

Passports into Credit Cards: On the Borders and Spaces of Neoliberal Citizenship

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"We have included in our design the necessary technological platforms to ensure that the card will have a useful life of approximately five years. Most importantly for commercial users today, it will sport the ubiquitous magnetic strip which the government will not use, making it completely available to the commercial sector. We have also included a microchip in the design as we will require some of the available storage space for automated inspections. We will make the remainder of the chip's storage available to our commercial partners. We think this is especially significant because of the recent announcement by Visa, MasterCard and Europay of their joint specification for chip-based credit cards. To further the appeal of this idea to the commercial sector, we will also allow cards prepared by our partners to display the logo of the partner. This would create in the mind of the card holder an instant link between our high technology application and the sponsoring corporation. Just think of the possibilities for a frequent traveler pulling out a card bearing the IBM or United Airlines logo, for example. Now potentiate that image by seeing the card as a charge card, an airline ticket, a medium by which you access telecommunications systems, an electronic bank, and/or any other card-based application you can conceive."

Ronald Hays¹

These plans for a new kind of passport using credit card and biometric technology are not the plans of a banker, a commercial web systems designer, or some other corporate planner. They are plans developed by a Seattle-based Immigration and Naturalization Service officer in the United States Department of Justice. Specifically, the plans are for a card that can be used by frequent cross-border travelers in order to secure for themselves fast track border-crossings based upon pre-clearance. The cards will, in this vision, contain biometric information such as digitized hand print data that will allow machinery installed at border checkpoints to ascertain whether the cardholder is in fact the person with the pre-cleared record. Coordinating with selected foreign partners as well as collaborating with business, the plans for the card anticipate a remarkable future where borders are effectively to be policed by credit card machines owned by private companies. It is a world in which pre-cleared cardholders come and go as they please across multiple borders irrespective of their nationality (so long as they are from a country that has joined the system) and dependent only on whether they are carrying their card. The various insignia of national identity that are today inscribed on specific national passport covers would in this world be replaced by the corporate logos of transnational corporations. And, the class-organized, transnational world of credit card transactions, along with all their liberating and constraining market-mediated contradictions, would seem to come to eclipse the more equalized world of belonging regulated in the second half of twentieth century by the serial sameness of national passports.² This is a view of the future, then, where the ambiguities of state control and state protection associated with passports would appear to be transcended by the ambiguities of corporate control and free market flexibility afforded by credit cards.³ As

such, the vision outlined by Hays is of more than mere technical, bureaucratic or local interest. It is symptomatic of a significant transformation of citizenship under the political-economic regime of market-based governance commonly called 'neoliberalism'.

Neoliberalism is a useful bracket term for the dominant political commonsense of our time. It brackets together the policy-making commitments to free trade, privatization, price stability and deregulation popularized in the west by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, exported to much of the rest of the world by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organization, and now repackaged anew as some sort of 'Third Way' by the likes of Tony Blair, Jean Chretien and Gerhard Schroeder. The transformative impacts of this dominant policy-making regime on citizenship have been significant, but to understand them better we need particular concrete empirical cases through which to examine the changes. The argument in this paper is that the re-regulation of borders and the related redevelopment of border regions provide just such opportunities for empirical study. Underpinned by popular neoliberal assumptions about the benefits of privatization and entrepreneurial policy-making, and forced through in part because of globalizing capitalism's need for speedy and flexible cross-border movement, the re-regulation of border controls involves shifts in how citizenship is both policed and imagined. Likewise, regional redevelopment plans for border regions in areas that come under continental free trade agreements commonly reflect the same increasing influence of market-oriented concepts of citizenship. In the Pacific Northwest of the US, the actual plans of Hays are yet to be fully implemented. Instead, they need to be seen as part of a longer term set of trends in border re-regulation, trends that have involved two fast track border crossing systems known respectively as the 'PACE lane'

and 'NEXUS'. These border re-regulation innovations need in turn to be examined in the light of specific border region redevelopment patterns. The aim in this chapter is to flesh out some of these broader trends, thereby exploring more concretely the re-making of citizenship portended in the vision articulated by Hays. While the episodic story of border re-regulation has to attend to the tidal changes in federal legislation in Washington, D.C., the account of border region redevelopment plans has to be more localized, and, in this respect it is the regional developments on the Pacific coast between the US and Canada - the district for which Hays has been an INS commissioner - that will be the main focus.

After 9/11, it may seem anachronistic to be discussing North American efforts to soften borders and speed-up border-crossing. It may also seem a strange stretch to connect such border re-regulation to the more geographical issue of border region spaces and their redevelopment. Both of these concerns can be answered together because they both centrally relate to the ways in which the emerging neoliberal norms of citizenship appear to depend on new forms of class-based inclusion and exclusion that have actually been intensified, at least in terms of border practices, since the crisis in confidence in US 'homeland' security. Long before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the concept of facilitating fast-border crossing for business traffic on the west coast was always twinned with security concerns about catching criminals and potential terrorists. In turn, this bifurcated vision of border re-regulation also always went hand in hand with the new regional redevelopment ideas for the region. These ideas will be examined at length later, save it to note here that they have been organized around the international promotion of a post-national cross-border regional concept that the local

politicians, planners and think-tanks like to call 'Cascadia'. As a cross-border region, Cascadia is imagined politically, economically and culturally as a kind of neoliberal utopia destined for growth and prosperity as a gateway of global-local commerce and as a homeland for managerial class elites. It is the exclusivism of this vision that explains why it is necessary to consider the wider geographical issues surrounding cross-border regional redevelopment in conjunction with the re-regulation of the border. 9/11 has simply intensified this exclusivism along with the attendant patterns of re-coding and re-imagining citizenship. The resulting reimagination of the border and cross-border region presents us with a space where distinctions are made between travelers less on the basis of their nationality and more on the basis of whether they appear to be good for 'economic security' or whether they can be deemed a threat to 'political security'. As a consequence of 9/11, then, the impetus to increase security has come together with the enduring planning vision of a business friendly cross-border region. The result, as we shall see, involves increased plans and practices of re-regulating the border that aim simultaneously at easing obstacles for business traffic while strictly securitizing everybody and everything else.

There are, of course, many complex contradictions involved in combining neoliberal freedoms with increased political security. These contradictions are telling, and much like the changing border regulations they produce and the border-region politics in which they unfold, they reveal a great deal about the contemporary transformation of citizenship. By examining them through their effects on the grounding of new assumptions about citizenship in cross-border space, the primary goal of this chapter is to register some of the complex ways in which citizenship is being recodified

in an area where neoliberal commitments to public-private partnerships and free market solutions are well entrenched. My broader goal is to connect the particular reimagination of space and citizenship in Cascadia with global tendencies towards new geographical visions of community and belonging that center on nodes and networks. By highlighting the contrasts between these visions and older geographical imaginations of belonging in territorially discrete nation-states, I seek ultimately to contribute to the wider debate over how elite post-national citizenship - what the anthropologist Aiwaha Ong calls 'flexible citizenship' - is coeval with significant transformations to the territoriality and borders of the modern nation-state.⁴ While Ong herself examines the ways in which Chinese managerial elites have effectively purchased multiple citizenships and multiple passports, this study highlights tendencies that have the potential to transcend the whole regime in which national citizenship is codified and policed through national passports. Before I turn to the empirical material itself, though, a little more needs to be said about my theoretical and terminological starting points.

Citizenship and the symptoms of neoliberalism

In dealing with the diffuse and perspectival stuff of cultural norms and geographical imaginations, my method has of necessity to be open-ended and qualitative. The focus is not on the numbers of people crossing the border, or in how many are actually being processed by the new border technologies, or in the technical specificities of any one particular plan such as that of Hays. The chapter is much more concerned with what the general innovation of new border policing strategies and new cross-border

visions tell us about the changing shape of dominant assumptions about citizenship. The word 'ideology' could be used here but is not because of its misleading associations with deliberately false or propagandistic representations. That said, the main concern of the chapter is with changing *ideas* about citizenship, and with the ways these are complexly, yet powerfully, interwoven with real, practical changes in how the border between Canada and the U.S. is being managed. For the same reason, the case study material here is presented as a symptom, or, more precisely, as a set of symptoms of a wider set of changes. It is not a representative sample of all the borders in North America, still less of all the borders in the world. But it is a border which provides us with a remarkable window on to how citizenship is being reimagined, recodified and, therefore, remade in an era when laissez-faire, free-market capitalism has become globally dominant.

Conceptually, my starting point is the sociologist T.H. Marshall's famous mid-twentieth century work on citizenship and social class.⁵ In this work Marshall's main concern is with how the commitments to equality that are central to modern ideals of citizenship have been historically squared with ongoing class inequalities between actual citizens. In order to answer this question, he argues it is necessary to distinguish between three different forms of citizenship that became increasingly differentiated in the context of modernity: civil citizenship (involving freedom of access to markets, the right to sell one's labor and the right to the protection of private property and contracts under the law), political citizenship (involving the rights to vote and run for office) and social citizenship (involving rights to education and other services aimed at securing a basic standard of living). Surveying the English experience, Marshall suggests that the formative historical periods for each of these types of citizenship followed one another

consecutively, with civil rights expanding widely in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth and social rights in the twentieth. In the first two of these three phases Marshall argues that the underlying tension between the equalizing implications of citizenship and class inequality shaped the subsequent expansion of rights. Social citizenship emerges thus in the twentieth century as a countervailing force against class inequality, but then, Marshall concludes (in an argument that reflected his 1960's interest in the development of the U.K.'s welfare state), seemed set to be at continual odds with the ongoing class pressures of capitalist society. The historical details and transferability of this evolutionary account to other contexts are questionable, as too are the adequacy of Marshall's categories in light of feminist and post-colonial critiques of the normative white western man of property that stands at the center of most modern formulations of rights bearing citizenship.⁶ But these concerns noted, Marshall's concern with the fundamental tension between capitalist class dynamics and social citizenship, his sensitivity to the differentiation of the different forms of citizenship, and his basic argument that their distinct histories overlay one another serves as a useful heuristic for approaching the question of what is happening to citizenship today under neoliberalism. Most particularly, as the geographers Sallie Marston and Katharyne Mitchell have argued, Marshall's attention to how eighteenth century civil citizenship was associated with the liberal repudiation of interventionist government helps explain how a certain sort of *retreat* to civil citizenship is now coincident with the entrenchment of neoliberal policies.⁷

With the increasing dominance of laissez-faire, market-based models of governance it seems we are witnessing the progressive erosion of national citizenship

rights and the wholesale transformation of the constitutional qualities of social, political, and even, in some ways, civil citizenship. In this respect it must be recalled that Ronald Reagan, the grandfather of neoliberal economic policy, described the expansion of market based governance as having a *constitutional* impact. In announcing the Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement, for example, Reagan described the neoliberal trade and investment charter as “a new economic constitution for North America.”⁸ This was no verbal slip. As Stephen Clarkson and many other critics have since noted, the constitutionalism of the free trade agreement amounted to a bill of rights for continental businesses, giving them expansive movement rights and enabling them to relocate production sites or threaten to do so thereby winning tax and other regulatory concessions from local governments. In this context, citizens have been left able to vote in formal elections, but their elected governments have been straight-jacketed by trade law and obliged to curtail certain social programs and environmental protections. As a result, the meaning and quality of political and social citizenship has been eroded.

North American free trade is just one example of neoliberalism at work, and it needs emphasizing that the constitutional capacities of trade agreements only have their governmental effects in a world-wide context wherein global competition for business investment and growth has become a primary force shaping public policy.⁹ As the political scientist Stephen Gill explains, it is the combination of all these forces that has systematic world-shaping effects, effects that comprise a regime Gill calls 'disciplinary neoliberalism'.¹⁰ This disciplinary regime is further buttressed, the anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff remind us, by neoliberalism's naturalization as an apolitical logic. Thus, they claim, “there is a strong argument to be made that neoliberal capitalism, in its

millennial moment, portends the death of politics by hiding its own ideological underpinnings in the dictates of economic efficiency: in the fetishism of the free market, in the inexorable expanding needs of business, in the imperatives of science and technology”.¹¹

The arguments about neoliberalism made by Gill, the Comaroffs and many others oblige us to reflect again on how exactly the differentiated development of citizenship charted by Marshall is being transformed. An initial, schematic response would be to argue that social, political and civil citizenship rights are being undermined in the reverse order of Marshall's original narrative of their formation. Thus we see cutbacks and/or privatization of state social services (because of the new emphases on fiscal discipline, price stability, and market based governance), followed by the attrition of meaningful electoral rights (because of money in politics and the increasing leverage of markets and trade agreements over elected governments), followed in certain countries by the eclipse of even civil rights as legal protections for ordinary workers are eviscerated and increasing numbers of people are incarcerated, expelled, or, as in the U.S., executed. Clearly, this reversed schema risks reproducing Marshall's own evolutionary teleology, and one way in which to begin nuancing such an account of citizenship in the current era is to address the ways in which certain sorts of rights are not being destroyed but rather *transnationalized*. This is certainly true of the types of economic rights that Marshall put at the center of civil citizenship. The rights to move freely between markets and be protected wherever by the rule of law are clearly being expanded transnationally as free trade regimes around the world are effectively entrenching a series of quasi-constitutional protections for everything from patents on intellectual property to cross-border movement

freedoms for business professionals. But here Marshall's attention to class remains of the utmost importance. It is, after all, largely the wealthy business classes, or what the sociologist Leslie Sklair calls the 'transnational capitalist class' for whom the prospects of transnational civil citizenship appear most real.¹² Indeed, in the U.S. the prospects of a more mass generalization of these rights to others seems ever more remote as post 9/11 security concerns and the widespread escalation of anti-immigration politics become increasingly dominant. It is precisely against the backcloth of these antithetical imperatives that the developments in border policing and territorial imagination in the so-called Cascadia region need to be situated.

The account begins next with a detailed examination of the various plans to provide expedited crossing for frequent travelers across the 49th parallel on the west coast. These plans have now gone through a number of metamorphoses, and the changes and the political struggles they have provoked reveal a great deal about the array of clashing forces shaping the codification of citizenship at the border. After relating this account of legal and institutional innovation, we turn next to the cultural geographical imagination of Cascadia as the regional space in which the movement to 'bulldoze the border' has developed. Lastly, in the conclusion the aim is to connect these empirical accounts to the larger theoretical questions concerning the emergence of flexible citizenship and the disarticulation of the nation-state in the contemporary era.

From PACE-ing the border to the NEXUS of business and security

At a conference on Cascadia and tourism in Seattle in 1996, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) chief responsible for the border with Canada at Blaine

prefaced his update on expedited crossing lanes with a tellingly curt description of the approach to belonging deployed by border guards. “There are basically just two main types of border-crossers,” he explained, “those that go in primary processing and those that go in secondary. If you are in primary our chief aim is to get you across the border as fast as possible, ideally in a matter of seconds. If you are in secondary,” he went on, “we really don’t care how long it takes.” What he meant by secondary were all those cases for which longer periods of questioning become necessary on the basis of the primary border guard’s assessment. People put into secondary at the Blaine crossings have to wait for a longer period of questioning in INS offices behind the curbside booths. They can be asked to provide further documentation, they can have their car searched, and they can even be strip-searched themselves, but, whatever the scope of the interviews and interrogations, they can expect to have their border-crossing considerably delayed, if not halted altogether. Meanwhile, the INS chief underlined, the service focuses much of its energies on speeding up the crossings of those in ‘primary’. At the conference, this commitment to speeding up primary processing was received with warm applause by the assembled audience of coach tour and cruise operators who were eager to emphasize that anything the INS could do to further ease congestion at the border would be good for their businesses. They understood that the service had an important responsibility to stop, as one manager put it, the ‘bad guys’, but they, the folks in business suits, the ‘good guys’, needed all the help they could get to make the border-crossing experience less time-consuming and less of a burdensome friction on business.

No doubt this kind of pressure to make borders more permeable for the ‘good’ flows (all the while distinguishing them and separating them from control of the ‘bad’)

has been a perennial puzzle of border management since the first development of border control posts. However, the definition of the 'good' and the 'bad' in terms of business, and the starkness of the bifurcation between them would also seem to reflect the contemporary impact of neoliberalism on citizenship and the definition of belonging in North America. Becoming an American citizen may help you win a place in primary, but it is not a necessary condition, let alone a sufficient condition of belonging there. Frequent travel, business travel, touristic travel or some mixture thereof are weighed too, and thus inclusion inexorably becomes more and more about having capital or thinking of territory and belonging in terms of capital. Indeed, the division between primary and secondary processing would seem to provide a border checkpoint corollary of the dual labor market effect that is often discussed by economic analysts of so-called post-Fordist 'flexibility'.¹³ It divides a necessary and integral core population from a contingent and externalized marginal population. The fact that migrants to the US constitute a crucial part of the contingent labor market population only serves to further underline the substantive connections and overlaps between these economic and political definitions of belonging. Of course, on the border there are often individual cases of mistaken identity, poor paperwork, and abusive and unprincipled enforcement, but the fundamental division of border-crossers into two groups of primary and secondary is the basic way in which the checkpoint serves to manage belonging.

Efforts to expedite 'primary' travel across the 49th parallel on the Pacific coast developed throughout the 1990s. Soon after the implementation of the Canadian-US Free Trade agreement in 1989, local business elites started pushing for a fast track system at the border, and over the next two years their hopes were realized with the

establishment in 1991 of the Peace Arch Crossing Entry or so-called PACE lane. While some security-minded border guards came to joke about PACE standing for 'Paraphenalia and Contraband Express', the INS was nevertheless rigorous in implementing the new program.¹⁴ The first year of its experimental implementation was 1992, and, by the fall of that year, American officials had approved 19,000 PACE applications. After the initial enthusiasm for the project numbers of applicants fell. However, by the end of 1999, 27 percent of southbound vehicles across the 49th parallel at the West Coast crossings were using the PACE lane. Before its immediate demise following 9/11 in 2001, it had almost 190,000 enrollees. By that point, the PACE program had expanded to more Washington/British Columbia border checkpoints and had become the dedicated commuter lane (or DCL in INS parlance) with the largest number of enrollees in North America.

The system the PACE lane established was quite simple, with nothing like the high-technology, biometric and credit-card features of the system that Hays came to outline in 1996.¹⁵ Applicants could go through a screening process, and then, if they passed, be issued with a decal for their car that showed they were entitled to drive in the PACE lane when they came to the border. This lane had much shorter line-ups than all the other lanes, and the likelihood of a long verbal interrogation by the border guard was considerably reduced. So long as applicants were American or Canadian citizens, and so long as they were prepared to pay the relatively small fee to purchase PACE lane membership, the application process was not especially burdensome. And the result, as the promoters of Cascadia liked to point out, was an important step towards the larger dream of 'bulldozing the border' for business traffic. Thus under the radical-sounding

section title "Bulldoze the checkpoints" of their report on the economic potential of the cross-border region, two influential Cascadian boosters argued that PACE "should be more widely promoted and expanded, eventually leading to even more open borders between the United States and Canada."¹⁶

All the PACE lane really did was further entrench and bureaucratically encode the divide between primary and secondary. It gave the primary population who traveled across the border frequently the chance to buy the additional flexibility they needed to cross the border fast, all the while guaranteeing them a certain degree of protection from the likelihood of being trapped by delays or erroneous assignments to secondary. In a sense, then, the PACE lane merely stripped away the superficial sense of equality that used to emerge from the common experience shared by primary and secondary populations alike of waiting in line to be interviewed at the checkpoint. An illustrative equivalent of this transformation within nation-states like the US might be found in the way in which valet parking takes away the forced equality of searching for parking spots in busy city centers. With rarely a line-up at all in the PACE lane, those who signed-up as members could simply speed up to the border and proceed onwards with almost as little trouble as crossing a line between two provinces or two states. The flexibility enjoyed by PACE lane members interestingly paralleled Ong's more general account of 'flexible citizenship'. Such 'flexible citizenship', she argues, "refers to the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions."¹⁷ As we shall see, the Cascadian cultural logics and discourses that lay behind the PACE lane also concerned capitalist accumulation, travel and displacement. Moreover, they also have

been articulated with a view to providing the envisaged Cascadian elite with all the border-crossing fluidity they might need to seize on the synergies and co-development opportunities presented by the vision of an emergent cross-border political economy. However, unlike the decentered and hybrid discourses and practices that are the focus of Ong's ethnography of Chinese business managers, the PACE lane was a bureaucratic innovation of the state and, as such, its emergence, maintenance and more recent replacement by the NEXUS system need to be understood in terms of the contradictory political directives of the state.

Not unlike North American free trade itself, and notwithstanding the associated bull-dozing rhetoric, border deregulation through fast track lanes actually requires more regulation, more policing, and more bureaucratic processing at the border in order to make the same border more permeable for the properly codified cross-border flows. The PACE lane also required more international support and coordination, with the Canadian government developing its reciprocal CANPASS program to expedite the reverse frequent traveler flows into Canada across the same border. As a result of this relationship to state regulations and inter-state agreements, the institutional evolution of the PACE lane was actually quite tumultuous. After its initial success, and after being hailed in 1995 as a step towards a complete bull-dozing of the border, the PACE lane suffered a heavy legislative blow the following year in 1996 when the politics of anti-immigration clashed directly with the politics of economic flexibility. The focus of this clash was the passage of the *Immigrant Responsibility and Illegal Immigration Reform Act*, a Republican sponsored piece of legislation that ultimately came to be signed by President Clinton. This clash, like the PACE lane and associated plans such as those

made by Hays, must be examined as symptoms of the evolving assumptions about citizenship in the US in the 1990s.

The politics involved in the 1996 legislative struggles can be seen summarily in terms of the tension between an emphasis on interdicting ‘bad flows’ and an emphasis on expediting ‘good flows’. But the contentious ground of this dispute in Congress was not between Republicans and Democrats, and certainly not directly between immigrants’ rights representatives and business representatives. Instead, the dispute largely took place within the Republican party itself between politicians more keenly focused on trade and development issues and those more exercised by a conservative, anti-immigrant nationalism. Pulled together under the leadership of Newt Gingrich, these feuding elements within the party together shaped the drafting of the *Immigrant Responsibility and Illegal Immigration Reform Act*. As well as condensing the tensions dividing Republicans, this act or IRIAIRA as it is referred to in the legal literature, was also profoundly animated by Gingrich’s own trademark fascination with technological futurism. Indeed, technology was turned to in the Act as the very means through which to combine strict interdiction with accelerated flow facilitation. The result, nevertheless, was a piece of legislation that represented a practical disaster for PACE lane advocates. “Its more than a slap in the face,” Alan Artibise, a key Cascadian visionary told a reporter. “It would bring business between Canada and the US to a grinding halt.”¹⁸ However, such practicalities were not noticed at the time as the bill was pushed through Congress in a giant omnibus legislative package at the end of a long session. It was not until after a pliant President Clinton signed the act into law that the problematic and self-defeating aspects of the legislation started to become apparent.

From the perspective of PACE lane supporters and advocates of dedicated commuter lanes on other parts of the 49th parallel, the particular offending part of the act was Section 110.¹⁹ This section became infamous insofar as it threatened – had it ever been implemented – to instantly create the worst and slowest moving traffic jams ever experienced on the US border with Canada. On the west coast, the resulting tailbacks of traffic were anticipated to stretch all the way back to Vancouver from Blaine. They would clearly have therefore made it impossible for anyone, whether they had PACE decals or not, to get even close to the border in a hurry. Uniformity and equality would have returned through the slow moving sameness of congestion. The main reason for the expected delays was that the Section demanded that *all aliens* entering and *exiting* the US would have to file arrival and departure records. The rationale for this demand was the concern that many illegally resident aliens in the US were coming in on legal visas and then simply overstaying. The idea behind the act was to keep bureaucratic track of all such aliens thereby enhancing the capability of the INS and law enforcement agencies to track down those overstaying their visas. For PACE lane advocates, the problem with this whole section lay in the targeting of so-called ‘aliens’, a word long used in the US to designate the status of foreign-ness against which US citizenship and belonging is defined. Although some local Washington state representative such as Republican Jack Metcalf did not seem to realize this as they voted for the Act, the wording ‘aliens’ therefore meant that the law would apply to Canadians, even if it was phobic fear about undocumented immigration from Mexico that was a driving force behind the legislation.²⁰ With Canadians thereby covered by the section, the Act effectively

condemned the northern border to the likely delays that would be created as each and every Canadian citizen filled in the entry-exit forms at the border.

In response to the IIRAIRA the Canadian government went into a high gear lobbying effort to repeal Section 110. They wanted the northern border and Canadians to be excepted from the stringent demands of the Act. But to this the Mexican government added its own criticisms of Section 110, arguing moreover that one NAFTA signatory should not be treated any differently from another. These inter-governmental complaints were then also complemented by Cascadia's promoters and many other neoliberal-minded groups from northern border states across the US whose view of Canadians was and is as business partners not potential illegal aliens.²¹ A lobby group entitled *Americans For Better Borders* was also formed, supported chiefly by the big auto companies and other transnationals like Eastman Kodak, with vested interests in moving goods across the border. These lobbies had good connections with business-oriented Republicans and Democrats, and it was not long before legislative amendment ensued. Section 110 was first put on hold, and then finally, in the early summer of 2000, it was re-written so as to be completely harmless to the status quo. Like the Canadian government, Cascadia's promoters heralded this as a success, but as they did so few noticed and none acknowledged publicly that in many ways Section 110 (along with a number of other key parts of the 1996 Act) actually represented a form of Congressional response to the call to expand the PACE program and other forms of expedited, pre-clearance type, passport processing.

To pick just one example of the pro-PACE lane rhetoric, here is more of the plea made by the Cascadian visionaries quoted above. Calling for a new border regime based

on coordinated data-management, or what they called 'one stop passport control', Schell and Hamer argue that:-

Ideally, a continental North American clearance someday would make one-stop passport control available for overseas guests, and within the continent would make access between British Columbia and Washington, for example, as easy as access between Oregon and Washington today.²²

Obviously, the predicted impact of Section 110 was the complete reverse of this vision. Highlighting this reversal in his critique, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont summarized the problem perfectly: "This is not Checkpoint Charlie," he said. "This is the largest unguarded frontier in the world."²³ However, a closer look at the wording of the act itself reveals how it was actually built upon the same vision of technological facilitation, pre-clearance data-base management and dual-tier processing that underpinned dedicated commuter lanes like the PACE lane.

SEC 110. AUTOMATED ENTRY-EXIT CONTROL SYSTEM

(a) SYSTEM. Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall develop an automated entry and exit control system that will –

- (1) collect a record of departure for every alien departing the United States and match the records of departure with the record of the alien's arrival in the United States; and
- (2) enable the Attorney General to identify, through on-line searching procedures, lawfully admitted nonimmigrants who remain in the United States beyond the period authorized by the Attorney General.²⁴

Running through this section, as well as through the Act more generally, is an emphasis on technological solutions. The entry and exit control system would be *automated*, the Section dictated. Perhaps it was for this reason that the drafters of the legislation were not worried by concerns about long delays. The technology, even though there was no budget to pay for it in the Act, would somehow solve the problems by creating a dual system for border-crossers, thereby speeding up the movement of

legitimate travelers while enabling a fool-proof process for identifying, detaining and deporting the illegal. Collecting all departure records might in earlier times have created enormous problems, but another techno-futuristic part of the act – Section 104 – saw this as easily addressed through new high-tech biometric systems. These systems, which were already being tested in 1996 at various US airports, effectively represented a further technologization of the sort of pre-clearance system installed with PACE.

It was in this context that Ronald Hays made his pitch for the high-technology biometric, public-private partnership, credit card solution outlined in the epigraph at the start of this chapter.²⁵ Hays suggested that biometric systems would simply accelerate fast track services by providing one-to-one automated inspections by machines at border checkpoints. The machines would determine if a card holder of a pre-clearance card actually was the person who had been pre-cleared by making a one-to-one match. A digitized hand-print or voice-print encoded on a chip on the card would be matched by the machine by a reading of the card-holder's hand or voice at the border. Automated in this way, the biometric systems promised to be extremely quick. Adding a further neoliberal gleam to this promise of technological efficiency and speed, Hays's description of INS planning also highlighted how the pre-clearance lane cards and the automated checking machines would actually be owned and maintained by private companies. He acknowledged that this would be a significant change in accepted government practice, but with a view it seems to communicating with the neoliberal revolutionaries in congress he noted that this was very much in line with the whole emphasis on 'reinventing government'.

"The idea of the Immigration Service turning to private industry to operate an automated inspection system would have been considered radical, and undoable, just a few years

ago. Today it fits in perfectly with the 'reinventing government' strategy which stresses the development of effective ways to control costs and improve the delivery of governmental benefits and services. To quote William Plamondon, Chair of the Facilitation/Reduction of Barriers subcommittee of the recently completed White House Conference on Travel and Tourism: '...[w]e must draw upon the individual strengths of the public and private sectors and form a partnership that will encourage people to come to the United States'."²⁶

It was building on this logic, then, that Hays argued for three guiding axioms in the development of the new border technologies. "The partnership the Immigration and Naturalization Service is considering is based upon three key ideas," he explained.

The INS should be the gatekeeper, not the operator, of the system;
The card should contain a variety of technological platforms for maximum flexibility; &
The card should have a commercial plus a governmental identity.

The resulting vision of passports turned private credit cards turned globalized badges of corporate belonging seems the very apotheosis of the neoliberal model of civil citizenship. If one follows the logic all the way it is a vision not of discrete national passports cum credit cards, but rather of a one-world passport for jet-setting border-crossers. While credit cards are already in many ways a medium for demarcating economic citizenship and belonging around the world, the neoliberal vision aims at linking this realm of emergent economic citizenship *directly* with the realms of political and social citizenship. The whole corporate model here has a neat symmetry as a border regulation policy vision and discourse, and so it is not hard to see why such ideas appealed so much to the Gingrich Republicans.

However, of course, when this vision and discourse were converted into legal code in the IIRAIRA the contradictions between its border-crossing reconceptualization of access and belonging and the still extant system of nationally defined and bordered citizenships came rudely to the fore. Here, then, is an example of the limits as well as of

the effectiveness of neoliberalism as a force restructuring the meaning of citizenship. Just as transnational corporations still cohabit with nation-states in many ways, so too do policies benefiting the transnational capitalist class have to be implemented and worked out in a world of nation-states and national politics where neoliberal interests are often dependent for their advancement on the support of neoconservative nationalists. These contradictory tendencies came to light in yet another way in 2000 when, after having been saved from the specter of Section 110, the PACE lane went on to become a victim of neoliberal budget cuts and defunding.²⁷ It was not long after recovering from these threats in 2001, that the whole PACE system was closed as an immediate border securitization response to the attacks of 9/11.

The instant results of the state of high security at the border after 9/11 were monumental delays. INS and Customs agents implemented so-called Code Red antiterrorism operations that involved inspecting individually all private vehicles, trucks and buses.²⁸ Reporting on the resulting traffic jams, *The New York Times* noted that in some areas the wait times lasted nine hours or more.²⁹ The economic consequences of these delays on the Ontario-Michigan border between Detroit and Windsor were still larger than those on the west coast because of the 'just-in-time' production systems run by the auto companies moving parts and vehicles across the border. Not surprisingly, the INS and Customs were asked to rectify this situation immediately, and, according to U.S. Commissioner of Customs, Robert Bonner, were able to use 'smart border enforcement' strategies to quickly bring the waiting times back to normal.

"The Customs service immediately went to work with the auto manufactures, the state of Michigan and operators of the bridges and tunnels in Detroit to develop a plan to ease waiting times while maintaining a high level of security. We implemented a comprehensive plan in a day. Within a few days, waiting times were nearly back to

normal, and just-in-time inventory systems were again operating with predictable regularity."³⁰

Although the economic stakes and the speed of the response were less rapid on the west coast, the same discourse of smart border enforcement and the same emphasis on working with business ultimately came to guide policy. However, in this context, the PACE lane with its simple car decals and low technology identification process, was not seen to be smart enough. Once closed, it stayed closed notwithstanding significant economic impacts and reverberating complaints.

Some of the complaints about the PACE lane's demise are worth quoting here because they provide a good illustration of the sense of entitlement to fast lane privileges evinced by the business community. "The PACE program was very beneficial to people and businesses, and I was one of them," said a local developer of a resort in Birch Bay to a reporter. "Our visitors are down 67%."³¹ Across the border in Canada, Darcy Rezac, president of the Vancouver Board of Trade, told another reporter the same story. "The PACE system was a godsend to many of our members," he said. "Many members said it changed their lives and that they simply won't do business now in the U.S. because of the lengthy delays at the border."³² Rick Turner, president of International Aviation Terminals, echoed the same theme: "The lack of a fast-lane system has made travel between the Lower Mainland and Washington state quite inconvenient, time-consuming and costly."³³ As these complaint multiplied, a forum was convened in November in a northern Washington resort to discuss the problems. At this meeting, many other voices rehearsed the same sense of loss and frustration amongst the business community. Ken Hertz, for example, the executive vice president of Trillium Corp, complained that the border economy was being hurt by the "regulatory mentality" of the INS and customs and

by what seemed to him to be the inaction of the state's congressional delegation. "We're in an economic disaster, and not enough attention is being paid to it."³⁴ Hertz need not have worried, however, because by then the local U.S. Representative Rick Larsen was already attempting to nudge the federal authorities to make allowances. After visiting the border towns in October and observing their plight, Larsen immediately wrote to the INS commissioner asking for the PACE lane to be reopened. "In light of the economic paralysis now gripping these towns," he said, "I would like to suggest action can be taken to increase traffic without sacrificing the safety of our border.... Participants have paid for [the PACE lane].... They would still be subject to inspections but in effect could jump the line."³⁵ Here the place of the PACE lane in the transition from passport to credit card lifeworlds becomes clear again. PACE participants have paid for the privilege of flexible citizenship, the representative implies. They should be allowed to 'jump the line', he proceeds to insist, not as traditional citizens but as consumers who have paid for a particular set of transnational rights.

Larsen's pleas to reopen the PACE lane did not prevail, but they, alongside all the criticisms of the cross-border business community, laid the argumentative groundwork for the new smart border enforcement system that has now come to take the place of PACE. Another step in this direction was made on December 12, 2001, when Canada and the US signed the so-called 'Smart Border Declaration'. With this, the two governments declared their commitment "to collaborate in identifying and addressing security risks while efficiently and effectively expediting the legitimate flow of people and goods across the Canada-U.S. border."³⁶ The central aim of the declaration, then, was to further entrench a dual-tiered approach to border management and thereby finesse the

contradictions between the new emphasis on increased security and the ongoing concern with reducing frictions on business. John Manley, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, made clear that from his perspective security and efficiency would thereby somehow become one. "We have agreed to an aggressive action plan that will allow the safest, most efficient passage of people and goods between our two countries, as part of our ongoing commitment to the creation of a Smart Border." Emphasizing the technological sophistication of the new plans, Manley went on, "[t]his action plan will enhance the technology, coordination and information sharing that are essential to safeguard our mutual security and strengthen cross-border commerce for the world's largest binational trading relationship."³⁷ Governor Tom Ridge, who had been appointed director of the new Office of Homeland Security shortly after 9/11, echoed the exact same mantra of combining efficiency and security with his own supporting comments on the declaration. "On behalf of President Bush," he said, "I was pleased to visit Canada to meet with Minister Manley and senior Canadian officials to discuss how to build a smart and secure border that allows the free flow of people and goods between our two countries. We look forward to working together to achieve real time real solutions as quickly as possible."³⁸ Five months later, President Bush himself repeated the same dual goals as he signed into law the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002. "I'm honored today," he said, "to sign a bill that is an important step in an effort to secure our border, while promoting trade and commerce."³⁹

As a result of the Smart Border declaration, of the new law signed by President Bush, and of all the efforts surrounding them, the old PACE lane on the British Columbia-Washington State border came to be replaced on June 26, 2002 by the new, so-

called NEXUS system.⁴⁰ Visiting the NEXUS enrollment center on July 1, Representative Larsen explained in the now familiar dualistic 'Smart Border' rhetoric that "NEXUS is going to help us insure a more secure border while insuring trade and tourism can continue."⁴¹ Like the PACE and CANPASS systems, and yet joined together as a bureaucratic bridge between Canadian and US governmental functions, NEXUS now allows for the same fast track border-crossing experience with little of the normal customs and immigration questioning. It is also based on pre-clearance, but unlike the prior systems it operates on the basis of photo-ID and biometric 'proximity cards'. NEXUS members crossing into the US on the dedicated lane carry the card in their car and as they approach the border it relays all their enrollment data - including finger prints, photo ID, name, date of birth and so on - to an antenna and from there to a border guard's computer screen. This is by no means the complete apotheosis of automation and corporatization envisaged by Hays, but it clearly represents another step in that direction. It also very directly illustrates the ways in which the dual track, 'primary' and 'secondary' partitioning of cross-border traffic lives on after the PACE lane not just in terms of the dualistic 'Smart Border' discourse, but also very practically in the new hardware of border checkpoint policing. Thus, while the immediate impact of 9/11 was to interrupt the neoliberal dream of bull-doing the checkpoints, while it led to considerably increased federal attention on the border, this attention also led, in the end, to increased spending on technology, and, through this, to the installation of a technical fix to the problem of combining neoliberal commercial freedoms with the heightened American emphasis on so-called 'homeland security'.

The Cascadian Space of Neoliberal Self-hood

Changing modes of regulating the border and expediting fast cross-border flows clearly give us a number of examples (both in terms of discourses and practices) of how citizenship is being policed in new ways by the state. The history of the PACE lane and the emergence of the successor NEXUS system help thus to illustrate what Marston and Mitchell describe as the contextual contingency of state citizenship formations. "In the era of 'fast' capitalism," they say,

"with a constant movement of bodies and capital across state borders, it became clear that the state could not and was not interested in guaranteeing the general rights of citizenship to all those within its territorial borders. Citizenship protection, in terms of its entitlements and obligations, became increasingly uneven, selective and fragmented, not related to territory per se, but more explicitly to economic considerations. The state thus extended citizenship rights to some but not others, i.e. to those who could bring various kinds of advantages to particular state sectors either economically or in terms of state legitimacy. State protection waxed and waned depending on historical and geographical context, and citizenship itself thus began to be perceived as a strategic category that was neither universal nor timeless, but rather one that was easily and often manipulated."⁴²

The use of the past tense here might be read as overly hopeful, but it underlines the point that historically changing state policies produce changing citizenship formations over time. The case of changing border enforcement policies would seem to offer an illustrative case in point. However, the story of border re-regulations related here is not just about explicit state policies. It is also about the regulatory micropractices of government and their effective production of new forms of subjectivity. These are the circulating relations of power, self-hood and state-hood that the philosopher-historian Michel Foucault once called governmentality.⁴³ In terms of governmentality, then, the evolving systems of border control reveal a great deal about a moment in which it would seem that the processes of producing and disciplining national subjects are being

increasingly morphed into processes and disciplinary strategies that support the production and circulation of more mobile transnational subjects. In this respect, it can be further noted that the shifts that are made manifest in the changing border regime are broadly coincident with the consumerization of citizenship that the Foucauldian sociologist, Nikolas Rose associates with the marketization of disciplinary practices under neoliberalism.⁴⁴ Rose suggests that this new regime is distinguished too by discourses and practices through which the dominant model of selfhood becomes that of the calculating business enterprise. The day to day ability to cross the border in a fast lane would appear thus to represent just one more example of the entrepreneurial citizen self on the move. The question I would now like to turn to concerns what geographical models of belonging, or what imagined communities, to use Benedict Anderson's phrase, help to ground and secure this calculating entrepreneurial citizen's transnational world.⁴⁵ This question is important not only because it helps explain some of the energies and personal investments that lay behind the agitation for the PACE lane and NEXUS, but also in its own right as a way of fleshing out more clearly the wider ramifications of a neoliberal reimagination of citizenship.

According to Aiwha Ong, "[t]he capability of entrepreneurial figures to manipulate and transform borders into value of trade and production has ... reconfigured the spaces and demographics of American citizenship."⁴⁶ Ong, however, does not offer any geographical examples of what these reconfigured spaces might look like. The neoliberal concept of Cascadia, I submit, provides just such an example. To quote again from the Cascadian promoters who argued for the expansion of the PACE lane in 1995, Paul Schell and John Hamer, the vision of Cascadia begins from a conceptual revaluation of

the border as an 'open border' of trade and transnational capital flows. "The lines imposed over 100 years ago have simply been transcended by contemporary cultural and economic realities," they thus assert.

Cascadia is organizing itself around what will be the new realities of the next century – open borders, free trade, regional cooperation, and the instant transfer of information, money and technology. The nineteenth- and twentieth century realities of the nation-state, with guarded borders and nationalistic traditions are giving way.⁴⁷

Exploring further evocations of this millennial post-national vision will make it possible to examine in more detail the inclusions and exclusions of the resulting neoliberal imagined community.

The core concept to which all the Cascadian visionaries have returned over and over again is that of the cross-border region as a geographical embodiment of the free-trade neoliberal times and, as such, a kind of post-national homeland for a managerial neoliberal elite. A good example in this respect is the almost spiritual evocation of Cascadia that appeared in the *B.C. Business Magazine*. Illustrative of the assumptions circulating around notions of the entrepreneurial citizen self, the magazine asserted that:

Cascadia is neither a place nor a feeling. It's a rite of passage, a sign of maturity. To seek this braver, newer world, a British Columbian would look not on a map, not in his shrivened or competitive heart, but in his bank account – economic man's most sacred place.⁴⁸

This placeless, accounting logic is telling for more reasons than just its virile brave new world heroism. It also reveals a model of Cascadian belonging based squarely on the economic bottom line, a vision of citizenship as entrepreneurial calculation. For Charles Kelly - the Canadian publisher of a magazine called *The New Pacific* that became the major organ of pro-Cascadian writing before it went defunct - this vision had necessarily

to be understood in geographical terms as a new regional order. The cross-border region as a place of business has necessarily, he suggests, to be considered as a place also of political reorganization.

“People in the greater Northwest are moving to establish some semblance of a regional order. Movement on the political scene represents a public realization that business is more and more looking to cross border opportunities. The shift, from business transactions to policy formation, makes official what many in industry and small business have known for some time – there must be greater cooperation if the region is to both compete in international markets and harmonize the area’s sometimes conflicting and counter productive policies and regulations. The benefits in the long term are obvious. In all probability, the New Regional Order will have more staying power than the much hyped New World Order.”⁴⁹

As a sign of the attendant model citizenship in this new regional order, Kelly's arguments were accompanied by another development he initiated as publisher of *The New Pacific*. He ran a flag competition in the magazine, offering a \$2000 prize for the winning design of a flag for Cascadia. A flag was duly chosen and, with its array of lurid colors, it provided the Cascadian promoters with their own post-national emblem of 'banal nationalism'.⁵⁰ However, the uses this flag were put to, including doing service as a banner above a booth for small ‘Cascadian’ software firms at the Las Vegas Comdex show, were not the typical nationalist uses at all. The flag was not meant to fly above government buildings, or become part of an official seal. Far from it, Kelly like all the other economically-oriented promoters of Cascadia insisted on the region’s non-national, indeed non-state like character. “We’re not talking about political union here,” he told one reporter. “We both have capitals 3,000 miles away that don’t consider our interests a priority.”⁵¹ It is these kinds of pronouncements that further illustrate the neoliberal model of citizenship and belonging are embedded in the Cascadian idea.

Partly the statement about not creating a political union served and serves as a protection against accusations of either breaking-up or of making colonizing incursions into Canada. Yet the main reason for insisting on Cascadia's non-state-like character relates to the other supplementary argument through which the region has been promoted as an embodiment of globalization. This argument is that the region also somehow embodies the political spirit of globalization: chiefly, the spirit of the neoliberal dogma of smaller, less interventionist government. As a corollary, then, to the spatial supposition that suggests Cascadia's eclipse of the 49th parallel enables it to capitalize on the benefits of free trade, this argument asserts that because B.C., the most western province in Canada, and Washington and Oregon states have all shared a similar experience of historical alienation from faraway federal capitals they are all also inclined towards a distrust of big government. Bruce Agnew, for example, the director of the Cascadia Project at the Discovery Institute, put it like this: "We are finding borders and national government policies increasingly irrelevant and even crippling".⁵² Or in the words of David Johnson, US Consul to Vancouver and a participant in the some of the early 90s meetings on Cascadian cooperation, "[t]his area is unified by a common hatred of their central governments."⁵³ No wonder then that the new flag was not meant to fly above a new Cascadian state house. And no wonder too that perhaps the other most significant promotional use of the Cascadia name and concept has not been to launch a movement for more meaningful regional democracy but rather to brand a regional stock fund, the *Cascadia Equity Fund*, managed by the Aquila investment firm.⁵⁴

The Cascadian visionaries have over time gone beyond writing op-ed pieces in newspapers and business-journals. While the PACE lane remains one of their signal

success stories, they have nonetheless been tireless in developing other concrete plans for cross-border co-development. The following list of policy goals of the self-appointed Cascadia Planning Group not only give a sense of these more practical plans, but also reveal how such plans fall into line with the wider common practice of neoliberal governance. “Co-operation in a corridor context has numerous, clear advantages,” the document notes under the heading of ‘cooperating regionally to compete globally’:

- It is an effective way to add leverage to investment strategies. The rationalization of functions corridor-wide and corridor-long can eliminate redundant activities and site them in the most cost-efficient, least disruptive locations.
- Corridor coalitions on border, trade and environmental issues can raise the Cascadia Region’s profile as a competitor for funding and can achieve collateral benefits such as improvements that serve local users as well as through traffic, and border and gateway (port and airport) staffing that encourages commodity flow through congested areas.
- A Corridor context can also create an idea sharing forum that offers leverage in innovative, comprehensive use of non-capital solutions: intelligent transportation systems, telecommuting, regulatory harmonization, work rules and hours of operation at key facilities.
- Corridor co-operation can create a larger, more secure financial base that allows access to funding under the most favorable conditions. The benefits include stronger credit ratings, use of the full-range of current and evolving financial mechanisms and public-private partnerships, and the possibility of a distinctive Cascadia Corridor Corporation as a focal point for organizing the financial resources that support major investments. The result of corridor cooperation can make Cascadia one of the world’s premier, cross-border regions, and define new economic, social and environmental realities for the 21st Century.⁵⁵

This bulleted list not only illustrates the practical connections that the visionaries see between their constructions and such material matters as credit ratings and easing congestion at the border. In addition, the list of the advantages said to accrue from the critical mass and leverage of cooperation is also clearly shot through with telling appeals to the neoliberal common denominators of entrepreneurial governance. Thus eliminating redundancy, increasing cost efficiency, regulatory harmonization, public-private

partnerships, are all there, as is the still more basic neoliberal inclination towards seeing all global life as one giant struggle for the survival of the fittest, which is to say, the most “premier.” Ironically - and especially so given the previously noted tendency to trace Cascadia’s neoliberal credentials back to a history of western alienation - much of this strategic cooperation argument is aimed precisely at the very federal governments of which Cascadians are so supposedly suspect. In the area of federal transportation funding, for example, the Cascadia Planning Group believes that applying cooperatively as a binational region will lend more credibility to its proposals for road improvements and a high-speed rail development between Vancouver, Seattle and Portland. Nevertheless, such appeals for federal resources from D.C. and Ottawa - just like the appeals for PACE lane expansion and more funding for facilitative border guards - are not envisioned in terms of national democratic governance and belonging. They are all about attracting more private capital, more entrepreneurial innovation and what might be called more neoliberal settlement in the region.

Given the Cascadian plans already listed it should not now be too hard to imagine the sorts of citizens given pride of place in the new regional order of Cascadia. Basically they include just two main groups: hi-tech business entrepreneurs, and monied travellers. To address the former first, the visionaries tend to argue that the business entrepreneurs will spring naturally from the bi-national Cascadian earth in much the same way as the mountains and streams that give the region its name. Dori Jones Yang, a writer for *Business Week*, came away from the region with the following impression.

Across the Pacific Northwest, from Burnaby to Boise, from Corvallis to Calgary, high-tech companies have sprouted up like mushrooms in a rain forest, emerging from the lush soils of the region and attracting an inflow of technical talent from across the continent. Cascadia is not yet the heart of the technology world. But as the glow in Silicon Valley

fades, its right where the high-tech sun is rising. And it has what many regions wish they could replicate: a natural environment where entrepreneurs thrive and techies long to live.⁵⁶

This message of regional boosterism basically seeks to sell Cascadia as the perfect place from which hi-tech business can be conducted: perfect not just because of the position of the region or its cross-border synergies, but also because it provides a post-industrial ludic landscape, filled with all the environmental amenities that will enable the new masters of the hi-tech universe to thrive and feel like they really belong. No matter if this belonging is inaccessible to the many people who make products for these people elsewhere around the world. The true Cascadian citizens are a privileged elite who like to live locally while profiting globally. Here, for example, is another description of what one contributor to a coffee table book on Cascadia describes as the business “pilgrims” to the region.

[Cascadians] have seen idealistic, if feckless, communism fall, sensible but uncaring capitalism triumph, and the dawning Information Revolution threaten to wreak as much social havoc in the twenty-first century as the Industrial Revolution did in the nineteenth. They know where they want to spend the next few decades of change, and its the same sort of place that a lot of other smart people are starting to crave: a pleasantly isolated region rich with food, water and plenty of natural resources, where they can find a good job and a nice life. That’s why, although compromises will be made and growing cities will sprawl alarmingly, the dominant ethic of this region will continue to revolve around environmentalism. The New Ecotopians have seen the rest of the world. In fact they help run it. And now they’ve moved to the suburbs – Cascadia, that is – they’ll do whatever has to be done to keep its troubles away from their neighborhood.⁵⁷

Belonging in Cascadia, in these comfy compromised terms, thus becomes envisioned in much the same way as belonging in a suburban gated community. Writ large as a cross-border landscape with hi-tech business campuses, golf courses, shopping malls, and nicely manicured gardens, the neoliberal citizenry are provided with a space through

which they can move easily across borders all the while they rest assured that their regionalized idyll will remain undisturbed.

It would be wrong though to suggest that outsiders are prohibited from belonging in this bull-dozer-borders vision of Cascadia. The key is bringing in money. Thus as well as advertising its multicultural credentials as a site for Pacific Rim business, the promoters also make much of the possibilities of Cascadia as a tourism destination. The large coffee-table picture book in which Sutherland's comments appeared, for example, was also marketed as part of a wider campaign to attract more tourists to the region.⁵⁸ The book contains page after page of glossy photos of the region, from the cities to the wilderness areas, each time playing-up the similarities north and south of the border, and, throughout, advertising Cascadia as an attractive holiday destination. More than just one picture book, though, the campaign to bring more tourists to the region has been developed for over a decade now under the banner of another Cascadian slogan, 'The Two Nation Vacation'. A pamphlet for travel agents designed as part of this campaign and circulated in 1997 put the following gloss on how tourists can thereby find their own way to belonging in the bi-national landscape.

"Cascadia, gateway to the Pacific North-west and the Two-Nation Vacation, consists of the American states of Washington and Oregon and the Canadian province of British Columbia. It's an advantageous location of international tourism and trade.... There's something magnetic here for a certain kind of soul... one who appreciates natural beauty, limitless recreational opportunities, and the vibrant blend of international influences that have produced Cascadia's diverse culture and thriving economy. Many people have decided to call this region home which is a decision you'll understand once you see Cascadia for yourself. ... Washington, Oregon and British Columbia. That's where Cascadia is. But once you've experienced this magical place, its going to be somewhere else as well. It'll be in your heart and on your mind... forever."⁵⁹

In this vision the vector of regional belonging becomes almost entirely switched around. Cascadia itself becomes an object, magical or otherwise, that can belong to you the tourist. It is the ultimate commodification of belonging, all framed with new age appeals to natural beauty, diversity and special magnetism. Insofar as the advertisement represents a certain commercialized sense of the regional self (itself based in part, it should be noticed, on a certain sort of denial of commercialization), it also helps illustrate how the entrepreneurial citizen subjects of the cross-border space imagine Cascadia as a neoliberal homeland.

Conclusions

“Borders, states and societies are mutually formative – borders shape what they contain and are shaped by them – but border research undermines lazy assumptions that ‘state’ and ‘society’, ‘state’ and ‘nation’, or ‘state’ and ‘governance’ are synonymous or territorially co-terminous. Instead of becoming redundant in a ‘borderless’ world, the increasing differentiation, complexity and contradictions of political borders make border research more important and more revealing of wider social change”

James Anderson and Liam O’Dowd⁶⁰

As I hope I have now shown, borders and border spaces can indeed reveal much about wider patterns of social change. Anderson and O’Dowd’s theoretical argument is well made in this respect because it underlines how much of the revelatory quality of border region transformation stems from the ways in which it helps unsettle assumptions about the spatial congruence of state, society, nation and governance. In an era of neoliberal governance that is mediated both by national-state governments and various transnational forms of effective government (including trade agreements and global institutions like the World Bank), it seems vital to abandon these assumptions while at

the same time as tracking the ways in which forms of national-state policy making still shape citizenship and belonging on the ground. This chapter has explored the history of the PACE lane and NEXUS, as well as the development of the concept of Cascadia, with a view to doing just this. The aim has not been to argue that fast-border crossing and the concept of a cross-border region embody the so-called borderless world. This is what the neoliberal promoters do themselves. Instead, by examining the statements of these promoters and their uneven success in developing and then maintaining a system of fast border crossing, the purpose of the chapter has been to highlight the changes as symptoms of mediated and yet persistently emergent neoliberal tendencies. In this conclusion, I would like to reflect further on what these tendencies tell us about changing state-society relations and the much commented upon 'disarticulation' of the nation-state. Clearly, as many of the other chapters in this volume show, international borders and border spaces are by no means the only useful empirical entry point into these questions. And so it also worthwhile to consider here why exactly borders can be as illuminating as Anderson and O'Dowd aver.

Much of the recent flurry of writing about borders in the social sciences and humanities has built on the basic insight that they offer revealing research windows through which to examine the changing meaning of citizenship and statehood in an era marked by the end of the Cold War, global migration, and intensified political and economic interdependencies.⁶¹ As conspicuously tangible and observable zones, borders provide spatial laboratories where the grand abstractions of 'globalization', 'global civil society' and 'the network society' can be compared with the empirical reality of what is actually happening on the ground.⁶² Of course, as soon as such research is pursued very

far, though, the epistemological conceit that the border is in fact a simple ground where all the abstract flows and ties become visible is exploded. Borders too are complex abstractions, particularly insofar as they underpin the representation and consequent imagination of nation in cultural and social life. So while they do indeed function as practical checkpoints where land is fenced, goods counted, and people stopped, labeled, and sometimes killed, borders also exist as part of the complex mental mapping of nation-states disseminated in media as varied as weather maps and school textbooks.⁶³ As Anssi Paasi has clearly argued in the terms of Anthony Giddens' structuration theory, this means that international boundaries lie at the heart of a reciprocal territorial dynamic between the socio-political production of space and the spatial production of society and politics.⁶⁴ Borders are the practical products of the nation-states on which they retroactively bestow an abstracted and imagined idea of contained coherence. Moreover, these reciprocal ties extend beyond the relays between representing and inspiring nationhood. As well as providing the cartographic outlines for the socio-cultural imagination of nation, borders also facilitate the more disciplinary mental-mapping of the state itself as a contained and containing abstract apparatus. In this way, they help give the 'idea' of the state its abstracted coherence as a state *apart* from society, all the while practically enabling state officials to go about the more messy, quotidian work of managing and policing membership *in* society.⁶⁵ Borders, then, are hybrid sites where the reciprocal ties between the social and cultural definition of belonging to a nation and the bureaucratic regulation of belonging to a state – ties that form the very basis of modern citizenship – are worked out and written out in space. They are places, in fact, where the generative geography dissembled by the space spanning hyphen in 'nation-

state' is actually inscribed on the earth. It is primarily because of this, I think, that borders provide especially useful sites from which to examine and nuance claims about the touted disarticulation of the nation-state.

In terms of claims about disarticulation there are actually very few scholars that are willing to echo Kenichi Ohmae's famously arrogant arguments about a borderless world and the coming end of the nation-state.⁶⁶ Indeed, it seems an almost ritualistic gesture of the general texts now being written on globalization to strawman Ohmae as a tendentious extremist against whose claims the more sober reflections of social science are reflected in all their scholarly rigor.⁶⁷ However, what these general texts still share with Ohmae is an attention to the ways in which national territoriality is today being undermined, loosening the hyphenation of nation and state, and leading to a variety of new geographical configurations of state authority and the eclipse or at least the deterritorialization of the nation as a dominant terrain of cultural and political identity formation. Scholte in fact defines contemporary globalization on the basis of its 'supraterritoriality' and 'deterritorialization'. In the more anthropological and culturally sensitive literatures on global networks, this particular concern with disarticulation and the resulting transformation of citizenship is still more strongly expressed. Thus in his book on the 'Cultural Dimensions of Globalization' Arjun Appadurai writes of the nation and state that "the hyphen that links them is now less an icon of conjuncture than an index of disjuncture".⁶⁸ For Appadurai such disjuncture is made manifest most strongly in the emergence of what he calls 'ethnoscapes', the flows of people across international borders along with the subsequent development of new border-crossing forms of diasporic consciousness and identity. This is more than jargon mongering, and the

notion of ethnoscapes (along with Appadurai's related concepts of transnational media-scapes, finance-scapes, techno-scapes and ideo-scapes) all help to elucidate some of the factors that have led to such concrete developments as the PACE lane and Cascadia. However, what Appadurai and other scholars of identity formation tend to ignore, is the way such forms of deterritorialization are both mediated by existing state practices and coupled with new types of *re*territorialization. He therefore pays scant attention to how emergent norms of cross-border belonging are mediated by the transformation and re-regulation (not dissolution) of traditional borders.

Appadurai's omission, of course, is exactly what this chapter has sought to address. In doing so, I used the title 'Passports into Credit Cards' because it seemed to capture the zeitgeist tendencies and underlying hopes of the Cascadian visionaries. Clearly, the actual plans that Hays laid out have still yet to be realized, and the uneven and unfinished developments that have led so far from PACE to NEXUS illustrate how the neoliberal vision of post-national citizenship has been consistently frustrated by stubbornly national state practices. That said, I would like to conclude here by noting that the evidence from the Canada-US border on the west coast does nonetheless point towards an increasingly incongruent spatial organization of civil citizenship *vis-à-vis* national-state practices. While social and political citizenship remain framed (and increasingly constrained) by national territorial logics, it seems clear that the emergence of fast-track border crossings and the associated visions of post-national Cascadian belonging point towards a de-linking of elite managerial citizenship from the territorial confines of the nation-state. They are examples of a shift towards a limited form of transnational citizenship for the transnational capitalist class, a sense of citizenship

animated by an entrepreneurial sense of self and enabled by a neoliberal regime of state transformation and transnational state-making.⁶⁹ To quote one last time from the plans outlined by Hays, "none of this is blue sky thinking. Its power comes from the linking together in a unique way of already existing ideas. The technological, commercial, and governmental timing are right."

The timing may be right, but from the perspective of the increasingly large numbers of critics who challenge the neoliberal worldview, the politics, the ethics and the social implications of neoliberal citizenship are all wrong. To end, then, on a different note, I would like to ask whether it is possible to think about other forms of transnational citizenship that move beyond the credit card model; forms of political and, perhaps one day, even social citizenship that create freedom of safe movement for everybody irrespective of whether they pre-qualify for platinum or gold class or all the other red-carpet, VIP club fast-capitalist privileges? Sites such as the Porto Allegre World Social Forum offer an obvious starting point for building such a future, but many other evocations of alternative 'transnationalisms from below' already exist. I will close with one example from the writing of Bharati Mukherjee whose character Jasmine (in the novel of the same name) describes a specter haunting, not Europe, but the transnational neoliberal world.

There is a shadow world of aircraft permanently aloft that share air lanes and radio frequencies with Pan Am and British Air and Air India, portaging people who coexist with tourists and businessmen. But we are refugees and mercenaries and guest workers, you see us sleeping in airport lounges, you watch us unwrapping the last of our native foods, unrolling our prayer rugs, reading our holy books, taking out for the hundredth time an aerogram promising a job or space to sleep, a newspaper in our language, a photo of happier times, a passport, a visa, a laissez-passer... We ask only one thing: to be allowed to land; to pass through; to continue... What country? What continent? We pass through wars, through plagues. I am hungry for news, but the discarded papers are in characters

or languages I cannot read. The zig-zag route is the straightest. I phantom my way through three continents.⁷⁰

This is a piece of fiction but it evokes the many experiences and spaces that lie beyond the neoliberal imagination. Alert to these alternatives, a truly smart border policy needs to begin imagining more global, more democratic and more inclusive models of citizenship.

¹ Ronald J. Hays, "INSPASS: INS Passenger Accelerated Service System," a paper authored on 4 January 1996 that was published on a now inactive webpage of the Department of Justice. For reasons that are no doubt connected to the argument for public-private partnerships put forward here by Hays, his paper is now available - on the web at the time of revising this paper (August 12, 2002) - on the site of the "Biometric Consortium". <http://www.biometrics.org/REPORTS/INSPASS.html>

² As Jane Caplan and John Torpey note in their survey of the history of modern identity cards, "the adoption of the passport regime in international travel is intimately tied to the development of citizenship rules." Jane Caplan and John Torpey, "Introduction," in Jane Caplan and John Torpey, eds. *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 1- 12, at page 3.

³ On the ambiguities of state-society relations associated with passports, Torpey glosses Max Weber as follows: "As the documentary expression of modern states' efforts to monopolize the 'legitimate means of movement', the passport concentrates in itself the enormous increase in modern states' control over individual existence that has evolved since the nineteenth century. At the same time, in a world in which documentary attestation of identity is generally required for the legal traversal of state boundaries, passports facilitate peoples movements. In addition passports ensure that their bearers may avail themselves of the protections that states may provide in an uncertain and potentially hostile world." In John Torpey, "The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Passport System," in Jane Caplan and John Torpey, eds. *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 256 - 270, at page 256-7.

⁴ Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999). The flexible citizenship Ong is most interested in is that of wealthy ethnic Chinese business managers who have purchased multiple passports along with many other social and political rights associated with multiple national citizenships; all with a view to securing business advantages, real estate deals and/or family security through elite education. Clearly, though, there are many other forms of cosmopolitan belonging in the current era, not all of them privileged with the official imprimatur of state citizenship. This is a point that the anthropologist James Clifford has made extensively, as do many of the other contributions to Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, eds., *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). See in particular James Clifford, "Mixed Feelings," in Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, eds., *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) 362 - 370. Following Clifford, I would argue that we need to study the *discrepant* forms of cosmopolitan culture as they take form in differently rooted global routeways, whether they be the plush aisles of red carpet in business class or the barbed wire borderlands of the US-Mexican desert. Obviously, then, this paper's attempt to chart the elite model of flexible citizenship reflected in the re-regulations and re-imaginings of the Canada-US border by no means illustrates all of the challenges to traditional national norms of citizenship in the era of neoliberalism.

⁵ T. H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class," in Gershon Shafir, ed., *The Citizenship Debates: A Reader*, (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1998) 93 - 112.

⁶ For the feminist critiques, see Sallie Marston, "Who are 'the people?' Gender, citizenship and the making of the American nation," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 8: 449 - 458; Nancy Fraser and

Linda Gordon, "Contract versus Charity: Why Is There No Social Citizenship in the United States?" in Gershon Shafir, ed., *The Citizenship Debates: A Reader*, (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1998) 113 - 127; and Eleonore Kofman, "Rights and Citizenship," in John Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell and Gerard Toal, eds. *A Companion to Political Geography* (New York: Routledge, forthcoming). For a wonderful and powerfully critical review of how citizenship in the West was systematically imagined by liberal thinkers (such as Mill) in a way that assumed the necessary denial of citizenship rights to the inhabitants of European colonies see Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth Century British Legal Thought*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

⁷ See Sallie Marston and Katharyne Mitchell, "Citizens and the State: contextualizing citizenship formations in space and time" in Clive Barnett and Murray Low, eds. *Spaces of Democracy* (London: Sage Publications, 2002).

⁸ Quoted in Stephen Clarkson, "Constitutionalising the Canadian-American Relationship," in Duncan Cameron and Mel Watkins, eds., *Canada Under Free Trade*, (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co, 1993) pp. 3 – 20, at p. 3.

⁹ Neoliberalism, therefore, is more than just as a quasi-constitutional outcome of signing trade agreements into law (as some free trade protesters sometimes suggest). It is just as much a product of the more global pattern of accelerated economic interdependency and the norms of free trade it has brought with it – often more simply dubbed 'globalization'. There is a systematic way in which neoliberalism in this sense has been progressively locked into transnational place ever since the oil crises and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system at the start of the 70s. Although much of the subsequent development of the Uruguay GATT round and the final formation of the WTO has been labeled 'Americanization' by critics, the US, and especially local government within the US, remains often just as susceptible as smaller economies to the structural force of this emerging free-trading regime.

¹⁰ Stephen Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 24, 3, pp. 399 – 423. Gill describes disciplinary neoliberalism further as being "institutionalized at the macro-level of power in the quasi-legal restructuring of state and international political forms: the 'new constitutionalism'. [This...] can be defined as the political project of attempting to make transnational liberalism, and if possible liberal democratic capitalism, the sole model for future development. It is therefore intimately related to the rise of market civilization" page 412.

¹¹ Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, "Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming," *Public Culture*, 12, 2: 2000: 291-344, at 322.

¹² Leslie Sklair, *The Transnational Capitalist Class*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).

¹³ David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).

¹⁴ Noted in Douglas Ward, "Using Fast Lane is in the Cards," *Vancouver Sun*, Thursday, June 27, 2002, A4.

¹⁵ However, it should be noted that there were already in the mid-1990s other operational systems that were far more technologically advanced than PACE. The most notable amongst these was the SENTRI network put into place on the border with Mexico at San Diego. SENTRI stands for Secure Electronic Network for Traveler's Rapid Inspection. However, given its location and its purpose of distinguishing pre-cleared travelers from ordinary Mexico-US border-crossers, the acronym SENTRI is a telling militaristic contrast to PACE..

¹⁶ Paul Schell and John Hamer, 'Cascadia: The New Binationalism of Western Canada and the U.S. Pacific Northwest', in Earle R. and Wirth J. (eds.), *Identities in North America: The Search for Community* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1995) p. 140 – 156, at page 148. The terminology of bull-doing had been carried forward from an earlier piece by Schell: Paul Schell 'Bulldozing Borders', *The New Pacific* (Summer 1990): 5 – 10. It should be noted that Schell later went on to become Mayor of Seattle where, during his tenure, his vision of bull-doing checkpoints was radically revisited by anti-WTO protesters. Schell's neoliberal response was to call in the National Guard and impose curfews on downtown Seattle.

¹⁷ Ong, *Flexible Citizenship*, p. 6.

¹⁸ Pynn, L., "Without Politicians, Cascadia is Just a Dream," *Vancouver Sun*, November 12, 1997: A1.

¹⁹ For a useful overview of the controversy see Theodore, Cohn, 1999, "Cross-border Travel in North America: The Challenge of U.S. Section 110 Legislation," *Canadian American Public Policy*, 40, October, 1999: 1 – 70.

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- ²⁰ Steve Wilhelm, "Future border procedures concern trade advocates," *Puget Sound Business Journal*, October 16th, 1997, A6.
- ²¹ Joel Connelly and Michael Paulson, "U.S., Canada say border law would create havoc," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, May 19th, 1999, A3.
- ²² Paul Schell and Hamer, 'Cascadia: The New Binationalism of Western Canada and the U.S. Pacific Northwest', in Earle R. and Wirth J. (eds.), *Identities in North America: The Search for Community*, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1995) pp. 140 – 156, at p. 143.
- ²³ Quoted in Frandsen, G. "Tighter entry rules could snarl the border," *Seattle Times*, November 25, 1997, A5.
- ²⁴ *United States Code Congressional and Administrative News*, 1996, 104th Congress-Second Session, Volume 3, Public Laws 104-208 to 104-325.
- ²⁵ Hays, 1996, *op.cit.*
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*
- ²⁷ See Meg Olson, Pace Lane Office Opens After Summer-Long Closure, *The Northern Light*, 2000, November 2.
- ²⁸ Later on the National Guard were also sent to do support work at the border too, creating the further impression of a state of high alert and fortification. However, to combat the concern that this was sending a negative message towards America's largest trading partner, Attorney General John Ashcroft emphasized that the Guard were there "to help facilitate the border not fortify the border." Quoted in Meg Olson, "National Guard impact on border waits remain unclear," *The Northern Light*, December 6, 2001.
- ²⁹ Anthony dePalma, "Slow Crawl at the Border," *The New York Times*, October 21, 2001, A1
- ³⁰ Robert Bonner, "The Customs Patrol," *Washington Post*, February 16th, 2002.
- ³¹ Meg Olson, "PACE Reopening Unlikely," *The Northern Light*, November 1, 2001.
- ³² Ward, 2002, *op.cit.*
- ³³ Ward, 2002, *op.cit.*
- ³⁴ Quoted in John Stark, "Security stifles fast lane plans," *The Bellingham Herald*, Wednesday, November 28, 2001.
- ³⁵ Meg Olson, "Larsen asks INS to reopen tighter PACE," *The Northern Light*, October 11, 2001.
- ³⁶ Canada-United States Smart Border Declaration, accessed at http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minipub/Publication.asp?Filespec=/Min_Pub_Docs/104780.htm on 12/12/01.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.* p. 1.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 1.
- ³⁹ See the White House web site records at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020514-4.html> Accessed August 13 2002.
- ⁴⁰ The application materials for NEXUS are at the time of writing available on a Canadian government website at: <http://www.ccra-adrc.gc.ca/customs/individuals/nexus/menu-e.html> Accessed on August 13, 2002.
- ⁴¹ Quoted in Meg Olson, "Nexus tweaking should speed-up enrollment process," *The Northern Light*, July 4, 2002.
- ⁴² Marston and Mitchell, 2002, *op.cit.*, page 28.
- ⁴³ Interestingly, at the close of his famous piece on governmentality, Foucault identifies in what he says is "a very global, rough and inexact fashion" three modalities of governmentality that correspond at least thematically, if not temporally, with Marshall's three phases of citizenship. "First of all, the state of justice, born in the feudal type of territorial regime which corresponds to a society of laws - either customs or written laws - involving a whole reciprocal play of obligation and litigation; second, the administrative state, born in the territoriality of national boundaries in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and corresponding to a society of regulation and discipline; and finally a governmental state, essentially defined no longer in terms of its territoriality, of its surface area, but in terms of the mass of its population with its volume and density." Micheal Foucault, "Governmentality," in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991, pages 87 - 104, at 104. This quotation is worth noting here, because like Marshall's account, it begs the question of what is happening today in a world where the territoriality of the nation-state has been both eclipsed and undercut by a host of globalizing economic dynamics. Just as the evolution from PACE lane to NEXUS points towards a post-national form of neoliberal civil citizenship, it might also be offered as a story of the

changing geographical organization of governmentality in a world where Foucault's 'governmental state' (i.e. the welfare state) is in decline.

⁴⁴ Rose prefers to use the term 'advanced liberalism' but his argument about how the infiltration of market and accounting concepts have also helped refashion citizens as consumers still seems congruent with the account of neoliberal border control policies outlined here. See Nikolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

⁴⁵ Anderson himself is evidently no fan of the new scholarly enthusiasm for all things transnational. That said, his robust arguments in the second edition of *Imagined Communities* about the abstract logoization of political and disciplinary space in the modern nation-state, help undergird the seriousness of the question about what kinds of territorial logics might underpin new forms of deep horizontal but yet transnational community. Benedict Anderson 1991, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso, revised edition. For his skepticism about transnationalism, see Benedict Anderson, "Nationalism, Identity, and the World-in-Motion: On the Logics of Seriality," in Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, eds., *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 117 - 133.

⁴⁶ Aiwha Ong, "Latitudes of Citizenship," in Alyson Brysk and Gershon Shafir, eds., *People out of Place: Globalization and the Citizenship Gap*, (New York: Routledge, forthcoming).

⁴⁷ Schell and Hamer, 1995: 141.

⁴⁸ Buchanan B., "untitled essay", *B.C. Business*, September, 1992: 36-7.

⁴⁹ Kelly, C. 'Midwifing the New Regional Order,' *The New Pacific*, (Spring, 1994): 6.

⁵⁰ The phrase is Michael Billig's who argues for a reconsideration of the power of songs, flags and other everyday taken-for-granted symbols in attempts to come to terms with the hegemony of nationalism. Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, London: Sage, 1995.

⁵¹ Gilbert, R. 'Erasing National Borders to Build a Trade Region,' *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 20, 1992: 9.

⁵² Quoted in Schodolski, V. 'Northwest's economy defies national borders,' *Chicago Tribune*, August 1, 1994: 1.

⁵³ Jim Francis, "Cascadia isn't just for dreamers anymore," *Sunday Oregonian*, 20th September, 1992, R1-R4.

⁵⁴ Halverson, G. 'Regional Road Maps Guide Some Mutual Funds,' *The Christian Science Monitor*, 8th. October 1996, 11.

⁵⁵ *Cascadia Planning Group*, 'British Columbia – Washington Corridor Task Force', mimeo (January, 1999): 3-4.

⁵⁶ Doris Yang, 'Magic Mountains: Attracted by pristine mountain beauty, the Pacific Northwest's high-tech wizards are aiming at conquering world markets,' *The New Pacific*, (Autumn, 1992): 19-23.

⁵⁷ Jim Sutherland, 'Natural Selection', in Beebe, M. *Cascadia: A Tale of Two Cities, Seattle and Vancouver, B.C.*, (New York: Harry Abrams, 1996): 40 – 43.

⁵⁸ Beebe, M. *Cascadia: A Tale of Two Cities, Seattle and Vancouver, B.C.*, (New York: Harry Abrams, 1996).

⁵⁹ Undated pamphlet.

⁶⁰ James Anderson and Liam O'Dowd, "Borders, Border-Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory Meanings and Changing Significance." *Regional Studies* 33 (7) 1999: 593 – 604, at p. 594.

⁶¹ For a useful recent survey of the ways in which border research speaks to questions about migration and othering see Henk Van Houtum and Ton Van Naerssen, "Bordering, Ordering and Othering," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 93, 2, 2002, 125 - 136

⁶² See, for example, Heikki Eskelinen, Ilkka Liikanen and Jukka Oksa, eds., *Curtains of Iron and Gold: Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Interaction*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Thomas Wilson and Hastings Donnan, eds., *Border Identities: Nation and state at international frontiers*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and, Liam O'Dowd and Thomas Wilson, eds., *Borders, Nations and States: Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996).

⁶³ Some of the most useful recent research on changing border regimes has drawn attention to precisely these questions of cultural and political representation. For example, Eve Darian-Smith's careful investigation of the reterritorializations wrought by the building of the Channel Tunnel between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais richly testifies to the contradictions between the transnational economic imperatives driving the cross-Channel project and the old English state formations and their constituencies who, she shows, have been so culturally disoriented by the Tunnel and the attendant EU plans for regional

transformation. [Eve Darian-Smith, *Bridging Divides: The Channel Tunnel and English Legal Identity in the New Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999)] In this case, the border has certainly not disappeared between the UK and France, but the capacity for the Channel to function in the UK as an absolute end point for both national mental maps and legal regulation is shown by Darian Smith to have been profoundly disrupted. She argues thus that the Channel Tunnel as a practical reterritorialization of the border has also served as a condensation point for English anxieties about European integration and the associated cultural politics surrounding changes to the norms of the nation-state. [See also Matthew Sparke, "Chunnel Visions: Unpacking the Anticipatory Geographies of an Anglo-European borderland," *Journal of Borderland Studies*, XV,1, 2000, 2 – 34.] In another study of a case where the border really has disappeared, Daphne Berdahl's book on German reunification shows how detailed ethnographic attention to the territorial legacy of the former international boundary also pre-empts lazy assumptions about wholesale deterritorialization. In so doing, it opens up useful insights on to the unevenness of citizenship and the divergent meanings of belonging in the newly reunited Germany, as well as showing how the mental maps of the Kella community – the former East German village that is the focus of the study – continued to be regulated by the legacies of the fencing and military checkpoints that overshadowed it for so long. See Daphne Berdahl, 1999, *Where the world ended: Re-unification and identity in the German Borderland*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

⁶⁴ Anssi Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border*, (New York: Wiley, 1996), p. 27.

⁶⁵ See Migdal, this volume. I should note that my own formulation of these relations here builds simultaneously on the arguments of James Scott and Timothy Mitchell. Both are especially attuned to the geography of state formation, but while Scott tends to anthropomorphize the state that 'sees' spatially, Mitchell offers a corrective attention to how spatial organization imbues the state with an aura of all-seeing-ness. See James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), and, Timothy Mitchell "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," *American Political Science Review*, 85, 1, 1991: 77 – 96; and idem, *Colonising Egypt*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).

⁶⁶ Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies*, New York: The Free Press, 1995.

⁶⁷ See David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); and Jan Art Scholte, 2000, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, New York: Palgrave.

⁶⁸ Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 39.

⁶⁹ For further elaboration of what I mean by transnational state-making see Matthew Sparke, *Hyphen-Nation-States: Critical Geographies of Displacement and Disjuncture*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming.

⁷⁰ Quoted in Van Houtum and Van Naerssen, op.cit., at page 133.