarily through the Worker's Rights Consortium and also through the Intermediary of the United Students against Sweatshops. But, in particular with this case, we found out typically through the Worker's Rights Consortium-their reports. Not in a formal capacity but just through, kind of, informal communications between our group and Worker Rights Consortium and then formally through one of their first reports in like [early] January.

ML: And just to clarify, was that before you were a member of SLAP...while you were a member of SLAP?

AS: Yeah

ML: Or before you were appointed to the ACTL?

AS: Yeah, I think, because that happened between [Inaudible] and I was appointed in, I don't know, the mid to late part of spring quarter 2009.

ML: Okay, and did you have any knowledge of the ACTL, Advising Committee on Trademarks and Licensing, before that had you [had any] negotiations?

AS: Well, my appointment was part of the founding of that iteration but there had been to my knowledge at least three similar committees with similar charges prior to my appointment dealing with other kinds of cases like this. So, yes, I had known about it, and I knew about Margaret, and I knew about Kathy. I should also add SLAP knew very well about these committees and knew a lot, and had a very strong opinion about them.

ML: Okay, would you be able to tell [what kind of opinions]?

AS: Yeah, yeah, we we're very hesitant, a lot of our meetings had to do a lot with the committee as what we had presumed to be a stalling tactic. So, I mean, there was a spectrum of ideas, clearly, and I found that it would have been a worthwhile endeavor, so I sat on it. But there was a lot of uncertainty about those kinds of committees.

ML: Okay and did that [change the culture]? [Inaudible] [Change the culture of the negotiation process] [Inaudible] [...Respond to the committee] [dealing with] [Inaudible]

AS: I mean yeah, I would say that primarily those kinds of committees' fundamental role is to slow the operation down. I think the initial reaction by myself and everyone else was kind of like a begrudging – well, this is the way it's going to have to be – and then over time, we did kind of cultivate a strategy around it and so we did use it to the ends that we could, and I think we were successful in that sense; partially because, [our group] was on the committee and also, just because the conditions were right and we took advantage of those conditions.

ML: So I want to talk more about that, but before I get into that, [if you could maybe tell us what were the key issues of the negotiations, from the worker's perspectives, with regard to Nike...Inaudible]?

AS: There were three issues: There was the union busting – or union organizing intimidation, which was well documented – There was an issue of worker's not getting the severance and back pay that they were owed, which was related to the third issue which was how, [the discrepancy between], how SLAP, USAS, how members of the committee, how Nike, how the University Administration were all interpreting the code. And specifically in the clause that deals with how contractors and subcontractors are identified in relationship to the brand. So for myself, and for SLAP and for a few other people on the committee, every contractor that was contracted by Nike post a UW agreement was identified as an entity within the brand and therefore the brand was, it was incumbent on the brands to [Inaudible]. They were the final say and [they were the final] responsibility to ensure that the labor code was maintained and upheld.

ML: [Inaudible]... Was it your understanding that Nike was in violation of the Code of Conduct?

AS: Absolutely...[with no denial]

ML: How do you respond to Nike's claim that they were not...[Inaudible]

AS: Well, they were lying on the first two cases and on the second one, they were just being willfully ignorant and being willfully dense and [intruding] to interpret in a way that was basically – no, it's my word against yours – they took the side of – we're choosing not to interpret it that way – and no, they don't get to choose how to interpret it.

ML: [Inaudible]If we go back to the key issues of the negotiations, could you say a little bit about what, from your perspective, what outcome you wanted to see from Nike...[Inaudible].

AS: In the end I think we got what we wanted. In a very kind of, narrow compliance perspective, I think we got what we wanted. I mean, I don't think we...what was the percentage that we got – I know it wasn't 100 % -

ML: I'm not sure of the percentage...

AS: Yeah, they got like maybe 70% of what they were owed. It was symbolic, it was historic and it was actually, you know, in compliance for the most part. [In fact] compliance to me [in the sense that] a check finally was written, whether or not we achieved compliance in the sense that we allowed almost 14 months to go by, if not more – 18 months maybe - so the final date's July, that's, no, that's 19 months – so that's not a very good [standard] of compliance, but if you think in terms of actually getting the worker's their money, because, you know, people's lives are on the line, I think we did succeed in that sense. But we...it remains to be seen in a more systemic level, how successful it was.

ML: Yeah, on that note, I know Nike was very careful in wording the final agreement so as not to set precedence in that regard?

AS: Yeah, I mean Nike's a good... Smart Corporation. I almost misspoke and said they were a good corporation [Inaudible]. They're intelligent, they're smart, they're clever, and so I'm sure they were very good at wordsmithing it; but the fact that they [paid], in my mind, speaks for itself, and the grand scheme of things, if it were to go to a legal court case, I mean, the legal precedent is set. They were responsible for it – it's clearly written in the contract – and Nike's dismissal of any kind of legal responsibility is...is just made up.

ML: Okay, yeah, and just on a similar tract as well, there were various elements to the final package including the severance for workers, and the compensation, and also the health care benefits and priority rehiring. Were there any aspects of the package that you were unhappy with, or that you wanted to see something else in there?

AS: By package you mean their final deal, like what is was they kind of conceded. Other than the actual [factory] management conceding the equipment, and Nike actually writing a check, what else was in the package?

ML: There was health care benefits and priority rehiring...

AS: Sure, Sure...that was part of...they were actually obligated to...okay, I guess I didn't distinguish that from just paying out what they owed.

ML: So you talked a little bit about what you wanted to see from Nike...What did you want to see, what role did you want to see the University play in this process? Maybe you can describe a little bit about what action the University took...

AS: Well, I think that the committee in general was more ready for action than I had anticipated. We actually did achieve something. Which was not my expectation and I don't think that was SLAP's expectation. But they actually paid and we actually recommended to the President a pretty strong recommendation. To that extent, I expect, I would have wanted to see that happen. That being said, I still think we waited too long. For quite a while, there was this whole – and then you might know, if you haven't done the background research yet, you will soon, you'll realize that there are these two [monitoring] organizations, the WRC and the FLA – and I mean, the kinds of excuses and just deliberate delays that the FLA would make and then that people in the committee and the administration would make for the FLA – they didn't report at all, in 19 months they, like, I don't recall one report. And if it was, it was not from them being in Honduras; I don't think that they ever went to the factories. It was just total lip service, total lip service. In contrast, in direct contrast to the WRC which went down there almost a dozen times. They had several communications – formal, explicit, thorough communications – evidencing invoice, audits and whatnot. And so that kind of – and I knew that going in – there was going to be this kind of catering to the FLA. It was kind of hard for us to get around that. And, so that led to some committee members – not necessarily outright agreeing with Nike or accepting Nike's stance of saying: we choose not to interpret that – but because the FLA made no remarks, it somehow – and I don't recall how – somehow, the debate evolved to the WRC's word against Nike's and who are we going to choose, you know. What are the arguments to be made for which voice is more legitimate or which voice is more credible? And to me, that seemed ridiculous. I mean, to give equal weight to Nike, to the brand, the contractor, the brand's voice with the monitoring organization, a third-party independent monitoring organization that we pay a membership to – a membership fee to – to put their voices on equal standing was, [it seemed]...it was incredible, it seemed totally nonsense to me, I mean why would you – what's the whole point of a monitoring organization, if the corporation is going to have the same level of credibility in this situation? So, I didn't want to see that and I don't think SLAP wanted to see that, but that's what happened. I think we were effective in ultimately pressing beyond that and you know the WRC, to their credit, just made it so that only, you know, either the woefully ignorant or the unintelligent would realize that Nike was in the wrong. There was one other thing I wanted to say, but I can't recall. I just wanted to also point out that we're also a membership, we're a dues-paying member to the FLA as well, and so when I was in SLAP, one of our main acts was to [leave] the FLA because this was not the first time that the FLA did not produce the product that we paid for them, for their services. And so clearly there's, for me I see there's collusion going on, but in general I mean, it's just, if you think of the WRC or the FLA as service providers, in the sense that they provided service in monitoring these brands and verifying their claims, the FLA did nothing. And to that extent, they're not a very good business partner. So, I just want to put that out there as well.

ML: Okay, thank you. Perhaps you can talk a little bit about your role on ACTL and, first we will start with how often you met with them, what the meetings were like, and how much input you feel like you had?

AS: Yeah, from my recollection we met like once a month and maybe sometimes twice a month sometimes once every two months. Over the summer it was less. My role was to represent the student body and to that extent I had to negotiate the official politicking of the ASUW administration. But also, you know, I was totally aware that of all the student organizations, student groups around, there was only one organization and one group credible enough to have a voice that deserved representation and that was SLAP. So I saw myself as default SLAP representative as well. Simply because they were the credible voices – they were the credible student voices. To that extent, my contributions were received relatively well. I don't think the urgency with which I tried to deliver my contributions was mutually met. I think, you know, clearly there were professors and staff administrators that were interested in dragging it on for as long as they could. But then there were also other professors who, in particular Professor Prakash was just a real joy to watch, um, because [he was just a] professor, you know, very qualified, highly credible political science professor who was able to talk about the intent of the code when everyone else, for whatever reason – and I'll talk about why I wasn't able to talk about the intent, or the spirit of the code – and I think kind of like, you know, [seeing it] in a legitimate way and I was really glad to see, to hear that he was able to make those kinds of arguments. Because as a student, and my background as an activist, if I were to say the intent of the code or the spirit of the code, I would probably be written off as some kind of idealist, you know, student. So, I was really pleased to see that, and I saw an ally in him. I did not appreciate the way that our appointments were dealt with and managed to the extent that, less for myself because of the way that my appointment happened before a SLAP representative; I do recall that very early on, the SLAP rep, Stephanie Adler, requested that her appointment be a rotating appointment, or rather be a general SLAP appointment, so that SLAP could elect a representative and I do recall that the chair vehemently struck that down, for whatever reason was unclear to me, but I didn't see, that didn't seem fair. And that had to do with internal SLAP politics in terms of the way they managed their organization and also, just in general I would like to think that our University is a democratic institution, although, more and more, I [get to] thinking otherwise. That was clearly not an instance in where, in which, an otherwise democratic process was made less democratic.

ML: Could you talk a little bit about the process of reaching the unanimous agreement to President Emmert? Like how it was presented to you [Inaudible]...

AS: So, if I recall there were two votes: one of them was like a 3-6, 6 being in favor, and the other one was unanimous. I don't know, what was the 3-6? I don't remember, I'll have to get back to you about this, but the [initial/unanimous] vote was, I mean it was clear, I mean, there wasn't a whole lot of...um, well, here – there were a couple people on the committee that were [ex-officio] that weren't able to vote, but were otherwise, their presence was very critical in that they were experts in the field to a certain extent. And one of the ex-officios was, I think the main source of the delay. Primarily, I think, just because you know, these brands and the representatives that represent these brands are you know...she has to work with them on a daily basis. So, you know, the more that she has the opportunity to, you know, work and negotiate, the

less her business relationship has to be stressed. Which is, to a certain extent, fair, but also, you know, this is a public institution with morals and principles and to a certain extent business relationships might have to suffer at the expense of maintaining the principles. So, it was a unanimous vote because the main source of the delay was not able to vote. And so, following that, my arguments and Professor Prakash's arguments and SLAP's arguments, you know, were met with open ears. And to me, it wasn't a hard argument to make and particularly because the FLA was, and Nike were just making stuff, well one of them wasn't making anything whatsoever, the other one was just making [something] totally egregious and complete, woeful ignorance. Or, not ignorance, woeful misinterpretation that served their ends entirely and they were clearly [not doing their due diligence]. So, but that, there was an asterisk to it as well which was, oh, I remember what it was...the recommendation was to put them on notice, that was unanimous. The split vote was whether or not we found them in violation. Six of us found them in violation, three of us didn't. Something like that, maybe it was 6-4 or 7-3 or something. For different reasons – one was a very academic reason that only on an intellectual level can I really agree with, and the other one's I just didn't understand. But yeah, it was unanimous to put them on notice, which is a probationary period, which is just kind of saying: Mr. President, we believe that you need to notify them, that, you know, things are being reviewed. It's not that threatening of a recommendation whereas the other one was we find them in violation [Inaudible].

ML: So were you happy that the...[with the decision...that the action ACTL took in the end]?

AS: No, I mean, I think we should have found them in violation, it was clear to me. I also recall, what happened with Phyllis Wise.

ML: I was just going to ask about the Phyllis Wise.

AS: I submitted some legislation as a ASUW representative to the senate, to sort of require, to demand that either Phyllis Wise step down from her position at the University or step down from her position at Nike. To me, they seemed like a total conflict of interest.

ML: Could you say a little bit more about why you found that to be the case?

AS: Two primary reasons: The second one was...well, one general primary reason which is that to me, the public, the integrity of a public institution is in an antagonistic relationship with corporations. And it's not to say that the success of academic research is in antagonism with corporations, it's that the University Administration and the processes of managing the university are in an antagonistic relationship with corporations. So, in a general sense, that was my first issue with it. She was our second-in-command, I mean if the President for whatever reason is not able to deal with this, the provost is the next person to deal with it. And to that extent, the fact that Nike was able to get her to willfully say I'm not dealing with this anymore, which is a crucial, crucial issue in terms of the principles that are at stake here in terms of a public institution, a moral institution. Nike had effectively removed our second-in-command and that was very troubling to say the least. And third, I guess it was just a basic disgust of [recusal] – that Nike already had succeeded in getting [garnishing] for themselves a 10 year exclusivity agreement with UW, so that Nike and UW are even made even more synonymous than they already were. And then just to have our administrators on, our top administrator on that

executive board, just seemed like policies the best policies for either organization was just not going to be met. I kind of suppose this can get into more of a conversation about why I think the benefits of what is to be learned between a university and a corporation sharing best practices, to me, does not outweigh the cost of losing some of the public-ness of our university. Does that make sense?

ML: Yeah, I think so. I know that Cornell and Wisconsin, were important in the [negotiation] process. [What role did you perceive the universities had in Nike's final decision]?

AS: Universities as they are the representation of the student and faculty and staff, employee, are the actor that needs to keep brands in line. They need to be determining the terms of conditions, not brands. So if the question is – which entity, the brand or the university – should have the power to define the possibilities of what is acceptable and what is not, I think the university is absolutely that entity and not the brands. So that being said, you know, I'm a proponent of designated suppliers program – which is basically a policy and a system in which universities as trading blocs are able to guarantee living wages and associational rights for the workers that do [spare] their clothing and that keep these kinds of, really egregious labor violations, human rights violations, at bay; because of the way they grant, you know, it's kind of like a good behavior, good factor behavior program. So, to that extent, I think that universities should have even more power than they do now determining where clothes are made and how they're made and who gets to make them.

ML: And when you say they should have more power, do you think that they [should take more of a stance on this.

[END TAPE]

Part II

Subject: Andrew Schwartz (AS)

Date: November 4, 2010

Interviewer: Milli Lake (ML)

Duration: 19:50

Note: Recorded in Café, severe background noise, very difficult to hear questions.

AS: Yeah, absolutely, I mean in my mind the fewer formal relationships universities have with their clothing providers along with food providers and resource providers, the fewer formal relationships they have, the fewer commitments they have. Meaning, the more effectively and deliberately they may be able to uphold the contracts that outline their moral and principles. So, I think university administrators should take an even harder line, [if that's] even possible, because I don't know [that it's going to take a very hard line right now] – yeah, you know, Wisconsin was first before UW but I mean they took like 12 months/13 months? Maybe that's just the reality of the situation in communicating with you know a factory in Honduras it takes that long, sure, but I don't think it needed to take as long as it absolutely did, [especially in today's world].

And the space that was made, for example, with Nike saying – we choose not to interpret that – not having any kind of grounding whatsoever [or currency]...it was...that shouldn't have...

ML: And did you have communication with other student groups with, other students groups at Wisconsin and Cornell [Inaudible]?

AS: The Student Labor Action Project did, yeah...

ML: You talked a lot about your interaction with ACTL [and a little bit with President Emmert and Phyllis Wise]. Were there any other key players and contacts that you interacted with that didn't [Inaudible]?

AS: Because I was a representative, my role was kind of supervised by the Vice-President at the time so that's Madeleine McKenna. Although, I mean, yeah, I don't know if an interview is really necessary with her, could be, but I think she would defer to me and then I also consulted particularly with the Phyllis Wise case – just briefly and really generally with the GPSS president Jake [Faleschini], but that was more a conversation about corporations and the university in general, who else?

ML: Any other faculty members, students?

AS: I mean Angelina Godoy is critical, possibly the most central faculty

ML: Could you say a little bit about what the role that she played?

AS: [It] was just one of her several areas of expertise and, so, unfortunately this time around she wasn't on the committee but she was the voice of reason [and] incredibly informed in both a more politically charged and an academic perspective. Her task force was I think really vital in the Estofel case. So she and I would just have side conversations, so that was just key to forming my perspective. Who else? That's about it.

ML: The first thing we talked about was the majority of your information coming through the WRC Did that continue to be the case throughout, or were there other, were there other sources for [your] information?

AS: I mean I also got information from the AAUP – the American Association of University Professors, and then their periodical *Inside Higher Ed*, had some reports on it. Very quickly though, kind of, because they were on the ground they were the reporters, they're the recognized, they're one of the two recognized [monitoring] organizations, so very much [whatever] other information I got kind of channeled back into the WRC. But other than the WRC, USAS reports, what else? I mean I read Nike's communications and their attempt at a report.

ML: Did you have any interaction with Nike at all?

AS: Yeah, I mean, they presented to us and we had an opportunity to ask questions and get a sense of where they were headed, a couple times. Once they actually came and spoke and once we webinared.

ML: And how [did you find them] when they came to speak? [Were they]...

AS: To the individuals who came, to their credit, they're working hard and I think they gave a fine presentation. But their responsibility is to look out for the bottom line and to represent what the official line is and to that extent it was not satisfactory. Yeah, I guess I mean we also, there was a webinar that the FLA put on that I sat in on in part. We very loosely and kind of just in ambiguous terms worked with the Maquila Solidarity Network and then the CGT, they also gave us some reports. And also, workers from the CGT came and presented to the campus.

ML: Since the settlement have you had any communication with anybody in Honduras or any of these organizations who've been keeping you informed [finding] anything about what happened?

AS: I don't, unfortunately.

ML: Okay, that's great. So my last question, I wanted to talk a little bit about, you said you were involved in the [Russell] case as well?

Maybe you could just talk briefly about what your role was in the Russell case and how the [process/protest] kind of played out?

AS: I was just a member of SLAP, a core member of SLAP, and so that involved two meetings with the President, it involved telecommunication with WRC, we had a very effective awareness campaign – we did letter drops, we almost [had a form of] a sit-in. It was sort of a shorter campaign, it lasted about 5 or 6 months and that was an even more clear cut case. Would you like me to add on to that?

ML: Yeah

AS: So a distinction between Nike and Russell was, and this was where Nike was kind of trying to leverage their – we are not responsible for them – was that Russell owned those factories, those were Russell factories. Those were not contracted out factories and so whatever went in there, there was not even a chance that they could dispute their liability. To that extent it was a very short case, a very clear cut, it was cut and dry – listen you guys are just, you're violating all sorts of laws, Honduran, international and American laws. So, to that extent, it was an easier case, it was just a simpler case. We met with the President and he received us as we expected, he was all lip-service – you know: 'I really appreciate you students taking this time', and 'it's only because of students that we actually do anything about this', but you know he basically waited for his cards to be played for him; which is fine because we played his cards. So that was the Russell case.

ML: Okay, and how did you perceive the university's response to that case?

AS: As predicted, as expected. We even got in the *New York Times*. This one was particularly fast in contrast to the Estofel, in contrast to the Nike one, in contrast to many others. This one in particular, and because of Russell's really just not being very strategic themselves, owning this factory where they were doing very clear union busting.

ML: So you found the university to move quickly?

AS: Relatively so, I mean, I think they were the 8th university in the country to uh, I mean, the 8th isn't the first and we certainly were lobbying them to cut prior to when they first announced it. So, they could have moved faster, but they moved fast.

ML: Okay, and the outcome, [how did you feel]?

AS: The outcome is, remains to be seen right? So, the workers were rehired...no they weren't, were they? I don't remember. Then I think it took about another year for them to, for Russell to kind of just like pick up the pieces of you know the 120 something universities cut – that's a lot of business lost. And then Spalding cut, and the NCAA almost cut. So Russell came back about a year later once I was on the board, once I was on the committee and kind of just demonstrated how they were reforming their ways and they went from a pro-business to a pro-union-effectively-company. So they're on a probationary period where we kind of outlined that, we were like – Listen, we want an itemized list (which I don't think we received yet), an itemized list of how you're going to reform this. We don't want any lip service. We want very clear outlining, like a time schedule with, you know, bullet after bullet after bullet and then [Inaudible] and we want it really specific. We'll see how specific it gets. [Inaudible] on how you are going to both compensate the workers for the money they're owed and then also, how are you going to reform your practices going forward. So that remains to be seen.

ML: Thank you, and then so it's clear that you hope both of these cases are kind of precedent settings for the future. I just wanted to hear you say a little bit about the extent that you think they will be.

AS: I can only speculate but I mean Nike's the largest and most powerful corporation [Inaudible]. So, the precedent isn't set so much, I don't think in what Nike does but in how people leverage what Nike did. To that extent, universities like we were talking about earlier, I think should feel emboldened, they have a lot of power, students have the final power, students are the reason this happens, and workers. Students and workers are the reasons this happens and to that extent, students should feel so powerful that this [Inaudible]. I think SLAP's or, USAS's, current slogan is 'All we do is win.' And [we] did, all we did is win. So moving forward I think there was a lot of leverage because of what Nike did. I mean Russell wasn't really precedent-setting because it was so cut and dry. This one is precedent-setting because we were able to interpret the code. We were actually able to make the code a living, active document. To that extent I think others will be able leverage it.

ML: You kind of preempted my next question which was going to be how important do you think the students were to the outcome?

AS: Fundamental and I don't think anyone would say otherwise. But, there's a lot of resistance, in particular with the Russell case and with the Nike case, I don't know how many letters we sent to the administration notifying them if this. I mean it's just willful neglect.

ML: So just one thing [about the administration... We talked about Phyllis Wise. President Emmert obviously accepted the recommendation from ACTL- is there anything else that he could have done before that and would you have liked to see done?

AS: Yeah, I don't think there should have been a committee. I mean, students know what's up. We're not as naïve and we're not as idealistic as they paint us. But you know we have a good sense of what's possible. I mean, we're the ones who determine what's possible, really. So to that extent, the fact that he advised the committee to just channel student [pressure], effective student pressure, into this kind of, you know, cumbersome committee, was not, it's just not satisfying. If the president wants to say he's really dedicated to justice and to worker's rights and to making sure that he is an administrator of a democratic university, the committee shouldn't have been formed. That being said, everything after that was pretty much standard.

ML: Just on that, would you, in the event that the committee was formed should there have been a greater student voice on it?

AS: Yeah, I don't know how much the president really, I mean, the president appointed Stephanie Adler, [didn't appoint SLAP]. So that was where that tension rose...

ML: Do you know why [Inaudible] picked her?

AS: No, I mean, she was really veteran, more veteran than I...but no. But I don't know that that was necessarily his policy that she, that Stephanie wouldn't be able to swap out if she actually solicited. Would I have liked to see more student representation? Well what was it? It was three students: two undergrads, one grad. The fact that he gave SLAP a spot is certainly notable because unlike the ASUW, they are not a formal...well, they're a group for sure, but they are not a formal university institution. They could be I don't think anyone really wants to see that. It could be, but they're not right now the way ASUW is. To that extent I think it was notable. So in terms of student participation, that's cool. [inaudible] The committee was open to the public, there could have been – the website was not nearly maintained, was not maintaining nearly through the, to the level of public-ness that it could've or should've. That could just be a staffing issue but it could also be something else.

ML: Okay, great.

AS: I hope that was helpful.

ML: Yeah, is there anything else you want to say for the public record? Like anything we didn't cover, or...?

AS: Yeah, let me think about that. No, I'd just like to reiterate two things: One is to the extent that I have expertise and to the extent that my experiences suggest anything, I'm a huge proponent of the [designated suppliers program]; and secondly, any argument that puts Nike's

word at equal, or the brand's voice at the same equal standing as the monitoring organization should be held with as much skepticism as humanly possible.

ML: Okay, well thank you for your time.

AS: Yeah, you bet.

[END TAPE]