
Babcock has us believe that global citizenship presents solution to both to the migration dilemma of stateless human beings and the human rights imperative (all human beings have rights, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights under UN Charter). But Babcock adds another layer: citizenship both rests within bounded nation-states, yet at the same time questions those boundaries and posits the possibility of multiple membership that may include a world state. Like other scholars, he seems in favor of a more broadened definition of citizenship that must take into account structures larger than a nation-state. He is sanguine about a world state, although he does not minimize the effects of globalization. He questions the efficacy of “global citizenship,” even preferring to use the term “transnational citizenship.” An important and significant contributor to the discussion.


We keep returning to the model of global citizenship provided by the EU. How convincing this is depends on your frame of reference; the presumption that multiple citizenship now offered in Europe (a national one and the pan-European one) somehow sets the stage for similar developments elsewhere, which has not been borne out. As with other scholars, Bellamy attempts to explain the “various levels of political activity” (p. 109) found in Europe, but without limiting the influence of national identities. In other words, he wants his cake and eat it too. He quotes Habermas a lot, who is much more optimistic about the possibility of trans-national citizenship, but criticizes him for being too idealistic and impractical. He dances around global citizenship, coming up with “communitarian cosmopolitanism” instead; somehow adding more syllables makes it more palatable. It’s quaint, even cute, but not very substantive.
Unlike some who claim that global citizenship occurs as the expense of national citizenship, Boli believes that the two are intertwinably linked and feed off of one another. Boli, one of the major theorists on the subject, and global citizenship, sees the basis of world citizenship arising out of global forces as well as the “doctrine of universal human rights” promulgated by world bodies, most notably, the United Nations. The increasing primacy of basic human rights, which such organizations as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch promote, has led to a gaining concept of certain inalienable rights that belong simply to the fact that we are humans living on this planet. These concepts are increasingly accepted as norms by all states, new and old, and for the most part remain unchallenged. Increasingly these global rights force national governments to give them protection, a new development in human history. Failure to do so “is one of the major factors leading to mobilization by the many rights-promoting transnational and national organizations that fill the world polity today.” (p. 379) In the global sphere, we see organizations such as the International Chamber of Commerce and Red Cross who set and write the standards in specific areas (international trade and conduct in war, respectively): “To a large extent, world bodies fashion the very substance of world citizenship, elaborating, refining, and arguing about its content, while they educate states about the implementation of that content.” (p. 379). How do these groups do this? Through “rational voluntaristic authority,” or the ability of world media and world public opinion to voice dissatisfaction with rogue states (e.g. witness the world reaction to the Taliban’s blowing of large Buddha statues in Afghanistan). There is no world government body to guarantee world citizenship rights; instead, the reliance on a “moral code” to do so. So citizenship is growing “softer,” especially the global variety.


In light with other "radical" use of the word "deep" ("deep ecology," "deep politics," etc.) which seemed to be the rage for a while, Clarke does make a useful argument about the inadequacy of present citizenship to respond to citizen's needs. Rather than extolling global citizenship as a panacea for an unengaged public, Clarke believes that there have been fundamental flaws built into citizenship from the very start of its inculcation in classical Athens. In his own words: "It supports a conception of democracy that remains less as unfinished business than as business scarcely started, and it invokes a conception of politics that is exclusive rather than inclusive." (1996: 2) Thus any discussion on the efficacy of global citizenship must take Clarke's critique into regard. So discussion of global citizenship seems prenatally flawed; how can we even talk about a global citizenry when the current national one is flawed; can we extend a flawed concept into a greater geographical area? Clarke thinks not.

Article does not deal with global citizenship per se, but its main argument is useful in possibly explaining it, and that argument is: In an increasingly neo-liberal, market driven civilization, citizenship is increasingly giving way to users, clients and customers. This is a fundamentally different concept of civil society than one depending on the rights and obligations of citizens to a state. In the new mechanism, where government is increasingly privatized, notions of how citizens of a state interact with those bodies that previously were part of the government but which are now privatized take on a different hue and tone: Do we feel the same rights and obligations to a corporation rather than to a democratically-elected government?


Falk categorizes global citizens into five types: global reformers, global business person, the environmental activist, the regionalist with some ties to the global sphere and the transnational activist, such as those seen at WTO protests. These categories are useful in delineating a model of global citizens, but does not help us in understanding the forces behind their emergence. What it does provide is a useful barometer of the changes that global citizenship is placing on the very notion of what is a citizen. Falk reinforces Steenbergen's main thesis as much as it harkens back to Plato, that the global citizen is less a political animal than a social one.


Takes off where Giddens and Turow end. Franck argues that modernity brings on the end of nation-states and the mutable identity that is reshaping the entire foundation of legal society. Self-invented identity, based on affiliation and personal fulfillment, and the individualism it springs holds the possibility of new relationships with the state and the community in which we are born. While multiple loyalties (to a nation, a region, a company, etc.) is a common feature of Western civ, the unique spin today is that unlike previous models, today’s multiple loyalties are freely chosen and not imposed. The notion of global citizenship (not specifically mentioned) may be based on multiple citizenship, or, more precisely, the current “intercitoyennete” emerging in Europe – citizens of one country can move about and have the same rights and privileges living in another EU country as do natives. We almost expect this in an era of “greater mobility and ever-widening communications.” (p. 73)

If the globalized sphere is a "multi-culti" one, that itself cannot act as a break against the acceptance of global citizenship. Less theoretical and more practical, Habermas here tackles the emerging European citizen, although his analysis has wider implications. Citizenship does not rely on ethnic and cultural homogeneity, but can thrive (as U.S. and Switzerland show) on diversity so long as there is an accepted and bonded notion of common political culture. Nations up to now typically been responsible for creation of this common political culture; if states are diminished in the globalized world, who is responsible for creating this culture to sustain global citizenship? In other words, if this culture is tied into national identity, how can citizenship survive when the engines of identity creation come increasingly under attack by global economic forces? Habermas does not tackle this thorny question.


The chapter on multiple citizenship is illuminating as historical discussion of world citizenship (not a new concept; discussed as early as the Greeks; Marcus Aurelius may be the most famous early "world citizens!") and its haphazard emergence. There is nothing new in Heater that we don’t see in other scholars, but he synthesizes the concept perhaps better than most. If not original, he is certainly explanatory. Like other scholars, he sees the evolution of world citizenship at the doorstep of the growth of human rights and global bodies like the UN. He also cites specific examples of attempts by individual to create world governing bodies. And like other scholars, he chooses to use different words for the same concept, in his case, he prefers “cosmopolites” (from the Greek for “citizens of the universe”). Interesting note: In his bibliography, there’s not one citation for Habermas.


Travel writer Iyer, himself a global citizen (he lives in the middle of rural Japan in an apartment building called "The Memphis") posits a more nightmarish vision of global citizens, or what he calls "global souls" who are everywhere and nowhere. Not a scholarly study, the book still manages to entertain notions of a world constantly shrinking and what that means for growing number of people who travel, work or simply meander to other parts of the world: growing uniformity that at once exaggerates our differences as it seeks to nullify them. In this milieu, there is really no "global citizen" per se, just an amalgam of people, increasingly lost and lacking in self-identity. A skimpy work but an interesting read.

Yet a different name: “universal citizenship.” The connection (not a causal one) between increasing migration and decline of citizenship seems reactionary, if not polemic. Somehow “the state… becoming the object of international law and institutions” does not sit well with Jacobson. The lockjaw of the state as dispenser, arbiter and recipient of citizen loyalty is broken and he’s not willing to see what might lie beyond the shattered remains. At the helm of this rupture is the migratory movements that are an increasing phenomenon in the 21st century.


An interesting theoretical assumption made here (although not always fully supported by evidence. Namely that military conscription was one of the bedrocks that led to citizenship in the first place. As such, the conscripted citizenry served to perpetuate state power as it forced it to grant citizenship to adults males that had not previously had it. The rise of state power came at the same time as the rise of citizenship, with both rights and privileges attached thereof. The “state produces and reproduces itself” and citizenship is used as a means to do so. This development led to “civil, social and political rights” all embedded under the banner of citizenship. But the increase use of professional armies and reduced popularity in citizen armies (military service for male adults is gradually weakening in Europe) removes a pillar in liberalist citizenship. Social movements replace national politics and parties. The rise of the European Union and the concept of trans-national citizenship has really only benefited industry and trade, not ordinary citizens.


While not discussing global citizens qua global citizens, Keck and Sikkink set the groundwork for how these new citizens operate. The rise of global activists, such as those protesting WTO, as one section of the growing fraternity of world citizens, gives way to pressure tactics that transcend national borders. These tactics (“through a combination of persuasion, socialization and pressure” [p. 214]) are powerful tools for what they call the “cosmopolitan community of individuals,” (p. 213), suspiciously close in tone to global citizens.

Not a new argument, regarding the line (however “weak”) between universal human rights and the emergence of “universal citizenship.” But the discrepancy and tension between the “international source of rights” and states’ willingness to enforce them is a growing issue. In Leary’s world, as Alan C. Cairns (1999) suggests, there’s the possibility of a future state where countries only enforce universal rights of those folks that happen to be living/traveling/working in their territory at any given moment. In this sense, the primacy of individuals and their rights take precedence over the state, and any attachments that we formally know as “patriotism” are quaint and anachronistic. If so, this is entirely keeping with developments in the 20th century that saw the heralding of universal human rights in the first place.


Old definitions of citizenship coming under increasing attack. The assumption that citizenship is a fixed concept is increasingly being challenged in the face of deep social, political and economic changes wrought by the onslaught of globalization. Any conceptualization of citizenship must take into account the interplay between national and supra-national forces. Fixed concepts of citizenship yielding to more flexible notions. The rise of the importance of human rights raises the specter that “citizenship” in some form can be “granted” even to those who do not have it, that is, who are ostracized in their own country. This requires looking at citizenship in a new way. She maintains that globalization has seeped into every facet of governing and institutions, and they must now react to these changes.


The gist of Mosco’s argument is that citizenship may be returning to the Athenian model, that is, to attachment to a city-nation. He discusses “Silicon Alley” in New York, the new Cyberjaya city south of Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, and Emilia-Romagna in Italy as emerging city-states. What does this have to do with global citizenship? I see two interesting points in his argument: 1) These city-states seem to emerge from globalization forces that are driving today’s society, and 2) That new definitions of citizenship (whether global, “cyber-citizens” etc.) are invariably tied to emerging communicational networks which are increasingly global. If our model of global citizens has relied, after Falk, on identifying key actors who make up this “constituency,” then Mosco argues that we are missing key elements of effects of technological change. It’s a compelling argument, though not thoroughly developed.

What concerns Preston most is the withering of the nation-state, and the emergence to loyalties on multiple levels: local, national and regional blocks (e.g. Europe, North America and Pacific Asia). Not a new argument, nor necessarily an insightful one, but as utilitarianism, it’s probably the best we can hope for in these changing times. Even though citizens is part of the title, scant little attention is really focuses on the subject, save for its relationship to identity and membership (is membership in the Kwanis Club really like being a citizen?!). If Preston is right, perhaps we should be thinking less of global citizens than “local citizens.” When he talks of “construing relationships of the self” and “ordered collectivity,” it has a strangely Giddens feel to it, without any of the latter's soothing charms. Where it’s heading Preston doesn’t know, but it’s “new routes to new futures.”


The crisis in democracy may in fact be a crisis in citizenship, a previously parochial term that has not kept pace with modern socioeconomic and political changes. Steenbergen suggests a more wholistic definition of citizenship, especially if it is to include any concept of globalization, and more realistically, if it is to survive as an active agent of democratic expression. Steenbergen may be at the forefront of a movement away from strictly technical definitions of a citizen - "on his or her relationship to the state" (1994: 2) - to one that is more sociological in composition. This fits nicely into Giddens' notion of lifestyle politics, and suggests that citizenship in the modern, global arena may be less a matter of rights and responsibilities to a specified state, or "political citizenship" from T.H. Marshall's own analysis, but instead more a "social citizenship" that seeks expression in social causes rather than strictly political ones.


The moorings between citizenship and its ties to civic community (whether it is city, region or nation) are furthered weakened by the emergence of the post-modernist culture. Turner's analysis fits nicely with Steenbergen and Giddens, that a citizenship that is more social than political, more an extension of belief and lifestyle than accountable to a recognizable sovereignty, is one that has increasingly fewer and fewer connections to historical models. It's impossible to guess where this might take us, but Turner seems to suggest this is merely just another rendition of old liberalism's quaint taste for individuality. His is a dulcet vision of modern citizens, ripping the new from the old is merely another conjurer's trick of assessing the inadequacy of the past to fit present conditions. What is less convincing is whether this new vision is as benign as he assumes.

If global environmental problems and the threat of nuclear annihilation proved strong engines of individuals seeking common cause across many nations, a common feature in the discussion of global citizenship, than Weale adds a third element that has been overlooked: the responsibility to future generations. While it glibly sounds like a campaign speech, this element that all citizens are responsible to the future adds an interest twist to the argument. It’s unclear what he means by the “reformists” possibilities that global citizenship implies. And in other guise, he posits that duties and obligations are not solely pertinent to national citizenship, but can be part of the global variety. So far, he’s the only scholar I’ve read who’s willing to stick his neck out that global citizenship even has duties and obligations. Although he needs a book to elucidate on this, not just a chapter.