Where Have All the Members Gone?

Union Density in the Era of Globalization

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There have been widespread claims in recent years about the effects of economic globalization on domestic politics (Cohen 1996). Many of these arguments suggest that there will be strong pressures for policy and institutional convergence as nations compete for investment by increasingly footloose capital. Such convergence is expected to have marked consequences for regulatory practices, wages, taxes, social welfare policies and union organization (Kurzer, 1993; Rodrik, 1997).

A number of recent studies, however, have raised serious questions about the validity of convergence claims. Garrett and Lange (1995) have underlined the role of domestic institutions in translating international pressures into domestic policy and institutions (also Dunning, 1997). More pointedly, others have suggested that there are multiple adjustment trajectories to increased globalization that are equally efficient (Garrett, 1998, Soskice, 1998). Finally, Rodrik (1997) notes the possibility that domestic resistance to the consequences of globalization may lead to policy adjustments that are divergent and politically viable, but also economically sub-optimal (see also North 1990). Indeed, to the extent that real-world national macro-economic policies have always been second-best, there is space for continued divergence in national economic policy.

In addition to theoretical questions about convergence, there is a great deal of empirical evidence to demonstrate continued divergence among nations in practice. Stopford (1997), citing several cases studies of national responses to globalization pressure, concludes that the nation state retains and is even increasing in importance as advanced economies require larger, and changing demands for (quasi-) public goods: basic education, technical (re)training, R&D, protection of new forms of property (intellectual property), and traditional public services. Garrett and Lange (1991) found that, despite a narrowing of macro-economic policy options, national supply-side policies may have actually diverged as economic openness increased in the post-war era. These findings are echoed in Garrett’s more extensive investigation of domestic policy under conditions of increasing trade and financial openness (Garrett 1998). On a related issue of changes in tax burdens (alleged to shift the burden of taxation away from investment and profits), Swank (1997) has found that taxes on capital have not converged across countries as globalization has increased. And, Stephens and Huber (1998) have found that welfare state regimes also are resistant to pressures (to the extent they exist) for retrenchment and convergence.

In a soon to be published edited volume on Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Kitschelt, Lange, Marks and Stephens summarize the findings on the impact of globalization on the advanced industrial democracies as follows:

First, convergence on any unique democratic capitalist political economic model is unlikely, both because there are strong

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1 All of these needs are highlighted in the literature on new growth theory (Barro, 1991; Barro and Romer, 1990).
2 Garrett concludes that globalization is often a convenient excuse for political leaders to alter policies (e.g., public pension systems) that are not viable for reasons unrelated to globalization.
3 However, Swank does find that there have been changes in the distribution of the tax burden, such that governments increasingly rely on tax policies that discriminate for or against particular types of investment. Thus, overall rates of taxation are the same, but there are fewer loopholes for particular kinds of investment.
theoretical reasons to doubt such convergence is even functionally dictated and because path dependent cognitive, institutional and political factors militate against it. Second, there are no strong empirical indications that convergence is occurring. (1998:23)

While what was “common wisdom” only a short time ago - that globalization would lead to domestic policy and institutional convergence - is rapidly becoming a straw man among political economists, the theoretical arguments and empirical findings against convergence leave many interesting and challenging issues open for research. In particular, far too little attention has been paid to the extent to which (and “mechanisms” by which) global forces might affect domestic policy and institutions and thus the conditions under which we could expect more or less adaptive change in different policy areas.

In this paper we examine one of those conditions: the strength and structure of the domestic labor movement. For more than two decades, the power and organization of domestic unions have been identified as critical sources of diversity in domestic policy regimes and outcomes. Differences in the strength and structure of the labor movement were identified as important causal variables in explaining the social policy regime, the extent and character of “supply-side” policies pursued by governments and different features of economic performance (e.g., inflation, growth, unemployment) and the particular mixes of them. Particularly relevant for our present discussion, these trade union variables are associated with differences in how different national political economies responded to the economic “shocks” - many of them international in origin - of the 1970s (Cameron, 1984; Lange and Garrett, 1985; Alvarez, Garrett and Lange, 1991 and Garrett and Lange 1991).

The association between the strength and structure of organized labor and national responses to international shocks has reappeared in discussions of the domestic impact of globalization since the 1980s. Iversen (1996) has highlighted the continuing importance of trade union strength in explaining the effects of central bank independence on economic performance. Garrett and Lange (1991) have shown a continued association between labor movement organization and the extent and type of supply-side policies pursued by governments. Pontusson and his colleagues (1996) have found that labor movement characteristics continue to affect patterns of income distribution. Most recently, Garrett (1998), in reviewing the theory and evidence on globalization and convergence finds a correlation between union density--the percentage of trade union members in the dependent labor force-- and differences governmental policy outputs and economic performance outcomes. Taken together, this evidence suggests that even in an era of global trade and finance, differences in the strength and structure of the domestic labor movements continue to make a significant impact on domestic policy regimes and national economic performance.

It is possible, however, that globalization is actually making national labor movements more similar, particularly by reducing membership in unions. If this is the case, then national policies and performance may still come to converge as this critical intervening cause of divergence (variation in union strength and institutions) is removed.
It thus becomes important to understand whether and how union movements may be changing and why.

This paper explores the impact of globalization on union density and the extent to which and how national configurations of union institutions and collective bargaining mediate this impact. We do so by focusing on the issue of changes in union strength, as measured by union density, during the post-war era. Our data on density covers the years 1960-1989. We proceed from presentations of the relevant variables and bivariate associations to a multivariate analysis. Section 2 examines trends in the dependent variable (union density) and trends in the "period of globalization" (beginning in 1974). This can be thought of as a cross-sectional approach to the question of the effect of globalization on density. Section 3, examines the measures of globalization more closely, identifying key cross-national variations in the timing and speed of internationalization. This provides an assessment of the convergence thesis from another angle, which can be thought of as something of a time series approach to the question, is a country's increasing exposure to international markets in goods and finance correlated with reductions union power and increased union membership? Section 4 describes the main institutional variables that we believe should be particularly relevant in mediating the relationship between globalization and union density. This section also uses bivariate associations to discuss their possible effects on changes in union density. In section 5, we employ a interactive cross-sectional/time series model to analyze the joint effects of institutions and globalization on changes in union density.

Section 1: Globalization and its effects on union strength

Globalization has today become almost a mantra. It is useful, therefore, to begin our discussion of its possible effects with a definition. For the purposes of this paper, globalization refers to both a formal institutional potential for and actual levels of engagement of a national economy with the other economies of the world, or at least a large portion of them. For our purposes it occurs along three critical dimensions: trade, finance and direct investment. Thus we treat globalization as the degree of formal openness to, actual levels of and changes in international trade, financial flows and total direct investment. Each of these measures is discussed more fully in the next section.

There are several reasons that globalization can be expected negatively to affect labor movements generally, and union density in particular. Directly, increased openness to international competition may reduce the ability of unions to deliver higher wages. Seeing fewer benefits to union membership or collective bargaining, workers will be less likely to join unions (Adamson and Partridge 1997; ILO 1997). Secondly, increasing

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4 In other papers we, and our collaborators, have explored both other dimensions of union strength and examined possible changes in the structure of unions and collective bargaining. (Golden and Wallerstein, 1996; Golden, Lange and Wallerstein, 1997; Lange and Scruggs, 1996). We concentrate on the 1980s because this is the period in which most analysts suggest the effects of globalization have been most pronounced.

5 We recognize the need to carry the analysis into the 1990s. Unfortunately, there is currently no directly equivalent data on density for the 1990s to that available for the 1960-1989 period. In the conclusions, however, we offer some brief discussion of recent developments in union density drawing on some non-comparable but reliable data.
global investment opportunities may induce employers to seek a union-free or more decentralized bargaining environment in the expectation of lower costs and/or more flexibility. Finally, globalization may encourage governments to change competition policies in ways that (intentionally or unintentionally) weaken union bargaining strength and legal voice in the workplace. Each of these methods can be considered a direct (negative) effect of globalization on unions.

While most of the political economy commentary - not to speak of the popular press - has viewed globalization in its various aspects as unfavorable to unions, there are reasons to at least question such arguments. First, the standard economic perspective is that expanding national markets increase global economic performance. To the extent this is the case, unions, which historically have done better under conditions of economic expansion, could benefit from globalization. This is especially the case if new markets are for traded goods produced by more highly unionized sectors. The more unionized the economy, of course, the more likely such effects. Second, international capital is differentiated, and different types of capital and investors are likely to "seek" different kinds of opportunities for investment. Under these conditions, countries may simply specialize in production sectors more (or less) conducive to unionization. Finally, as Garrett (1998; see also Rodrik 1997) has argued, to the extent that globalization increases economic insecurity due to market forces, workers may look to government and unions to help protect them from such insecurity. In this case, unionization is a reaction to the very forces that allegedly cause reduced density.

As all of this suggests, the effects of globalization on unionization cannot be taken for granted. It is quite possible that the effects of the increased trade, capital openness and flows and direct investment will combine to be beneficial for unions or at least reinforce divergence among countries, rather than stability or convergence. For example, investment in sectors that require high union membership may flow to highly unionized countries, while investment in sectors not compatible with unions may flow to low-union countries.

Section 2: Trends in union density and the "era" of globalization

Union density-- the proportion of active (non-retired) wage and salary earners who are union members - has been a traditional and widely used measure of union strength. The ability of trade unions to gain and hold members has been associated with workers’ collective strength in bargaining over wages and benefits and with the ability of unions to mobilize workers for industrial action, voting activity, and sometimes, political protest.

Table 1 summarizes the levels and trends of union density in sixteen advanced OECD countries between 1960 and 1989, the last year for which we have comparable data. Figure 1 plots density levels over this period by country. Of the sixteen countries examined in this paper, ten suffered declines in average union density since the 1970s, the beginning of the period of globalization. All but two countries had lower union density in 1989 than in 1980. However, in six of these ten countries, Austria,
Switzerland, France, Japan, the Netherlands and the USA, density rates began their decline well before the mid-1970s, and thus well before the "age" of globalization began. In all six of these countries, density peaked in the early 1960s (or even earlier). Thus, if we consider only countries that were not already experiencing a secular decline in density well before the early 1970's, more countries (6) gained, or maintained, union density after 1974 than lost (4).

Table 1: Union Density Trends 1960-1989

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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>1960</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>1981</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>1986</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>1978</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>1976</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>1964</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>1960</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>1960*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>1960</td>
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* Switzerland's gains in 1970's is caused by expulsion of "guest workers".
Whether the decline of unions in the 1980s actually represents a true reversal of long-term union power is also not clear. The 1980's may be the “ebb” after the “flow” of the 1970s (Golden and Wallerstein 1996). The years from 1968 to the mid-1970s were a period in which union militancy was widespread, and national political conditions (especially pro-labor governments) often favored unions. Density increased noticeably during that decade (1970-1980) in nine of the sixteen countries: Australia (7%), Belgium (35%), Canada (14%), Denmark (24%), Finland (35%), Great Britain (9%), Italy (32%), Norway (10%), and Sweden (18%). At the end of the 1980's union density was still higher in about half of our countries in 1989 compared to 1970. Since short-term economic conditions were generally more unfavorable to unions in the 1980s than the 1970s (e.g., higher unemployment, lower inflation and low growth), it is conceivable that these short-term conditions, and not global integration, explain differences in density trends between the 1970's and 1980's in many countries.

Further, and more important for the convergence hypothesis, density across countries diverges in the 1970s and 1980s. Visser (1991; 1994; 1996) reports that the coefficient of variation in density among 24 more advanced OECD countries reached its lowest level of the 20th century in 1950 (.25), rose slightly to .29 in 1970, but then accelerated upward in 1980 (.37) and again in 1990 (.48). In terms of the organization of workers, “today’s capitalist democracies appear to be as wide apart from one another as during the 1920s and 1930s” (1994:165).

The patterns of this diversity do not appear random. As relayed in Table 1, the ranking of countries in terms of their density has changed little between 1960 and 1989. What is notable is that countries where union density was highest in the 1960's grew faster in the 1970s. These "strong union" countries also lost a far smaller percentage of

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8 Switzerland's gained density in the mid-1970's, but this was by expelling low-skill, and relatively non-union "guest labor."
members (or continued to gain members) in the 1980s. On the other hand, the weak-union countries in the 1960's and 1970's continued to lose members in the 1980s. The exceptions are Austria, Canada and Finland. Austria had very high union density in the 1960's, but has been losing density steadily throughout the post-war period. Finland had very low density levels in the early 1960's (and a relatively weak labor movement in general), but has one of the highest unionization levels (and strongest labor movements) today. Canada had relatively low density in the 1960's but has had increasing or stable density levels since that time.

These conclusions are further reflected in Table 2 which displays the average density rates and average annual rates of change in density for the period 1974-1989, as well as the respective rank order for the sixteen countries in our sample. What should be noted is that the rank ordering of the five countries with the highest density levels (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Belgium and Norway) is identical to those with the highest rates of positive annual change in density. At the other end of the distribution, four (Japan, USA, France and the Netherlands) of the five countries with the lowest levels of density in 1974, also had the lowest rates of annual change between 1974 and 1989. Finally, the five countries in the middle of the distribution (Switzerland, Germany,

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9 1974 is chosen as the starting date because it corresponds to the end of the Bretton Woods system, the beginning of international balance of payments crises, and the growth of Euro-dollar markets precipitated by the first OPEC price hikes.
Australia, Italy and Austria) show a weak, positive relationship between density level and annual rate of change.

These results contradict the impression that globalization has systematically weakened labor organization and induced convergence among advanced democracies, at least as measured by union density. In fact, on the basis of the results in Table 2, there is clear divergence. To show this more explicitly, Figure 2 plots the average annual change in density between 1974 and 1989 plotted against the density level in 1974. Superimposed is the regression of starting density level on change in density. Density in 1974 is strongly and positively associated with the subsequent average annual change in density between 1974 and 1989. For each additional point of density in 1974, the predicted total annual change in density between 1974 and 1989 is .5 points higher. This means that low density/weak labor countries at the beginning of the "globalization era" got weaker, while strong density/strong labor countries at the beginning of the period of rapid globalization got stronger.

Are we "cheating" by including the late 1970's in this calculation? After all, we noted that Visser (1994) dates the period of globalization at around 1980; and there is evidence of greater liberalization in national capital account restrictions in several countries in the 1980's (explained more fully in the next section). If we repeat the previous analysis with data for 1980-1989, we get very similar regression results: a strong positive association between union density in 1980 and changes in density between 1980 and 1989.

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Figure 2

![Graph showing the relationship between density in 1974 and annual change in density 1974-89](image)

\[ y = 21.516x + 44.914 \]

\[ R^2 = 0.5763 \]

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10 Diagnostics do not suggest a serious problem with extreme values (with case-wise deletion of all countries, the estimated coefficient for density level in 1974(1980) was stable and t-scores were all above 3.5 (2.1)). Details available from the authors.
Section 3: Trends in globalization

The results in the previous section may seem compelling evidence for divergence in union density levels, but they are subject to several challenges. One obvious challenge is that individual countries become exposed to international markets at different times. This would explain the regression results if, for example, high-density countries maintained low levels of openness to international markets until the late 1980's, while low-density countries became more open in the 1970's. The crucial source of variation would thus lie in the timing of openness, not the different starting levels of density. Examining this possibility requires time series as opposed to cross-sectional analysis. It also requires using national-level measures of globalization, rather than assuming, as much of the existing literature does, that these forces act upon all countries similarly and simultaneously.

As previously mentioned, we use two standard economic and two institutional or policy measures of globalization. The first economic indicator of economic globalization is total foreign direct investment flows. FDI is used as a general indicator of integration into the international marketplace, not as a measure of competitiveness. Though some labor leaders (and scholars) consider direct investment to be an indicator of international manufacturing competitiveness, this is somewhat misleading. The primary sectors accounting for the bulk of growth in foreign direct investment have been financial and other private services, not manufacturing. Moreover, the main motive of companies investing directly abroad has often been to establish a market presence in the country, and not necessarily to take advantage of cheap foreign labor or a particular production advantage in the host country. This makes the best indicator of globalization the total level of direct investment (measured as a percentage of GDP), rather than inward or outward FDI flows.

The second economic variable, trade openness, is considered (especially in the context of the US labor movement) to be detrimental to unionization levels, because it places unskilled workers in competition with the global pool of unskilled workers where wages and worker conditions are much lower (Wood, 1995). However, free trade has long been embraced by very strong union movements, particularly in small corporatist countries, where it is seen way to ensure international competitiveness. For this reason, we expect its effect on union movements to be more pronounced in historically unexposed countries. Thus, we use percentage change in trade openness, (imports + exports)/GDP, to operationalize the expected effects of trade openness on density.

11 A growing volume of foreign direct investment presents particular problems for the "strong union" countries, because it tends to undermine efforts to a) organize private service sector workers, b) grant tax concessions for domestic reinvestment, and c) preserve long-standing, cooperative relationships between national producers, national bankers and the state (all of which provide a foundation for strong unions and union-management consensus).
12 For example, a large part of the "capital flight" from Sweden in the late 1980's came as the result of a desire to bolster an economic presence in the EU, as it was very unclear whether Sweden would decide to join the union (Blomström and Kokko, 1997). This is clearly an economic decision stemming from the effects of globalization (or at least regionalization), it is not clear that it was "more" or "less" of an opening than an equivalent investment inflow in the same year would have been.
13 Percentage changes will weight the changes to assign a larger (smaller) value to the same absolute change in trade openness the smaller (larger) the level of trade openness. Thus, a country going from 20 to 25 % on
The two institutional measures of economic globalization used for this paper are the product of a pathbreaking effort by Dennis Quinn (1997) to measure the legal extent of national financial market openness on an annual basis. The first measure (here called financial openness) ranges between 0 (restricted) and 14 (open). The second measure, capital account openness, is subsumed in the first, and ranges from 0 (restricted) to 4 (open). Capital account openness is included as a separate variable, because capital account restrictions are alleged to be a chief means by which small, corporatist countries have maintained high levels of domestic capital investment despite "unfavorable" labor market conditions (high union density). Thus, greater openness is expected by many to be associated with declining union density.

Looking at these measures graphically, we see that globalization, even based on the limited measures proposed here, is a multifaceted concept. Figure 3 graphs the annual level of total direct investment (TDI) for each of our sixteen countries for the period from 1960 to 1989. There is extensive growth in TDI in several countries in the 1980’s, but there is also a pro-cyclical pattern: growth in the 1960’s, declines through the recession of the 1970’s and 1980’s, rapid growth in mid-to-late 1980’s, and again downturns in the early 1990’s with renewed recession. Growth of TDI is greater in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s in some of the small, "strong union" countries (Sweden, Finland, Belgium), but there is also rapid growth in Britain, Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland and France, which have declining unionization. The relatively late upsurge (in the late 1980’s) might presage future impacts on national union movements. Unfortunately, we lack directly comparable density data on the mid-1990s at this time.

14 Some of the increased investment is undoubtedly attributable to European integration, as non-member companies invest in Europe to get access to the market. While this certainly is a globalization process, it is somewhat different from the “footloose” international capital markets often suggested in the literature.
Turning to trade openness, we can examine relative changes in exposure by converting openness to an index for all countries (1960=100). Figure 4 shows the value of this index and the traditional measure of openness ((imports + exports)/ GDP) for each country over time. Ignoring the temporary "bumps" created by the two oil shocks, increased exposure to international trade is relatively limited in most of the smaller economies (Australia, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, and Norway).\[15\] Belgium, Austria, Canada and (perhaps) Sweden are exceptions, experiencing high and growing trade exposure from the late 1960's. More striking are the larger countries, whose exposure to trade has increased much faster relative to their initial levels. Here, the exception is Japan, where trade exposure has actually declined slightly since the 1960’s, when Japan was still committed to an extensive export-led recovery.

These results are not much more consistent with the thesis that increasing globalization undermines union density than is the TDI data. True, the growth of trade exposure could be invoked to explain the declines in union density in Austria, France, the USA, and Italy, and the lack of increasing openness to explain union growth in countries like Sweden, Finland and Denmark. However, trade growth is positively correlated with union growth in two countries (Canada and Belgium), while Britain, Japan Netherlands and Switzerland experienced little overall trade growth but all had declining density throughout the period. Moreover, the high-density countries where trade growth has been relatively low (Denmark, Finland and Norway) have relatively high levels of exposure,

\[15\] This is defined as 20% growth in openness from 1960 to 1992.
and are thus accustomed to existing as open economies. Finally, high trade exposure has traditionally been invoked to explain higher density in corporatist countries (Katzenstein, 1985).

What about Quinn's measures of institutional financial openness? Figure 5 shows annual levels of financial openness and capital account openness. The results appear to bear a somewhat stronger correlation with trends in density identified in the last section. (They also provide clear evidence that most of the liberalization of finance and national accounts occurred before 1973.) First, among those countries that have been very financially open since the 1960’s, only Belgium and Sweden has density grown considerably since the late 1970’s. We can also put Canada in this category, though its density growth has been much more limited. In the other countries with strong growth or stability, two -- Denmark and Finland -- reduced overall financial restrictions considerably in the early 1970’s, but only Denmark has long had a relatively unrestricted capital account. Australia and Norway have maintained very tight restrictions on capital mobility until the late 1980’s, and both maintain more restrictions than most other countries. Finally, only Japan combines extensive capital controls (until the 1980’s) with consistently declining union density.

Figure 5 here

Though more consistent with the conventional wisdom that financial market liberalization hurts unions, this evidence is not overwhelming for two reasons. First, one can make a case that the late 1970’s/early 1980’s was the critical period for liberalization in only four, or perhaps five, of sixteen countries—Australia, Britain, Japan, Norway and (perhaps) the Netherlands. While we might expect further density declines in these countries due to this liberalization, recall that density has been in decline in both the Netherlands and Japan since the 1960’s, and Britain is undoubtedly a special, politically-driven, case. Meanwhile, density in Norway in the 1980’s was quite stable, despite considerable capital market liberalization in the early 1980’s. This leaves Australia as the only country fitting the theory of union decline very well. The second reason is that the opening of capital markets in two countries, Denmark and Finland, coincides closely with these countries’ period of highest union growth (i.e., the 1970’s). Unless there is an unusually long lag (more than 15 years!), unions in both countries have survived well under internationalized capital markets.

Section 4: The mediating effect of labor market institutions

In the political economies of all countries, the ultimate effects of international "exposure" are mediated by existing institutional arrangements linking the relevant actors (in our case, unions, employers and governments) (Garrett and Lange, 1996). The effect of these institutions in altering the available responses open to economic actors (particular managers and capital) is often ignored in the literature on globalization. How might the institutional setting in which industrial relations takes place affect the strategic decisions of critical actors in the face of changes which alter the environment for unionization? In particular, how might they shape responses to changes, above all increasing globalization, which are viewed as having been generally unfavorable to unions and their market and political power in the last twenty years or so?
Visser (1994: 168-174) argues persuasively that labor market institutions matter. He notes that decisions affecting union density (at the individual level) are the product of joint decisions taken by workers – to join, stay in, or leave the union - and employers, unions and government - how much effort to put into promoting or discouraging unionization. It should be underlined that these decisions are joint and that it cannot be assumed that across countries unions will always spend resources to promote unionization or that employers will always oppose it. For example, under a variety of conditions, unions may not see it as cost effective to devote significant resources to adding new members. Similarly, employers may find that the net benefits of accepting unionization exceed the net benefits of opposing unions. Unions may better provide for the complex monitoring and flexibility of task assignment necessary for high productivity in the flexibly specialized workplace (Regini, 1996); or they may simply threaten to strike if exit options are employed.

The literature on industrial relations identifies a number of institutional conditions that can affect both individual decisions about joining and leaving unions as well as the policies likely to be pursued by labor organizations and employers. Effects on both levels (individual and inter-organizational) may affect patterns in union density. In this section, we identify several such institutions, and discuss their likely impact on responses to changes in the environment affecting the prospects for unionization. Summary data on these various institutional features are presented in Table 3. The measures for each institutional measure are re-scaled from their original range to a 0 (lowest)-1 (highest) interval. (The measure for bargaining level represents the mean bargaining level for the 1960-1989 period.)

Table 3 here

Ghent systems. Prominent among the features said to explain trends in unionization is the presence of the “Ghent system”, in which unions manage the publicly financed unemployment insurance system (Rothstein 1992; see also Visser 1994: 172). The Ghent system, it is argued, provides unions with “selective incentives” which are likely to induce workers to join the unions and to discourage them from leaving, especially under conditions of rising unemployment and economic insecurity. Ghent systems should also reduce the marginal costs to unions of adding or keeping members. Thus, in Ghent countries union membership should be more resistant to environmental changes that might otherwise depress union membership; or as Western (1998) argues, Ghent systems

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16 Wallerstein (1989), for instance, argues that the size of the labor force affects the incentives for unions to devote resources to increasing membership at the margin.

17 Visser (1991; 1994), Western (1998), Lange and Scruggs (1997), and Golden and Wallerstein (1996) provide extensive and largely overlapping lists of industrial relations system institutional variables and arguments regarding their possible effects on union strength. We only discuss here those used in our subsequent analysis. These are primarily those for which there is available data appropriate for statistical analysis.

18 One should note, that the laws governing union administration, do not allow for discrimination. There is not much evidence of systematic discrimination against non-union members of these systems.
may allow unions to turn negative economic consequences into organizational advantages.19

The countries with Ghent systems (see Table 3) are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, all of whom have increased density throughout the period and performed well after the mid 1970's. Whether this relationship is robust to alternative explanations, however, remains to be seen. Two non-Ghent countries, Norway and Canada, have sustained or increased density without union-run unemployment insurance systems, and among Ghent countries, there is not much evidence that density increases with increasing unemployment.20

Centralization of collective bargaining. Several reasons suggest that more centralized collective bargaining is conducive to higher unionization of the labor force. Centralization of collective bargaining reduces competition between workers by taking salaries out of competition, thereby decreasing the likelihood that workers would think that union membership might reduce job security. Second, bargaining centralization reduces the incentives for employers to seek to eliminate unions from their workplaces (Western 1998; Visser 1994), for they are unlikely thereby to gain wage advantages21. Finally, bargaining centralization, with its potential macro-economic effects, may reinforce government’s interests in maintaining strong unions, especially a government of the Left (Alvarez, Garrett and Lange 1991).

As Visser (1994) has stressed, however, bargaining centralization also has potential negative effect: the possibility of workers “free riding” by not joining unions while gaining the benefits of union bargaining. Ideological and other selective incentives (such as those provided by the Ghent system and/or strong social networks of unionized workers in the workplace) may be needed to compensate. Nonetheless, the effects on employers’ strategies are likely to be the most pertinent.22

Most countries show relatively few changes in the predominant level of collective bargaining since 1960. Except for very brief experiments with centralized wage setting in the mid 1970's, both Canada and the United States are dominated by plant level collective bargaining, the most decentralized category. Despite their almost identical bargaining centralization pattern, recall that their density trends diverge considerably. Great Britain has relied predominantly on plant-level bargaining, but experimented with very centralized bargaining under Labor governments in the late-1960's and mid/late-1970's.

19 Western finds that at a minimum, the presence of the Ghent system diminishes the effects of variables which otherwise might depress density. Rothstein’s (1992) argument suggests a stronger hypothesis: that rising insecurity may lead to higher density in Ghent countries, the reverse of the effect in non-Ghent countries.
20 Indeed, density increases in the 1970's tended to precede increases in unemployment. Moreover, unemployment remained low until the 1990's in two of the four countries with the highest gains in density.
21 Note that bargaining centralization generally is associated with the extension of bargained agreements to non-unionized firms.
22 Centralization is measured in our dataset on a four point scale based on the predominant level at which collective bargaining takes place. It is based on the following: 0 = plant level; 1= industry (steel, autos, etc) level; 2= sectoral (private, public, white-collar, etc.), without a peace clause; 3= sectoral level with a peace clause. More explicit discussion of the coding is in Golden, Wallerstein and Lange (1996). Column 2 of Table 3 contains the (re-scaled) mean score on this variable for each country from 1960-1989.
Many more collective bargaining systems operate primarily at industry level (coded 1). Six countries (Austria, Belgium Switzerland, Germany, France and Japan) have been dominated by bargaining at this level throughout the last forty years. Except for Belgium, which enforced sector-wide bargains in 1976 and in the early 1980's, these countries use industry level bargaining exclusively from the 1960's until 1989. Two countries, Denmark and the Netherlands, switched from centralized, sectoral bargaining with sanctions to more decentralized, industry level agreements in the 1980's.

As with plant-level bargaining, density trends in industry-level bargaining situations are highly variable. Among those countries who have consistently used industry level bargaining, all but Belgium and Germany have had steady declines in density since 1960's. Union density peaked in Germany in the late 1970's. Though this is consistent with the literature's general timing of economic globalization, Germany has been one of the most formally open and trade-dependent countries economies since the 1960's. Decentralized bargaining in the Netherlands occurs in the late 1960's, but the density trend precedes decentralization by two decades. In Denmark, on the other hand, decentralization appears to have had little effect on Danish density rates.

The final five countries-- Australia, Finland, Italy, Norway and Sweden all have been and remain relatively centralized collective bargaining systems. Only Italy has witnessed an increase in centralization since the 1960s, going from an unsanctioned to sanctioned sectoral agreements (i.e., agreements are legally enforceable). Norway has predominantly used sanctioned sectoral agreements since the 1960's, (despite some non-sanctioned sectoral agreements during the early 1980's. Australia has consistently used unsanctioned, sectoral agreements. Finland and Sweden, like Denmark, have experienced bargaining decentralization. In Finland, this happened before 1970, while in Sweden it occurred only in 1982, when the Swedish Employers Association dismantled its formal centralized bargaining unit, permanently moving Sweden to a more informal system of sectoral wage bargaining. These two countries still bargain predominantly at the sectoral level, remaining among the most centralized bargaining systems in the industrial world.

Workplace access. Where unions have greater access to the workplace, defined a legal or de facto presence on the shop floor, union organizations can better protect themselves from events that undermine the unionizing incentives. Access provides unions with more on-site ability to induce workers to join, stay or not leave the union, among other ways, by creating social and other selective incentives to overcome possible free-rider propensities. Access also should discourage employers from seeking to take advantage of changes in external conditions unfavorable to unions (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1996). Our coding of countries levels of access is taken from Visser, who categorizes countries on a three point scale, high, medium and low access.

Access scores are provided in column 3 of Table 3. Of the six high access countries, five -- Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden-- enjoy sustained or growing density since the late 1970's. High access does not seem to have been sufficient to prevent a long-term decline in union density. The three countries with "moderate" union access to the workplace-- Germany, Italy and UK-- all experienced increases in density during the late 1960's and early 1970's, but their densities declined consistently from the 1970's through the end of the 1980's, albeit at different rates. Finally, among the
seven countries with very limited union access to the workplace, all except Canada experienced strong declines in density after the mid 1970's and experienced density declines well before that period. It thus appears conceivable that access to the workplace is an important determinant of long term density trends. Again, whether this correlation stands up to a more rigorous analysis is taken up in Section 4.

Corporatism: A critical dimension of interest group relations in Western democracies, and one may say to the smooth functioning of social democracy, is the system of interest group participation and representation in economic and social policy. Centralized interest group organization and active participation in policy making (particularly for employer association and unions) have been considered critical to maintaining political and economic stability. Moreover, the network of relations between official groups may create mutual interdependence among unions, employers and government, reinforcing unions’ power and, presumably, their ability to have and maintain membership.

The measure of corporatism used here is taken from a standardized ranking of expert judgments, compiled by Lijphart and Crepaz (1991). A list of the rankings is given in column 4 of Table 3. In a simple association, we would expect that greater corporatism results in higher density and resilience in the face of external shocks.

Comparing these ranking with what we know about changes in density over the period, one is hard pressed to find a correlation. Two countries classified among the top four corporatist countries (Austria and the Netherlands) have had declining density over most of the last forty years. On the other hand, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, three of the most corporatist countries had some of the most resilient density levels during the 1980’s. At the other end of the spectrum, Finland, Belgium, and Canada have growing density levels since the 1970’s despite having relatively low levels of corporatism. Simultaneously, five of the six least corporatist countries (Japan, France, Italy, UK and US) experienced steep declines in density since the mid to late 1970’s.

Combined Effects: Taken individually each of the institutional conditions above is expected to influence the likely impact of changes in globalization that might otherwise be expected adversely to affect union membership. They do so by affecting expected costs and benefits: to workers of joining, staying in or quitting a union; to unions of seeking to overcome such adverse effects; to employers of seeking to take advantage of them to attack unions and unionization; and to governments of undertaking policies which might either counter or reinforce unionization. In affecting the strategic decisions of the actors in the industrial relations system, these institutions thus mediate changes in the industrial relations environment and industrial relations outcomes, in our case, changes in union density.

It is also possible that, in combination, the institutional conditions favorable to unions described above constitute a more general environment which is more or less favorable to unions and unionization. The combined effects of these institutions, furthermore, especially if sustained over time, can be construed as a more general societal

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23 Australia was excluded from Lijphart and Crepaz ranking. Its score is assigned on the basis of its moderate union density and relatively high level of wage bargaining centralization.
view of unions and their role as institutional shields against the whims of the market. This, in turn, would reduce the likelihood that workers will seek to leave (or fail to join) unions under conditions of increasing globalization, and raise the costs to employers (and governments) of taking advantage of favorable “external” conditions. Thus, it might well be that whether of not specific institutional conditions are favorable to unions, the configuration of institutions may have a mediating effect on density trends. The combinations of institutional conditions may create local “equilibria” where unions, employers and governments have adjusted their policies and behaviors best to take advantage of institutional features of the industrial relations system. If this is the case, employers in an institutional system favorable to unions would have little interest in substantially weakening unions, even if environmental conditions were favorable to such an effort, while employers in system in which unions were weak might want to weaken them further (Soskice 1998).

To obtain a composite measure of these conditions, which we call “union-compatible institutions”, we created a variable that is an equally weighted sum of each of the conditions discussed above. This is shown in column 5 of Table 3. This score is highly correlated with density levels in 1990 (r=.92) and changes in density levels between 1974 and 1989 (r=.78). Figure 6 shows changes in density between 1974 and 1989 plotted against this combined institutional measure. This institutional measure is an extremely good predictor of density levels among five very strong and five very weak national configuration of union institutions. The main outliers are Canada, Austria and the Netherlands.

Section 5: Multivariate Empirical Analysis

The previous two sections sharpen two central questions posed in Section 1. Can increases in globalization explain cross-national trends in union density when those patterns have been so diverse? Does the institutional strength and structure of unions and collective bargaining mediate this relationship? This section considers these questions by modeling union density as a function of globalization and domestic control variables and their interaction with the degree of labor institutionalization. The results show that the negative effects of globalization on labor power obtain almost exclusively where labor market institutionalization is weak. In countries with highly institutionalized labor movements, the evidence suggests that union density increases with the opening of domestic capital markets. This conditional impact of international trade and finance suggests different national responses to globalization: increased “liberalism” (for relatively "unorganized" labor markets) and continued “collectivism” (for relatively "organized" labor markets).

We estimated several models using the cross-sectional time series data used in the previous analysis for 16 countries between the years 1961 and 1989. In all models the

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24 A previous version of this paper used the historical level of density as the important "institutional" variable mediating developments during the 1970's and 1980's.

25 Scores not on a 0-1 range were scaled to that range.
dependent variable is net union density. In each model we included three of the four globalization variables discussed in Section 3 on the right hand side—total direct investment (TDI), the trade openness index, Quinn's capital account openness and Quinn's general financial openness. (Since the second Quinn measure subsumes the first, each is estimated in different models.) Also included as explanatory variables are five controls for domestic cyclical economic effects and labor market trends that are likely to affect union density independently of the forces of globalization. (These estimates are reported but not discussed here.)

To estimate the model, we use the lagged first differences of these independent variables and the first difference of the dependent variable, union density. We include in each of the models, one of the five labor institutional variables identified in Section 3, and estimates of that variable's interaction with the globalization and control variables.

More formally, the first set of models we are estimating is:

\[ \Delta D = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta TDI_{it-1} + \beta_2 \Delta CAL_{it-1} + \beta_3 \Delta \ln TO_{it-1} + \beta_4 I_i + \beta_5 I^* \Delta TDI_{it-1} + \beta_6 I^* \Delta CAL_{it-1} + \beta_7 I^* \Delta \ln TO_{it-1} + \beta_{j+7} \sum_j C_{it-1} + \beta_{k+j+7} \sum_k I_i^* C_{it-1} + \epsilon_{it} \]

\[ \Delta D = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta TDI_{it-1} + \beta_2 \Delta FO_{it-1} + \beta_3 \Delta \ln TO_{it-1} + \beta_4 I_i + \beta_5 I^* \Delta TDI_{it-1} + \beta_6 I^* \Delta FO_{it-1} + \beta_7 I^* \Delta \ln TO_{it-1} + \beta_{j+7} \sum_j \Delta C_{it-1} + \beta_{k+j+7} \sum_k I_i^* \Delta C_{it-1} + \epsilon_{it} \]

D=net density,
TDI= total direct investment,
CAL=capital account openness,
FO = general financial openness
TO = trade openness,
I = the specific institutional measure, and
C = a vector of control variables—partisanship, dependent labor force (logged), percent unemployment, and growth rate.

Each model was estimated using OLS with panel corrected standard errors. Each model includes a (common) autoregressive term for all countries.

*Table 4 here*

Before discussing the model estimates, it is useful to restate the main hypotheses

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26 These are government partisanship, unemployment, GDP growth, (logged) dependent labor force, and government employment. The expected effects for each are respectively: negative (increases in partisanship imply more conservative governments), negative, positive, negative and positive, with these effects likely to be attenuated by strong labor institutions.

27 We also estimated the effect of lagged levels of density on subsequent changes, but this had no appreciable effect on the estimates reported here.

28 We tried additional controls, including service sector employment and government employment, neither of which affected the reported estimates significantly.
being evaluated. Table 4 presents a matrix of the expected associations derived from what we term the conventional wisdom and from our own analysis. First, the conventional wisdom suggest that globalization depresses union density in all countries. The strong version of the conventional wisdom asserts that the most severe changes should occur in countries in which labor markets are the most mal-adjusted to the "new realities" of the international economy (i.e., countries with highly institutionalized union movements). Our thesis is that the greater the institutionalization of labor movements, the more the negative effects of globalization will be attenuated. A stronger version is that institutionalized union movements will actually become even more institutionalized with increased globalization.

**Results**

Unlike normal regression estimates, the individual interaction model estimates are conditional on the values of the other interaction variable (Lange and Garrett, 1985; Friedrich, 1982). The regression coefficients and standard errors in interaction models cannot be interpreted directly, because they are summaries of a series of conditional relationships. The statistics associated with the multiplicative interaction term also cannot be analyzed in isolation. The term does not have a discrete identity as the joint impact of two variables beyond their additive effects (Friedrich, 1982, 804). The conditional effects are best presented by showing slope estimates (and standard errors) for the globalization (and control) variables at given levels of labor institutionalization.

*Tables 5 and 6 here*

Table 5 shows the "raw" regression results using each of the institutional measures. Table 6 presents the conditional slopes at given levels of the institutional variable. We eliminated variables with estimates that were statistically insignificant at the .20 level. This meant eliminating all but one of the globalization measures in all models. In four of the five models, the only remotely significant globalization variables were Quinn's openness measures. (For the Ghent model, the only significant globalization effect was for the trade index.). The insignificance of the trade index and TDI are themselves notable given the common claim that the effects of changes in these variables has a lot to do with the declining fortunes of labor in advanced countries. Of course, this does not mean that there is no real effect. Somewhat to our surprise, we found little difference between Quinn's two measures of capital market openness, though general financial openness did provide slightly more precise estimates. For both of these reasons, we report and discuss only the results of the models using general financial openness.

Looking at the results from the combined measure of labor institutionalization (Column 1 of Table 6), the estimates indicate a divergent effect of greater capital openness as we hypothesized. Among countries with high levels of institutionalized labor, increasing openness is positively associated with changes in density; among those without well-institutionalized union movements, globalization is associated with declines

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29 The results in Tables 5 and 6 are thus different representations of the same set of models. Technically, the interaction model can also be interpreted to show the conditional effect of changes in globalization on the institutional variable levels. However, this is inappropriate here, because the institutions do not vary across countries, and we assume that these effects are themselves independent.
Lange and Scruggs (1998)

in density. The results not only belie both versions of the conventional globalization hypothesis, but also provide reasonable support for the strong version of our hypothesis. On one hand, where labor organizations are institutionally weak, globalization does appear to significantly weaken unions. The notion that these countries (US, Canada, Japan, France, and Switzerland) are converging to a more individualist, "free" labor market is consistent with conventional fears about the effects of globalization on labor institutions and institutional strength. For these countries, globalization may be destroying the already relatively weak long-term organizational base of unionism.

On the other hand, countries with well-institutionalized union organizations appear to have a positive association between membership and globalization. These countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) may thus be "converging" on a pattern of high openness and high density. (This estimate should be interpreted with caution since it is statistically significant only at p<.20.) The positive density-globalization relationship in "strong labor" countries suggests that institutions can not only help to attenuate the "natural liberalization" brought on by globalization, but can actually become organizationally stronger in such situations. Unfortunately, we cannot determine whether this density growth is a "last gasp" resistance to the effects of globalization, or further evidence of a sustained, long-term divergence in the ways that different national political economies are inserted into the more globalized world economy.

The results from the models using individual components of the labor institutionalization score are consistent with the results for the combined measure. Though the precision of the estimates varies, the estimates generally suggest that the negative correlation between density and globalization is significant only under conditions of weak labor institutions. The conditional effects in strong labor countries, on the other hand, indicate a positive relationship or no statistically discernable relationship. Even in the Ghent model, where the only significant effects found for globalization are for the trade index (not capital openness), the signs and significance levels of the conditional estimates are consistent with our hypothesis.

**One More Cut**

Finally, as an alternative to the interaction specification, we divided the countries into categories on the basis of their combined institutional scores and ran separate estimates for each group. Since we believe that the institutional distinctions do in some ways define distinct populations of countries, this approach may be more appropriate than pooling all countries.

We divide the countries into three categories. Those with sores of 3 or greater are coded "high", those less than 1 coded "low" and the rest are coded "middle". We then estimated the same OLS PCSE model as in Equation 1 and 2, but dropping all "I" terms.30

*Table 7 here*

The results shown in Table 7 provide further statistical evidence supporting our

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30 The “I” term is extraneous, since we have already divided countries on the basis of the strength of their labor institutions.
main hypothesis that increased globalization has a positive association with changes in union density in strong labor countries and negative effects in weak labor countries. Once again, we find that Quinn’s financial openness measures are the only globalization variables with estimates significant in any of the models at p<.20, and that there is not much of a difference between the two forms of Quinn’s measure. In the highly institutionalized countries, the results are in the direction we predict (positive) and significant at p<.10. In the weak labor countries, in contrast, the coefficient is negative (as we predict), but only significant at p<.20. The "middle" countries have very imprecise (negative) estimates. In all, these results provide the same contrast between the effects of different degrees of labor's institutional strength in conditioning the relationship between globalization and union density as did the interaction models.

In summary, the results of the multivariate analyses lend support to our contention that globalization does not mean convergence around decentralized, ”free” labor markets among all countries.

Section 6: Conclusion

The results of this paper suggest several important conclusions about the increasing globalization of the international economy during the last quarter of the 20th century. First, controlling for cyclical and demographic features within national economies, we were unable to find significant associations between density and either the volume of direct investment flows or of increased trade flows. Only formal restriction of capital flows produced anything approaching a systematic effect on density. Even this result, however, does not provide much support for the thesis that globalization produces general convergence in union density (or hurts all unions severely). The effect is limited to the countries where unions were already the weakest. Where unions were strong, increased globalization is associated with increases in union density, and this result appears robust to several different "cuts" at the data. These results suggest that the convergence effects of globalization are far weaker – at least with respect to trade union density in the advanced industrial democracy – than is commonly asserted.

Secondly, our results show that institutions play an important mediating role between international changes and domestic level effects. Where institutions that solidify the place of unions in the economy are strong, globalization has little discernible impact on unions’ ability to organize. Some of our evidence even suggests that such institutions may actually facilitate organization under conditions of globalization, the opposite of what the convergence theories suggest. On the other hand, the predictions of the convergence thesis do seem borne out in those countries where unions have been most weakly institutionalized. Here, increases in financial liberalization have had deleterious effects on the ability of unions to maintain membership, and these countries have had lagging membership since the mid-1970s. On the whole, our empirical results clash sharply with expectations of convergence. Globalization seems to be producing increasing divergence in national density rates.

It could, of course, be the case that our data conceals longer-term effects. We have not presented analyses for the 1990s because data comparable to that for the earlier years is not available. Nonetheless, we do have some information on density (measured somewhat differently) for the current decade. Visser (1996) reported density figures for
OECD countries through 1992/93 which are reported in Table 8. Without lengthy elaboration, these data show that the countries with the best density performance in the 1974-1989 period continue this pattern in the early 1990's (compare to Table 2). Indeed, density trends in one of the countries with moderately high labor institutionalization (the Netherlands) reverses its downward trend from the preceding period. This suggests that the growing diversity in union density trends continues into the 1990's, fifteen to twenty years after the beginning of the era of economic globalization.

The data presented on density and cross-national divergence in response to globalization have broader implications. First, they suggest that if there is an acceleration of economic growth and a tightening of labor markets in the advanced industrial democracies (especially in Europe), union movements will retain very different capacities to respond to such favorable conditions with renewed market and political militancy. In the countries with historically weaker union movement, globalization has further weakened the unions, further decreasing their market and political power. In the countries with historically stronger unions, however, no such weakening has occurred and thus unions may be able to reassert themselves in industrial relations and in politics, albeit probably more constrained by international market forces.

Second, as so many studies have shown, the institutional strength of unions, and thus their power in markets an in politics, is associated with a wide range of consequences in public policy and firm behavior. In other words, divergence in the strength of unions has been associated with marked differences in the state-market relations, the size of the public economy, the character of the welfare state and numerous features of firms and their operations. Our findings would suggest that, even under the impact of globalization, such differences are likely to remain substantial or even grow. As in the 20th century, so in the 21st, capitalist democracy is likely to appear in numerous guises, substantially different in their consequences for democratic values, for economic growth and for the distribution of income and risk through market and political forces.
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