The convergence of international systems, often referred to as globalization, is said to create more efficient, trans-national regulatory and economic systems via trade liberalization agreements and international competition. (1) As the barriers to trade are dismantled around the world, concern for the environment is also converging globally. Domestic and international rules that protect the environment are in a crucial transition. The strength of the linkage between these rules and global economic and trading systems determines their level of effectiveness at protecting the environment as these systems move towards convergence. The complexity of forces and interests involved in the negotiation of global trade/environment rules is immense and convoluted. By securing participation and access to a diversity of interests in both the formulation and the implementation of these types of rules, the benefits of these rules expand significantly.
Historically, trade liberalization and environmental protection were consistently treated as separate issues. Examples of this include the Canadian-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) and the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). (2) In contrast, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are examples of trade agreements that have connected, in various degrees, the issues of free trade and the environment. As integration and interdependence between countries deepens, the necessity of forging a stronger link between environmental protection and trade liberalization becomes increasingly apparent. This linkage ultimately leads to more equitable trade, rather than strictly free trade, and also promotes the goals of sustainable development contained within the mandates of both the NAFTA and the WTO.
These agreements are distinct in regards to what parties have access to the negotiation, implementation and dispute resolution of the trade/environment rules contained within them. Another important difference is revealed by the various levels of recognition and support for domestic environmental protections and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). By comparing the strength and breadth of the trade/environment linkage and public and group participation within the GATT/WTO and the NAFTA, it becomes evident that effectively linking these issues and involving the public expands the benefits of these trade agreements to become more comprehensive tools to facilitate healthy, sustainable environmental management. Also, by realizing how competing forces pursue their policy goals through the implementation process, it becomes clear how important implementation efforts are for securing the connection between trade liberalization and environmental protection. This paper argues that not only does this inclusive approach to these historically separate issues widen the benefits of free trade, but such a linkage is necessary to effectively address global environmental problems in a comprehensive manner.
Economists, politicians, environmentalists, and numerous others hotly debate whether trade liberalization will be the ultimate demise or savior of the environment. Free trade proponents consistently refer to the positive relationship between increased income and environmental quality seen in many modern societies. (3) The classic neo liberal argument that follows from this relationship is that trade liberalization generates growth and production, which increases pollution levels initially, but the subsequent economic growth raises per capita income. Increased income stimulates the demand and support for environmental protection, which ultimately decreases pollution levels. However, a recent review of the economic literature suggested that in order for economic models to successfully reflect the inverted U-shaped growth/pollution relationship outlined above, pollution abatement technologies, high levels of income elasticity and popular demand for environmental quality must also be present. (4)
Empirical studies have resulted in conflicting relationships between income level and pollution level in cross-national studies, though free trade proponents have routinely emphasized only the relationships that support the inverted-U relationship. The study cited most frequently is Grossman and Krueger 's 1993 comparison of urban sulfur dioxide concentrations and gross domestic product (GDP) from a cross section of cities. This study is also referred to in GATT, along with language concluding that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between GDP and environmental quality. (5) Other studies have pointed out that while some data indicate that certain environmental indicators do improve with economic growth, the data do not demonstrate that economic growth alone will improve the environment, nor that the other effects of growth on the environment can be excluded. (6) A review of the current empirical evidence supports the obvious claim that increased industrial development and growth produces more pollution. (7)
A further difficulty is differentiating between the increase in pollution levels due to trade-induced industry from the increase due to the general influx of dirty industries that are part of the normal evolution of industrial structure that accompanies the development process. (8) Environmentalists point to the devastated environments of countries spoiled by polluting, unregulated industry, concluding that the deregulation that accompanies trade liberalization will inevitably worsen the global environment. However, since trade is not the main stimulant to growth, it could be argued that trade stimulates technology exchange and innovation that is essential to counteract industrial pollution at all levels of development.
Within the confines of existing free trade agreements, the debate between protecting the environment and dismantling trade barriers has become a predominantly north/south debate through the process of implementation of the rules contained in these agreements. Multi-national corporations want to create new consumers in developing societies, and developing nations want increased market access to sell their products to the rich mass consumers in industrialized nations. Though both support limiting trade barriers to achieve these goals, the wealthier, more environmentally-conscious countries want to protect their own competitiveness, as well as their environment and health. The comparative advantage of the developed countries has enabled them to afford environmentally sound technology while their domestic environmental regulations protect from extreme resource exploitation and environmental degradation. Developing countries do not have this advantage, and rely on exploiting their remaining natural resources and/or developing industry without the benefit of expensive technology or strict enforcement of environmental regulations.
Scientific evidence of global environmental problems, such as ozone depletion, has spawned a cooperative movement to find workable solutions to curb pollution and enforce global standards (i.e., the Montreal Protocol that imposed international restrictions on the manufacture and use of ozone-depleting chemicals). Environmental justice proponents have demonstrated that marginalized sectors of society are unfairly burdened by pollution and hazardous waste, spawning increased awareness of the importance of equitable treatment for all people. These movements, among others, both fall under the umbrella movement promoting sustainable development. Greenpeace defines sustainable development as development that is both economically sound and socially just. (9) Other definitions stress the importance of "inter- and intra-generational equity", or effectively using natural resources in a way that improves self-sufficiency of communities and takes future usage needs into account. (10)
Some groups within developing countries promote sustainable development strategies, but others see development strategies that protect the environment or restrict resource extraction as weakening their ability to compete. Some corporate and investment interests oppose sustainable development because it conflicts with the goal of building new consumers for western products and lifestyles while exploiting the cheaper resources within the developing nations. (11) If developing countries successfully build their domestic capacity and self-sufficiency with infrastructure, sustenance food crops and clean industry, these countries will become less dependent on selling their natural resources to richer nations, but will rather become competitive economies in the world market. Developing countries have joined forces to oppose wealthier nations ' protectionist policies, support improved market access, reduce the cost of environmentally sound technology, and promote domestic capacity building strategies. Developed countries are opposed to reducing access to environmentally sound technology because it will reduce the profits they reap under the trade agreement laws that protect intellectual property rights. This plethora of positions supporting or opposing policy considerations take form in the creation and negotiation of trade agreements, adding to the complexity of implementation and public support for trade policies.
The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as players in trade negotiations and rule implementation has grown substantially. The NAFTA's labor and environmental side accords resulted from the influence of NGOs operating totally separately from the free trade constituencies. Mass media has educated and involved the public at large in the debates over decisions that will impact future generations. Institutions created by trade agreements require public participation and access to information. Demands for environmental responsibility within the domestic populations of the participating countries demonstrates the importance of environmentalism on a global scale. Studies have determined that political support from domestic populations and member governments is crucial for international agreements to succeed. (12) Arguably, it is the inclusion and participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society, and the developing nations themselves that will achieve rules that will support sustainable development and form alternatives to the continued exploitation under strictly market-based development strategies and trade agreements.
Sustainable development requires equity, above all else. And the classic neo liberal model of economic growth does nothing to further equity, but thwarts it. However, to truly make headway in the fight for environmental protection in the globalized world, corporate interests must be included with incentives and market-based strategies to achieve responsible, sustainable development of the Third World. (13) Technical innovation must be adopted by industries in developed and developing countries in order for sustainable development to actually occur on a large scale. (14)
In order to understand what elements make the most effective trade/environment linkage, it is first helpful to adopt a framework to analyze the trade/environment rules contained within most trade liberalizing agreements. In conjunction with the organization and composition of the rules, this paper will also assess the levels of public participation and interest group access to negotiation, implementation and dispute resolution across the three trade agreements. Richard Steinberg, a law professor at UCLA, developed four categories of trade/environment rules that appear within trade liberalization agreements. (15) (1) The first type responds to domestic issues concerning health, safety and environmental protection. These are the rules that limit the importation of goods based on national laws, and have been criticized by some developing countries for being protectionist. (2) The second type are rules that regulate extra-jurisdictional activity such as foreign pollution and endangered species. This would include whether or not a trade agreement upholds other multi-lateral environmental agreements (MEAs) or domestic environmental regulations that concern activities outside a nation's jurisdiction. An example of this type would be the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act which forbids destruction of dolphins by tuna fisheries. A law banning the import of non-dolphin-safe tuna was determined to be in opposition to provisions of the WTO, because it created barriers to trade based on protecting a non-endangered species. (3) The third type of trade/environmental rules concern transboundary remediation efforts that deal with the increased environmental degradation in border areas that usually accompanies trade liberalization. (4) The last type deals with the creation of trade/environment institutions to administer trade/environment issues. These institutions are given the legal standing to develop implementation rules, regulate processes, and solve disputes.
Understanding how these four categories of rules are negotiated into trade agreements is a critical step towards comprehending who benefits from such rules and how these rules can be designed to incorporate technology innovation and secure access and participation to a diversity of interests. More importantly, how effectively these rules are enforced distinguishes the level of influence such rules hold within the populations that are affected by these agreement. Vague rules that are difficult to regulate indicate a low level of interest and influence by the participants to protect the environment while promoting free trade. Strong rules that are solidly enforced indicate a high level of support by the participants to an agreement.
If the goal is to expand the beneficiaries of trade agreements beyond the limited interests that benefit from strictly free trade, then it is essential to understand why and how trade agreements differ in their approach to this linkage.
The member countries of the multilateral GATT/WTO represent a wide diversity of development levels with low amounts of overall integration between the countries. (16) Despite the fact that goals of environmental protection and sustainable development are specifically included in the preamble to the Marrakech Agreement, promoting environmental protection within the GATT/WTO is accomplished in a minimal fashion, and demonstrates a comparatively weak commitment by participants. Recent changes have improved NGO's abilities to contribute information to the WTO 's environmental committee, but only designated representatives from WTO member countries may file for dispute resolutions of trade disagreements, thus limiting the ability of other interests to make claims regarding adverse impacts of the trade organization 's rules.
In regards to the first category of trade/environment rules, there are three GATT/WTO rules that impact each member nation 's ability to ban imports based on domestic regulations regarding health, safety and environmental protection. They are (a) Article XX, (b) the Uruguay Round Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), and (c) the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).
(a) The exception clauses in Article XX of GATT allow each country to ban imports based on environmental, health and safety standards upheld in that country. Certain provisions must be met in order for this to happen, including sufficient scientific evidence supporting the banning of any product, because the most important thing for GATT is to not apply discriminatory trade measures and avoid trade barriers of any kind. The provisions include import bans relating to the conservation of natural resources or to human, animal or plant life, health or safety, and member countries may determine their standard levels of health or safety.
Several disputes have erupted over wealthier nations imposition of bans based on domestic regulations, with the banned country claiming protectionist tactics. Decisions by WTO's dispute resolution panel focus have consistently focused on the end product, rather than the process under which the product was produced. For example, proponents of eco-labeling who distinguish environmentally protective production methods have opposed the WTO 's decisions, stating that the whole basis of eco-labeling is in the process, not the end product. (17)
(b) The Uruguay Round Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) regulates agricultural products such as pesticide and fungicide tolerance and meat inspection rules. Environmental and consumer NGOs effectively lobbied to ensure that the SPS allowed countries to determine health and safety standards for themselves. This has caused the SPS to be used by complainants to allege that certain environmental standards within other countries unfairly restrict trade. The U.S. has levied complaints against EU countries for bans on beef hormones, and for the EU 's preference to import bananas from small banana farms in the Caribbean over massive Chiquita operations. Through the WTO Appellate Body, these disputes were decided in favor of the American corporate interests pursuant to the provisions protecting against trade barriers not based on clear, scientific evidence. This is an ideal example of how GATT/WTO laws can override domestic standards.
(c) The third set of rules is contained in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which was designed to make certain that any technical standards and regulations that do not fall under the SPS agreement are not used as trade barriers. Generally the GATT rules, the SPS and the TBT together allow each country to maintain regulations necessary to protect risk levels determined by that country to be appropriate. Therefore, the GATT/WTO rules do not necessarily limit a country 's set standards, unless those standards are not supported by scientific evidence, or arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against imports.
Because GATT/WTO does not include exceptions that respect multilateral environmental agreements, any such agreements could and have come under fire for constituting trade barriers. This limits GATT/WTO 's effectiveness in promoting or increasing environmental protection. The EU 's efforts to amend Article XX to include provisions to honor other multilateral environmental agreements would transform the GATT/WTO into a more effective policy advocating environmental responsibility especially at the regional level.
In regards to the second type (2) of trade/environment rules concerning extra-jurisdictional activity, GATT/WTO law does not condone trade restrictions aimed at environmental activity outside a nation 's jurisdiction. (18) The classic example cited earlier is the WTO 's decision forbidding bans on tuna caught without dolphin safety procedures. (19)
No rules exist within GATT/WTO to address transboundary remediation, the third type of trade/environment rules, and therefore the GATT/WTO does not formally recognize MEAs as superseding its authority.
The fourth type concerns the creation of institutions to handle the issues of trade and environment contained in a trade agreement. For GATT/WTO, there are three institutions that apply; the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which administers the SPS Agreement; the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, which administers the TBT Agreement, and the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE). (20)
The CTE 's responsibilities include both analytical and prescriptive functions: to assess the relationships between trade and environmental measures in order to promote sustainable development, and to make recommendations on whether any modifications to the provisions of the multilateral trading system are required. (21) An important facet of the CTE is that it is designed only to study and resolve issues involving both trade and environment, and is not responsible for examining or setting standards that only relate to the environment. The development of environmental policies remains within the jurisdiction and control of national governments.
The negotiations over new trade/environment rules and recommendations in the CTE have been rife with conflict, with the U.S. and the European countries on one side, and the developing countries on the other. Generally speaking, negotiations have resulted in a north/south deadlock. The northern developed countries are seeking clarification of WTO provisions that protect domestic environmental laws and address some of the extra-jurisdictional issues raised regarding MEAs. On the opposing front are the developing, or southern countries, who are against strengthening domestic environmental laws that they view as discriminatory and protectionist. These countries support improved market access for their products, improvements in transparency of environmental regulations, reducing the cost of environmentally sound technology, and restricting the use of eco-labeling. (22) The U.S. and the EU have alternate views on these issues, thus most of them have not been resolved.
Perhaps an agreement could be reached on many of these disputes if the developed countries would agree to provide financial and technological assistance and improve the market access to certain products, in exchange for developing countries acquiescence to northern issues, such as enforcement of MEAs and clarification of domestic policies to improve transparency. The problem with this seemingly logical conclusion is that the corporate interests in developed nations are unwilling to sacrifice profits by lowering the cost of new technologies, or reducing their competitiveness by increasing market access.
Because only WTO member countries can file disputes with the WTO, it is impossible for any other parties to initiate claims in regards to the implementation of these rules. However, the CTE has increased access by NGOs through the Secretariat, as is evidenced by the WTO 's Symposium on Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development which took place in May of 1997 in Geneva prior to the CTEs meeting. This is an ideal example of a method to involve NGOs and other interested parties to the inter-workings of trade organizations.
The Symposium provided a forum for diverse interests to meet, debate, and inform each other about their respective concerns. The more prominent issues brought forth in the Symposium included the overall inequity of many of the WTOs policies favoring developed countries over developing countries. The failure of technology transfer and financial support to developing countries promised at the Earth Summit in Rio, the lack of participation by civil society in trade issues, the unfair advantage to northern companies due to domestic subsidies, and the need for more transparency in rules to increase their effectiveness. These concerns, among numerous others, would never have been voiced had the forum not been provided. Bringing outside interests directly to the table with WTO-member representatives allowed meaningful dialogue and exchange of ideas to take place, thus improving deliberative policy making.
The NAFTA is an example of a regional trade liberalization agreement that benefited from participants who strongly support environmental protection. Unlike the much wider membership of the GATT/WTO, the NAFTA presently includes only Canada, the U.S. and Mexico. The environmental side accord, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) directly resulted from the influence and access of mostly American and Canadian NGOs. NAFTAs trade/environment rules provide examples for other regionally-based trade agreements that can facilitate the upward harmonization of poorer, less environmentally protective countries to the higher standards of wealthier countries. The public participation requirements of certain NAFTA institutions encourages high levels of community involvement in trade-related environmental protection projects, which increases equitable and discursive decision-making. Any individual or group may file a complaint or request a factual determination regarding non-compliance by a member government with an environmental law. Also, the NAFTA recognizes certain MEAs as superseding its authority. Though there are certainly examples of serious problems with the enforcement and funding of institutions created by the NAFTA side accords, the organization, implementation and institutions of trade/environment rules within the NAFTA has successfully integrated environmental considerations into a trade liberalization agreement.
In regards to the first type of rules (1) affecting domestic health, safety and environmental protection, the NAFTA adopted the bulk of the Uruguay Round SPS (sanitary) and TBT (technical) agreements and incorporated them into NAFTA, with some minor differences that encouraged upwards harmonization of Mexican environmental standards to the levels of Canadian and American standards. A recent study indicates that Mexico 's environmental policy making and enforcement improved in the early 1990s during NAFTA negotiations, and sustained commitment to the environment was evidenced during the environmental crisis of 1995 as well. (23) Both the NAFTA and GATT/WTO rules allow each country to ban imports that do not meet that country's established appropriate standards for domestic health, safety and environmental protection, as long as the bans meet general requirements to prevent trade protectionism.
The second type of rules pertain to transboundary remediation. Two binational institutions were created from a November 1993 agreement between the U.S. and Mexico to address the highly polluted boundary areas: the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADBank). Both are equally financed and staffed by equal numbers of Mexican and American representatives. Though not formal components of the NAAEC, these institutions further the goals of the trinational side accord by promoting growth while reducing negative environmental impacts. (24) Their mandates are to foster long-term self-sufficiency in border communities by providing aid to develop and improve environmental infrastructure projects (i.e. water supply, wastewater treatment and hazardous waste management) and certify the projects for financing through NADBank. The influence of NGOs on the design of these institutions is evident throughout their provisions and processes that incorporate sustainable development strategies and require public participation of local communities.
Adopted in 1995 and revised and strengthened in 1996, the criteria for project approval used by BECC create incentives for sustainable development. Projects must satisfy all criteria to gain approval, and the criteria include (a) environment and human health; (b) technical feasibility; (c) financial feasibility; (d) community participation; and (e) sustainable development. (25) Despite this cutting edge design, of the 12 projects approved by the BECC, only four have had funding arranged for them by the NADBank and no construction has started on any of the projects. (26) Though both the Mexican and American governments have contributed equal capital totaling $337 million to the NADBank, the lending restrictions and high interest rates have prevented project sponsors, usually the small border cities, from financing their projects. (27) Until the market rates are reduced to levels that can facilitate repayment of the loans, it is impossible to accurately determine whether the partnered BECC/NADBank institutions can live up to their novel design and intentions.
Unlike the GATT/WTO, the NAFTA specifically protects certain MEAs, and awards them precedential authority in case of any inconsistencies. Though only a few MEAs are included, it is still a major step towards enforcing environmental accords already in place that have placed environmental protection above trade interests. Examples of the MEAs protected by NAFTA include the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. (28)
Also created under the NAAEC, the Committee for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) is unique in its breadth and composition as a multilateral, comprehensive body created to monitor the environmental effects of trade and development. Mandated to promote transparency and public participation, the CEC extends and supports regulatory activity in all three countries using an ecological approach. (29) The CEC has a three-tiered structure with a council of three commissioners representing each country, a secretariat for administrative support, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) containing five representatives from each country. The overall goals of the CEC have evolved since its inception in 1994 from focusing on enforcement/dispute resolution to an emphasis on cooperation/harmonization. (30) However, the CECs innovative design has not enjoyed wide political support and has been criticized for being weak. (31)
An important element of CEC is its unique dispute resolution process that is limited to conflicts regarding environmental issues. Supported in large part by American environmental groups that saw great success using litigation to solve environmental disputes at home, the CEC's inclusion of international sanctions as a means of punishment is truly unique and controversial. Unlike GATT/WTO, any citizen or group within the three nations may petition the CEC Secretariat for a factual finding regarding an alleged failure by a party to enforce its environmental regulations within any country. This open ability to have complaints put on the CEC's agenda for resolution encourages public participation, and the media attention that usually results helps facilitate dispute resolution. Furthermore, the governments themselves may agree to fine and even impose trade sanctions on each other if two of the three governments find the other guilty of persistent non-compliance. (32)
Of the four noteworthy petitions filed by NGOs for resolution by the CEC, two were dismissed while the other two demonstrated the effectiveness of this trans-national institution. In a finding released in October 1995, a trinational scientific panel concluded that the deaths of 40,000 migratory birds in the Silva Reservoir, near Mexico City, were caused by botulism poisoning from urban and industrial sewage pollution. (33) Mutually working out a solution to this type of problem has alleviated environmentalists' fears that the CEC would be ineffective, and the Mexican government's fears that the CEC would launch an aggressive attack on Mexico's environmental policies. As further developed in Karen Fischer's chapter regarding the dispute resolution processes in NAFTA's side accords, the CEC lacks enforcement capabilities to back up its factual recommendations.
The CEC has experienced recent leadership difficulties with the resignation of its executive director, Victor Lichtinger. Funding has also been a problem, with significantly smaller annual budget allocations ($9 million) than the original planned amounts ($15 million). (34) This can be seen as reflecting a lack of Canadian and Mexican support for the environmental side accord, which was created nearly unilaterally by the hegemony of United States to build popular domestic support for NAFTA. (35) Other reluctance can be attributed to economic recessions in Canada and Mexico. However, the institution is still quite young, so it is too soon to fully evaluate its effectiveness.
It is clear that the economic and environmental benefits to Mexico under NAFTA are potentially extensive, as long as the institutions created to enforce environmental protection within the confines of the agreement can effectively perform their mandates. If NAFTA is extended to other Latin American countries, it would arguably lead to improvements in developing nation 's environmental protection standards as well. However, before any expansion occurs, the institutions need to be fully stabilized and supported in order to be capable of enforcing the multitude of additional issues that would accumulate under any expansion.
The enormous markets in the US and Canada are important bargaining tools to persuade developing South American nations to increase their standards in exchange for market access. The EU has demonstrated significant success at upward harmonization of environmental quality through institutional and regulatory schemes. Germany 's influence enabled the Maastricht Treaty to require that all harmonized standards and EU environmental measures be based on a high level of protection. (36)
However, it is important that as NAFTA expands, the clearly defined goals of sustainable development are kept at the forefront, and not simply used as a smoke screen by corporate interests to increase profits and resource exploitation. In conjunction with deepening and stabilizing of enforcement of NAFTA side accords, other multilateral agreements providing incentives for technology innovation and sharing would promote sustainable development along with expanding regional trade.
Even with deep integration of environmental protection into trade liberalization agreements, other methods are needed to successfully promote equitable, sustainable development. In order to truly be sustainable, development must be equitable across social and class barriers. Studies have shown that the poor and otherwise marginalized sectors of society are most often the victims of pollution. Within trade organizations that encompass vastly different social classes contained in different societies, truly equitable development is impossible when looked at on the whole. However, by focusing in on methods that lessen these inequalities, such methods can positively impact a move towards sustainable development.
Roberto Sanchez argues that technological change and innovation is the first step towards facilitating equitable development and sustainable use of resources. (37) It has already been established that pollution abatement technologies are essential to reducing the increased pollution caused by increased growth. Examples of pollution prevention technology include substitution of materials used as inputs in industrial production, process redesign, and final product reformulation. (38)
These processes are different from the standard "end of the pipe" approach to pollution control, and instead attempt to reduce the pollution by changing the process that created it. Despite efforts by the U.S. government to increase innovation technology, industry has done little to change its "end of the pipe" approach. The increased costs of disposing of hazardous waste has spurned some action, as has increased regulations by the EPA. However, the real problem lies in the lack of any guidelines in NAFTA to promote technology innovation, and the increased industrial practices in Mexico under NAFTA will only increase the market for "end of the pipe" technology which satisfies existing pollution control regulations. Because of this, NAFTA could actually decrease the technology innovation and pollution abatement that is essential to reducing pollution while increasing growth. (39)
To prevent this from happening will require cooperation between all three countries, increased participation among industry to develop new methods, willingness to share the methods with competing industries at a reasonable price, and support from the federal governments for research and development of pollution prevention technologies. The downside of technology transfer would be that developing nations' dependence on multi-national corporations for access to clean technology increases their indebtedness and reduces their autonomy. The only way to truly achieve sustainable development in these countries is to avoid the vicious cycle of increasing their indebtedness to richer countries.
In the face of increasing deregulation, voluntary standards, such as ISO 14000 for environmental management, are another way to increase innovation, reduce costs, improve product quality and safety, and increase competition with foreign-made products. By supporting those corporations that practice environmentally sustainable processes and equitable labor practices, the consumer becomes a significant force to increase global corporate responsibility and practice.
This paper has contrasted the trade/environment linkage between the GATT/WTO and the NAFTA to better understand how to make this link stronger and more effective. The GATT/WTO demonstrates a minimal linkage of trade and environmental protection. Its broad-based, multi-lateral, non-participatory institutions and provisions protect against trade barriers above all else. The GATT/WTO Appellate Body has ruled against domestic environmental laws repeatedly, and demonstrates how a strictly trade liberalizing agreement can threaten environmental protection. However, its authority is suspect given that governments affected by its rulings have not changed laws to reflect their inconsistency with GATT/WTO (i.e., the Marine Mammal Protection Act).
The lack of NGO participation in this trade organization has been alleviated somewhat with the CTEs efforts to involve NGOs via symposiums designed to allow open debate of issues. However, it remains to be seen whether this will actually have any input on the CTEs policies. The extension of GATT/WTO to include other powerful developing countries, especially China, could weaken the minimal trade/environment linkage it presently has and make any efforts by NGOs inconsequential.
The NAFTA, in contrast, demonstrates a viable trade/environmental linkage, especially in its institutional design. Because the agreement in regionally based in that it only concerns the three North American nations, it is better able to facilitate a strong, international linkage. By allowing NGOs into the negotiation process of NAFTA, the resulting agreement reflects the strong influence of environmentalists in its public participation requirements, transparency and access to information, and in its dispute resolution process. The strong emphasis on sustainability within BECC 's criteria for project approval demonstrates a high level of commitment within the institution to sustainable development projects in border areas. Solving the difficulties with NADBank to allow more reasonable interest rates to fund BECCs projects will improve and stabilize both institutions significantly. The following chapters illustrate further the commendable design of NAFTA institutions, but the lack of enforcement and support to fully develop their "green" potential.
Technology innovation remains central to protecting the environment in the face of rapid global development under these international trade agreements. As stated previously, only with advanced pollution abatement technologies does environmental quality survive the effects of economic growth and increased production, so these technologies must be subsidized and incorporated into free trade agreements. Incentives by federal governments to support research and development of pollution prevention technologies, and ensuring access to these technologies by developing countries, is the only way to prevent environmental degradation with increased growth. Incorporating incentives for technology transfer into trade or other multi-lateral environmental agreements could help developing countries acquire this advanced technology.
Other methods to assist in the move towards more sustainable development include: increasing access to information through the internet and transnational institutions; requiring and soliciting more public and group participation in trade/environment rule making; educating impacted communities (especially in border areas) to improve their understanding and ability to contribute to community projects; sponsoring education and awareness programs to involve the public in trade/environment issues; and supporting businesses that practice sustainable practices.
The resource exploiting lifestyles of westernized society can not be supported on a global scale. Only by making significant efforts towards assisting the developing world to adopt sustainable strategies, and making decisions to change our own consumptive lifestyles, will environment be secured for future generations.