Predicates of Personal Taste, Attributive Expletives and the Expressive – Reportive Distinction

Nadav Sabar

CUNY Graduate Center

nsabar@gc.cuny.edu

Abstract: Expression types such as *fun* or *ouch* are not straightforwardly accounted for in semantic frameworks which center attention on truth conditional propositions. The present paper surveys some of the recent literature on the semantics of predicates of personal taste, e.g. *fun*, as well as of attributive expletives and interjections, e.g. *damn* or *ouch*. While the inherent subjectivity that is characteristic of such expression types is widely recognized, still predicates of personal taste are normally treated so as to convey propositions. The attributive expletives and interjections are, by contrast, thought to belong to a unique semantic class of so called 'expressives'. It will be the goal of this paper to argue that both predicates of personal taste and the expletives and interjections, precisely due to their subjectivity, make useful linguistic tools for speakers to *express* their subjective feelings and attitudes. Rather than considering a special semantic class of expressives, it will be argued that to *express* is a speech act.

Keywords: *Performatives, expressive, reportive, predicates of personal taste, attributive expletives*

Introduction

This paper concentrates on two classes of expression types – predicates of personal taste (e.g. *fun*) and expletives (e.g. *damn*), and argues that due to the subjectivity inherent to the meaning of such expression types, they are readily usable in performing *expressive speech acts*, where a speaker expresses or *displays* one's own mental state, as well in performing *reportive speech acts*, where a speaker reports on the mental state of whoever, possibly of oneself.

Both kinds of expression types pose serious difficulties for standard accounts of formal semantics. Generative semanticists are concerned with propositional meaning and truth conditions, matters that are normally understood to be objective, and certainly not dependent on the personal tastes of individuals. But subjectivity is exactly what characterizes the expression types dealt with here, i.e. their dependence on there being some *experiencer* argument, whose mental state these predicates denote. That which, say, Bart finds *fun* Lisa finds excruciating, and an utterance of *damn* seems to convey an attitude that need not be shared. How, then, does one state objective truth conditions of sentences such as *This is fun* or *that damn Homer ate the last doughnut*? Glanzberg (2007:12) writes "it seems we need to work the experiencer argument into the meaning of [predicates such as] *fun* and *tasty*, to a significant degree. […] These [predicates] are really about personal taste."

Glanzberg is generally thinking about expression types such as: *fun*, *tasty*, *interesting*, *boring*, *great*, *nice*, *wonderful*, *good*, *cool*, *sucks* etc. The other class of expression types considered here includes: *ouch*, *whee*, *wow*, *yum*, *yay*, *hurray*, *damn*, *fuck, bastard*, *jerk*, etc. In the present work these are examined under one umbrella for the semantics of both involves *subjective* mental states, i.e. ones that require an *experiencer* argument. It has consistently been noted that POPTs take a complement argument expressing the experiencer overtly, as in *fun for Sam* or *good for you*, and that this is prime reason for postulating an *experiencer* in the semantic representation of POPTs. The class of expletives has likewise come to be analyzed so as to include some kind of an *experiencer* argument in their semantic representation. In saying *that jerk Homer ate all the doughnuts*, we assume the speaker must be displaying some personal attitude she has toward Homer or his actions. Thus, it seems that formal semanticists must conjure up unique mechanisms in order to seriously incorporate or integrate these expression types into the standard accounts.

Traditionally it has been assumed that *jerk* in the example above is in no way involved in setting the truth conditions of the proposition, i.e. that Homer ate all the doughnuts. Kaplan (1999:7) refers to the old dictum that "logic, and perhaps even truth, is immune to epithetical color". Frege would claim that the attributive expletive here contributes nothing to 'cognitive content' and so its analysis does not belong in the domain of semantics. The very term 'expletive' is derived from the Latin 'explere', literally meaning 'to fill'; the traditional idea being that these expressions are merely meaningless fillers, not part of semantic content.

The literature in formal semantics of recent years has taken up the challenge to incorporate or integrate each class of expression types into familiar frameworks of propositional semantics. In a nutshell, POPTs are assumed to require a 'taste parameter' for assessment of truth value, and the big debate that has emerged surrounds the question whether the truth of sentences containing POPTs should be always relativized to individuals or be wholly objective, even within a particular context of utterance (Lasersohn (2005), Stephenson (2008), Glanzberg (2007), Stojanovic (2007) inter alia); expletives, by contrast, are assumed to belong to a unique semantic class of 'expressives', which stands in opposition to expressions with "regular" propositional content (see Cruse (1986), Kaplan (1999), Potts (2003, 2007) inter alia). The special expressive meanings need then to somehow interface with the propositional meaning. In Potts (2007) the 'taste parameter' is carried over to the analysis of the expletives as well[1].

The purpose of this paper will be to critically review these methods for analyzing expletives and POPTs, and expose their internal incoherencies. I will then offer an alternative analysis which will account for the uses of these expression types through the lens of a speech act distinction, contrasting a class of *expressive* speech acts to that of *reportive* speech acts. The expressive speech act is quite different from the assumed class of 'expressives' alluded to by Kaplan or Potts in that the former by no means denotes a *semantic* class to which expression types such as *damn* invariably belong. The approach taken here assumes rather that expression types are tools employed by rational speakers to advance rational goals, and that certain expression types, due to their meaning, are better well suited for the performance of certain kinds of speech acts. POPTs and expletives, due to their inherent subjectivity, prove useful tools for *displaying* one's present mental state. This instrumental approach evades the difficulties faced by semantic accounts, as will be shown.

Subjectivity in Predicates of Personal Taste and Attributive Expletives

Lasersohn (2005) asks us to consider a dialogue such as the following:

(1) *Homer*: Kissing is fun!
Marge: No, kissing is not fun!

According to Lasersohn two mutually incompatible intuitions emerge from this dialogue. One intuition stems from our understanding that in matters of personal taste each speaker is entitled to his or her own perspective and so each speaker is making a truthful statement, while the other intuition is that in a dialogue like (1) Marge's utterance seems to contradict Homer's. But then how could both be true?

It is because of this apparent contradiction that Lasersohn is reluctant to simply assign POPTs a hidden argument place, either filled by an implicit indexical pronoun or overtly (as

[1] POPTs too have been occasionally analyzed so as to belong to the class of expressives (e.g. Gutzmann 2010), though for the most part they have been analyzed rather as conveying propositional content.

in *fun for me*). Such a proposal would entail that the proposition expressed by Homer is as represented in (2) below, and that expressed by Marge is as represented in (3). As is evident these are quite distinct, and so this account would fail to capture the intuition that there is disagreement between the parties.

(2) fun(kissing, Homer)
(3) ~fun(kissing, Marge)

Lasersohn's treatment is based on the work found in Kaplan (1989) on indexicals. According to Kaplan we distinguish between two senses as to what is the *meaning* of a sentence: the 'content' and the 'character'. The *character* is that which is constant across all utterances of a single expression type; so if two different speakers utter "I am a student" then they have uttered a sentence which has the same meaning, in the *character* sense. Clearly, the *character* doesn't provide any proposition. The *content* by contrast gives us the proposition. This is achieved as the *content* is supplied by a 'context' with values for indexicals, such as world and agent.

Kaplan treats *contents* as functions from world-time pairs to truth value, and *characters* as functions from *contexts* to *contents*, or equivalently to propositions. Thus truth value can only be assessed given the *content*. The *context* is understood technically as a formal construct which sets values for parameters. In essence then the *context* amounts to the sum of the assumed parameters. Suppressing much formal detail the picture we get at can be summarized in the diagram below:

(4) Character → Resolve indexicality → content → Evaluate truth value

The utterance "I'm a student" has a single character when spoken by either Bart or Lisa, but conveys a distinct proposition in each case as the context supplies a different value for *I*. It would do Bart no good to deny Lisa in saying: "??No, I'm not a student", because he would be denying a completely different proposition than that which Lisa has asserted. A contradiction is therefore a matter of conflicting *contents*, not *characters*, for a contradiction arises when two propositions are mutually incompatible.

Returning now to POPTs and to our dialogue in (1), Lasersohn indicates that Marge's denial of Homer's statement produces none of the anomaly present in Bart's denial above. Marge, Lasersohn argues, is quite felicitously expressing her disagreement with an initial "No" and could even say "That's not true" or "You're wrong". Lasersohn (2005:649) takes this fact as evidence that Marge's utterance is "a very overt, direct contradiction" to Homer's.

The great dilemma posed for POPTs has become known as the problem of 'faultless disagreement' (Lasersohn 2005, 2009). The issue is how to settle these two conflicting intuitions: that each speaker is making a true statement and yet one statement contradicts the other.

Lasersohn explores several solutions to getting out of this entanglement, but concludes that each fails to account either for the subjectivity that is inherent to POPTs, or for the contradiction that is felt in dialogue (1). One option, for example, is to de-relativize POPTs, so that the truth of sentences containing them does not vary from speaker to speaker, but rather will be absolute. There are various ways of developing such an approach: one could argue for an existentially quantified hidden argument, or for a universally quantified one, or perhaps for no experiencer argument at all. Each of these alternatives poses its own array of difficulties, but for Lasersohn the common thread is that none of these options accounts for these predicates' inherent subjectivity. If most people in a relevant group thoroughly enjoy roller coasters but Maggie doesn't, then under such an approach it would

appear impossible for her to say “Roller coasters are not fun” and speak truthfully, and that result would be absurd.

Another line of investigation explored by Lasersohn involves treating sentences containing POPTs as expressive. Under such an analysis, POPTs would be assimilated to the expletives, such as *whee!* As mentioned before these expletives are not thought to play a role in propositional content, and so in this approach sentences containing POPTs would not involve truth or falsity at all, but would rather serve only to express a speaker’s subjective perspective. Now this analysis, Lasersohn claims, fails to capture the intuition of a contradiction. Contradiction, being a matter of conflicting propositions, entails that these sentences are propositional in nature. To distinguish POPTs from “real expressives”, Lasersohn shows that while sentences containing POPTs can be coherently negated, expletives cannot be:

(5) *Bart*: Whee!
Lisa: ?? That’s not true! This isn’t fun at all!

After having refuted these and other options Lasersohn finally proposes his own solution which is committed to account for both the subjectivity and the contradiction. In essence what Lasersohn suggests is that the truth value of sentences containing POPTs be relativized to a new contextual taste parameter – an individual index, but this relativization is of truth-value only, and importantly, *not* of semantic content.

The indexical representing the new ‘taste parameter’, the *judge,* is quite different from the familiar time and world indexicals. The value for these latter is supplied by the context, as sketched in (4), in the derivation of *content* from *character*; once these values are given as input to the *character* the *content* emerges in full. It is this portion of the derivation, Lasersohn maintains, that is responsible for the intuition that Marge is contradicting Homer in (1).

But the value for our new judge index is not supplied at this portion of the derivation. Curiously, a truth value for each sentence is also still at want at this stage where the semantic content is now already available. When POPTs are involved, so it should seem, the truth value is not yet supplied even given the semantic content in full. The value for the *judge* index is supplied rather by the *context*, in the derivation of *truth-value* from *content*. This portion of the derivation accounts for the subjectivity of POPTs. Homer supplies himself as the value for the *judge* index of his statement, and Marge for hers, each thereby expressing a true proposition.

There are several peculiarities in Lasersohn’s analysis of POPTs, some of which Lasersohn admits to in full closure. To start, there’s a problem in the very coherency of the formal proposal. Notice that the analysis sketched above asks us to accept that speakers intuit a contradiction at a level in the derivation at which the truth conditions have not yet been fully supplied. How can this occur? Lasersohn asserts that contradiction is to be defined in the usual way: “Two sentences ϕ and ψ contradict each other if their *contents* have an empty intersection” (2005:663). The *contents*, however, as they stand in this analysis, fail to specify in full what the truth conditions are. Seeing as the truth value of sentences containing POPTs is assessed relative to a *judge* parameter, and since the value for the *judge* parameter is lacking from the semantic content of such sentences then the truth conditions are as yet not available given the semantic content. It would seem then that Lasersohn actually fails to propose a coherent account for the supposed intuition of a contradiction.

A related issue which Lasersohn notes explicitly is that “this analysis still […] leaves the nature of the disagreement somewhat mysterious. […] The fact remains that in this analysis there is no matter of fact on which disagreements of taste turn. Such disagreements

are in some sense "without substance"" (2005: 683-684). Not only, then, does the contradiction somehow manage to precede knowing the truth conditions but moreover, it is "substanceless". Lasersohn leaves the question open for future research as to what exactly *is* a contradiction without substance anyway.

Stojanovic (2007), in criticizing Lasersohn, insists that we think of the nature of the scenario in which dialogue (1) could be uttered. If the case is such that Homer is understood to be talking about his own assessment of kissing, and Marge is understood to be talking about hers, then in fact there is no disagreement whatsoever. Competent adult speakers understand that sometimes speakers are merely asserting how they feel toward a particular object or activity, and that each person may feel differently; in such cases no disagreement emerges.

By contrast, suppose a case where the speakers are understood to make universal statements. Homer is then asserting that in general kissing is fun, and Marge is asserting that in general it is not fun. Well, in that case the disagreement does involve a real contradiction, but now the speakers cannot both be saying something true. Either the majority/everyone finds kissing fun or not; that is an objective matter, and the contradiction would be real.

The force of this criticism lies in that once we consider actual *uses* of sentences containing POPTs we discover that a situation of 'faultless disagreement' simply never arises. If speakers know that truth values are assigned to sentences containing POPTs only relative to a *judge*, then they must understand that the value *True* may be assigned to anyone's utterance. Ultimately, only a context of utterance could indicate what value to assign the *judge* and in every case the speakers will either be asserting different things entirely, or alternatively, genuinely disagreeing.

How does Lasersohn justify his position? Stojanovic's criticism implicitly maintains that at every context of utterance (not *context* in the technical sense, but simply the concrete situation in which the utterance occurs) it is possible to determine a *unique* value for the *judge* index, and this entails that the truth value too is unique for each particular utterance of sentences containing POPTs. Thus in a particular circumstance the *judge* may be uniquely identified as Homer for Homer's utterance, and then as Marge for hers, and at another circumstance it may be uniquely identified as, say, the universal quantifier for both of their utterances. This assumption ensures that no disagreement could take place unless each speaker's utterance in a particular context is understood to provide a single consistent value for the *judge* index.

Lasersohn, by contrast, argues that it is impossible that the truth value of sentences containing POPTs will be determined uniquely and objectively even with respect to a single utterance within a particular context of utterance. Homer's utterance at one and the same time may be assessed as *True* relative to Homer and *False* relative to Marge. Lasersohn is resistant to accept that there is a definite and objective truth value to sentences containing POPTs because he believes that would strip POPTs of their inherent subjectivity. He explains that "In order to maintain an authentically subjective assignment of truth values to sentences containing [POPTs], we must allow that the objective facts of the situation of utterance do not uniquely determine a judge" (2005:669).

Here lies the central source for the debate that has arisen in the literature as to the correct analysis of POPTs: Lasersohn's *relativist* view maintains that the truth value of sentences containing POPTs is relativized to a context of *assessment*, not to a context of *utterance*, thereby leaving the value of the *judge* indeterminate even in a particular situation. In the relativist approach Homer's utterance in dialogue (1) could be at one and the same time true relative to Homer's *assessment* of the semantic content and false relative to Marge's. The number of *contexts* (in the technical sense, i.e. the number of distinct sequences of parameter values) is equivalent in any given case to the number of individuals pertaining to the actual

context of utterance – we get at least one *context* (in the technical sense) for each potential individual who can serve as the value for the *judge* in a given *context of utterance*.

By contrast the *contextualist* view (e.g. Glanzberg (2007), Stephenson (2007)) argues that the context of utterance uniquely determines a *judge* for every context of utterance, relative to which truth value is assessed and determined uniquely. In this approach the *judge* may be formally represented as an additional argument of the POPT proper, e.g. Stephenson's (2007) "PRO*judge*"; this argument needs to be supplied uniquely by the context of utterance even when it is realized only covertly. In another analysis of Glanzberg (2007), the judge forms a scale analogous to that formed by other gradable adjectives but based on an *Experiencer E*, so that *fun*, for example, would produce the scale *enjoyment as experienced by E*; the truth value of, say, "This is fun" would likewise depend upon the unique value of *E* in a particular context[2].

It is outside the scope of this paper to delve into the debate between relativists and contextualists. Ultimately it is the aim of the present work to show that any account of POPTs which analyzes them as consistently bearing a truth value at all is at odds with both intuition and empirical evidence. Indeed our last ax to grind with respect to existing analyses of POPTs applies equally well to relativists and to contextualists. Wherever or however the 'taste parameter' is represented in the formal system, and whether the context of utterance determines a value uniquely or not, both accounts must first address the question of how a value for the taste parameter is to be determined at all, or as Lasersohn puts it "*Who is the judge*"?

Lasersohn considers the possibility that the judge shall be *automatically fixed* either to the agent, or to some other individual or group intended by the agent. Such options are rejected for if the judge were to be fixed automatically that would again strip sentences containing POPTs from their subjectivity; a truth-value would simply be determined objectively in all cases by assessing the truth of the semantic content relative to the fixed *judge*. That would defeat the relativist stance which Lasersohn advocates. Seeing as the relativist view maintains that the judge can be anyone at all, Lasersohn argues that people tend to take themselves as the judge, whether they are the speaker, the addressee or whoever.

Note that in Lasersohn's analysis the semantic content remains constant, and different values for the *judge* are responsible for giving varying truth values. Lasersohn's understanding of the *judge* index thus can be used as an explanation for virtually any phenomenon whatsoever that involves POPTs. We tend to take ourselves as *judge* but we can always set the *judge* to anyone at all in whatever way seems to be required in a context of utterance.

This inherent flexibility proves, in fact, a far more principled reason why the judge cannot be fixed automatically, and that is because proper identification of the judge invariably depends on the *context of utterance*, i.e. on the full circumstances in which the utterance is issued. Lasersohn's "deviant" examples, in which the judge is not the speaker, include say, a context in which one is asking a question, such as "Is it tasty?" The speaker here is understood to take the *addressee* as supplying the value for the *judge*; or in trying to convince you to go bowling I may say: "come on, it'll be fun!", and again I am understood such that the value of the judge parameter to be set by the *addressee*. These are cases where speakers adopt an "exocentric" perspective.

The trouble is that there is no categorical way to determine when an exocentric perspective need be adopted. Lasersohn explains that a father may say that the ride in the park was "fun", even though he was not on the ride at all, but rather is understood to be

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[2] The truth value will depend on other factors as well, such as fixing the standard *s* for *enjoyment*, much like needs to be done for a gradable adjective such as *tall*.

making an assertion from the perspective of his daughter, who can't quite yet speak for herself. As the value of the judge index cannot, in principle, be fixed automatically, it should seem that it is always up to the interlocutors in a given context to *infer* what the value is (if not made explicit, of course).

Note now that contextualist view cannot escape this situation either. It too requires something like a 'taste parameter', however represented, which can be set to anyone at all given a context of utterance. The question between the camps only boils down to whether the value for the taste parameter is supplied *uniquely* or not once a context of utterance is given. All camps recognize that predicates such as *fun* inherently involve an *experiencer* argument. However, interlocutors must figure out whose perspective is at hand, and they do so on the basis of any information available, linguistic or not.

All the literature on POPTs notes that for very many POPTs the syntax allows for the *experiencer* argument to be realized overtly or remain covert, and yet it fails to address any potential difference between these types of sentences. For example Lasersohn fails to address the fact that in the context of convincing a friend to come bowling the speaker is less likely to say: "?come on! it will be fun *for you/for us*".

Returning to dialogue (1), suppose Marge and Homer rekindle their love on one special romantic night, and as they lovingly kiss Marge utters:

(6) Oh Homer, kissing is fun!

Consider now the relative oddity in saying one of the following under the described circumstances:

(7) ?Oh Homer, kissing is fun for me!
(8) ??Oh Homer, kissing is fun for us!
(9) ???Oh Homer, kissing is fun for everyone/anyone!

Or suppose now that Homer goes to the airport to pick up Marge. They have not seen each other in a long time and Homer missed her very much. Upon seeing her face he feels the excitement and says:

(10) Hey! It's great to finally see you!

He probably will not say in these circumstances:

(11) ??Hey! It's great for me to finally see you!

We are all familiar with the situation where we make a new acquaintance and say:

(12) It's nice to meet you.

But we don't normally say then:

(13) ??It's nice for me to meet you.

Or again when you say goodbye after a fun outing with your best friend, you might say:

(14) It was good to see you buddy!

Less likely you would say:

(15) ??It was good for me to see you buddy!

Lastly, imagine Bart having a blast at the Luna park and as he is riding the scariest roller coaster he shouts elatedly:

(16) Wow! This is so much fun!!!

He is less likely to shout:

(17) ??Wow! This is so much fun for me!!!
(18) ???Wow! This is so much fun for everyone!!!

It is important to note immediately that sentences marked by question marks are not argued to be impossible. Rather, the question marks come to indicate that in a particular context imagined these are less likely. One may of course imagine more into the context in a way that would make them more plausible. That is beside the point though; the point being that there exists a difference between the structure which leaves the experiencer overt and that which makes it covert. The literature ignores this difference completely. Lasersohn maintains that "the contents of [fun](The-Giant-Dipper) and that of [fun for John](The-Giant-Dipper) are identical in their John-oriented segments" (2005:677). Indeed in his formal system we see this equivalence too:

(19) $[[\alpha \text{ for } \beta]]_{U, c, u, t, w} = [[\alpha]]_{U, c, b, t, w}$ where $b = [[\beta]]_{U, c, b, t, w}$.

The same equivalence is seen in, e.g., Stephenson's work, who writes that "*fun for X* as judged by any judge j is equivalent to *fun* as judged by X. […] In principle […] there is nothing to stop [POPTs] from taking overt arguments, and I assume that this is what happens in expressions such as *fun for X*" (2007:519).

The literature on POPTs certainly realizes that only in a context of utterance can a value for the taste parameter be determined, and yet it fails to explain how the semantics can handle doing that on a systematic basis. The 'taste parameter' is a kind of a "solve all" mechanism, simply asserting that whatever we understand (ultimately *infer*) the experiencer to be is just what the semantics assigns to the *judge* index. But there is no insight in this kind of explanation. We don't know yet how speakers use POPTs, and there's no explanation for the difference in the uses of utterances which make the experiencer argument overt or covert.

Observe that despite the value of the first person pronoun *I* varying with context, it nonetheless seems possible to account for how the semantics computes this value systematically, for *I* is always set to the speaker. By contrast, the semantics offers no account which is able to systematically determine a value for the 'taste parameter'; as noted it would seem incorrect to say that the value is always set to the speaker. Rather, the interlocutors need to know, say, whether the speaker is talking about herself or a young child, whether she is trying to convince the addressee to do something or merely stating her own attitude, whether she is asking a question or expressing a positive surprise (such as in "(wow!) Is this fun")[3]. So to the question *who is the judge?* we only get the very low content answer 'well… anyone, you'll figure it out…'

[3] This should indicate that it cannot be argued that the sentence structure "is this fun" somehow automatically fixes the value of the judge to the addressee.

The same problem faces attributive expletives and interjections: How can we determine in a systematic way the perspective required in the interpretation of such expression types? Potts (2007) indeed argues that an analysis of expression types such as *damn*, *ouch* or *jerk* require a kind of *experiencer* argument, much like that which Lasersohn suggests for POPTs. Potts too finds it necessary to adopt a *judge* index precisely because he needs a theoretical mechanism which would allow the value to be set to anyone, as the context would make salient. Normally, the attitude is that of the speaker, but, as he notes, this is by no means necessary.

Contexts of embedded clauses constitute an important deviation. In the example below it may well be the speaker who is understood to have a negative attitude toward Bart:

(20) Lisa believes that that bastard Bart got a promotion.

Yet Potts brings some other more "difficult" cases, where it seems *bastard* is not meant to convey anything about the speaker, but rather about subject of the matrix:

(21) My father screamed that he would never allow me to marry that bastard Wesley. (Potts 2007: ex. 15)

(22) I am not prejudiced against Caucasians. But John, who is, claims you are the worst honkey he knows. (Potts 2007: ex. 16)

Now with the judge index capable of being set to any individual the context makes salient, Potts feels the problem is solved. However, Potts solution proves inconsistent with how he understands the class of expression types he is trying here to characterize.

Following Kaplan (1999), Potts categorizes expression types such as *bastard*, *damn* or *whee* as belonging to a class of *expressives*. This is understood as a unique semantic class of expression types whose meanings do not depend on propositional value. Kaplan (1999) posits a *Semantics of Meaning* which accounts for expression-types with "*descriptive content*", standing against a *Semantics of Use*, which is to account for expression-types with "*expressive content*". Potts adopts Kaplan's categories and sees the distinction as one between two "*dimensions of meaning*", the descriptive and the expressive dimensions, which are "fundamentally different" (Potts 2007:165).

Despite being qualitatively different from Lasersohn's essentially propositional understanding of POPTs, Potts sees "perspective dependence" as a defining characteristic shared by both POPTs and expressives, and thus offers a formal analysis which employs a *judge* index in the semantic representation of these so called expressive morphemes. The problem is that this essential property of expressives, i.e. *perspective dependence*, if it is understood so as to involve this all capable judge index, stands in a direct contradiction to two other defining properties of expressives hypothesized by Potts, *immediacy* and *non displaceability*. The result, as will be shown, is an inherent incoherency in the very category of expressives as understood by Potts.

According to *immediacy*, Potts argues, it is a defining characteristic of expressives that they don't offer content, so much as inflict it. In that sense, Potts maintains, expressives are like performatives. In saying "I promise to come" I commit myself to coming; the act of promising is actually being performed in saying this, and not merely reported on. By analogy, Potts explains that "the act of uttering an expressive *is* the emotive performance" (2007: 180, original emphasis). So in saying "*that damn Bart*" Lisa is displaying her negative attitude toward Bart.

But it should be evident that if we allow expressives to have a *judge* index, then we are inevitably saying at best that the property of *immediacy* only occasionally involves

expressives, namely just in those cases where the value of the *judge* is set to the speaker. If the value is set rather to, say, the father in (21) then in that case the speaker's utterance of *damn* is by no means an act of emotive performance, for she was reporting what the father has said.

Next consider the property *non-displaceability*, which maintains that expressives "always tell us something about the utterance situation itself". This property is clearly related to the previous one. The expressive being *immediate* in its impact, it is assumed to denote the attitude of the speaker *at the time the utterance is made*. Thus again one promises in saying "I promise", and one is certainly not promising in saying "I promised/ I will promise/ He promises".

But it should again be evident that in allowing a judge index Potts is opening the door for the so called expressive to denote the attitude of anyone at any time. Indeed, if the father in the example above is to set the value for the judge index then in that case the expressive morpheme *must* be displaced, indicating the attitude of a third party at some past time. There could not be therefore a class of expression types such as *expressives* who is at one and the same time characterized by *perspective dependence*, *immediacy* and *non-displaceability*.

In fact, the "deviation" Potts sees in embedded contexts is really not a serious issue at all. What Potts fails to recognize is that such sentences are potentially ambiguous, and yet the attitude involved with the expletive is consistently assigned to whomever words' are in question. Thus there is really no need for a *judge* index, but rather all one needs to know is whose words are at question. Fortunately, there is an orthographic mechanism to indicate this, the quotation marks. Thus below it is indicated explicitly that whatever attitude is conveyed by *bastard* is to be attributed to the father:

(23) My father screamed that he would never allow me to marry "that bastard Wesley".

By using the quotation marks it becomes evident that these are not the speaker's words. There are ways for speakers to signal that they're not using their own words also in spoken conversations, such as employing some particular hand movements or tone of voice, etc. Ultimately though, it is the interlocutors who must *infer*, based on any given information, whose words it is, and once that is done it is known whose subjective attitude the expletive involves. Not surprisingly, Potts' examples are all of "verbs of saying", such as "scream" or "claim". It is indeed quite sensible that the embedded clauses of such verbs require quotation marks, as they offer the words of the matrix verbs' agents. Other verbs though, such "believe" or "know" would not work in such a way. Observe the relative oddity in writing:

(24) ??John knows/believes that "that bastard Bart" got a promotion.

Interjections, which are also assumed to belong to the class of expressives, cannot be syntactically embedded and so the quotation-marks confusion normally doesn't arise for them:

(25) ??John screamed that whee!

However it is most certainly possible to embed "whee" if we just eliminate the complementizer and use quotation marks:

(26) John screamed: "Whee!"

And as expected this works with verbs of saying[4], and not with verbs like "believe" or "know":

(27) ??John believed: "Whee!"

It is again evident that the relevant question is not who the speaker is, but whose words it is.

I conclude it is only sensible that a speaker will use expression types, such as *damn* or *whee* to express her subjective attitude, but this does not entail that *damn* or *whee*, as expression types, are inherently expressive. In embedded contexts where the words of others are *reported* then such expression types are simply not being expressive, and are naturally displaced.

The trouble with Potts' account of expressives is that it attributes the very category of expressiveness, i.e. the emotive performance essentially non-displaceable, ultimately to the expression type itself, rather than to speakers, namely to people. Instead of seeing that it is *speakers* who are being expressive, Potts talks as though it were *words* which are being expressive. If the expression types themselves are expressive then they might be dealt with within a formal semantics framework. But Potts' analysis of expressives yields an incoherent class, marred by yet more inconsistencies as explained below.

Thus another characteristic property of expressives is that they involve gradability, some being more positive or negative than others. Cruse (1986: 272) argues that "expressive meaning can be varied continuously, and is therefore analogically encoded". Potts's account offers a formalization of the comparative positivity or negativity of expressives, employing something called an "expressive index": "An expressive index is a triple <*a* I *b*>, where *a* and *b* are in the domain of entities and I [-1, 1]" (Potts 2007: 177).

The idea conveyed is that individual *a* is at an expressive level I for individual *b*. Thus the expressive index encodes both the degree of expressivity of the expressive morpheme as well as the direction the expressive – who is expressive towards who or what. In the example below it is represented that Tom feels negatively toward Jerry, and is appropriate perhaps for a sentence in which the speaker Tom is saying: "that damn Jerry…"

(28) <tom -.5; 0 jerry>

Potts considers the use of real numbers a great theoretical advantage for the analysis of expressives for it indeed allows infinite gradability. Importantly, Potts works the positivity or negativity into the meaning of each expressive morpheme by indicating in the semantic representation whether the numbers are positive or negative. Thus the semantic representation of *damn* would specify that only negative numbers are allowed.

But again trouble arises, for sometimes *damn* is actually used positively or affectionately. Potts handles this formally by simply allowing for an elimination of the clause which stipulates negative numbers, when the context of utterance is such that the expressive is used positively. This is essentially a *deus-ex-machina*, much like the *judge* index itself it is designed to handle any situation. Potts is further perplexed by the fact that some contexts do not seem to allow a positive use of a normally negative expressive, which otherwise would allow a unique positive use. Potts writes: "no matter how clear I make it that I feel positive and respectful of my dean, I cannot refer to him with "bastard" and expect it to heighten my positive expressivity. I do not at present see a way to formulate [the semantic] denotations in a way that allows for carefully controlled positive uses" (Potts 2007: 188).

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[4] Clearly "whee" is not a claim and so the verb "claim", while can be considered a verb of saying, will trivially not work here.

Again, the problem results from a clash as to who is to carry the burden of being expressive – the morpheme or the speaker. If *damn* is inherently expressive and is negative as such, then it is surprising that speakers can use it positively, and moreover that it is ultimately always dependent on the particular context whether one can use or interpret *damn* positively or negatively. Potts is forced to admit: "It is certainly true that these items [*damn* and *freaking*], are characteristically negative. But they are not always negative. If I am speaking affectionately about Sam, then my use of *damn* in connection with him will probably be construed as affectionate" (2007: 187-188).

Kaplan (1999), the work on which Potts is basing himself, sets a path of inquiry that aims to extend formal semantics to the point where it could account for the traditionally "ignored semantic phenomena" (2005:5). Indeed the expletives and interjections under discussion have consistently been excluded from semantic analyses of propositional content. In order to bring them back in, Kaplan suggests a way we might analyze these expression types with the standard formal toolkit of propositional semantics, and yet account for their inherent context dependence; this is achieved by stating *conditions of use*. Kaplan explains his method:

"I ask not what the expression means. […] Instead, I ask, "What are the conditions under which the expression is correctly or accurately used?" […] To the degree that such conditions reflect linguistic convention, the information that such conditions obtain is carried in the semantics of the expression" (Kaplan 1999: 5)

In parallel to the concept of Truth, Kaplan introduces the notion of Truth+ which indicates that an utterance is "*expressively correct*", i.e. that its conditions of use are met in the context of utterance. To take one example, Kaplan takes it that the conditions of use for the expressive *damn* stipulate a derogatory attitude on the part of the speaker. The same for *freaking*, "which, while 'richer', also serves the function of a completely general, denigrating expressive as well" (1999:9). Then it is concluded that ""That damn/freaking Kaplan got a promotion" is going to be expressively correct just in case the speaker has a derogatory attitude toward Kaplan, and descriptively correct just in case Kaplan *was* promoted (1999: 9-10, original emphasis).

We can see that Kaplan faces the same challenges as Potts, for these conditions of use may actually not obtain, if the speaker is using the relevant word affectionately, as Potts shows. How is it going to be possible to predict how a speaker is using an expressive on any given occasion? If the expression type itself is going to specify as its meaning that it can only be used to convey a derogatory attitude, then speakers, who have learned the expression type to mean that, would not be expected to use that expression to convey a positive attitude.

We have examined what some of the recent literature has to say about two classes of expression types, POPTs and attributive expletives. Expression types of either of these classes are not readily incorporated into standard accounts of propositional semantics and both seem to require some kind of a taste parameter; this parameter can be set to anyone at all, and while only in a context of utterance can one imagine what would be the value of this parameter, it is also only relative to it that the utterance is assumed to be *semantically* interpreted.

The Expressive – Reportive Distinction

I argue that expression types are actually never themselves expressive, but rather that speakers *use* certain expression types *expressively*. Under this instrumental approach to meaning, expression types are considered to be tools. The tools that we use are distinguished from the uses to which they are put. It does not follow from the fact that *damn* is often used expressively that it belongs to a semantic category of "*expressives*". The distinction is then to be made between kinds of *speech acts*, *expressive* and *reportive*.

While expression types are not themselves expressive, still, if there is some structural, semantic, characteristic to certain expression-types that makes them particularly suitable for performing an expressive speech act, we may take note of this and try to explain what in that structural characterization makes these expression-types suitable tools for performing this particular speech act. I argue here that expression types whose lexical meaning inherently involves the subjective attitude of some experiencer are particularly suitable tools for expressing. But I will not, in any way, argue that such expression types are used exclusively in the performance of an *expressive* speech act. Rather they may just as well be used in a different kind of speech acts, i.e. one of *reporting*.

When a person is in a certain mental state he or she, in *expressing* or *displaying* that state, may use bits of language. One of the expressive speech acts, for example, would involve *expressing* or *displaying* pain. And a useful tool for performing this speech act could be perhaps the single word "*ouch*" or the sentential "*it hurt*". Cruse (1986: 274) writes: "expressed meaning most characteristically conveys some sort of emotion or attitude". I subscribe to this general characterization, but stress that it is not the "meaning" which conveys an emotion or attitude, but rather the speaker, in uttering a token of one of these expression types. Sometimes rather than expressing our own subjective attitudes, we report or speculate about the subjective states of others. I may tell you that "Sam thinks it's fun" and not be understood then to express my own feeling but Sam's.

Competent adult speakers are generally able to tell whether a speaker is performing an expressive or a reportive speech act, and based on this understanding the interlocutor is directly guided to the correct identification of the experiencer argument.

Interestingly, distinct linguistic structures containing POPTs lend themselves naturally to be more or less useful in the performance of either speech act. Thus, when one is *expressing*, one generally uses a structure which leaves the experiencer argument covert. This does not mean that "it's fun" is expressive while "it's fun for me" is not, but rather that in performing a speech act of expressing one is more likely to say "it's fun" than "it's fun for me". We shall see why that is once we finish characterizing the speech acts and the POPTs.

We may characterize the *expressive speech act* as having the following properties:

Non Displaceability – It is only the mental state that one is *presently* in that one can *display*. By contrast, one may *report* on things however far removed in time and space. Thus one cannot *display* the pain one felt yesterday, but one can certainly *report* on the pain felt yesterday, or on the pain of others.

Speaker's Perspective – It is only one's *own* mental state that one can *display*. One cannot *display* the pain of another. By contrast one may well *report* that someone else is in pain. One may also *report* on one's own pain. Here's a nice example from Kimball (1971): suppose the doctor is gradually wrapping a rubber band around your wrist and asks you to inform her when it starts to hurt. As the band is going around you say "I'm still good, a bit more is fine, and… now it hurts". When you say, in this context, "it hurts" you are not displaying your pain but reporting on it.

Based on these first two properties the reader should note how our account differs from Potts', for here we are committed all the way that the concept of an *expressive speech act* is simply incoherent unless it is the *speaker's* expression. Since it is not the expression type itself which is expressive, but the speaker, we need not worry about introducing an all capable *judge* index to handle a sematic class of so called "expressives".

Immediacy/Performative – One performs a speech act of *displaying* one's mental state *in* uttering an expression-type of the appropriate kind in the appropriate circumstances. Just like in saying "I bet you Sam will win" or "I promise to come" I do not report on my betting or my promising but actually bet or promise, so too in saying "ouch" or "it hurt" in the right circumstances, I do not report that I am in pain, but actually *display* pain. I rely here

on Austin's (1962) analysis of speech acts and contrast an *expressive* speech act from a *reportive* one. Of course, in order for one to sincerely *display* a subjective mental state one must indeed *be* in that mental state. Thus just like it would be insincere to promise without any intention of doing that which is promised, it would be insincere to yell out "ouch" when one is not experiencing pain, or say "the soup is tasty" when one finds it disgusting. The reportive speech act is subject to similar infelicities. The patient in the example above may report that "it hurts" even if no pain is felt.

Non Deniability/Non questionability – An *expressive* speech act cannot be denied or questioned. If you're hit on your toe and scream "*ouch*!", or "*it hurts!*", there is no sense in denying or questioning this. By contrast, in the example from Kimball, the doctor could well question the report by responding with, say: "Are you sure it hurts already?" (Suppose the patient is a scared child who is worried about when it will actually hurt and so reports on his pain sooner than required; the doctor knows the boy and suspects this might be going on). There is a contradiction of some sort between the speech acts of *displaying* on the one hand and either *questioning* or *denying* on the other. This has to do with the final characteristic of expressives below.

Non propositional – At least some of the times when one is reporting, one is using sentence types which have truth-values. This makes perfect sense because when reporting, one is often in the business of saying something that is either true or false. But that is never the case when expressing. An utterance in an expressive speech act is never true or false, as there is no logical sense in which a *display* of one's mental state can be true. Observe that one cannot lie while expressing. One may deceptively utter "ouch" *expressively* even when one is not experiencing pain, but we hardly call that knowingly making a false claim. There is some qualitative difference which Kaplan actually wishes to capture with his concept of Truth+ or "truth with an attitude" which is supposed to characterize his expressives. Here is it argued that the speech act is non-propositional, not the expression type, which as noted may take part in a speech act involving propositional content.

In the above I characterized what I consider the most important properties of the expressive speech act, contrasting it to the reportive speech act. Having characterized the expressive speech act I now propose two characteristics which unite PoPTs and attributive expletives:

Subjectivity – PoPTs denote some subjective attitude or mental state. Each person may have her own subjective attitude in matters of taste. A little test (which is not full proof but still useful) to identify subjective predicates in English is see whether or not the expression "for one" makes coherent sense as an argument for the predicate. Thus it seems semantically anomalous to say "??collecting comics is fun/interesting/boring for one" or "??vegetable soup is tasty to one". Yet if we take an objective predicate like "healthy" it is perfectly sensible to say "eating vegetables is healthy for one". Attributive expletives also have perspective oriented meanings. He who is a *jerk* for one person is not for another.

Evaluative – PoPTs are inherently evaluative predicates. It is part of the meaning of "fun" that it denotes a positive attitude, of "boring" that it is negative, of "tasty" that it is positive, of "hurt" that it is negative and so on. In learning the meanings of these lexical items, surely one needs to learn roughly where on the scale of the predicate this particular expression stands. Likewise Potts notes that an expletive such as *damn* is not as powerful as *fucking*, indicating that this class of expression types likewise involves making some evaluation.

Having delineated the properties of the expressive speech acts and of POPTs and expletives, it should become apparent why these expression types are so widely used in performing expressive speech acts. Speakers use subjective – evaluative predicates to express

their feelings or attitudes about people, activities or things. This is very human to do. We often just have to show how we feel.

And here I suggest a structural distinction between two kinds of sentence types containing POPTs: those in which an experiencer argument is realized overtly and those in which it is absent. Examples of sentence-types in which there is an overt experiencer are: "*This is fun for x; That is tasty to x; It hurt x*." And examples of sentence-types in which an experiencer is absent are: "*This is fun; That is tasty; It hurt*".

Now I argue that a sentence type which contains a POPT but has no overt experiencer argument is, precisely due to this structural characteristic, more suitable for *expressing*. The reason is simple – one can only display one's *own* mental state, and so when performing a speech act of *displaying* or *expressing* it could not be more otiose to refer to oneself.

Theoretical support for this idea comes from a concept known as Austin's Thesis, which states: "No modification without aberration". Suppose I tell you: "I ate lunch". Now it is clear that I ate lunch deliberately. There is no way that you would think that I did not do so deliberately. Yet if I *say*: "I deliberately ate lunch" then that is surely a little odd. The hearer will think why is the speaker saying this? Clearly something must be outside of the norm if this modification to the sentence is made. The point is that it is so obvious that I ate lunch deliberately that under the *normal* circumstances I will not say that I did so deliberately. Such modification to the sentence is not appropriate unless the message I am trying to convey is in some sense itself aberrant.

Turning to PoPTs, in a context of utterance in which it is clear that I am *displaying*, such as when a bowling ball falls on my toe and I shout "it hurts!", or when I make your acquaintance and say "it's nice to meet you" (I'm not reporting that it's nice, but *showing* that it is) or when I say "it was fun hanging out" or "it's good seeing you again", it is clear in all those cases that it is *my* attitude which is consistently being expressed. In fact it is so obvious it is me, that it would be quite odd to *display* my pain by saying "?that hurts me!", or to *display* my positive feelings about hanging out in saying "?it was fun for me hanging out". If an utterance is truly expressive there could be no one other than me whose attitude the POPT could take as its argument, so saying "me" is otiose – it serves no end.

Now to say "it hurt me" is to specify that it hurt *me* and not someone else. This specification may be required for good reason if what I am doing is *report* on my pain (though even then, depending on the context, I may choose the other sentence-type). One may report on the attitudes and feelings of anyone though, and so it may well be necessary to explicitly state whose attitude the POPT concerns when one is reporting. Suppose you ask me "Why does Sam collect comics?" I may reply to you: "well, because it is fun for him". I choose here the sentence-type which includes an overt experiencer because I am informing you about *Sam's* attitude, and I may not want you to think that this is my attitude toward the activity as well.

I would like to now offer some empirical support to my hypothesis. I assume that expression-types such as "damn", "wow", "God", etc. are generally used by speakers expressively. In accordance with this assumption I predict that tokens of sentence types such as "wow, this is fun!" will produce more results on an exact search in Google than sentence types such as "wow, this is fun for me!" I perform Google searches for various such sentences which include all sorts of initial interjections and all sorts of POPTs. My predictions are consistently born out.

Thus, a Google search for "it's fun for me" yields 1,030,000 results. But when we add the initial interjection "damn" as in "damn, it's fun for me" the results drop down to merely 7. By contrast "Damn, it's fun" yields 853,000 results. And again, "Wow it's fun for me" yields merely 8 results, whereas "wow, it's fun" yields 3,000,000 results. It should be noted that "it's fun" yields 28,000,000 results, and so about 14% (close to 4,000,000) of the occurrences

of “it’s fun” start with either “wow” or “damn”. This while less than 0.1% (a mere 15 out of 1,030,000) of the occurrences of “it’s fun for me” start with an initial “wow” or “damn”. Additional Google results are presented below:

That was interesting *for me* → 1,900,000	That was interesting → 45,500,000
Wow, that was interesting *for me* → 4	**Wow**, that was interesting → 6,830,000

That hurt *me* → 3,990,000	That hurt → 7,600,000
God damn that hurt *me* → 7	**God damn** that hurt → 34,500
Oh fuck that hurt *me* → 5	**Oh fuck** that hurt → 34,400

It is tasty *to me* → 14,900	It is tasty → 4,620,000
Man it is tasty *to me* → 0	**Man** it is tasty → 112,000
Wow it is tasty *to me* → 0	**Wow** it is tasty → 250,000
Yum it is tasty *to me* → 0	**Yum** it is tasty → 3,380
Mmm it is tasty *to me* → 0	**Mmm** it is tasty → 6,670

It is important not to get confused and think that sentence-types such as “kissing is fun” or “it hurt” are inherently expressive. They are not. Sentence-types are never expressive, speakers are. Rather, these sentence-types lend themselves to being used expressively, precisely because they lack an overt experiencer argument to the inherently subjective predicate – this argument is invariably otiose in the performing of a *display* of one’s mental state. But these very same sentence-types may also be used *not* expressively. We have already seen in the doctor’s example before how “it hurts” can be used as a report. The reason “it hurts” is an appropriate sentence-type to choose in that context is because it is obvious that the patient, in response to the doctor’s explicit request, is reporting on her own state of pain, and so there too, although reporting, it is otiose to use the sentence-type “it hurts me”.

Another context in which sentence-types lacking overt experiencer are readily used *not* expressively is when they are embedded under a matrix clause. Thus in a sentence like “John wonders whether kissing is fun”, it should under normal circumstances be quite obvious, due to the saliency of “John” in the matrix, that *John* is the intended experiencer of the embedded PoPT. “For phrases” are optional – if it is perfectly obvious who they denote then they can delete. It would seem quite redundant in this context to use the other sentence-type, namely: “John wonders whether kissing is fun for him”, though this might be chosen for some particular communicative purposes. For example, this would be said if the speaker meant to convey that John is so out of touch with his feelings that he does not actually know whether kissing is fun for him.

Let’s go back now to the initial problem raised with respect to POPTs: ‘faultless disagreement’. In dialogue (1) it could well be that each speaker is *expressing* their own subjective attitude to kissing. In that case no contradiction arises and the use of “No” can be analyzed as part of the expressive speech act. Suppose your team scores and you shout ‘YES!!’ but your disappointed friend shouts ‘NO!!’ Is this a *contradiction*? The situation in (1) may be quite parallel; each speaker is *expressing* his/her subjective individual attitude, without any contradiction, or indeed a truth-value, being involved. Speaker B is simply *expressing* the opposite attitude from that expressed by A; thus this proposal allows preserving all contradictions as contradictions of substance, as has been assumed since Aristotle.

The critique might argue that while the above analysis may be true for “yes” and “no”, it still fails to explain how it is that speaker B may respond with “you’re wrong” or “that is

not true". These responses seem to make it obvious that a contradiction is actually taking place. To this I respond, first one should realize that the words "true" and "false" are hardly reserved by speakers to matters of propositional content. A good example comes from the movie "The Life Aquatic": in one scene the wife of the main character, Steve, is leaving him and she says to him: "Goodbye Steve", to which Steve replies: "Even if it's true, don't say it". Now would we want to argue that the wife's "goodbye" was propositional? That seems rather absurd.

Second, I argue that the burden of proof is on the analyst who claims that "that's not true" or "you're wrong" are indeed readily used responses to "kissing is fun" or "this is tasty". A Google search verifies my intuitions that such responses are highly unlikely. I have searched for exact strings comparing cases of agreement to those of disagreement between speakers:

You're right, it's fun to: 1,840,000	You're wrong, it's fun to: 2
You're right, it isn't fun to: 5,160	You're wrong, it isn't fun to: 0
That's true, it's fun to: 260,000	That's not true, it's fun to: 7
	That's false, it's fun to: 0

You're right, it's tasty → 15,200	You're wrong, it's tasty → 0

You're right, it's interesting → 2,460,000	You're wrong, it's interesting → 4
That's true, it's interesting → 442,000	That's not true, it's interesting → 8
	That's false, it's interesting → 1
You're right, it isn't interesting → 1,600	You're wrong, it isn't interesting → 1

It appears that by and large speakers tend not to express overt disagreement when it comes to matters of taste. These findings are really not surprising at all. *Adult* speakers, who have developed a theory of mind, are well aware that each person has their own subjective attitude toward such matters as what is fun or tasty. Therefore, it makes little sense for a competent adult to blatantly protest against his/her interlocutor that they are *wrong* or *false* in having the subjective evaluation they have.

In this paper I argued for an instrumental approach to language, where the work of the analyst consists of explicating, on the one hand, the *structure* of expression-types, and on the other hand the *uses* to which expression-types are put. The underlying assumption is then that expression-types are structured objects. Each speaker, due to the grammar she has internalized, has available to her these structures which she puts to use in the performance of various speech acts. According to this framework using language, i.e. using expression-types, is not in essence different from tool using generally. While the structure of the tool is distinct from its uses, the two are related. It is not an accident that, say, a hammer is used to put a nail in the wall or to break open a piggy bank. The hammer's weight, size and shape make it a tool appropriate for such tasks. Expression-types are used as tools to perform certain speech acts. Certain expression-types, because they have the structures they do, are deemed by speakers to be appropriate tools to perform certain speech acts and not others. POPTs and expletives, due to their inherent subjectivity, are appropriate tools to use either to express one's own subjective attitude or feeling, or to report on someone's subjective attitude or feeling.

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