ContentsSpecial Section on Stock AnalystsThe Value of Client Access to Analyst RecommendationsT. Clifton Green
How Do Analyst Recommendations Respond to Major News?
Buy-Side Analysts, Sell-Side Analysts, and Investment Decisions of Money Managers
Analysts, Industries, and Price Momentum
What a Difference a Month Makes: Stock Analyst Valuations Following Initial Public Offerings
The Cross Section of Analyst Recommendations
Are Analyst Recommendations Biased? Evidence from Corporate
Bankruptcies
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Abstracts to the Special Section on Stock Analysts
The Value of Client Access to Analyst Recommendations
Early access to stock recommendations provides brokerage firm clients with incremental investment value. After controlling for transaction costs, purchasing (selling) quickly following upgrades (downgrades) results in average two-day returns of 1.02% (1.50%). Short-term profit opportunities persist for two hours following the pre-market release of new recommendations. The results are robust within sub-periods and a calendar-based strategy produces positive abnormal daily returns of over 10 basis points, or roughly 30% annualized. Recommending firms' market makers shift their quotes accordingly, providing indirect evidence that clients make use of the informational advantage that arises from analysts' opinion changes.
How Do Analyst Recommendations Respond to Major News? We examine how analysts respond to public information when setting stock recommendations. We model the determinants of analysts' recommendation changes following large stock price movements. We find evidence of an asymmetry following large positive and negative returns. Following large stock price increases, analysts are equally likely to upgrade or downgrade. Following large stock price declines, analysts are more likely to downgrade. This asymmetry exists after accounting for investment banking relationships and herding behavior. This result suggests recommendation changes are “sticky” in one direction, with analysts reluctant to downgrade. Moreover, this result implies that analysts' optimistic bias may vary through time.
Buy-Side Analysts, Sell-Side Analysts, and Investment Decisions of Money Managers We examine the role of financial analysts in forming institutional investors' investment decisions. In our model, a fund manager invests in a stock based on the optimal weighting of reports created by a biased sell-side analyst and an unbiased buy-side analyst. The manager puts a higher weight on the buy-side analyst's report when the quality of the buy-side analyst's information relative to that of the sell-side analyst increases, or when the sell-side analyst's degree of bias or uncertainty about the bias increases. Utilizing a unique dataset of U.S. equity funds, we find evidence supporting our model predictions on how fund managers weigh buy-side research relative to sell-side and independent research.
Analysts, Industries, and Price Momentum This paper examines the value of analysts as industry specialists. We show analysts create value in their recommendations mainly through their ability to rank stocks within industries. An industry-based recommendation strategy substantially improves the return to risk ratio and reduces price momentum tilt relative to portfolios that ignore industry information. An examination of the links among analyst information, aggregated at the industry level, and industry returns and industry momentum shows that industry returns precede industry-aggregated analyst upgrades and downgrades, and the short-term industry price momentum phenomenon is partly explained by returns of firms with more analyst coverage leading those with less in that industry. Recommendation information is not valuable for predicting future relative industry returns, however.
What a Difference a Month Makes: Stock Analyst Valuations Following Initial Public Offerings We examine how analysts establish target prices for IPO firms and whether comparable firms used to support target prices are helpful in explaining IPO offer prices. During the bubble period of 1999 to 2000, the average offer price was set at a discount relative to comparable firm valuations. In contrast, the average offer price was set at a small premium relative to comparables in the pre-bubble period. This shift appears to hold even after controlling for the differences in the types of firms going public during the bubble period. Moreover, target prices of IPO firms were set at a higher premium relative to comparables during the bubble period. While our results suggest that underwriters systematically discounted offer prices during the bubble period, an alternative explanation is that the shift arose because underwriters and analysts faced different incentives and legal exposures during the bubble period.
The Cross Section of Analyst Recommendations We analyze the price reaction to analysts' revisions by testing the Griffin and Tversky (1992) hypothesis that agents place emphasis on the strength of the signal (the dramatic nature of the event) and may de-emphasize the weight (the ability of the analyst making the recommendation). Two attributes, namely, years of experience and the reputation of the analysts' brokerage houses form proxies for analyst ability (or weight) that we validate by documenting that revisions by high ability analysts outperform those by low ability ones. We find evidence of return persistence following small (low strength) revisions by high ability analysts and the opposite return pattern following large (high strength) revisions of low ability analysts, consistent with the arguments of Griffin and Tversky (1992). Our study provides an empirical link between evidence on individual decision making and stock market returns, and also helps promote an understanding of the analyst industry as well as its interaction with the investing population.
Are Analyst Recommendations Biased? Evidence from Corporate
Bankruptcies We test whether a bias exists in analyst recommendations for firms that file for bankruptcy during 1995-2001. We fail to find overoptimism in analyst recommendations, including those of affiliated analysts. Our multivariate analysis of the market reaction to changes in analyst recommendations indicates that prior affiliation exerts no impact on either returns or trading volume. We find that the market does not view recommendation upgrades by affiliated analysts as biased since there is no price reversal following these recommendation changes. Overall, our results suggest that recently passed legislation to reduce analysts' conflicts of interest might be an overreaction.
Abstracts to the Regular Section
Returns to Acquirers of Listed and Unlisted Targets We examine announcement period abnormal returns to acquirers of listed and unlisted targets in 17 Western European countries over the interval 1996-2001. Acquirers of listed targets earn an insignificant average abnormal return of -0.38%, while acquirers of unlisted targets earn a significant average abnormal return of 1.48%. This listing effect in acquirers' returns persists through time and across countries and remains after controlling for the method of payment for the target, the acquirer's size and Tobin's Q, pre-announcement leakage of information about the transaction, whether the acquisition created a blockholder in the acquirer's ownership structure, whether the acquisition was a cross-border deal, and other variables. The fundamental factors that give rise to this listing effect, which has also been documented in U.S. acquisitions, remain elusive.
Are Observed Capital Structures Determined by Equity Market Timing? Contrary to Baker and Wurgler (2002), I find that the importance of historical average market-to-book ratios in leverage regressions is not due to past equity market timing. Although equity transactions may be timed to equity market conditions, they do not have significant long lasting effects on capital structure. Debt transactions exhibit timing patterns that are unlikely to induce a negative relation between market-to-book ratios and leverage. I also find that historical average market-to-book ratios have significant effects on current financing and investment decisions, implying that they contain information about growth opportunities not captured by current market-to-book ratios. |