Dobyne v. State
672 So. 2d 1319 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)

The defendant objected to the introduction at trial of an incriminating statement he had made after receiving a Miranda warning and signing a waiver of rights form.

Dobyne asserted he lacked the mental capacity to understand those rights. The evidence he offered included testimony that (a) he appeared to have FAS, (2) he had an IQ of 73, (3) he had mental capability of a 12 or 13 year old. A former teacher testified that Dobyne could read "some" but that, "in her opinion, he could not have understood all the terms in the rights waiver form he signed." He had, on the other hand, graduated from high school. 672 So. 2d 1336.

The trial judge had concluded the waiver was knowing. Because Dobyne's attorney had failed to raise this issue at the suppression hearing (but apparently did raise it later), the admission of the statement could be overturned on appeal only if there was "plain error." 672 So. 2d at 1336. The appellate court ruled,

"[T]here is no evidence that the appellant could not understand that he had the right to remain silent and that he had the right to an attorney. The court did not err in receiving appellant's confession into evidence at trial."

672 So. 2d at 1337. This first sentence is unclear. If it asserts that Dobyne was capable of understanding the concept of a right to remain silent and speak with an attorney, the sentence is correct but not dispositive--the issue is whether Dobyne did understand that at the time he signed the waiver. On the other hand, if the sentence asserts there is no evidence Dobyne did not understand at the time that he had those rights, the sentence is simply incorrect--the teacher's testimony is evidence of precisely that conclusion.

The opinion contains several statements relevant to a determination of whether an individual with FAS/FAE had made a knowing waiver of his or her rights.

(1) "While an accused's intelligence and literacy are important factors to be considered in determining whether he intelligently and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights and made a confession, weak intellect or illiteracy alone will not render a confession inadmissible." 372 So. 2d at 1337, quoting Hobbs v. State, 401 So. 2d 276, 282 (Ala. Cr. App. 1981). This passage is a bit obscure, but it seems to mean that limited intelligence or literacy are sufficient to suppress a confession only insofar as they demonstrate that the defendant did not in fact understand the rights he was waiving.

(2) "[A] defendant's mental impairment, even if it exists, is merely one factor affecting the validity of his waiver of rights." 372 So. 2d at 1337.

(3) "[T]he fact that a defendant may suffer from a mental impairment or low intelligence will not, without other evidence, render a confession involuntary." 372 So. 2d at 1337. This seems somewhat beside the point; evidence insufficient to prove an act was voluntary might be sufficient to prove a waiver was not knowing and intelligent.

Dobyne subsequently sought without success to argue that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in presenting this argument. Ex parte Dobyne, 2001 WL 670506 (Ala.); Dobyne v. State, 2000 WL 869500 (Ala. Crim. App.).