The county Department of Social Services brought this action to have Danielle Smith declared a "neglected child." This apparently was a first step toward removing the child, at least temporarily, from the custody of her mother. The action was based solely upon the prenatal conduct of the mother.

During her pregnancy the mother drank 10 alcoholic beverages on an average of 3 or 4 days a week.

The Department urged, first, that Danielle was a neglected child because her mother's drinking had actually caused FAS. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence that the child actually had FAS.

The Department also argued that Danielle was a neglected child simply because her mother's drinking had created a risk of FAS. The court agreed.

492 N.Y.S. 2d at 334. Under state law creating an imminent danger of impairment was sufficient to support a finding of child neglect.

The court also held that the fetus was a "person" within the meaning of the state Family Court Act.

The county department of social services filed a dependency petition, alleging that the mother (Toni D.) had been guilty of physical abuse of a child because she drank while she was pregnant with C.W.

The child was born prematurely at 26 weeks, and required oxygen and a feeding tube. A neurologist present at the birth testified that the child had a small head, which was a "direct indicator" that the child had an underdeveloped brain. The neurologist in turn attributed this to FAS. The mother had consumed two quarts of beer daily during her pregnancy, as well as using other drugs.

Under the statute relied on by the county, it was required to show that physical injury was caused by a "single act of abuse." The court held that this standard could not be met, because it was "the cumulative effects" of alcohol use, not a single drink, that had interfered with the development of C.W.'s brain.

The court suggested the county might be able to proceed under a different state statute.

Diagnosing FAS based solely on the size of a child's head, even given a mother's history of alcohol abuse, is not consistent with current medical practice.

A state agency sought to terminate the parental rights of a mother because she had used cocaine shortly before giving birth. The state Supreme Court holds that Connecticut law does not authorize termination of parental rights ont hat basis.

The state's argument was that prenatal use of cocaine fell within the statute authorizing termination of parental rights for causing "serious physical injury" to the child. The state conceded that on its interpretation of state law termination of parental rights would be warranted if a mother drank alcohol.

223 Conn. at 525