ABSTRACT

When the Bush administration launched the Gulf War in 1991, they followed the guidelines of an intervention strategy that would later be dubbed the Powell Doctrine. This strategy demanded the use of overwhelming force to achieve clear military and political goals that could be quickly and obviously achieved. When the basic tenants of the Powell Doctrine were employed strategically in the Gulf War to reverse the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the benefits of the Doctrine became clear. The war was quick, decisive, did not cost the intervening coalition very many lives, and helped the US protect its vital national oil interests in the Middle East. In many ways, the Gulf War validated the benefits the Powell Doctrine. However, Iraq was plagued by instability after the Gulf War. The economy and infrastructure were crippled and harsh sanctions and military interference only exacerbated the problems. Internationally, Iraq was labeled a rogue state and relegated to diplomatic inferiority. Many of these problems, it turns out, link directly back to the military and political strategies dictated by the Powell Doctrine. First, the use of overwhelming force decimated Iraq’s infrastructure. Then, the United States’ adherence to the strict objectives outlined prior to the conflict prevented it from helping repair the damage inevitable in war, especially one employing overwhelming force. Finally, the pre-war vilification of Iraq, specifically Saddam, isolated Iraq so completely that post-war interactions were impossible. Separately, but especially together, these failings surely caused a majority of the instability in Iraq after the Gulf War. It turns out, therefore, that despite its benefits the Powell Doctrine does not fully account for the effects of war and will likely exacerbate instability as it did in Iraq in 1991.

Completing the Powell Doctrine
Theorizing Post-War Instability in Iraq

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Iraq suffered from substantial instability following the 1991 Gulf War intervention. Among other acute conditions, Iraq was labeled an international rogue, its people suffered in poverty, the Iraqi economy was in shambles, the Kurds were massacred in the North, and prominent UN member states were prompted to intervene on a fairly regular basis. President George H. W. Bush, who had professed a desire for regional stability in the Middle East prior to the Gulf War, certainly failed to achieve his end. The question then arises: what caused this post-war instability? Ironically, the failure of the Powell Doctrine, as an intervention theory, may suggest that the very strategy used to win the Gulf War caused a significant portion of the problems following it.

I begin by exploring the potential gaps in premises of the Powell Doctrine that might have contributed to the post-war instability. I establish that the Powell Doctrine may cause substantial instability in the enemy country because of its reliance upon the use of overwhelming force, its reluctance to plan for or participate in post-war activities, and its vilification of the enemy state. I then proceed to test these hypotheses against the events following the Gulf War. Since the hypotheses fit well with the aftermath of the Gulf War, I conclude that the Powell Doctrine did contribute to the instability that followed the war. While some would argue that the mere presence of Saddam caused a majority of the instability, I posit that Saddam certainly contributed to episodic periods of extreme unrest but was actually a predominantly stabilizing force. While not the sole cause, the intervention style used in the Gulf War had specific theoretical failings that caused and aggravated a number of problems after the conclusion of the conflict.

Efficiency ruled United States military policy in the 1991 Gulf War. With vital national economic interests at stake, the US reacted strongly against Iraq’s invasion of the oil-rich country of Kuwait in August 1990. Without delay the US, led by President George H. W. Bush, condemned Saddam’s actions. Days later, it deployed defensive troops to protect the Saudi border from potential further aggression should Iraqi forces continue their offensive military actions into Saudi
Arabia. Then the US directed the international diplomatic and economic pressures that led to several UN mandates and international sanctions. Within days, Bush declared that the invasion ‘would not stand’. He immediately began to assess the necessity and viability of a military offensive to drive Saddam out of Kuwait. Rallying international support, Bush built up a force of over half a million military personnel along Saudi Arabia’s northern border. Using impressive, though largely coercive, strategic diplomacy, Bush persuaded the UN to set a January 15th deadline for Saddam’s withdrawal from Kuwait. When Saddam failed to comply, Bush immediately launched a massive air campaign that took control of Iraqi air space, eliminated strategic targets, and prepared the battlefield for a massive ground offensive. After six weeks, the ground offensive cut through Iraqi forces, ejecting them from Kuwait and all of Southeastern Iraq in less than one hundred hours. Despite their momentum, however, the military pursuit stopped well short of Baghdad, leaving Saddam in power. The war ended officially on February 28th, 1991, only seven months after the initial invasion of Kuwait. After the war, Iraq was diplomatically isolated and stripped of its sovereignty for years by sanctions, inspections, the introduction of a no-fly zone, and the repeated interjection of military force.

The US intervention strategy executed during the Gulf War strategy was both a statement against the failures of Vietnam and the test run of an emerging model of intervention that would drastically reduce military failures. Following the military success of the Gulf War, the model’s viability was confirmed. Indeed, “After the war, political and military leaders in the US hailed the conflict as a model for the future of warfare.” Casper Weinberger and Colin Powell are generally credited with the establishment of what is now known as the Powell Doctrine. Essentially, the Powell Doctrine promotes, “full spectrum dominance”—“the capability to prevail, quickly and cheaply, in any and all forms of conflict.” This approach was derived from Colin Powell’s experience as an Infantry Captain in Vietnam. Weary of future military failures, Powell

3 A. J. Bacevich, The limits of power: the end of American exceptionalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008), 128-29. Bacevich notes that the Powell Doctrine was a body of principles first developed by the post-Vietnam officer corps, adopted by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and “expanded” by Powell during his tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He writes that:
   According to Weinberger and Powell, the US would fight only when genuinely vital interests were at stake…mobilize the necessary resources…to win promptly and decisively.
   It would end conflicts expeditiously and then get out, leaving no loose ends (129).
4 Ibid.
categorically refused to put the US or its Armed Forces in a debilitating and hopeless position again. As such, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and endangered the US’ access to reasonably priced oil, Colin Powell and the Bush administration felt substantial pressure to react forcefully. With the failings of Vietnam in mind and the underpinnings of coherent doctrine at their disposal, the Bush administration started down the path to war. Indeed, the Gulf War was everything Vietnam was not. US objectives were limited and gave rise to specific military goals. The forced used was overwhelming and strictly oriented toward achievable objectives. The coalition received widespread international support. Military victory was quick and decisive. By the end, “both President Bush and Colin Powell… claimed that the war in the Gulf had exorcised the ghosts of the Vietnam War.” Unfortunately, the actual result was much more complicated.

After the war, Iraq’s internal instability led to a dire humanitarian crisis. Beyond its borders, Iraq was in a precarious position. Alienated from the international community, Iraq desperately tried to regain its former glory, but was cornered by coercive US containment polices and international distrust. Because of the many religious and political factions in Iraq, the intense regional competition in the Middle East, and the stigma produced by Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, hypothesizing the cause Iraq’s internal and external instability is complicated. However, the nature of the Powell Doctrine and its influence on the Gulf War may have significantly contributed to the post-war instability. The all or nothing intervention style of the Powell Doctrine coupled with strict military objectives conceivably contributes to, and then fails to help rectify, conditions that lead to both internal and external instability in the rogue state.

The nature of Powell Doctrine warfare suggests several potential doctrinal weaknesses that would cause post-war difficulties. Drawing from gaps in the theory, three hypotheses follow. First, the use of overwhelming force would likely debilitate the enemy state by decimating their army and robbing them of essential infrastructure. Due to the nature of the all or nothing strategy, there would be acute casualty asymmetry, which would noticeably undermine the enemy state’s ability to police its citizens after the engagement. Furthermore, any factory, refinery, power plant, or military unit that could help the enemy wage war woul

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5 Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in international relations: power, politics and ideology*, The contemporary Middle East, 4 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge, 2005), 14.
after the conflict but difficult to secure in light of the damage the country sustained.

The second hypothesis posits that the strict objectives, which must be achievable militarily, would probably engender resistance to involvement in political issues after the military campaign. This is especially true in a situation that might evolve into a nation building mission—a mission fraught with risks and the possibility of long-term entanglement. On the path to war, the heads of state would clearly delineate an ultimate goal and direct all action toward achieving that goal. In all likelihood, there would be no plans for handling problems that occur post-victory. Thus, any unforeseen conditions caused by the war, or occurring in its wake, would simply linger like festering wounds. As conditions reach extremes, the intervening country would probably have to either intervene again or use ad hoc measures to deal with the problems.

The final hypothesis predicts that in the search for political support prior to the war, the rhetoric used by the intervening country might vilify the enemy state so completely that civilized post-war interaction is impossible. Such a volatile condition simply preempts regional stability. The treatment of Germany after WWI is the best example of this reality. Because Europe and the US blamed Germany for the war, they isolated it, demanded substantial post-war reparations, installed harsh containment measures, and continued these punishments even in the absence of significant threats. Pre-war vilification followed by victory, in accordance with the Powell Doctrine, would facilitate similar conditions. It is also likely that the losing state would be treated as inferior and therefore excluded from international diplomatic forums and future negotiations. Separately, and especially together, these Powell Doctrine tendencies would cause substantial instability for the enemy state, both internally and internationally. Gutted, alienated, and left to rot, the enemy subdued by Powell Doctrine warfare would be anything but stable.

The state of Iraq in the years following the Gulf War clearly demonstrates that the prospective failings of the Powell Doctrine translated into reality. Largely consistent with the aforementioned hypotheses, the outcome of the Gulf War highlights the theoretical failings of the Powell Doctrine. First, the effects of overwhelming force used during the Gulf War sufficiently mirrored the predicted effects on both the army and the infrastructure of the state. Indeed, between the six week air war and the one hundred hour ground assault, “tens of thousands [were] killed on the Iraq side, a few dozen [were] killed on the
This result affirms that the use of overwhelming force produces highly asymmetrical losses. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, the Iraqi army was damaged, but not decimated. Enough of the army, particularly Saddam’s ideologically loyal Republican Guard, remained to suppress several uprisings that occurred directly after the war. Several events prevented the full realization of the Powell Doctrine during the Gulf War. Iraqi forces were toppled so quickly that many immediately surrendered or fled. While coalition forces bombed the fleeing Iraqi convoys, graphic news coverage of the destruction put an end to the coalition pursuit. What is more, “Iraq asked for a ceasefire to prevent further destruction of its forces.” The US was not interested in breaking apart the finely balanced coalition or involved in a nation-building effort, and thus allowed the Iraqi forces to retreat. In accordance with the hypothesis, casualty distribution in the Gulf War was highly asymmetric. Furthermore, the graphic media coverage, quick retreat, and ceasefire, prevented the intended crippling of Iraqi forces. Though Saddam’s Republican Guard did escape and subsequently suppressed citizen uprisings, it was a result of unforeseen and mainly political influences, not the Powell Doctrine.

The second potential outcome of all-or-nothing warfare, namely the strategic demolition of vital infrastructure, certainly occurred during the Gulf War. Woodward writes that the initial invasion plan specifically, “directed that civilian casualties and damage to Iraq should be minimized consistent with protecting friendly forces.” During the war, quite contrary to initial intentions, the coalition air campaign leveled Iraq. Tripp states that, “within the space of six weeks, the air bombardment had destroyed more of Iraq’s economic infrastructure countrywide than had the eight years of war with Iran.” The air campaign primarily targeted military installations or structures that promoted military efficiency. However, over time the air campaign expanded. Saddam’s army was wholly unequipped to handle such an intense aerial offensive, and so the dictator attempted to divert coalition attention by launching Scud missiles into Israel and Saudi Arabia. Iraq intended to stir up Arab inclinations and undermine the unity of the coalition by inciting an Israeli retaliation. Even in the face of these attacks, “the allied bombardment continued unabated, targeting not only Iraq’s military apparatus but also much of its civil infrastructure.”

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6 Halliday, 223.
9 Tripp, 261.
10 Ibid., 254.
militarily relevant structures were sometimes bombed superfluously. Halliday observed that, “the destruction of the civilian electricity generating plants had a legitimate military purpose, to disrupt Iraqi military communications, but it was in retrospect excessive and unnecessary.” In the end, the coalition used so much force during the six-week air campaign that Iraq was essentially relegated to the status of a Third World nation.

After the war, the Secretary General of the UN observed that, “the recent conflict has wrought near apocalyptic results on the economic status of what was until recently a highly urban and mechanized society.” Quite in line with the predicted outcome of a strategy employing overwhelming force, Iraq’s infrastructure suffered extensively during the Gulf War. By itself, the annihilation of Iraqi infrastructure created internal unrest. Left unchecked, these problems quickly escalated into a humanitarian crisis that required international aid. Simultaneously, the infrastructure damage prevented the stabilizing forces of economic growth, reintegration into the diplomatic community, and civilized interpersonal relationships from taking hold. Not only, then, did the use of overwhelming force cripple Iraq’s internal mechanisms, it also obstructed future stabilization. Interestingly, the effects of infrastructure damage were intensified by the sanctions that resulted from the realization of the third hypothesis.

In order to prove the validity of the second hypothesis, several conditions must be met. To start, the limits of the military objective must be clearly defined. This objective was stated three days after Saddam’s initial invasion. Though Bush stated four objectives, only “the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait” was militarily achievable. In accordance with the main tenants of the Powell Doctrine, the US strictly adhered to this stated goal. The US secured Kuwait and went no farther. Even when Iraqi forces were in full retreat and Baghdad was only miles away and completely undefended, the US Third Army Commander, General Schwarzkopf, under instructions from President Bush, order coalition forces to stand down. “Frankly my recommendation had been… continue the march,” General Schwarzkopf

11 Halliday, 128.
stated “I mean we had them in a rout.” But, despite the military advantage, Bush and his advisers were not interested in the nation building that would be required if Baghdad was captured and Saddam was removed from power. Feeling that the coalition had already successfully secured its oil interests, the US National Command Authority opted to encourage Saddam’s overthrow from a distance. This policy falls directly in line with the limited objective missions encouraged by the Powell Doctrine. The US refused to get mired in messy political missions despite their appeal.

Past the ceasefire, however, the US acted impulsively and reluctantly. Such action corresponds to the second half of the second hypothesis, namely that the US would focus so intensely on its main objective that policy makers would fail to prepare for situations arising after the strategic objective was met. In conjunction with this hypothesis, the US policy after the war, in stark contrast to its intervention policy, lacked direction and vision. For example, the US half-heartedly encouraged an Iraqi uprising. Then, reluctant to intervene on the rebel’s behalf, the US allowed Saddam’s Republican Guard to massacre those involved in the insurrection. In fact, the uncertainty about how to handle Saddam was pervasive in US policies following the Gulf War. The US simultaneously refused to acknowledge Saddam’s legitimacy and refused to remove him from power.

The Powell Doctrine asserts that military involvement in post-war internal or political affairs of the enemy state is largely unacceptable because it falls outside of the ultimate objective. But when combined with the damaged caused by the conflict itself, this policy becomes unrealistic. A potent demonstration of this difficulty occurs after Saddam ordered the destruction of the Kurdish insurrection in Northern Iraq. Even in the face of extreme aggression toward a US inspired rebellion "the realpolitik-oriented Bush hoped to avoid any greater entanglement in Iraq's internal politics, but the televised plight of the Kurds forced the president to send U.S. troops to their aid or lose his world leadership role over the U.N. alliance." What is more, US troop involvement on behalf of

14 Lawrence E. Cline, “Defending the end: Decision making in terminating the Persian Gulf War,” *Comparative Strategy* 17, no. 4 (1998): 368. Schwarzkopf added that, “We could have completely closed the doors and made it in fact a battle of annihilation…There were obviously a lot of people who escaped who wouldn't have escaped if the decision hadn't been made to stop where we were at that time” (368).

the Kurdish rebels in the North only came after Britain and France, prompted by Turkey’s concern over the refugee situation, threatened to act without US leadership. The defeat of Saddam’s forces in the Gulf War and US encouragement incited the rebellion; however the US was subsequently unwilling to help deal with the aftermath. As demonstrated in this episode, the US was also forced to respond to the Kurdish problem reactively. Diverging briefly into a counterfactual, it is arguable that the US’ initial strategy to destroy the Republican Guard would have given the rebels a fighting chance and thereby precluded the need for further US intervention. But since this was not the case, the US’ hesitation to aid the rebels demonstrates its reluctance to get involved in Iraqi political issues beyond the scope of the military objectives. It also demonstrates that the inherent instability caused by war may make it impossible to stay out of them. As such, the ad hoc measures taken by the US following the conflict were very shortsighted. The Kurdish problem, for instance, required recurrent interventions and involvement. It also ended up separating the Kurds into factions and reinforcing their distance from Iraq, rather than fostering integration and acceptance. The frequency and nature of the interventions reinforced the diplomatic inferiority of Iraq and angered Saddam, which caused further isolation and reinforced the need for harsh containment measures.

The final hypothesis suggests that in the effort to secure support prior to the Gulf War, the US vilified Saddam Hussein to such an extent that civilized post-war relations were impossible. Bush, with a certain moralistic flair, certainly vilified Saddam: “Besides comparing the Iraqi regime’s harsh occupation of Kuwait to Nazi storm trooper atrocities in Poland, Bush suggested Hussein was even more horrible than Hitler because he employed hostages as human shields.” Of course, because Bush used strategic diplomacy, namely bribes and threats, to persuade the members of the UN Security Council, he didn’t really need rhetoric like this to secure support. At home this type of characterization probably had the best effects. However, “President Bush used inflammatory rhetoric against Saddam Hussein and threatened to place the Iraqi dictator on trial for war crimes, which only reduced the chances for a political resolution of the confrontation and raised expectations regarding the ultimate goal of the war.” Logically, since Bush’s incendiary characterizations of Saddam prior to the

16 Swansbrough, 267.
17 Ibid., 271.
conflict limited the potential for negotiation, the likelihood of mutual respect after the conflict further diminished.

In further support of the hypothesis, the US treatment of Iraq after the Gulf War reflected the schism created between Bush and Saddam in the pre-war period. From the Gulf War on, Iraq was labeled a rogue state and therefore largely excluded from international diplomacy. This in itself puts Iraq in a precarious position in the world and creates unease, if not instability. In many ways, the punishments levied on Iraq after their loss resembled the ones imparted on Germany after World War I. Immediately following their defeat, Iraq was forced to sign on to Resolution 687. In line with Bush’s dislike and distrust of Saddam, “Resolution 687 [was] unquestionably the most intrusive and wide-ranging array of demands made on a sovereign state since the creation of the UN.”

The list was indeed long. Iraq had to officially recognize Kuwait, relinquish all nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, disassemble all ballistic missiles, submit to UN weapons inspections, implement regional arms control measures, avoid hostage taking and terrorism, comply with a whole litany of humanitarian concerns, adhere to the No-Fly Zone restrictions, and pay Kuwait reparations. In addition, the harsh sanctions initiated before the war would not be lifted until Iraq completely complied with the resolution. Certainly, Bush’s vilification of Saddam prior to and during the Gulf War contributed to the severity of these measures. Iraq was stripped of its sovereignty. Its label as a rogue in the international arena also robbed it of negotiating power and relegated it to a realm of inherent inferiority. Essentially, “the ‘mother of all resolutions’ turned Iraq into a kind of delinquent ward of the Security Council.” Of course, strict containment measures are expected after a war like the Gulf War. Since the US did not occupy Iraq, it had the responsibility to ensure post-conflict regional stability. These measures, however, were excessive. The extent of punishment inflicted upon Saddam surpassed containment, appearing much more like vengeance. The alienation of Iraq not only created instability by angering Saddam, it also blocked any chance of Iraqi integration into the international community and exacerbated the internal damage done during the war. Consequently, it is clear that the Gulf War confirms the theoretical failings of the

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18 Koshy, 3018.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
Powell Doctrine, all of which clearly contributed to internal, regional, and international instability.

Though the impact of the theoretical failings of the Powell Doctrine have been assessed independently from one another, when taken together it is astounding how the failings exacerbate the negative effects of one another. Though the Powell Doctrine failings antagonize each other in a number of different scenarios, observing one scenario reveals a sufficient idea of the potential for the failings to exponentially magnify a problem that occurs in war. Beginning with a discussion about Iraq’s damaged infrastructure, the US could have presumably pursued one of three courses of action. One: Help restore at least a basic living standard in Iraq. Two: Stay out of Iraq’s internal affairs but allow the necessary goods in to help fix the infrastructure. Contractors could be used to ensure parts do not get into the wrong hands. Three: Block all aid into Iraq, thereby aggravating already dire circumstances. Option one can be discarded on the grounds that few countries would choose to undertake this burden following a defensive war against a hostile dictator. So between options two and three, two obviously seems preferential. This option allows the citizens of Iraq have a chance at a decent standard of living, which fosters stability, but also takes into account potential risks.

However, a combination of US biases, generated by the Powell Doctrine intervention style, prevented the US from choosing the obviously preferential option. The vilification of Saddam, for instance, complimented the US’ desire to contain Iraq’s potential aggression via harsh sanctions. Unfortunately, the US’ post-war plan was purely reactive. Because of this, the US failed to appreciate the long term effects that sanctions would have on the internal stability of Iraq. In the end, the US was forced to intervene anyway because the situation was simply too dire. This trifecta of theoretical failings is frustrating and self-perpetuating. Wars, especially ones relying on overwhelming force to achieve their objectives, cause extensive damage to important societal mechanisms, in this case the infrastructure. Limited objective interventions fail to prepare for the instability that will inevitably result from such occurrences. Reluctance to get involved allows these damages to fester. Injuries are then made worse by the effects of vilification, specifically exclusion from negotiations, isolation, and harsh punitive measures. As demonstrated in Iraq, the result is certainly not stability.

Of course, a number of other factors certainly contributed to the instability in Iraq. Leaving Saddam in power, for instance, is blamed for a significant portion of the post-war instability. In fact, Saddam’s tactics have certainly caused
episodes of instability. The Kurdish refugee problem, for instance, stemmed directly from Saddam Hussein’s brutal and relentless tactics. For years, “Kurds have died by the hundreds of thousands from the savage depredations of the Baath Party [led by Saddam], which for decades has sought to crush the least degree of separatism or political resistance to its policies.” In other words, Saddam and the Baath Party set the stage for Kurdish uprisings years before the Gulf War. But, “with the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein, the greatest opportunity yet emerged for the Kurds to assert their aspirations for autonomy.” Perhaps giving the US any credit for the Kurdish uprising after the war, then, is overly self-important. In fact, years of oppression by Saddam and his clan prompted the uprising. Saddam’s method of handling the uprisings, furthermore, created an intense humanitarian crisis that caused international unease. Eventually, France and Britain, prompted by Turkey’s concern about an influx of refugees across its southern border, decided to step in on behalf of the Kurds. This intervention, which the US joined at the last second, led to a Kurdish safe-zone and continued intervention over time. Far from stabilizing the situation, this safe-zone actually led to inter-Kurdish fighting as Saddam erected a trade blockade and prevented the Kurds from getting sufficient aid and supplies.

It is obvious, therefore, that Saddam’s brutal tactics certainly contributed to the Kurdish problem and a number of other instabilities in Iraq. The uneasy position of Iraq in the world was also attributable to Saddam’s betrayal of US trust and his resistance to comply with the UN mandate. There are, therefore, multiple reasons to think that Saddam contributed to the instability of Iraq. However, Saddam was also a unifying force that effectively suppressed internal unrest and worked hard to establish Iraq’s place in the world. In fact “the ability of Saddam Husain to maintain his regime and much of his ruling circle intact during the years that followed the defeat of 1991 was a testimony to the resilience of the system he had constructed.” Though Saddam used brutal tactics to achieve his ends, the control that Saddam had over the many factions of Iraq was astounding. He was the cult of personality that held the country together. Furthermore, many of the tactics that contributed to the international distrust of Saddam were simply realistic measures taken to ensure national security in a highly volatile region. Thus, while some of Saddam’s tactics surely contributed to instability, Saddam was predominantly the unifying force that held his country together despite the incendiary presence of several competing ethnic and religious factions.

22 Ibid., 113.
23 Tripp, 265.
The Powell Doctrine, therefore, largely contributed to the instability in Iraq after the Gulf War. Furthermore, I believe that the post-Gulf War period is instructive for US policy makers attempting to formulate an effective intervention policy. The Powell Doctrine shows definite potential in the early stages of intervention. In its current form, however, it lacks the ability to help establish effective post-war strategies to help handle the inherent instability generated by massive and destructive conflicts. The Gulf War brings to light many of these failings. In the future, perhaps the positive attributes of the Powell Doctrine can be matched with a viable post-intervention doctrine that will facilitate the achievement of national objectives while minimizing the damages of war for all parties involved.

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