Dillbeck v. State
643 So. 2d 1027 (Fla.)

This case holds that in Florida courts evidence of FAE should be admitted at the guilt phase of a trial if offered to show that the defendant lacked the mental state (here premeditation) that is part of a crime.

Dillbeck was charged with premeditated murder. The trial court refused to admit evidence of FAE at the guilt phase. Once Dillbeck had been convicted, the judge did permit introduction of that evidence at the sentencing hearing, and concluded that the defendant did have FAE. 643 So. 2d at 1028.

The Florida Supreme Court held that Dillbeck should have been allowed to offer that evidence in order to establish a defense of diminished capacity.

"Evidence concerning certain alcohol-related conditions has long been admissible during the guilt phase of criminal proceedings to show lack of specific intent. . . . [I]f evidence of a self-induced condition such as voluntary intoxication is admissible, then so too should be evidence of other commonly understood conditions that are beyond one's control, such as epilepsy . . . . Just as the harmful effect of alcohol on the mature brain of an adult imbiber is a matter within the common understanding, so too is the detrimental effect of this intoxicant on the delicate, evolving brain of a fetus held in utero. As with 'epilepsy, infancy, or senility,' . . . we can envision few things more certainly beyond one's control than the drinking habits of a parent prior to one's birth. We perceive no significant legal distinction between the condition of epilepsy . . . and that of alcohol-related brain damage in issue here--both are specific, commonly recognized conditions that are beyond one's control."

643 So. 2d at 1029-30.

Although this decision is binding only in Florida courts, it should be persuasive authority in other states, most of which permit proof of intoxication or other conditions to show a lack of specific criminal intent.

This decision also holds that the brain damage caused by alcohol use is a "commonly understood" phenomenon. 643 So. 2d at 1029. That may be important where a criminal defense attorney has failed to investigate the presence of FAS/FAE, and the defendant asserts that he or she was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

The passage in this opinion which stresses that the disabilities caused by FAS/FAE are beyond the capacity of the victim to prevent may be helpful in arguing that FAS/FAE should be a mitigating factor in sentencing.

The court concluded that the error of the trial judge in excluding the evidence would not have affected the outcome of the case, because there was substantial evidence that Dillard had carefully planned the crime.