"We have nothing, absolutely nothing. Not a decent roof, norwork, nor land, nor health care, nor education."
-Subcommandante Marcos, leader of the Zapatistas, on the social condition of the indigenous in Chiapas (1)
It was no coincidence that on January 1, 1994, the day that the North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect between Canada, the United States, and Mexico, an uprising began in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas involving 3,000 to 4,000 indigenous campesinos. These campesinos called themselves the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN), or 'Zapatistas', rhetorically linking their movement to Mexican revolutions of the past. They framed their discontent in terms of the economic and social marginalization that the indigenous populations of Mexico have faced as a result of centuries of exclusion, a situation particularly exacerbated by a recent history of neoliberal reforms. The leader of the group, calling himself Subcommandante Marcos, declared that NAFTA, the latest culmination of these reforms, would represent "a death certificate for the indigenous peoples of Mexico." (2) This paper will examine how neoliberal reforms and NAFTA have impacted indigenous groups in Mexico, and will consider what modifications could be made to that agreement or to future trade agreements that could provide for more equitable economic and social integration of such groups within the participating nations. It will also consider the prominent role that identity and discourse have played in setting the stage both for regional economic integration, and also for confrontation between the actors involved in the Chiapas uprising.
The role of discourse and its use in the formation of national identity plays a critical role in the analysis of the implementation of NAFTA and the resulting Zapatista uprising. Various scholars have illustrated that political and economic elites can discursively "create" an identity for a nation by carefully manipulating the values and ideas which a society chooses to adhere to. (3) By monopolizing the process of forming and advancing those ideas, elites can control the manner in which a nation defines itself. In hopes of preparing the nation for accession to NAFTA, recent Mexican presidential administrations have attempted to do just that by carefully sculpting an international image of Mexico as a nation ready to make the transition to First World status.
By conjuring up images of a Mexico based on social and democratic equality, these elites have attempted to portray Mexico as an advanced and equitable society. In reality, however, this identity formation has worked to marginalize and exclude various social groups, particularly indigenous populations throughout the country. The theory behind national identity creation illustrates how this has been possible. By drawing upon the "unique" nationalist visions created by elites, citizens learn to identify themselves as being different from citizens of other nations. Paradoxically, though, when a nation establishes certain identities in this manner, "internal exclusions" set apart social groups within the nation that do not conform to those supposed "national identities." (4) In Mexico, the recent history of neoliberal reforms and the implementation of NAFTA have set the stage for the exclusion of indigenous groups, who chose not to define themselves in relation to free market forces.
In preparing for entrance to NAFTA, the Mexican government, headed then by President Carlos Salinas, led its citizenry to believe that neoliberal reform would be the only option in terms of bringing modernity to the nation. By identifying Mexico as deficient and unmodern, the elites were able to consolidate public opinion around various socially unfavorable reforms. President Salinas attempted to present Mexico as a multicultural nation with a unified national character supporting capitalist modernization. (5) By solidifying an image of populist nationalism welcoming neoliberalism and NAFTA, Salinas monopolized the path of Mexican development under the ideology of the economic and political elites. By doing this, however, he undermined the diversity of identities and beliefs that are omnipresent within Mexican society.
In this manner, traditional revolutionary ideals such as sovereignty, justice and liberty, which at one time had been used to advocate the protection of indigenous groups, now became defined in relation to the world market. (6) Salinas also used this discursive construction internationally to court investment, diplomatic legitimacy, and beneficial media coverage. (7) This served to consolidate international public opinion behind the reforms taking place in Mexico, while obscuring the real exclusions that were subsequently occurring. "[President] Salinas was able to mobilize a seemingly popular consent around neoliberal reforms and to legitimate existing and highly unequal power relations in order both to maintain stability and further consolidate changes that would keep Mexico abreast of global competition." (8) These representations were very important to the Salinas administration, which, desperate for American support for NAFTA, also depended on discursive constructions to sway the support of the United States Congress and various American public interest groups towards supporting the trade agreement. Not until the actual implementation of NAFTA did the outside world recognize that the Mexican government had created illusions that obscured the many marginalized and exploited social groups.
The impact of neoliberal reforms on those various social groups throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, however, began to impinge on the ability of the Mexican government to continue producing such a nationalist facade. The ruling elite had sought to underplay the negative effects of neoliberal reforms to both the domestic community and the international community (upon whose potential investments the future of Mexican progress rests.) (9) Consequently, the government was pressured to highlight - materially and ideologically - everything modern and progressive about the "new" Mexico, and to eradicate any part of Mexico that did not conform to the identities necessary for the implementation of NAFTA. (10) Reform of the most "backward" and "inefficient" areas of Mexico, areas that could not be quantified in terms of economic value or commodification value, thus became targets. The EZLN tacitly understood this strategy, however, and realizing that their indigenous lifestyles would be challenged by the ideological focus of NAFTA, directly attacked the trade agreement and the discursive operations of the State.
Thus, it is in this manner that political and economic reforms in Mexico over the past several decades have all been motivated by the desire of the Federal Government to promote the nation into a position of a developed nation's modernity. That position has not been attained, however, particularly because the nation has not come to terms with key socio-political issues that would be necessary for a transition to real political democracy, a key in the transition to developed country status. As will be discussed later in this paper, the State in Mexico has used its position to co-opt and eliminate many social actors, attempting to monopolize the path towards development. The uprising in Chiapas has clearly shown that the real path to modernity in Mexico has yet to be defined, and that any functional definition must also take into consideration the needs of all social groups within a given society. Clearly, when the processes of modernization are not based on, and do not promote, strong social actors, "the resulting "modernity" may well lack elements of substance, resilience, and durability." (11) In marginalizing and excluding indigenous populations, the Mexican government has not created a society prepared to succeed under NAFTA. The Zapatista rebellion has effectively promoted this realization to the global level.
Critical to understanding the position of the EZLN is understanding the degree to which indigenous populations have been exploited within Mexican society. While this exploitation has existed for many years, the basic tenets of neoliberal reforms and the subsequent implementation of NAFTA have magnified the crisis in rural Mexico, as land reform further marginalizes the indigenous. In all critical areas, social indicators speak for themselves. Geographically concentrated in southern Mexico, indigenous populations represent more than ten percent of Mexico's ninety million people. Yet today indigenous groups represent one third of all Mexicans living in poverty. In fact, 75 percent of all indigenous populations suffer from malnutrition. While the national average of households with access to electricity is 87.5 percent, for the indigenous it is just 54.3 percent. Seventy-nine percent of Mexican families have access to potable water, and 64 percent have some sort of drainage system. For the indigenous, however, those statistics are 38.1 percent and 15.7 percent, respectively. Additionally, 28 percent of indigenous children do not attend school, while the national average is only 16 percent . (12)
In the state of Chiapas, the flashpoint of the insurrection, these social statistics are far more grave. Three out of every five children have no access to education in that state, and illiteracy remains around fifty percent. Poverty is rampant, with high unemployment or subemployment. Per capita income in Chiapas is one-eighth that of Mexico City. (13) These conditions have been aggravated under NAFTA as indigenous land ownership and traditional agriculture have been attacked, contributing greatly to the rebellion which continues in Chiapas. The Chiapas revolt has been termed an "ecological struggle" due to the central questions of who controls the land and what is used on the land. (14) It is important to note that Chiapas supplies 50 percent of hydroelectric power to Mexico, but has fewer households with electricity than any other state. It also has large petroleum reserves and the highest percentage of forest cover. These resources, however, are extracted from the region with little compensation to the indigenous populations.
Issues of land reform are key to understanding the Zapatista uprising and its link to neoliberal policy and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Indigenous communities in southern Mexico have formed their own identities in terms of their long-standing relationship with land. Land not only has religious value to them, but is critically important in sustaining their agrarian subsistence lifestyle. Dating back to the colonial period, however, productive lands and resources in southern Mexico have been taken out of the hands of indigenous populations and placed under the control of wealthy landlords loyal to the political elite. Inaccessibility to productive lands led to rebellion in the early parts of this century, but despite promises of land reform following the Revolution of 1910-1917, land access in Chiapas has continued to be highly inequitable.
Between 1950 and 1970, land reform in Chiapas took place on a limited scale through the distribution of ejidos. Ejidos consolidated indigenous communities around geographical territories of land, providing small patches for each family's subsistence production. Generally, though, this land was of significantly lower quality than the land possessed by large landowners, and distribution of ejido lands remained very inequitable. (15) Meanwhile, large landholders have continued to control the most productive lands. Due to the impetus of neoliberal reforms, these landholders have turned to ranching and the production of export cash crops, meaning that the most productive land in Chiapas is not used to produce locally consumable goods. Additionally, utilizing those lands is increasingly less labor intensive due to technological advancements inherent in new means of production, resulting in increasing unemployment among indigenous laborers. The result is that the indigenous find it harder and harder to provide for even subsistence levels of consumption on the limited land and limited employment that is available to them. In this context, advancing neoliberal reforms in the face of NAFTA have been crippling to the indigenous populations of Chiapas.
Additionally, population pressures have increased the scarcity of land in the southern regions of Mexico. Beginning in the 1970's, the Federal Government began using those rural areas as a population valve, easing pressures in other regions by promoting resettlement, rather than conceding to agrarian reform. Tenuous or ecologically fragile land was made available to those desperate for any land on which they could survive. Environmental implications of these actions have been tremendous, as the indigenous groups of these areas are forced to turn to slash and burn styles of agriculture in order to produce enough to feed their families. Indirectly, the neoliberal reforms that NAFTA was predicated on have led to high levels of erosion and deforestation.
It was in that decade that indigenous groups began to coalesce in order to voice their grievances. Land expropriations became commonplace as campesinos sought to reestablish possession of lands taken from them by wealthy landowners. Repression of the indigenous became increasingly severe at this time, as the police, military, and private security guards protected the interests of the landowners. This pattern of conflict lasted throughout the 1970's and into the 1980's. It is estimated that between 1982 and 1988, more than 800 indigenous people were murdered by forces loyal to landowners. (16) Meanwhile, the Federal Government did little to come to the aid of the indigenous.
Political and social exclusion of the indigenous has continued to be an outright goal of the national government throughout the contemporary period. In reality, this exclusion has been a well orchestrated and practiced policy, meant to fractionalize indigenous groups throughout Mexico. In order to implement and sustain NAFTA , the Federal Government has depended on the effectiveness of these procedures. Structuring and ensuring poverty in the region allowed continued economic exploitation of labor and environmental resources, while limiting political accountability.
The Federal Government realized that various methods could be employed to cause deep divisions within and among indigenous communities, insuring against collective uprisings. Through a variety of illegitimate and undemocratic mechanisms, the PRI could depend on and promote stability in the region, while ignoring suffering throughout indigenous communities. While political reforms evident since the implementation of NAFTA have damaged the ability of the PRI to manipulate the political system, indigenous groups continue to be victimized by government policies, which subvert and undermine indigenous input within the national forum. Lacking a distinct position within the national identity due to the discursive creations of Mexican elites, the indigenous continue to be denied a voice in development decisions.
These policies reflect the historic use of the "indigenismo" approach taken by the Federal Government towards indigenous groups. Indigenismo has been a development-oriented approach to Indian policy that stressed the assimilation of the Indian into the national sphere . (17) Assuming that the indigenous groups would be assimilated into the national identity in this way helped validate the government's exclusion of their demands for more equitable development. Assimilation was encouraged by limiting opportunity within indigenous communities, and by facilitating a colonial relationship to indigenous areas. This relationship has facilitated the ability of the government to control the productive labors of indigenous groups while being able to deny real political participation on the part of those groups. As will be described in the following pages, neoliberal reforms, the cacique system, the free reign of the 'guardias blancas', and federal programs such as PRONASOL have all functioned to marginalize the indigenous groups of southern Mexico.
One way the Federal Government of Mexico spread its influence within indigenous communities in Mexico was by vesting local power and money in loyal village strongmen called 'caciques'. Caciques were often recruited from the indigenous groups of a particular area, and were expected to act in the interests of the economically and politically powerful. Those that cooperated were rewarded with land, power, and money, while those that did not were ostracized. Caciques typically used threats of violence and offers of patronage to tame the constituents of their communities. By controlling opportunity within the community, the cacique could effectively implement the will of the government. Ironically, the Federal Government has long considered the cacique system a "pro-Indian" policy. (18) By manipulating these relationships, the Federal Government could control the cohesion of indigenous communities. Furthermore, this system created real disparities of wealth within indigenous communities, causing social divisions and impeding any potential collective rebellion. It was in this manner that the PRI was able to consistently garner support within indigenous communities . (19)
Violent coercion is not practiced by Chiapas' caciques alone. Guardias blancas, or "white guards" are hired guns that caciques support in order to protect private property and the political machinery of the elite. (20) As organizations such as Human Rights Watch / Americas have documented, indigenous populations are often the victims of various human rights violations committed by the white guards. The existence of these groups is denied by the Chiapas government, but various non-governmental organizations active in the region have determined that there is "conclusive evidence that they [the white guards] remain active and at times work in coordination with police". (21) This affiliation with the political system of Chiapas means that the actions of the white guards are often in complicity with supposed officials, and consequently are rarely held accountable for their actions.
Neoliberal reform began in Mexico in the late 1970's as that country faced several economic crises. Changes in the global economy, such as the transition from Fordist to post-Fordist production and the failure of the Bretton-Woods system, had severe consequences in Mexico. Already suffering under the transition away from an Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy, Mexico was forced into a position of making critical economic policy changes . (22) During the Debt Crisis of 1982, the Mexican government was forced to accept debt burden and to implement a strict structural adjustment program designed to control inflation by limiting wage increases and reducing government deficits. In the same period, welfare expenditures were dramatically cut while public sector investment decreased greatly. Indigenous populations stood to lose considerably under these reforms. Additionally, the government did little to mitigate the impact of these reforms on those populations.
A secondary result of these reforms was that Mexico's traditional party system, long dominated by the PRI, became fractured as the government "moved its locus from political areas of government to that of a bureaucratic administrative elite." (23) The shift away from statist governance to one much more focused on economic performance would have grave consequences within indigenous populations. The resultant loss in the power of the PRI meant that leadership of that party had added incentive to solidify not only their party identity, but also the international identity of the nation. While the PRI tried to reconsolidate its position within the government, opposition parties began to gain a foothold. (24) It was in this context that the PRI candidate Carlos Salinas took over the presidency of Mexico, and was put in the position of expanding the discursive project. To counter the severe financial and political crisis that faced Mexico, Salinas had to enact far-reaching restructuring in order to appease global economic pressure and competition. (25)
The implementation of NAFTA necessitated land reforms throughout Mexico in order to attract foreign investors. "Because the private sector had complained that Mexico's ejido system, with its land-holding ceilings and the threat of expropriation, had discouraged investment, Salinas moved quickly to dismantle a system that has been a symbol of the state revolutionary commitment to peasants." (26) In November of 1991, in keeping with the advancement of neoliberal policy, the Mexican government amended Article 27 of the national Constitution. That amendment, originally formulated to protect the social and property rights of indigenous groups, became the victim of the government's desire to attract foreign investment and capital. The reforms declared that ejido and communal lands, previously protected against commodification, could be legally sold, purchased, rented, or used as collateral for loans. (27) This opened the way for private companies to purchase individual holdings, and hastened the further consolidation of large landholdings throughout Chiapas. Now a company with at least 25 member-shareholders could acquire an area equivalent to 25 times the individual limit. Additionally, the government, in an effort to guarantee security for private property, deleted from law sections of Article 27 which had allowed campesinos to petition for land redistribution. (28) Indigenous groups, some having waited decades for definitive land titles to be awarded to their communities, considered this a direct attack on their social group. While certain to attract investment, reform of Article 27 seriously exacerbated the crisis among indigenous groups, and brought about increased conflict between ranchers and the indigenous. (29) Additionally, the reform worked to split further indigenous groups, as wealthier campesinos bought up land from neighbors, causing divisions within communities.
Restructuring of the coffee sector, which occurred in the same period as reform to Article 27, shook indigenous communities as well. Cash crop production and the rapidly expanding inroads of meat production had already taken their toll on the indigenous farmer. Between 1989 and 1993, though, small producers of coffee saw their wages drop precipitously. (30) While the initial cause of the price plunge of coffee was based on the failure of the International Coffee Organization, Mexico's Federal Government did nothing to support internal price support mechanisms for coffee. In preparation for the implementation of NAFTA, the government eliminated the Instituto Mexicano de Cafè, which had previously regulated the production and price of coffee. (31) Given that Chiapas is Mexico's largest coffee producing state, the effect of these changes in that area were immediate and intense. A deepened cycle of debt and poverty ensued, and by 1992, the sector had already accumulated $270 million in debt. (32) As the price paid for coffee plummeted, land struggles became more belligerent and radical. (33) By 1993, guerrilla activity was being reported in Chiapas.
The Mexican government has consolidated its role as the sculptor of national identity in other ways, as well. Fundamental changes have been made in the composition of civil society that have allowed the government to co-opt national consensus. (34) The state/corporatist structures that have historically mediated the relationship between the state and the masses have been replaced by direct links between the government and community groups. (35) This has created a profound hole in Mexican civil society, which the government can exploit in such a way that consensus building or revolution can be co-opted by fostering competing social groups. By carefully controlling the allotment of economic or political resources to particular social groups, the government can ensure that nobody contests their creation of national identity.
Sergio Zermeno writes that "[t]he global integration of Mexico has radically dismantled [the] .. collective actors of civil society....[while] the institutions and intermediaries that have traditionally inhabited the space between social actors and the state - the media, unions, corporations, political parties, universities, grassroots organizations, and social movements - are being seriously undermined." This is consistent with the elite project of dominating discursive identity formation. Societies "less integrated sectors" become marginalized due to the fact that they have no "space" in which to participate, despite any liberal-democratic reforms. (36)
PRONASOL, the National Solidarity program instituted by the Salinas administration in 1988 under one of the most prolific neoliberal reform programs, is an example of just how this social co-optation works. PRONASOL was administered by the executive branch of the government, and was supposed to address the most severe problems of poverty in cities and the countryside by increasing social spending. (37) Ironically, though, the program has the real effect of further dividing indigenous populations, as this social spending is strategically aimed to particular segments of society.
By selectively appropriating funds, the Mexican Government is able to bolster areas of support while undermining areas of opposition. These activities have been particularly evident during election periods, when areas of strong opposition parties are selectively targeted for PRONASOL handouts. Similarly, in an effort to bolster support prior to elections held in 1993, the government instituted PROCAMPO, a program of rural subsidies, to supplement PRONASOL. (38) Clearly these programs have functioned to support the discursive creations of the Federal Government. It is in this way that the Federal Government has been able to ensure the success of the PRI, as exemplified in the following passage:
Solidarity's funds tend to be spent where the PRI feels most threatened electorally. For example, $135M was spent [in 1992] in the state of Michoacan, where the PRD is strong. This amounts to 6% of Solidarity's estimated annual budget of 6.8 billion pesos ($2.2 billion). On the whole, spending tends to be concentrated in the countryside, where it is easier to garner political support in return for material benefits (admittedly, because that is where most of the poor live) (Wood, 1993:12). (39)
In the face of these neoliberal reforms and the implementation of NAFTA, rebellion exploded on January 1, 1994. In an effort to counter the discursive representations produced by the Mexican government, indigenous campesinos of Chiapas took to arms. Rebels took control of four towns, each of which had large indigenous populations: Altamirano, Las Margaritas, Ocosingo, and San Cristobal de las Casas. The Zapatistas caught the Mexican army off guard due to the New Year's festivities, and quickly consolidated their newfound political position by broadcasting their situation and demands to a transnational audience. Those demands came in the form of a declaration identifying, "work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice, and peace" as conditions for an armistice. (40)
Initial armed conflict only lasted twelve days, as the vastly larger and more powerful Mexican army counterattacked and sent the rebels fleeing. But the Zapatistas had already achieved success: international public opinion turned against the actions of the Mexican government, and investor confidence and sense of security had been shaken throughout Mexico. On a global level, NAFTA and neoliberal reforms became a target of analysis and criticism. Furthermore, what started as an armed rebellion in one southern state of Mexico turned into an ideological battle that has been played out on an international level. That battle has persisted for years, and continues to affect political stability among the NAFTA partners.
Recognizing that their forces were far too limited to truly combat the Mexican army, the Zapatistas have mirrored the Federal Government in turning to a war based on discourse. What has ensued has been termed by some scholars the first "postmodern" rebellion, in that the Zapatistas utilized computers, fax machines, and e-mail to keep global civil society updated on their struggle. (41) The leaders of the rebellion have since hosted teleconferences and conventions, and have turned to the Internet to advance their cause. Through these actions, the EZLN has "turned the indigenous position from symbolic objects into historically subjective agents". (42) Additionally, the EZLN had pointed out exactly what made Mexico "unsuitable for membership in the developed national community and in doing so, form[ed] a new discourse about what should be "required" to join the international community - not just economic stability but social justice as well". (43)
Based on a Gramscian style discursive strategy very similar to that used by the Federal Government, the Zapatistas have attempted to build a broad base of popular consensus advocating their demands for revamped economic and political arrangements. Thus Zapatista use of guerrilla warfare has shifted to what has been termed a "War of Position". (44) This political strategy, based on the strategic positioning of ideology, has proved far more damaging to the ruling elite than any military strategy could. In this context the EZLN in 1996 made a transition in renaming themselves the FZLN, or the Zapatista National Liberation Front, rather than the militarily contentious label of Zapatista National Liberation Army. Pledging to refrain from violence, the Zapatistas vowed to continue to challenge the government's treatment of the indigenous, but mainly at the ideological level. While the Zapatistas continue their discursive attack, they hope to inspire the emergence of other armed groups throughout the country, in order to initiate a multi-front war against the military. (45)
Several scholars have suggested that the severe economic downturn that Mexico faced in 1995, triggered by a rapid devaluation of the peso, was to some degree the result of actions taken by the Zapatistas. Several fundamental economic weaknesses contributed to the devaluation, and were later exploited by the EZLN. (46) At that time, export led industrialization brought about by neoliberal reforms had resulted in high trade deficits in Mexico. Also, as a result of portfolio capital influx, six times as much investment in Mexico went towards speculation rather than into direct productive investment. Coupled with growing short-term debt and inflationary pressure, economic crisis in Mexico was close at hand.
The actions of the Zapatistas may have represented the final push that led the Mexican economy over the precipice. On December 19, 1994, the EZLN used the media to announce that they had somehow evaded the army's encirclement of 20,000 troops, and had taken control of 38 towns in Chiapas. The statement shocked the international community, including investors and governments alike. Amazingly, though, the EZLN announcement had been a complete fabrication, a discursive attack strategically aimed at the Mexican economy. Its success attests to the fragility of the Mexican system at that time. It was a key battle in the "War of Position", and presented a severe challenge to the proponents of NAFTA.
By dealing a blow to the confidence of investors and others in the countries involved in Mexico, the continuing uprising led to a rapid withdrawal of foreign capital. Adding to an already building fiscal crisis and a related political crisis ( the assassination of PRI candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio), the EZLN announcement led to the largest financial crisis and capital flight disaster in Mexico since the 1930s. (47) The result was that in just a few days the US dollar rose from 3.34 pesos to over 6 pesos. (48) The immediate economic and social gains that had been promised with the implementation of NAFTA proved to be illusory.
President Zedillo was quick to respond to the crisis in investor confidence by responding militarily to the actions of the Zapatistas. Federal forces quickly cracked down, unwilling to let the conflict spread to other fronts. In February of 1995, the military drove the insurgents into a remote hamlet, and began an informational counterattack. The government was able to frame the rebels as leftovers from socialist Central American struggles of the 1980's, "ones who wished to deploy violence against the Mexican population at large". (49) On the political front, Zedillo approached the crisis by hardening his stance with the EZLN. An all-out offensive against the EZLN was declared on February 9, 1995. EZLN leaders were declared criminals , and arrest warrants were issued in their names. Amazingly, in July of 1995 there was a ratio of 1 soldier for every 3 residents in some cities of Chiapas. This crackdown was a carefully crafted move intended to solidify the image of the nation as being responsive to the needs of investment and capital. According to presidential aids, Zedillo's actions were "designed both to calm international investors and to improve [his] image to make him into a "tough guy". (50)
Zedillo's tough approach to the financial crisis has paid off for Mexico. Buoyed by $50 billion in bailout money offered by the International Monetary Fund and the United States, Mexico has corrected important economic weaknesses. Additionally, real reform has begun within the Mexican political system. These changes are all indirectly the result of continuing opposition in southern Mexico. Media attention, however, has shifted away from the Zapatistas, and once again the Federal Government is winning the discursive battle as the economy rebounds in Mexico. A constant threat looms in Chiapas, though, and tensions do remain high, as exemplified by the December, 1997 massacre of 45 Indians. (51)
This paper has shown that neoliberal reforms and the discursive productions of previous Mexican administrations have had severe consequences within indigenous communities. Those consequences in turn have contributed to political instability throughout the Americas as investor confidence in Mexico has been unpredictable. In short, there is real economic incentive in solving the social inadequacies seen in Mexico. The following section will discuss some of the changes that could help Mexico more equitably deal with its indigenous populations while paving the way for transition to First World status.
Neoliberal reforms and the implementation of NAFTA have had profound effects in Mexico. Indigenous groups continue to be denied an effective voice within development policy, and as a result they tend to be excluded in modernization attempts in Mexico. The Zapatista uprising has illustrated that the contributions of all social actors are important within a society, and that long term financial and political stability in Mexico hinge on more effective inclusion. In light of these findings, several modifications should be made within the current international framework of economic integration witnessed under NAFTA.
Electoral reform remains the most critical change needed to enhance stability in Chiapas. While recent actions by the Zedillo administration appear to be moving the nation towards open and free elections, inclusion of the indigenous must remain a priority. (52) Electoral democracy does not necessarily bring about social inclusion when the government strives to deter participation. In Mexico, the neoliberal project has relied on the exclusion of certain segments of the society. Policy changes must be made so that all segments of society can participate and have a voice in development alternatives. By implementing and enforcing fair elections, those changes can be facilitated.
Efforts to strengthen civil society in Mexico should also support the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO's). These organizations can already be found at a grass roots level throughout Mexican civil society, including among the various indigenous groups affected by neoliberal reforms and NAFTA. By supporting these groups on a widespread basis, social co-optation can be combated by creating social links protected against the manipulations of federal governments. By enabling the emergence of numerous actors throughout civil society, NGO participation will ensure more equitable social inclusion. To reinforce this project, transnational alliances should be encouraged among NGO's, linking the societies of the NAFTA nations in a common goal.
Additionally, human rights violations in Mexico involving the indigenous must be investigated and prosecuted. Human Rights Watch / Americas has documented that the Mexican army has committed serious human rights violations while combating the Chiapas uprising. Those violations have included coerced confessions, torture, and extrajudicial executions. (53) Additional violations occurred following the 1995 EZLN offensive. In curbing these violations, the government must confront not only the actions of the military, but must also acknowledge the existence of, and begin to punish, local power brokers who abuse their positions, such as caciques or the guardias blancas. The Federal Government must move away from the granting of impunity to those charged with human rights violations throughout the conflict. Additionally, effective judicial remedies must be made accessible to all indigenous groups of Mexico. (54)
Human Rights Watch has recommended further policies to curb violence in Chiapas and to bring violators to justice. They recommend that an impartial and independent task force be assigned to Chiapas in order to investigate allegations and activities of local government and police forces. They also recommend that law enforcement agencies of the United States should create stronger ties to their southern counterparts. Also, the US State Department should extend ties to Mexican human rights organizations. In light of the nature of these recommendations, NAFTA could potentially be modified to include provisions for the establishment and financing of these relationships. These changes would help remedy the weaknesses of Mexican civil society, and would contribute to protection of the indigenous communities. Strengthening these shortcomings in the current civil society could have very beneficial implications for future economic interactions.
The Zapatista demands must be met by the Mexican Government. Additionally, militarization of Chiapas should be ended. As of 1997, it has been estimated that 40% of the Mexican army is occupying the state of Chiapas. (55) Autonomy must be granted to indigenous communities in order for effective local government to succeed. Neoliberal policies must be amended to reflect the need for more long term, sustainable development in Chiapas and other states with large indigenous populations. Legal enshrinement of indigenous languages must occur, as the Zapatistas have requested, and indigenous radio stations should be created. State relationships with indigenous communities perhaps could be modeled on those existing in Canada and the United States, where indigenous groups in those countries have been granted sovereignty over certain territories.
NAFTA and future trade agreements must be linked to side agreements protecting all segments of participating societies. Various international agreements already exist protecting the rights of the indigenous. Mexico, in fact is party to several. For almost a decade, the United Nations has been working on a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Ratification of, and ideological commitment to, such a treaty would go a long ways towards protecting the rights of indigenous populations on a transnational scale. Mexico is party to the International Labor Organization Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and should be held accountable to that treaty. Customary law now protects the rights of the indigenous, and global norms in this area are evident in the body of international law. Enforcement of these norms is now the critical issue.
Carlos Fuentes, one of Mexico's leading intellectuals, has this to say about modernity in his nation:
"[W]e have to rethink what modernity means. If modernity is seen to be homogenous and exclusive of alternative cultures then it is not really modernity at all. If we want only a modernity as defined in our large cosmopolitan cities, it is a false modernity.... Modernity must be inclusive of plurality. Especially in a world that tends toward uniformity, it is healthy to remember that there are other people that have alternative values, alternative ways of life, alternative languages." (56)
In fact, it is critical to consider alternative values, alternative ways of life, and alternative languages. This analysis of the Zapatista uprising illustrates the importance of considering the needs of every social group within our integrating societies. Further integration of the societies and economies of North America must take this into account by providing for more equitable and just development.