Social fragmentation is a new threat to Central Asian stability. Ethnic instability seems to be the most vulnerable aspect of Central Asia's post-Soviet development. The origin and dynamics of the ethno-political situation are highly complex and depend on many domestic and external factors.
Alongside the region's ethnic divisions, there has been a tremendous growth in religious pluralism throughout the Central Asian states, which some observers view as a potential source of conflict. Since the end of the Soviet period in Central Asia, Muslims have become a visible majority. The strengthening of Islam in Central Asia can be illustrated by the swift increase in mosque construction and pilgrimages to Mecca since the end of the Soviet era.
Throughout the region's history there has been competition among the various ethnic groups regarding their "Muslimness", stemming from the division between nomadic and sedentary peoples. The division between "good" and "bad" Muslims was brutally demonstrated during the Osh riots.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are more multi-religious than Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, or Tajikistan, and have no official obstacles to the revival or import of any religious denomination.
The few emerging Islamic parties that have sought to inject religious ideas into political life have been subject to constant harassment and have been declared illegal. Prior to being banned, the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) had a mass appeal in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The party now continuous its efforts underground and its most active segment is the Uzbek population in the Ferghana Valley.
Today's Muslim leaders in the Central Asian states have shown marked rigidity in ignoring the social and psychological needs of many Russified or westernized Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Tajiks - particularly women, the part of population most sensitive to religious issues.
Meanwhile, the label of Islamic fundamentalism in Tajikistan is fading. Clearly, the country's civil war has revealed itself as a regional or clan struggle, not a conflict between secular and clerical powers. Central Asian Muslims are still quite far from attaching themselves to notions of political Islam and a theoretic state. However, some new Muslim leaders are attempting to import fundamentalist ideas, and Islamic influence and funds are gradually frequency throughout Central Asia.
The process of Christianization of the northern part of Central Asia competes with Islamization in the southern part. This religious polarization further complicates the region's ethnic divisions.
Frequently it is difficult to distinguish between the development of ethnic identity and the growth of aggressive nationalism.
While the rise of nationalism and the development of national consciousness is taking place under political leaders` slogans of a Central Asian 'renaissance', what is actually occurring is cultural regression and de-intellectualization of these societies. The mass construction of historical centers contrasts sharply with the deterioration of grade.
What is even more troubling is the decreasing number of well-educated people, especially among women, as well as Russian-speaking and native intellectuals. The revival of the medieval past throughout the region has resulted in a decline of advanced research units and higher education, and reduced European cultural influence in the Central Asian states.
The cultivation sentiment in the Central Asian states manifests itself in a variety of ways in each country. In some cases, the region's artificial and convoluted borders means that attempts to establish national identities may ignite latent conflicts in areas where identities overlap, and where the region's other sources of conflict seem to exist in a conflict-prone commination. Central Asia`s Ferghana Valley is one such case.