| HomeAvian Influenza and EINetVirtual SymposiumHuman Avian Influenza CasesAbout APEC-EINetNewsbriefs> Browse• SearchAPEC EconomiesPeople DirectoryTeaching & LearningResearch ResourcesContact Us
|
Vol. IX, No. 11 ~ EINet News Briefs ~ Jun 02, 2006*****A free service of the APEC Emerging Infections Network***** APEC EINet News Briefs offers the latest news, journal articles, and notifications for emerging infections affecting the APEC member economies. It was created to foster transparency, communication, and collaboration in emerging infectious diseases among health professionals, international business and commerce leaders, and policy makers in the Asia-Pacific region. In this edition: - Global: Cumulative number of human cases of avian influenza A/(H5N1) - Global: Wild birds' role in HPAI crisis confirmed, but conference fingers poultry business - Europe: Avian influenza--findings from wild bird surveillance - Romania: Suspected case of avian influenza near Bucharest - Russia (Novosibirsk, Omsk, Altai): New case of avian influenza in birds - Russia (Volgograd and Stavropol): Cases of Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever - Indonesia: WHO urges the right kind of medical donations for quake victims - Indonesia: Additional 6 case of human infection with avian influenza H5N1 - Indonesia (North Sumatra): Update on cluster of human cases of avian influenza H5N1 - Indonesia: New suspected human cases of avian influenza H5N1 - USA: 2 cases of atypical strain of BSE - USA (California): Prison outbreaks; norovirus suspected - USA (Massachusetts): Measles outbreak in a Boston office building - USA (New Mexico): 2 cases of plague so far in 2006 - Canada (Ontario): 8 cases of hepatitis prompt warning at Scarborough Hospital - Canada: 4 imported cases of Chikungunya virus infection - USA (Oklahoma): Girl dies from Rocky Mountain spotted fever 1. Updates - Avian/Pandemic influenza updates - Cholera, diarrhea & dysentery - Dengue 2. Articles - Two clusters of human infection with influenza A/H5N1 virus in the Republic of Azerbaijan, February–March 2006 - Human H5N1 infections: so many cases – why so little knowledge? - The safety of trivalent influenza vaccine among healthy children 6 to 24 months of age. - Epidermal DNA vaccine for influenza is immunogenic in humans - Recombinant vaccines protect poultry from avian flu, Newcastle disease - Epidermal DNA vaccine for influenza is immunogenic in humans - Twenty-Five Years of HIV/AIDS--United States, 1981--2006 - Epidemiology of HIV/AIDS--United States, 1981--2005 - Achievements in public health: reduction in perinatal transmission of HIV infection--United States, 1985--2005 - Evolution of HIV/AIDS Prevention Programs--United States, 1981--2006 - Update: Fusarium Keratitis--United States, 2005--2006 - Investigation into recalled human tissue for transplantation--United States, 2005--2006 - Measles case imported from Europe to Victoria, Australia, March 2006 3. Notifications - Biosafety and Biosecurity Training Course - Recommendation to defer meningococcal vaccination of persons aged 11--12 years 4. APEC EINet activities - APEC EINet team to participate in Pacific Health Summit 5. To Receive EINet Newsbriefs - APEC EINet email list Global Global: Cumulative number of human cases of avian influenza A/(H5N1) Economy / Cases (Deaths)
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total no. of confirmed human cases of avian influenza A/(H5N1), Dec 2003 to present: 224 (127). Global: Wild birds' role in HPAI crisis confirmed, but conference fingers poultry business
"There is a need to mobilize the international donor community to invest in the improvement of veterinary services in developing countries, especially in Africa and Asia,” Dr Gideon K. Brückner, Head of OIE's Scientific and Technical Department, said. Wise investments here will promote early detection in wild birds and rapid response to disease outbreaks, Dr Brückner added. H5N1 disease management would need to be based on improved biosecurity and hygiene at the production level, and in all poultry sectors, including minimizing the possibility of contact between domestic and wild birds. It called for the establishment of a global tracking and monitoring facility involving all relevant institutions across the world, including scientific centres and farmers' organizations, hunters, bird watchers, and wetland and wildlife conservation societies. The participants rejected any suggestion of trying to stop the spread of HPAI by killing wild birds. It urged continuing research to adopt an inter-disciplinary approach, and called for investment to incorporate telemetry/satellite technology to improve understanding of wild bird migration patterns. Flying backpackers, communications satellites and a network of computers would monitor the movements of wild birds on their migrations under a plan proposed by the FAO. The 6.8-million-dollar plan could also provide the world with crucial advance warning of the occurrence of HPAI virus, which causes bird flu. Deploying teams of national and international veterinary and wild bird experts on the ground, it would fill a huge gap in scientific knowledge about where, when and how wild birds associated with HPAI – principally aquatic and shore birds – migrate. The plan involves capturing thousands of wild birds before they migrate, testing sample birds for disease, and fitting some of them out with tiny backpacks weighing less than 50 grams each. After the birds are released, the sophisticated telemetry equipment inside the packs would track their every movement. A system of radio beacons and satellites would then feed data into the computers of ornithologists, ecologists, virologists and epidemiologists.
The backpacks would show the migrating birds’ exact whereabouts when they stop over on their long journeys. Mobile, ground-based teams would then re-test the sample birds for disease and, in the case of a positive return, have a good idea of where the infection originated and where it might head next. Early warning would give governments and producers more time to respond to potential threats – with great benefits for the poultry industry and society at large. A small part of the money to fund the project is already on hand, but FAO would need the help of donors and governments to get it up and flying. Calling on the donor community to provide generous support to the efforts to control and eradicate the H5N1 avian influenza virus currently affecting over 50 countries worldwide, David Nabarro, U.N. System Influenza Coordinator, said too little is being spent on global animal and public health given the threat posed by diseases such as influenza. Europe/Near East Europe: Avian influenza--findings from wild bird surveillance The European Commission and the Community Reference Laboratory (CRL) for Avian Influenza in Weybridge, UK have published the results of the surveillance for avian influenza in wild birds carried out in the EU over the past 10 months. The extensive epidemiological data were presented 31 May 2006 at the FAO/OIE International Scientific Conference on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds. Although final figures are still being collected for Feb-May 2006, it is estimated that around 60 000 wild birds were tested for avian influenza in the EU during that period. This, combined with the 39 000 wild birds tested between July 2005-January 2006, means that almost 100 000 tests for the H5N1 virus have been carried out on wild birds over the past 10 months. Since Feb 2006, over 700 wild birds across 13 Member States have been found to be infected with the H5N1 "Asian strain" of avian influenza. However, a positive decline in the incidence of the disease in wild birds in Europe has also been noted over the past weeks. Between Feb 2006 and 21 May 2006, 741 cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza (most of them confirmed as H5N1) have been detected in wild birds in 13 Member States--Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, Germany, France, Slovakia, Sweden, Poland, Denmark, Czech Republic and UK. There have been only 4 outbreaks of H5N1 avian influenza in poultry in the EU, and all of these were swiftly eradicated following detection. No human case of the H5N1 virus has occurred in the EU. There is considerable variation in the number of cases of HPAI in wild birds, ranging from 326 in Germany to 1 in the UK. The peak in terms of the number of cases in wild birds was reached in March with 362 cases (compared to 200 in Feb), with cases declining to 162 in April and 17 in May. The most commonly affected wild birds have been swans, [465] representing 62.8 percent of the total, followed by [121] ducks (16.3 percent), [33] geese (4.5 percent), [29] birds of prey (3.9 percent) and [93] others (13 percent). Following the major geographical spread of the H5N1 avian influenza virus from South-East Asia in 2005, the EU has intensified its programmes for the surveillance and early detection of avian influenza, both in wild birds and poultry. Almost 2.9 million Euros has been made available by the Commission to co-finance Member States' surveillance programmes for the period Jul 2005-Dec 2006. Guidelines on enhanced surveillance for avian influenza in wild birds were also issued by the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health. The intensified surveillance has enabled the Commission and Member States to gain a clearer view of the avian influenza situation in the EU, and to rapidly detect and respond to any outbreaks. Additional data can be found in the following presentations: 1. Surveillance, prevention and disease management of Avian Influenza in the EU, by Maria Pittman, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/food/animal/diseases/controlmeasures/avian/surveillance2en.pdf
2. Incursion of H5N1 'Asian lineage' virus into Europe: source of introduction? by Ian Brown, EU/OIE/FAO reference laboratory for AI, VLA Weybridge, UK.
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/food/animal/diseases/controlmeasures/avian/surveillance3en.pdf Romania: Suspected case of avian influenza near Bucharest
According to OIE (updated 24 May 2006), Romania has become the sixth on the list of countries which have reported H5N1 in domestic poultry since Dec 2003. The 10 leading countries on the list are the following: Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Turkey, Russia, Romania, China, Nigeria, Ukraine, and South Korea. Of these, South Korea is the only one which eradicated the disease, thus regarded as free of HPAI. Russia (Novosibirsk, Omsk, Altai): New case of avian influenza in birds
Russia (Volgograd and Stavropol): Cases of Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever
Asia Indonesia: WHO urges the right kind of medical donations for quake victims The emergency continues in Indonesia, as WHO works with authorities to provide medical care to survivors, to acquire the right kinds of medicines and equipment, and to set up a disease surveillance system in the areas hit by Saturday's earthquake. WHO is coordinating the health response with the UN system and non-governmental organizations, to try to ensure the most effective response. So far, several tonnes of medicines and medical equipment have arrived in the country. WHO is helping to manage these to ensure that the right medicines and equipment are distributed to the right places. "There are shortages of some very specific medicines and supplies, including orthopaedic supplies, anaesthetics and antibiotics," said Dr Georg Petersen, WHO Economy Representative, Indonesia. “However,” he added, “Only appropriate medicines should be sent, and that too in consultation with the national authorities. Previous experience of disasters has shown that inappropriate contributions have only led to confusion.” There is also a lack of bed sheets, mattresses and other consumable medical equipment such as sterile kits for surgeries, stitching materials and x-ray films. WHO is compiling a full list of necessary medicines, supplies and equipment and will be constantly updated and distributed.
Based on experience from the tsunami, WHO is also offering its technical guidelines in local languages, which will help authorities in the management of medicines, mental health assistance for the survivors and the handling of dead bodies. The great majority of the dead were quickly buried. WHO emphasizes that the human remains still entombed under the rubble do not constitute a public health hazard, as bodies do not "carry" disease. More than 400 Indonesian health personnel are arriving in the area from around the country to help offer treatment and support. Indonesian authorities are emphasizing that donations of appropriate medicines, supplies and equipment, rather than people, will be most helpful. Clean water and safe sanitation are critical. Without them, these conditions can quickly lead to disease outbreaks, including measles, diarrhea, dengue fever, and respiratory infections. WHO has epidemiologists on the ground, who are helping to set up a disease surveillance system, which can detect and respond to diseases outbreaks. WHO has 13 staff serving in the area in close coordination with national health authorities and more national and international staff are on stand-by. WHO has already dispatched emergency health kits to serve the needs of 50,000 people for 3 months and surgical kits to perform 600 surgeries. More supplies are being sent. Indonesia: Additional 6 case of human infection with avian influenza H5N1
Indonesia (North Sumatra): Update on cluster of human cases of avian influenza H5N1
No new cases suggestive of H5N1 infection have been detected since 22 May. This finding is important as it indicates that the virus has not spread beyond the members of this single extended family. No hospital staff involved in the care of patients, in some instances without adequate personal protective equipment, have developed the disease. The last person in the cluster, who developed symptoms 15 May and died 22 May, refused hospitalization. He moved between 2 villages while ill, accompanied by his wife. The wife is under surveillance and has not developed symptoms. Despite multiple opportunities for the virus to spread to other family members, health care workers or into the general community, it has not, on present evidence, done so. Based on an assessment of present evidence, WHO has concluded that the current level of pandemic alert (phase 3) is appropriate. This phase pertains to a situation in which occasional human infections with a novel influenza virus are occurring, but there is no evidence that the virus is spreading in an efficient and sustained manner from one person to another. WHO has recommended continued close monitoring of the situation in Kubu Simbelang for the 2 weeks following 22 May, the date when the last known case in the cluster died. Indonesian authorities have decided to extend this recommended period to 3 weeks. This information differs in some details from information released in previous updates, but is derived from extensive investigations by epidemiologists, who have developed a clearer picture of the situation. The cluster involves an initial case and 7 subsequent lab-confirmed cases. All cases are members of an extended family: sisters and brothers and their children. Family members resided in 4 households. 3 households were next-door neighbours in the village of Kubu Simbelang, Karo District, North Sumatra. The fourth household was located about 10 km away in the nearby village of Kabanjahe. The initial case in the cluster was a 37-year-old woman who sold produce at a market in the village of Tigapanah. Her stand was located close to a stand where live chickens were sold. The investigation uncovered no reports of poultry die-offs in the market. However, the woman kept a small number of backyard chickens, allowed into the house at night. 3 of her chickens reportedly died before she became ill. She is also known to have used chicken faeces from these chickens as fertilizer. A parallel investigation has not, to date, detected H5N1 virus of approximately 80 samples from poultry, other livestock and domestic pets, and chicken fertilizer taken from the vicinity. The initial case developed symptoms 24 April, was hospitalized 2 May, and died 4 May. No samples were collected for testing prior to her burial, but she is considered part of the cluster as her clinical course was compatible with H5N1 infection. The initial case had 1 sister and 3 brothers. The sister and 2 of the brothers subsequently developed infection. The remaining cases occurred among children in these families. The confirmed cases include 5 males and 2 females with an average age of 19 years (range 1 - 32 years). 6 out of the 7 confirmed cases developed symptoms 3 - 5 May. These cases include 2 sons of the initial case, her brother from Kabanjahe, her sister, the sister’s baby, and the son of a second brother living in an adjacent house. This second brother, the last case in the cluster, developed symptoms 15 May. 6 out of the 7 cases were fatal. On 29 April, 9 family members spent the night in a small room with the initial case at a time when she was severely ill, prostrate, and coughing heavily. These family members included the initial case and her 3 sons; the brother from Kabanjahe village, his wife, and their 2 children; the 21-year-old daughter of another brother (who did not become infected); and another young male visitor. Following this event, 3 family members – the woman’s 2 sons and the visiting brother from Kabanjahe – developed symptoms 5 to 6 days later. The woman’s sister, who lived in an adjacent house, developed symptoms at the same time, as did her 18-month-old daughter. Prior to symptom onset, this sister, accompanied by her daughter, provided close personal care of the initial case. The last case in the cluster provided close care for his son throughout his hospital stay, from 9–13 May. The son was a frequent visitor in the home of the initial case and was present there 29 April.
According to the FAO, all laboratory examinations of samples -- mainly from chickens, ducks, swine and manure -- have failed to detect the virus. Antibodies in a low proportion of chickens and ducks could be consistent with known earlier circulation of the avian flu virus in northern Sumatra in late 2005 and early 2006. Or, they could have resulted from vaccination. An announcement that some swine from a nearby village had tested positive for avian flu antibodies raised concern because this would have represented a new development in the spread of the disease, opening up the possibility of mammal to mammal transmission. However, all available evidence suggests that swine play no role in the transmission of the current strain of H5N1 avian flu virus. Swine sera are difficult to examine and results need to be confirmed by additional tests in a reference laboratory that can carry out validated tests for influenza antibodies in swine. Indonesia: New suspected human cases of avian influenza H5N1
A 25-year-old nurse is currently being treated at the Hasan Sadikin Hospital for bird flu-like symptoms. She was admitted to the hospital which has been treating a number of bird flu patients 1 Jun 2006. The hospital was planning to send the patient's blood sample to the laboratory of the Health Development and Research Body in Jakarta 2 Jun 2006. "We could not confirm that she had contracted H5N1 avian influenza, although she had earlier had contacts with 18-year-old and 10-year-old siblings, who died of avian influenza recently," he said. The ailing nurse had never had contact with poultry, but she had treated [the] sibling at Ujungberung Hospital, where she worked as a nurse.
A 7-year-old Indonesian girl who died this week has shown up positive for bird flu in local tests. The girl's samples have been sent to a WHO reference laboratory for confirmation. The girl from the Pamulang area on the outskirts of Jakarta died 1 Jun 2006 on the way to Sulianti Saroso hospital after being treated for 2 days in a hospital in South Jakarta. Sulianti Saroso hospital is the designated avian influenza centre in Jakarta. 2 days before the girl died, her 10-year-old brother also died after suffering flu-like symptoms, but officials did not manage to get his samples. The family reported that a number of chickens near their house died before the children went sick. The children's parents and their 2 siblings were taking Tamiflu after suffering similar flu-like symptoms, but they refused to be admitted to a hospital. Americas USA: 2 cases of atypical strain of BSE The 2 cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy found in U.S. cattle over the past year came from a rare strain of BSE found largely in Europe that scientists are only beginning to identify. Researchers in France and Italy who presented their work at a conference reported 2 rare strains of BSE that are harder to detect and affect mainly older cattle. Thierry Baron of the French Food Safety Agency presented research indicating that a 12-year-old Texas cow testing positive for BSE Jun 2005, and the 10-year-old Alabama cow that tested positive in Mar [2006?], showed identical testing patterns to a small number of BSE cases in France, Sweden and Poland. Such strains are called "atypical" BSE, different from the "typical" BSE caused by cattle eating feed with ruminant offal contaminated with a BSE protein. Art Davis, a U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) scientist for the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) at the National Veterinary Services Laboratory, said the Texas and Alabama test results showed completely different prion patterns than the Washington state case discovered Dec 2003. "The classical lesions were not there," Davis said of the cases. The Washington state cow originated in Canada. The "typical" BSE strain caused a mad cow disease epidemic in Great Britain beginning in the mid-1980s that killed 184 000 cattle and more than 100 people who contracted a human form of the disease caused by eating contaminated beef products. The scientific evidence shows that in almost all cattle cases, the fatal disorder was contracted through contaminated meat and bone meal fed to the cow, typically at a young age. However, scientists finding atypical cases of BSE are beginning to question if there has been a change in the abnormal protein that causes BSE or if cattle might be susceptible to a sporadic BSE affecting older cattle. Danny Matthews, head of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies at England's Veterinary Laboratories Agency, said recent research on atypical cases of BSE raises questions over whether older cattle can sporadically get the disease or if there are more strains of BSE than previously understood.
Although the test patterns in the U.S. cases and atypical cases in Europe closely matched, Baron said there were no known links among any of the positive animals. Baron also raised the prospect that the disease could be sporadic in at least a small number of older cattle. He said, however, such a conclusion would be hard to determine because of the small number of cattle with this atypical strain. Dr. Sam Holland, South Dakota's state veterinarian, said it is possible the atypical strains are not caused by contaminated feed but that it still makes sense to continue the ban on ruminant offal in cattle feed to prevent typical BSE. USA (California): Prison outbreaks; norovirus suspected
USA (Massachusetts): Measles outbreak in a Boston office building
Measles is a highly contagious viral disease characterized by prodromal fever, conjunctivitis, coryza, cough, and small spots on an erythematous base on the buccal mucosa (Koplik spots). A skin rash usually occurs about 2-4 days after the initial symptoms. The rash begins on the face and soon spreads to other parts of the body. The rash usually lasts 4-7 days and then disappears in the same order it appeared. Koplik spots may become visible inside the cheeks of the mouth 1-2 days before or after skin rash onset. Measles is transmitted person to person by direct contact with infectious droplets or by airborne spread. Persons are infectious from 4 days before rash onset to 4 days after the appearance of the rash. The incubation period generally is 8 to 12 days from exposure to onset of symptoms but can range from 7 to 18 days. Immunization with MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccine provides the best protection from measles. The vaccine is normally given to young children, but adolescents and adults who are not immune should also be vaccinated. Adults born in or after 1957 and children > 12 months of age should have documentation of 2 doses of MMR or serologic proof of immunity to measles. Persons born in the US prior to 1957 likely have immunity to measles. However, to increase the likelihood of protection against measles, mumps, and rubella, they should consider receiving a dose of MMR vaccine. USA (New Mexico): 2 cases of plague so far in 2006
Bubonic plague is the classical form of Yersinia pestis infection, representing 85-90 percent of clinical presentations. Deaths from plague are generally related to spread of the bacilli from the infected bubo into the blood stream with septicemia and dropping blood pressure. The septicemia can spread to the lungs causing a secondary plague pneumonia. It is this form that can spread from person-to-person. Symptoms of the plague include fever; painful, swollen lymph nodes in the groin, armpit and neck, and chills. Canada (Ontario): 8 cases of hepatitis prompt warning at Scarborough Hospital
Hepatitis B and C viruses are carried in the blood, but can survive outside the body for days. It can pass between hosts through sex, intravenous needles, and contaminated hospitals. "There is no evidence that the equipment itself is an issue," Dr Finkelstein said, but he added there could be any number of possible other sources of infection. No one yet knows when or how the infections occurred, or when new infections might show up. All employees are being tested, as are the other 392 dialysis patients. Canada: 4 imported cases of Chikungunya virus infection
USA (Oklahoma): Girl dies from Rocky Mountain spotted fever
1. Updates Avian/Pandemic influenza updates - WHO: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avianinfluenza/en/index.html. Includes the updated document, “WHO pandemic influenza draft protocol for rapid response and containment.” - UN FAO: http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/en/health/diseases-cards/specialavian.html. Read the articles: “Avian flu: FAO in action”; “Protect poultry, protect people”; “A manual for countries at risk”. - OIE: http://www.oie.int/eng/enindex.htm. Read the highlights from the 74th Annual General Session of the International Committee of the OIE and the editorial, “the birth of the WAHIS Web application”, which describes the updates on the OIE’s information system. - US CDC: http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/index.htm. - The US government’s web site for pandemic/avian flu: http://www.pandemicflu.gov/. Latest updates on U.S. State Summits are available. Read the report, “Congressional Budget Office Updates Report on Possible Macroeconomic Effects and Policy Issues”. - CIDRAP: http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/. Frequently updated news and scholarly articles. - PAHO: http://www.paho.org/English/AD/DPC/CD/influenza.htm. Read the article, “Americas Make Progress on Pandemic Preparedness”. - American Veterinary Medical Association: http://www.avma.org/publichealth/influenza/default.asp. - US Geological Survey, National Wildlife Health Center Avian Influenza Information: http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov/diseaseinformation/avianinfluenza/index.jsp. Very frequent news updates. (WHO; FAO, OIE; CDC; CIDRAP; PAHO; AVMA; USGS) Cholera, diarrhea & dysentery
Dengue
2. Articles Two clusters of human infection with influenza A/H5N1 virus in the Republic of Azerbaijan, February–March 2006 http://www.eurosurveillance.org/em/v11n05/1105-222.asp A Gilsdorf et al. Eurosurveillance monthly releases 2006. Volume 11 / Issue 5. Abstract: “Following the appearance of influenza A/H5 virus infection in several wild and domestic bird species in the Republic of Azerbaijan in February 2006, two clusters of potential human avian influenza due to A/H5N1 (HAI) cases were detected and reported by the Ministry of Health (MoH) to the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe during the first two weeks of March 2006. On 15 March 2006, WHO led an international team, including infection control, clinical management, epidemiology, laboratory, and communications experts, to support the MoH in investigation and response activities. As a result of active surveillance, 22 individuals, including six deaths, were evaluated for HAI and associated risk infections in six districts. The investigations revealed eight cases with influenza A/H5N1 virus infection confirmed by a WHO Collaborating Centre for Influenza and one probable case for which samples were not available. The cases were in two unrelated clusters in Salyan (seven laboratory confirmed cases, including four deaths) and Tarter districts (one confirmed case and one probable case, both fatal). Close contact with and de-feathering of infected wild swans was considered to be the most plausible source of exposure to influenza A/H5N1 virus in the Salyan cluster, although difficulties in eliciting information were encountered during the investigation, because of the illegality of some of the activities that might have led to the exposures (hunting and trading in wild birds and their products). These cases constitute the first outbreak worldwide where wild birds were the most likely source of influenza A/H5N1 virus infection in humans. The rapid mobilisation of resources to contain the spread of influenza A/H5 in the two districts was achieved through collaboration between the MoH, WHO and its international partners. Control activities were supported by the establishment of a field laboratory with real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) capacity to detect influenza A/H5 virus. Daily door-to-door surveillance undertaken in the two affected districts made it unlikely that human cases of influenza A/H5N1 virus infection remained undetected.” (CIDRAP http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/index.html ) Human H5N1 infections: so many cases – why so little knowledge?
None of this should be seen as a criticism of any individuals, national health authorities or any single organisation. It is a collective failure, but one that must be overcome. Investigations of emerging zoonoses are difficult anywhere. They require simultaneous and coordinated investigations of human and animal cases by joint teams, plus environmental sampling which is difficult even in well-resourced countries. Poor affected communities can be reluctant to be open with officials and investigators as they fear punishment or adverse economic consequences. . .Usually there are multiple confounding exposures which need careful analysis. . .Considerable stamina may be needed as sometimes there are good plans for investigation but they are not implemented after the drama of the outbreak passes. Serological testing of those exposed is incorrectly regarded as a possible research procedure to be done later rather than an important and urgent investigation, consequently it is almost never completed. The academic process does not always help. It can encourage investigators to hold on to data rather than forward them to WHO and the rare anecdote will be published while the tedious reality will not. . .Unfortunately most of the countries where the first cases have occurred do not have traditions of analytic field investigation and the high profile of ‘bird flu’ does not encourage governments to allow immediate openness. . .Having a practical guide to investigations would help and WHO and its Regions are now developing one while ECDC is doing the same for the European Union. Universal use of these and forwarding the results would then allow WHO to populate a global dataset, at least for newly identified clusters.
. . .This month, the World Health Assembly. . .agreed that implementation of the new International Health Regulations be brought forward. This step was driven by the pandemic threat and the need for early detection and prompt and competent investigation of the first pandemic cases. This is not just to isolate the pandemic strain but also so that WHO’s Rapid Response and Containment tactic could be deployed to stamp out or reduce transmission. Modelling suggests there would only be a short window of opportunity for this tactic, a few weeks. If that opportunity is missed – and realistically that is the most likely scenario – then for most of the world damage limitation, not containment will be the key preventive strategy, using public health measures and anti-virals. If existing public health measures and anti-virals are to be most effective, countries will need to have fast answers to some important questions from field investigations. How and where is the virus transmitting? Is it behaving like seasonal influenza or is it different (as SARS was)? Is it transmitting mostly in schools, workplaces, homes or the community (i.e. might selective school closures be justified)? Are antivirals working as prophylaxsis or treatment for the first cases? What is the effectiveness of any pre-pandemic vaccine'? Early competent investigations around a transmitting pandemic strain, be it based on H5 or another type, will be crucial and the information generated will save lives. Doing better at investigating H5N1 clusters should be a model for this.” The safety of trivalent influenza vaccine among healthy children 6 to 24 months of age.
Epidermal DNA vaccine for influenza is immunogenic in humans
At 21 days, only the 4-mcg group met 1 of the criteria for immune response used for vaccine licensure by the Committee for Proprietary Medical Products (CPMP) in the EU. By day 56, the 4-mcg group met all 3 immune-response criteria, even though only 1 criterion is required to meet CPMP standards. By day 56, 64% (7/11) of patients in the 4-mcg group seroconverted, and 100% (11/11) achieved seroprotection (antibody titer of 40 or greater). Neither of the lower-dose groups met CPMP standards for antibody response by day 21, but both groups had by day 56. The 2-mcg group met all 3 criteria by day 56, while the 1-mcg group met 1 criterion. No volunteer reported serious side effects. 27 of the 36 participants reported mild to moderate local adverse events, and 23 reported mild to moderate systemic adverse events. PowerMed CEO Clive Dix, said, "The advantage of a DNA-based approach is that the vaccines can be manufactured very rapidly and in large quantities, while yielding an efficacious immune response at low doses." Reportedly, the vaccine is stable and does not need to be refrigerated, or even administered by a healthcare professional. PowerMed will begin phase 2 trials later this year using both avian flu and annual flu strains. Recombinant vaccines protect poultry from avian flu, Newcastle disease
Jutta Veits and colleagues cloned a full-length copy of a low-pathogenic ND strain and then inserted the coding sequence for the hemagglutinin of a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N2) between 2 ND virus genes. The resultant product was an ND virus that expressed the hemagglutinin H5 (HA) of avian influenza. Twenty-five 3-week old, pathogen-free chickens were immunized by oculonasal administration of the modified virus. Chickens tested 3 weeks after inoculation had ND- and AIV-specific antibodies and were also protected against clinical challenges with lethal doses of either virus. No AIV was shed from vaccinated chickens. Recombinant viruses isolated from chickens that had been inoculated with the vaccine at 1 day old were found to be benign. Enhanced virulence and viral shedding from vaccinated animals, 2 concerns about recombinant vaccines, were eased by these findings, according to the article. Recombination events among vaccine and wild viruses may produce more virulent strains, and propagation of AIV among vaccinated birds might mask such events, making control more difficult. In addition, shedding of virus could promote spread of disease. An important characteristic of this vaccine, the authors write, is that it allows serologic discrimination between vaccinated and wild virus–infected animals. Testing detected antibodies against the nucleoprotein of AIV. This antibody is absent in vaccinated chickens but present in vaccinated chickens that are infected with AIV. Such a vaccine would allow identification and culling of birds infected after vaccination. It thus circumvents the problem of undetected circulation of virus among vaccinated birds and represents a potentially important tool for controlling AIV.
A second group used reverse genetics to produce vaccines for negative-stranded RNA viruses that also protected chickens against a highly pathogenic AIV (H5N1) and a highly virulent ND. Man-Seong Park and colleagues constructed an AIV vaccine that substituted the "a" portion of the hemagglutinin-neuraminidase gene of ND for the neuraminidase protein gene of the H5N1 avian influenza virus. These constructs were used to test modified viral sequences aimed at reducing potential spontaneous conversion to virulence and for making an effective bivalent vaccine. The resultant bivalent vaccine (rNDV/F3aa-chimeric H7) was based on expression of part of H7 AIV hemagglutinin in a truncated and attenuated ND background. The chimeric virus enhanced the incorporation of the foreign protein into virus particles and reduced concerns about the other vaccine's potential for spontaneous conversion to virulence. 20 chickens were vaccinated with the vaccine by eyedrop application, with half receiving 1 dose and half getting 2 doses. Vaccinated chickens were challenged with both diseases. A single immunization induced 90% protection against H7N7, a highly pathogenic AIV strain, and complete immunity against a highly virulent ND virus. The authors suggest that chimeric constructs might serve as the basis for developing convenient, affordable, and effective vaccination against these diseases in chickens. A similar approach might also be used to produce human viral vaccines, provided suitable viral vectors can be found for humans. Epidermal DNA vaccine for influenza is immunogenic in humans
At 21 days, only the 4-mcg group met 1 of the criteria for immune response used for vaccine licensure by the Committee for Proprietary Medical Products (CPMP) in the EU. By day 56, the 4-mcg group met all 3 immune-response criteria, even though only 1 criterion is required to meet CPMP standards. By day 56, 64% (7/11) of patients in the 4-mcg group seroconverted, and 100% (11/11) achieved seroprotection (antibody titer of 40 or greater). Neither of the lower-dose groups met CPMP standards for antibody response by day 21, but both groups had by day 56. The 2-mcg group met all 3 criteria by day 56, while the 1-mcg group met 1 criterion. No volunteer reported serious side effects. 27 of the 36 participants reported mild to moderate local adverse events, and 23 reported mild to moderate systemic adverse events. PowerMed CEO Clive Dix, said, "The advantage of a DNA-based approach is that the vaccines can be manufactured very rapidly and in large quantities, while yielding an efficacious immune response at low doses." Reportedly, the vaccine is stable and does not need to be refrigerated, or even administered by a healthcare professional. PowerMed will begin phase 2 trials later this year using both avian flu and annual flu strains. Twenty-Five Years of HIV/AIDS--United States, 1981--2006
Epidemiology of HIV/AIDS--United States, 1981--2005
Achievements in public health: reduction in perinatal transmission of HIV infection--United States, 1985--2005
Evolution of HIV/AIDS Prevention Programs--United States, 1981--2006
Update: Fusarium Keratitis--United States, 2005--2006
As of May 18, 2006, CDC had received reports of 130 confirmed cases of Fusarium keratitis infection, defined as clinically consistent fungal keratitis with symptom onset after June 1, 2005, no history of recent ocular trauma, and a corneal culture yielding a Fusarium species. Cases have been reported from 26 states and 1 territory. . .As a result of this infection, corneal transplantation was required in 37 of 120 (31%) cases. Among the 130 patients with confirmed cases, 125 reported wearing contact lenses, and 118 were able to identify which contact lens solution(s) they had used during the month before onset of infection. 75 (64%) reported using Bausch & Lomb's ReNu with MoistureLoc alone, 14 (12%) reported using MoistureLoc in combination with another product, 8 (7%) reported using an unspecified Bausch & Lomb solution, and 21 (18%) reported using only products other than MoistureLoc, from various manufacturers. Ongoing surveillance continues to identify persons who used MoistureLoc and had disease onset after April 13, when Bausch & Lomb withdrew this product from the market in the United States. In April, a subset of confirmed case-patients who were soft contact lens wearers and aged >18 years was enrolled in a matched case-control investigation to evaluate risk factors for infection. To avoid potential bias from media coverage on case-patient responses, this subset was limited to those patients reported to CDC before online publication of the initial MMWR Dispatch on April 10. Neighborhood-matched controls were adults reporting soft contact lens use during March 2006 with no history of fungal keratitis. Information regarding contact lens types, solutions used, and contact lens hygiene practices was obtained via telephone interviews. . .Exact conditional logistic regression was used to estimate odds ratios.
A total of 50 case-patients and 79 controls were enrolled in the matched case-control investigation. For the most stringent test of product association, analysis was limited to the matched sets of 25 case-patients and 37 controls who were soft contact lens wearers, reported using only a single solution type, and provided all the information requested. In a multivariable model, use of Bausch & Lomb's ReNu with MoistureLoc during the month before symptom onset was independently associated with being a case-patient (adjusted odds ratio: 19.0, 95% confidence interval = 2.4--944.9, p<0.001), when compared with contact lens solutions other than ReNu with MoistureLoc or ReNu Multiplus. . .This association was statistically significant even after controlling for poor contact lens care. . .Use of ReNu Multiplus solution was not significantly associated with infection. . .The results of this case-control investigation indicate an increased risk for Fusarium keratitis associated with use of Bausch & Lomb's ReNu with MoistureLoc. The cause of this association is not clear; however, further studies, including environmental and molecular testing, are ongoing. . . Bausch & Lomb. . .announced its decision to voluntarily recall and permanently remove this contact lens solution from the worldwide market on May 15, 2006. Contact lens wearers should immediately discontinue use of this solution and consult an eye-care professional regarding use of an appropriate alternative product for cleaning or disinfecting lenses. Contact lens wearers also should practice good hygiene, including hand washing and drying before handling lenses, avoiding reuse of contact lens solutions, and following the specific instructions of manufacturers of contact lenses and contact lens solutions. . .” Investigation into recalled human tissue for transplantation--United States, 2005--2006
Measles case imported from Europe to Victoria, Australia, March 2006
3. Notifications Biosafety and Biosecurity Training Course Register soon for the Third Annual Biosafety and Biosecurity Training Course to be held summer 2006 in Fort Collins, Colorado. The course will start 7 Jul 2006 and run through 14 Jul 2006. 7-9 Jul 2006 will be animal-oriented: 1 day on large animal ABSL-2 and -3 facilities, containment, etc; 1 day on small animal ABSL-2 and -3 facilities and containment; 1/2 day on veterinary hospital, clinic, and farm and ranch biosecurity (infection control). 10-11 Jul 2006 will be general Biosafety and Biosecurity: BMBL, rDNA Guidelines, Biosafety committees, other administration aspects, risk assessment, Select Agent regulations and administration, HEPA filters and biosafety cabinet certification. 12-14 Jul 2006 will be plant-oriented: containment of recombinant plants, infectious disease research with plants, biopharm, regulations, permits, plant disease diagnostic lab network, diseases of crops. Website is at: http://www.cvmbs.colostate.edu/microbiology/crwad/BiosafetyTrainingCourse2006.htm. For more information, contact Robert Ellis at (Promed 5/24/06) Recommendation to defer meningococcal vaccination of persons aged 11--12 years
4. APEC EINet activities APEC EINet team to participate in Pacific Health Summit The APEC EINet team will be participating in the Pacific Health Summit, in the Emerging Infections/Pandemics Workgroup (publication now available online). The Summit will be held in Seattle, USA, 20-22 Jun 2006. The APEC EINet team had also participated in the Health Information Technology and Policy (HIT) Workgroup, in April 2006 in Tokyo, Japan. For more information, visit: http://pacifichealthsummit.org/ 5. To Receive EINet Newsbriefs APEC EINet email list The APEC EINet email list was established to enhance collaboration among health, commerce, and policy professionals concerned with emerging infections in APEC member economies. Subscribers are encouraged to share their material with colleagues in the Asia-Pacific Rim. To subscribe, go to: http://depts.washington.edu/einet/?a=subscribe or contact apecein@u.washington.edu. Further information about APEC EINet is available at http://depts.washington.edu/einet/.
|
|