EINet Alert ~ Oct 24, 2008

2008
Bangladesh / 1 (0)
China / 3 (3)
Egypt / 7 (3)
Indonesia / 20 (17)
Viet Nam / 5 (5)
Total / 36 (28)

***For data on human cases of avian influenza prior to 2008, go to: http://depts.washington.edu/einet/humanh5n1.html

Total no. of confirmed human cases of avian influenza A/(H5N1), Dec 2003 to present: 387 (245).
(WHO 9/10/08 http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/index.html )

Avian influenza age distribution data from WHO/WPRO: http://www.wpro.who.int/sites/csr/data/data_Graphs.htm (WHO/WPRO 6/19/08)

WHO's maps showing world's areas affected by H5N1 avian influenza (last updated 10/6/08): http://gamapserver.who.int/mapLibrary/

WHO’s timeline of important H5N1-related events (last updated 8/14/08): http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/ai_timeline/en/index.html

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Global: UN says pandemic risk remains despite progress on avian influenza H5N1
So far this year no new countries have been hit by H5N1 avian influenza outbreaks, and fewer previously affected countries have reported fresh outbreaks, but the threat of an influenza pandemic has not changed, according to a recent progress report from the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank.

The 115-page update on the global avian influenza status and pandemic planning efforts was released in advance of an international conference on avian and pandemic flu that starts 24 Oct 2008 in Sharm el-Sheik, Egypt. The report is an analysis of survey responses that the UN's influenza coordinator compiled from 148 countries. The findings also include information that the World Bank provided on the international pledges, commitments, and expenditures for avian influenza prevention and control.

Too little testing
David Nabarro, the UN's influenza coordinator, said that despite widespread pandemic planning efforts, only 53% of countries have tested their plans in the past year. He added that the findings are sobering, particularly in light of a recent World Bank report that put the potential economic cost of a global influenza pandemic at up to $3 trillion, nearly 5% of the world's gross domestic product. "When planning for an extraordinary concern like an influenza pandemic, it's not enough just to have a written plan and have everybody signing off on it," he said. "You also have to check it, test it, and make sure that it works, and then revise [it] on the basis of assimilation."

Pandemic plans need to include both social distancing and pharmaceutical strategies, but not all countries are prepared to apply both strategies, the report said. Some haven't established the logistical and legal provisions needed to enact social distancing measures. The UN said it found great disparities in preparedness among countries with, for example, wealthier countries more likely to have planned for pharmaceutical interventions. "Given the interdependence of countries when responding to a pandemic, preparedness within poorer countries will be a critical element of the world's readiness for the next pandemic," the report said.

Also, some individual countries have made progress on plans to maintain essential services during a pandemic, but more nations need to engage the private sector to accomplish multisector planning. The UN recommended that for 2009, countries develop protocols, frameworks, and indicators for longer-term multisector pandemic preparedness and fund the efforts through their all-hazard preparedness mechanisms. In response to reporters' questions about pandemic planning transparency, Nabarro said he's noticed more openness among some countries, such as China. However, he said he was concerned that interactions among countries were "sometimes a bit tense."

Outbreaks and surveillance
In reporting that no new countries had H5N1 outbreaks through September 2008, the UN report said for comparison, four countries reported the virus for the first time in the first 6 months of 2007. Only 20 countries have experienced outbreaks so far this year, down from 25 reported in 2007. Bangladesh is the only new country that has reported a human H5N1 case this year, according to the UN's findings. Nabarro said he was concerned about Nigeria and Togo, which have both reported recent H5N1 outbreaks. The UN said effective surveillance, prompt detection, and rapid response have helped many countries eliminate outbreaks. The report notes that surveillance for animal diseases, including H5N1, has substantially improved over the past three years, with 75% of countries not reporting that they are able to detect highly pathogenic avian flu. For some countries, though, surveillance systems are still in the planning phase, and some planning hasn't included risk assessments to target priority areas. The threat of further outbreaks in poultry and sporadic infections in humans persists, because the H5N1 virus is still entrenched in many countries. "The threat of an influenza pandemic remains unchanged," the report said.

Funding is eroding
The World Bank reported that the gap between what's needed to control avian influenza and boost preparedness and what world donors are pledging has been increasing since 2005. Though major donor nations have continued their support, the number slipped from 25 at the Beijing donor's conference in 2006 to 17 at the Bamako conference in 2006, and to nine at the New Delhi conference in 2007. Donors have pledged $2.7 billion, of which $2 billion has been committed. Of that amount, $1.5 billion has been disbursed, of which 59% was cash or loans and 41% was in-kind contributions. Declines in funding threaten the sustainability of control and planning investments that have already been made, according to the report.

East and Southeast Asian countries received 56% of the funds, Eastern Europe and Central Asia received 22%, and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and North Africa got 20%, according to the report. Only $125 million remains in available funding, the World Bank said. "Grant finance will continue to be needed to sustain critical capacities and actions in the medium to longer term."
(CIDRAP 10/23/08)

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Global: World Bank says influenza pandemic could cost $3 trillion
An internal report prepared by the World Bank estimates that a severe influenza pandemic could kill 71 million people and cause a recession costing more than $3 trillion. The report says that in a severe pandemic, sagging tourism, transportation, retail sales, and productivity, coupled with worker absenteeism, could reduce global gross domestic product (GDP) by 4.8%.

The new report increases the economic impact estimates made by the World Bank in June 2006. At that time the bank estimated GDP would drop by 3.1%, or about $2 trillion. Bank officials estimate that a "mild" pandemic, similar to the Hong Kong flu of 1968-69, could kill 1.4 million people and reduce global GDP by 0.7% in the first year. The projections for a “moderate” pandemic like that of the Asian flu in 1957-58 is that it could cause 14.2 million deaths and reduce global economic activity by 2%. The bank report also notes that some experts have estimated a death toll ranging from 180 million to 250 million in a severe pandemic.

The World Bank predicts that changes in individual behavior, such as avoiding air travel, restaurants, and mass transportation, could account for 60% of the costs during a pandemic. In the worst case, the authors estimate that air travel, tourism, restaurant business, and use of mass transit could drop 20% for the first year.

The World Bank's estimate of a 4.8% drop in GDP in a severe pandemic is slightly lower than some other estimates of the hit on the global and US economies. For example, researchers at Australian National University predicted that an "ultra" pandemic would slash global GDP by 5.5%. In 2007, the health advocacy group Trust for America's Health estimated that US economic activity would shrink 5.5% in a 1918-like pandemic. And in 2005 the Congressional Budget Office projected that a pandemic would cut the US GDP by 5%.

Access the entire World Bank report: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAVIANFLU/Resources/EvaluatingAHIeconomics_2008.pdf.
(CIDRAP 10/17/08)

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Global: Projected supply of pandemic influenza vaccine sharply increases
Recent scientific advances and increased vaccine manufacturing capacity have prompted experts to increase their projections of how many pandemic influenza vaccine courses can be made available in the coming years. In spring 2008, the World Health Organization (WHO) and vaccine manufacturers said that about 100 million courses of pandemic influenza vaccine based on the H5N1 avian influenza strain could be produced immediately with standard technology. Experts now anticipate that global production capacity will rise to 4.5 billion pandemic immunization courses per year in 2010.

"With influenza vaccine production capacity on the rise, we are beginning to be in a much better position vis-à-vis the threat of an influenza pandemic," Dr Marie-Paule Kieny, Director of the Initiative for Vaccine Research at WHO said on 23 Oct 2008. "However, although this is significant progress, it is still far from the 6.7 billion immunization courses that would be needed in a six month period to protect the whole world." "Accelerated preparedness activities must continue, backed by political impetus and financial support, to further bridge the still substantial gap between supply and demand," she said.

In 2008, manufacturers have been able to step up production capacity of trivalent (three viral strains) seasonal influenza vaccines to an estimated 565 million doses, from 350 million doses produced in 2006, according to the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations. According to experts working in this field, the yearly production capacity for seasonal influenza vaccine is expected to rise to 1 billion doses in 2010, provided corresponding demand exists.

This would help manufacturers to be able to deliver around 4.5 billion pandemic influenza vaccine courses because a pandemic vaccine would need about eight times less antigen, the substance that stimulates an immune response. Vaccine production capacity is linked to the amount of antigen that has to be used to make each dose of the vaccine. Scientists have recently discovered they can reduce the amount of antigen used to produce pandemic influenza vaccines by using water-in-oil substances that enhance the immune response.

The progress was reported at the first meeting of a WHO Advisory Group on pandemic influenza vaccine production and supply. The Global Action Plan Advisory Group, an independent, international committee of ten members, met at WHO headquarters one year after eight new strategies to increase pandemic influenza vaccine were identified and published in the WHO Global pandemic influenza action plan to increase vaccine supply.
(WHO 10/23/08)

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Preliminary sequence and phylogenetic analysis of the HA gene from four duck samples gave evidence for a representative of a cluster 2.2 sublineage, which had been detected in spring 2006 in Southern Germany. In fact, a virus from a tufted duck (R1240/06; Starick et al., 2008) found in 2006, 40 km away from the present outbreak location is very closely related. So far, there are no records for the presence of viruses of this sublineage after May 2006 in Germany or Europe. In summary, the data suggest a very recent introduction of HPAIV H5N1 into this farm from an as yet unknown source.
(ProMED 10/22/08)

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"We have already taken extra surveillance measures across the country," he said. "Farmers have been told to step up bio-security." Bangladesh was hit by bird flu in February 2007, and the virus made another comeback in January 2008. At the outbreak's peak, some 50 of the country's 64 districts were affected, and more than a million birds were slaughtered.

Officials said the outbreak was a warning for the country's poultry industry, which generates about $1.5 US per year. Bangladesh's poultry industry is one of the world's largest, producing 220 million chickens and 37 million ducks annually. Industry officials said the bird flu outbreak at its peak in early this 2008 led to the closure of 40 percent of the nation's poultry farms and left half a million workers jobless. The country also reported its first confirmed case of human bird flu in May 2008, but the government said the 16-month-old baby who contracted the virus had recovered.
(ProMED 10/19/08)

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Pandemic flu vaccines are not restricted under the rules. But the Department of Commerce confirmed that Cuba, Iran, and Sudan are subject to a ban on pandemic flu vaccines as part of general US trade embargoes covering nearly all products. Those embargoes are based on "broader foreign policy reasons," said Kevin Kurland, a spokesman for the department's Bureau of Industry and Security.

The list of pathogens subject to the rules includes many viruses, some of which are little known and some of which there is no vaccine for. A list of animal pathogens covered by the restrictions includes highly pathogenic avian flu viruses. Bacterial pathogens on the restricted list include anthrax and the microbes that cause tularemia and plague. Not on the list are the causes of common vaccine-preventable diseases, such as measles, mumps, rubella, chickenpox, and seasonal influenza. It can take up to 40 days for a country to obtain an export license for a restricted product. But he said humanitarian needs are considered, and licenses can be granted much faster in emergencies.

Rules go back to 1990s
According to the AP report, the restrictions were quietly established in the mid 1990s and were strengthened after the Sep 11, 2001, attacks and subsequent anthrax mailings. Officials from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention were not even aware of the regulations until asked by the AP.

Disease and bioterrorism experts say there is little reason to think that exporting the vaccines would increase the risk of biological attacks, but a Commerce Department official reportedly defended them. "Legitimate public health and scientific research is not adversely affected by these controls," Assistant Commerce Secretary Christopher Wall stated. Concerning avian flu vaccines for poultry in particular, Wall declined to explain what kind of threat they pose, but said there are valid reasons for taking steps to ensure they "do not fall into the wrong hands."

Bill Hall, an HHS spokesman, said HHS is not usually consulted about trade sanctions, even when they involve medical products. "The United States government currently requires a license for the export from the US of a wide range of goods, products, and services to Cuba, Iran, and Sudan as part of its overall foreign policy," Hall commented. "Although these licensing requirements cover exports of medical products such as human influenza vaccine, HHS is not routinely consulted on the foreign policy decisions to impose sanctions on exports of U.S. goods to state sponsors of terrorism, even including medical products such as vaccines. "In the meantime, HHS is working closely with the Department of Commerce and other government agencies to determine the most effective and humane actions the US government could take to help protect global public health, regardless of the nation or nations involved."

Vaccines into weapons?
Scientists said the idea that vaccines could be used to make biological weapons makes little sense. Vaccines typically contain inactivated viruses or bacteria or pieces of a virus or bacterium, though some vaccines use live but weakened microbes. Smallpox vaccine contains live vaccinia virus, a less dangerous relative of the smallpox virus.

Regarding avian flu vaccines, Ian Ramshaw, an immunology and biosecurity expert at Australian National University in Canberra said, "I can think of no scientific reason how a terrorist organization could use such a vaccine for malicious intent. I personally think it's a rather silly attitude and the U.S. is probably going overboard as it has in the past with many of its bioterrorism initiatives."

Infectious disease expert Michael T. Osterholm, director of the University of Minnesota Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, said he doesn't see the logic behind the restrictions either. "There really isn't any reason that using the vaccine to create the agent would be a concern," he said. "The only potential implication is if you had individuals working on [weaponizing] the agent, by vaccinating them you could protect them so they could work on it." He observed that the idea of weaponizing the H5N1 avian flu virus, for example, is not a concern, since the virus does not easily infect humans or spread easily from person to person. The virus could be used as a weapon against poultry, "but that's not about the vaccine," he said. "So I don't understand the logic about this at all. Anywhere in the world you can reduce the potential for these diseases, we should do that," Osterholm said.
(CIDRAP 10/17/08)

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USA: Biotechnology agency demonstrates efficacy of oral avian influenza vaccine in preclinical studies
Vaxart Inc., a biotechnology company focused on the development of oral vaccines, announced positive efficacy results from preclinical studies of the company's oral avian flu vaccine. Sean Tucker, PhD, Vaxart founder and vice president of research, presented data from animal models demonstrating that an orally administered flu vaccine was protective against lethal exposure to H5N1 influenza on 24 Oct 2008. Tucker presented the data at the Modern Mucosal Vaccines, Adjuvants & Microbicides (MMVAM) international conference.

Delivery of flu vaccine via a capsule rather than an injection offers critical advantages, particularly in the case of a pandemic. The Vaxart vaccine formulation can withstand ambient temperatures, enabling emergency distribution methods that avoid the transmission risks associated with centralized vaccination clinics. In the developing world, where medical providers and supplies are scarce, oral vaccination will reduce costs, as well as needle reuse and consequent cross-infection.

The data presented are from studies measuring the effectiveness of an orally-administered avian flu vaccine designed by Vaxart scientists using the company's proprietary modular platform. The Vaxart vaccine (ND1) comprises a non-replicating chimeric adenovirus-5 vector, or delivery vehicle, engineered to express avian flu hemaggluttinin (HA) and a TLR3 ligand as a vaccine adjuvant. "Injected vector-based vaccines that deliver a target pathogen protein have shown excellent potency in animal models, but their application has been limited in humans because the immune system typically responds to the vector rather than the target," said Dr. Tucker. "By using oral delivery of a non-replicating vector with a potent adjuvant, we achieve a robust immune response that is focused on the targeted pathogen rather than the delivery vehicle. This approach addresses the problems that have plagued vector-based vaccination and also allows us to create different vaccines simply by switching out the antigen."
(Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News 10/24/08)

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Ijoro said bird flu threat should be made a policy issue at all tiers of government in Nigeria, urging participants at the workshop to take the message to groups concerned with policy management, especially as they relate to agriculture and poultry. AHI Project Assistant, IOM Nigeria, Mr James Atusue, said organizers of the workshop were ready to work with both general and UN stakeholders to give towards a consolidated conflict plan for avian and human pandemic preparedness, specifically by addressing the needs of migrants and mobile populations in Nigeria.
(Bird Flu Breaking News 10/24/08)

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Abstract: The unprecedented emergence in Asia of multiple avian influenza virus (AIV) subtypes with a broad host range poses a major challenge in the design of vaccination strategies that are both effective and available in a timely manner. The present study focused on the protective effects of a genetically modified AIV as a source for the preparation of vaccines for epidemic and pandemic influenza. It has previously been demonstrated that a live attenuated AIV based on the internal backbone of influenza A/Guinea fowl/Hong Kong/WF10/99 (H9N2), called WF10att, is effective at protecting poultry species against low- and high-pathogenicity influenza strains. More importantly, this live attenuated virus provided effective protection when administered in ovo. In order to characterize the WF10att backbone further for use in epidemic and pandemic influenza vaccines, this study evaluated its protective effects in mice. Intranasal inoculation of modified attenuated viruses in mice provided adequate protective immunity against homologous lethal challenges with both the wild-type influenza A/WSN/33 (H1N1) and A/Vietnam/1203/04 (H5N1) viruses. Adequate heterotypic immunity was also observed in mice vaccinated with modified attenuated viruses carrying H7N2 surface proteins. The results presented in this report suggest that the internal genes of a genetically modified AIV confer similar protection in a mouse model and thus could be used as a master donor strain for the generation of live attenuated vaccines for epidemic and pandemic influenza.

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Pandemic Preparedness in the States: An Assessment of Progress and Opportunity
National Governor’s Association Center for Best Practices. Sep 2008. Available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0809PANDEMICASSESSMENT.PDF.

Introduction
Between April 2007 and January 2008, the National Governors Association Center for Best Practices (NGA Center) conducted a series of regional pandemic preparedness workshops involving all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and four of the five U.S. territories. The workshops were designed to identify gaps in state pandemic preparedness—specifically in non-health-related areas such as continuity of government, maintenance of essential services, and coordination with the private sector. A secondary goal of the workshops was to examine the strengths and weaknesses of coordination activities among levels of government, both vertically (state-federal and state-local) and horizontally (state-state) as well as with the private sector.

This paper presents an overall assessment, based on our observations and an analysis of the information provided by workshop participants, of the current level of pandemic preparedness in the states. It focuses specifically on preparedness in four sectors or disciplines that are common to all states: health care, commerce, education and public safety. The paper also describes several areas in which additional, focused work can reap immediate benefits not only for pandemic preparedness but for any catastrophic event.

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Pandemic: Potential Insurance Impacts
Lloyd’s Emerging Risks Team Report 2008. Available at http://www.lloyds.com/NR/rdonlyres/08B1357D-AD59-4C48-8064-599AF6F4F340/0/ER_Pandemic_InsuranceImpacts.pdf.

The British insurance market Lloyd's released a report on the possible effects of a pandemic on the insurance industry. The report says a pandemic on the scale of 1918's could reduce economic activity by anywhere from 1% to 10%. "Economic impacts are likely to occur and a pandemic as severe as 1918 may lead to a global recession with reductions of between 1% and 10% of GDP," it states. "These may impact the general business environment."

The Lloyd's report also cautions against assuming that the 1918 pandemic necessarily represents the "worst case" event. "1918 may not be a worst case," the report says. "It is certainly true that the 1918 event was extreme relative to other pandemics in history. However many published 'worst case' scenarios take 1918 as a base. There is a danger that we over optimize to this one scenario. There are other forms of pandemic than influenza, some have higher case mortality. Pandemic preparedness should consider a range of scenarios to ensure plans are appropriately flexible."
(CIDRAP 10/17/08)

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The International Response to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: Science, Policy, and Politics
Scoones, Ian and Paul Forster. Steps Centre. Oct. 2008. Available at http://www.steps-centre.org/PDFs/Avian%20flu%20final%20w%20cover.pdf.

Introduction
On June 11th 2008 another outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) was reported in Hong Kong – the site of the first reported human deaths from this virus in 1997. Media reports portrayed the possibility of a major catastrophe. Anxious citizens stopped eating chicken. With China hosting the Olympics in a matter of weeks, concerns were raised in the highest circles about the consequences of an outbreak – for world profile and for business. Politicians wanted firm action. On June 20th, officials proposed a package of US$128 million to put the small-scale poultry sector and wet markets out of business. Traders have rejected the proposal, and many consumers argue that the alternative frozen supermarket chickens are not what they want. Others argue that attempts at regulating imports and banning wet markets are futile. Informal, unregulated trade abounds, and with South China being a known, if poorly reported, hot spot of avian influenza virus circulation, the chances of keeping Hong Kong free of the disease are very small indeed. Yet, skeptics argue that the proposed measures are more about political grandstanding and public relations than sensible, science-based control policies. They argue that the net consequences for farmers’, traders’ and poorer consumers’ livelihoods will be negative, with only the well-connected large suppliers and supermarkets benefiting. But, given the fears around viral mutation into a form capable of efficient human-to-human transmission, others conclude that precaution, even if drastic, is the most appropriate route.

This example highlights the complex trade-offs involved in policy processes around avian influenza. These are intensely political, pitting different interests and groups of actors against each other. Public image, business interests and poor people’s livelihoods are all involved in a complex mix. And the science often is so uncertain that firm decisions based on exact predictions and precise measures are impossible. Judgments – normally political judgments – are made, and these are necessarily highly contextual. Media pressure, political effectiveness, implementation capacity and geopolitical positioning all come into the picture. Thus, in order to understand the politics of the international policy response to avian influenza, we must explore an intersecting story of virus genetics, ecology and epidemiology with economic, political and policy machinations in a variety of places – from Hong Kong to Washington, to Jakarta, Cairo, Rome and London. This paper offers one, necessarily partial and incomplete, view of the story over the last decade – and particularly the last few years when over $2 billion of public funds have been mobilized.

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This summit is designed to help you understand the threats of avian flu pandemic in your country, as well as meet your planning requirements -on time, under budget, and with a minimum of disruption to your operations.

Confirmed speakers include:
• H.E. Dimitris Avramopoulos, Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity of Greece
• Hon. Dennis Wolff, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture
• Jonathan Sleeman, VetMB, Dipl. ACZM, MRCVS, RCVS, Wildlife Veterinarian and President
• Capt. Francis Doris, MSM,MMS,USN, US Homeland Defense Planning and Pandemic
• Brit Oiulfstad, DVM, MPH, Director of Pandemic Influenza Planning

An updated full agenda and additional information is available on the event website at: http://www.new-fields.com/birdflu7/index.php.

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National strategy for pandemic influenza implementation plan: two year summary
White House Homeland Security Council. 17 Oct 2008 Available at http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/federal/summaryprogress2008.html.

Introduction
This document consists of a compendium of actions due to be completed within 24 months of the release of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (Implementation Plan), along with responses from departments and agencies.

The actions [included] are reproduced from the Implementation Plan. Each action is followed by a summary of progress, in italics, prepared by relevant departments and agencies for this report. The status of each action is indicated directly after the action number. A determination of “complete” indicates that the measure of performance has been met but does not necessarily mean that work on the action has ended; in many cases work is ongoing. A determination of “in progress” indicates that the measure of performance has not yet been met and additional work is being done to meet the appropriate standard.

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Blueprint for a Healthier America: Modernizing the Federal Public Health System to Focus on Prevention and Preparedness
The Trust for America’s Health. Oct 2008. Avialable at http://healthyamericans.org/assets/files/Blueprint.pdf.

Drawing on the expertise of more than 150 health experts, Trust for America's Health (TFAH), a nonprofit health advocacy group in Washington, DC, released a report on 21 Oct 2008 designed to help the next president and Congress reform the public health system to improve the nation's health and emergency preparedness.

Jeff Levi, PhD, executive director of TFAH, stated that the country is losing ground on battling preventable diseases such as diabetes and obesity and could stall in its efforts to prepare for a pandemic or other public health emergency. "We believe Americans deserve better, and these problems place us at a competitive disadvantage," he said in introducing the 119-page report. Levi said the report, "Blueprint for a Healthier America: Modernizing the Federal Public Health System to Focus on Prevention and Preparedness," contains recommendations that came from a yearlong consensus-building effort among the 150 experts. The report also includes a number of public opinion surveys on Americans' perceptions of natural disaster and disease threats.

Levi emphasized that the TFAH "blueprint" proposes a public health and preparedness strategy that doesn't depend solely on the federal government but envisions critical roles for state and local governments. He said some of the key themes of the blueprint are holding funding recipients accountable for progress and results and making prevention a cornerstone of the nation's health, not just an afterthought.

In the report, TFAH projects a $20 billion annual shortfall in funding for critical public health problems. Establishing a stable funding stream though various options outlined in the report would require increases of $12 billion at the federal level and $8 billion at state and local levels.

The report urges the next administration to ensure that emergency preparedness is part of the health reform debate. Levi told reporters that strengthening surge capacity is "the single biggest and hardest issue for health preparedness." To make best use of federal resources, TFAH recommends that the next administration designate a single official at HHS to oversee all emergency preparedness activities and ensure coordination across other federal agencies that have a role in preparedness.

Among several specific suggestions for influenza pandemic preparedness, TFAH recommends developing a "Pandemic Vaccine Research and Development Master Plan," setting more ambitious goals for producing a pandemic vaccine, streamlining the licensing process for flu vaccines, implementing a nationwide system to track the use, safety, and efficacy of vaccines, and increasing the federal stockpile of antiviral drugs to enable it to treat 25% of the population.
(CIDRAP 10/21/08)

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Conference in Egypt focusing on global plan for pandemic preparation and response
Ministers of health and agriculture will formulate a global plan to prepare for, and respond to, the threat of avian flu and other emerging infectious diseases at the International Ministerial Conference on Avian and Pandemic Influenza in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt from October 24-26, 2008.

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Second Ditan International Conference on Infectious Diseases
November 14-17, 2008
Beijing, China

An international conference where thousands of experts and distinguished scholars from around the world gather in the heart of China to engage in the discussion of the prevention policy for infectious diseases. Additional information is available at http://www.bjditan.org.

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