6. The Pragmatics of Narrative Knowledge

In Section 1, I leveled two objections against the unquestioning acceptance of an instrumental conception of knowledge in the most highly developed societies. Knowledge is not the same as science, especially in its consensual science, far from successfully obscuring the problem of its legitimacy, cannot avoid raising it with all of its implications, which are no less sociopolitical than epistemological. Let us begin with an analysis of the nature of "narrative" knowledge, by providing a point of comparison, our examination will clarify at least some of the characteristics of the form assumed by scientific knowledge in contemporary society. In addition, it is worth us in understanding how the question of legitimacy is raised or fails to be raised today.

Knowledge [connaissances] in general cannot be reduced to science, nor even to learning [connaissance]. Learning is the set of statements which, to the exclusion of all other statements, dictate or describe objects and may be declared true or false. Science is a subset of learning. It is also composed of denotative statements, but imposes two supplementary conditions on their acceptability: the objects to which they refer must be available for repeated access, in other words, they must be accessible in explicit conditions of observation; and it must be possible to decide whether or not a given statement pertains to the language judged relevant by the experts.

But what is meant by the term knowledge is not only a set of denotative statements, far from it. It also includes notions of "know-how," "knowing how to live," "how to listen" [savoir-faire, savoir-vivre, savoir-écouter], etc. Knowledge, then, is a question of competence that goes beyond the simple determination and application of the criteria of truth, extending to the determination and application of criteria of efficiency (technical qualification), of justice and or happiness (ethical wisdom), of the beauty of a sound or color (auditory and visual sensibility), etc. Understood in this way, knowledge is what makes someone capable of forming "good" denotative utterances, but also "good" prescriptive and "good" evaluative utterances. It is not a competence relative to a particular class of statements (for example, cognitive ones) to the exclusion of others. On the contrary, it makes "good" performance in relation to a variety of objects of discourse possible: objects to be known, decided on, evaluated, transformed. From this derives one of the principal features of knowledge: it coincides with an extensive array of competence-building measures and is the only form embodied in a subject constituted by the various areas of competence composing it.

Another characteristic merits special attention is the relation between this kind of knowledge and custom. What is a "good" prescriptive or evaluative utterance, a "good" performance in denotative or technical matters? They are all judged to be "good" because they conform to the relevant criteria (of justice, beauty, truth, and efficiency respectively) accepted in the social circle of the "knower's" interlocutors. The early philosophers called this mode of legitimating statements opinion. The consensus that permits such knowledge to be circumscribed and makes it possible to distinguish one who knows from one who doesn't (the foreigner, the child) is what constitutes the culture of a people.

This brief reminder of what knowledge can be in the way of training and culture draws on ethnological description for its justification but anthropological studies and literature that take rapidly developing societies as their object can attest to the survival of this type of knowledge within them, at least in some of their sectors.

The very idea of development presupposes a horizon of nondevelopment where, it is assumed, the various areas of competence remain enveloped in the unity of a tradition and are not differentiated according to separate qualifications subject to specific innovations, debates, and inquiries. This opposition does not necessarily imply a difference in nature between "primitive" and "civilized" minds, but is compatible with the premise of a formal identity between "the savage mind" and scientific thought, it is even compatible with the (apparently contrary) premise of the superiority of customary knowledge over the contemporary dispersion of competence.

It is fair to say that there is one point on which all of the investigations agree, regardless of which scenario they propose to dramatize and understand the distance separating the customary state of knowledge from its state in the scientific age: the preeminence of the narrative form in the formulation of traditional knowledge. Some study this form for its own sake, others see it as the diachronic costume of the structural operators that, according to them, properly constitute the knowledge in question, still others bring it to an "economic" interpretation in the Freudian sense of the term. All that is important here is the fact that its form is narrative. Narrative is the quiescent form of customary knowledge, in more ways than one.

First, the popular stories themselves recount what could be called
positive or negative apprenticeship (Baldridge). In other words, the success or failure of the hero's undertaking is determined by his adherence or failure to adhere to these criteria. The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria.

The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria. The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria. The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria. The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria. The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria. The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria. The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria. The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria. The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria. The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria. The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria. The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria. The narrative is understood as a function of the hero's adherence to or failure to adhere to these criteria.
And yet this kind of knowledge is quite common; nursery rhymes are of this type, as repetitive forms of contemporary music have tried to recapitulate or at least approximate it. It exhibits a surprising feature: as meter takes precedence over accent in the production of sound (spoken or not), time in turn obtains support for memory to become an immemorial bearing that, in the absence of a noticeable separation between periods, prevents their being numbered and consigns them to oblivion. Consider the form of popular sayings proverbs, and maxims: they are like little splinters of potential narratives, or molds of old ones, which have continued to circulate on certain levels of the contemporary social edifice. In their prosody can be recognized the mark of that strange temporalization that is the golden rule of our knowledge: 'never forget.'

Now there must be a congruence between this lethal function of narrative knowledge and the functions, cited earlier, of criteria formation, the unification of areas of competence, and social regulation. By way of a simplifying fiction, we can hypothesize that against all expectations, a collectivity that takes narrative as its key form of competence has no need to remember its past. It finds the raw material for its social bond not only in the meaning of the narratives it recoupts, but also in the act of reciting them. The narratives' reference may seem to belong to the past, but in reality it is always contemporaneous with the act of recitation. It is the present act that on each of its occurrences marshals in the ephemeral temporality inhabiting the space between the "I have heard" and the "you will hear."

The important thing about the pragmatic protocol of this kind of narration is that it betokens a theoretical identity between each of the narrative's occurrences. This may not in fact be the case, and often is not, and we should not blind ourselves to the element of humor or anxiety noticeable in the respect this etiquette inspires. The fact remains that what is emphasized is the metrical beat of the narrative occurrences, not each performance's differences in accent. It is in this sense that this mode of temporality can be said to be simultaneously evanescent and immemorial.

Finally, a culture that gives precedence to the narrative form doubtless has no more of a need for special procedures to authorize its narratives than it has to remember its past. It is hard to imagine such a culture first isolating the post of narrator from the others in order to give it a privileged status in narrative pragmatics, then inquiring into what right the narrator (who is thus disconnected from the narratee and diegesis) might have to recount what he recounts, and finally undertaking the analysis or anamnesis of its own legitimacy. It is even harder to imagine it handing over the authority for its narratives to some incomprehensible subject of narration. The narratives themselves have this authority. In a sense, the people are only that which actualizes the narratives: once again, they do this not only by recounting them, but also by listening to them and recounting themselves through them; in other words, by putting them into "play" in their institutions—thus by assigning themselves the posts of narratee and diegesis as well as the post of narrator.

There is, then, an incommensurability between popular narrative pragmatics, which provides immediate legitimation, and the language game known to the West as the question of legitimacy—or rather, legitimacy as a referent in the game of inquiry. Narratives, as we have seen, determine criteria of competence and/or illustrate how they are to be applied. They thus define what has the right to be said and done in the culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of that culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do.

7. The Pragmatics of Scientific Knowledge

Let us attempt to characterize, if only in summary fashion, the classical conception of the pragmatics of scientific knowledge. In the process, we will distinguish between the research game and the teaching game.

Copernicus states that the path of the planets is circular. Whether this proposition is true or false, it carries within it a set of tensions, all of which affect each of the pragmatic posts it brings into play: sender, addressee, and referent. These "tensions" are classes of prescriptions which regulate the admissibility of the statement as "scientific."

First, the sender should speak the truth about the referent, the path of the planets. What does this mean? That on the one hand he is supposed to be able to provide proof of what he says, and on the other hand he is supposed to be able to refute any opposing or contradictory statements concerning the same referent.

Second, it should be possible for the addressee validly to give (or refuse) his assent to the statement he hears. This implies that he is himself a potential sender, since when he formulates his agreement or disagreement he will be subject to the same double requirement (or proof or refutation) that Copernicus was. He is therefore supposed to have, potentially, the same qualities as Copernicus: he is his equal.
of the referent. Even in the case of the human sciences, where it is an aspect of human conduct, the referent is in principle external to the partners engaged in scientific dialectics. Here, in contrast to the narrative game, a person does not have to know how to be what knowledge says he is.

4. A statement of science gains no validity from the fact of being reported. Even in the case of pedagogy, it is taught only if it is still verifiable in the present through argumentation and proof. In itself, it is never secure from "the knowledge that has accumulated in the form of already accepted statements can always be challenged. But conversely, any new statement that contradicts a previously approved statement register of the same referent can be accepted as valid only if it refutes the previous statement by producing arguments and proofs.

5. The game of science thus implies a diachronic temporality, that is, a memory and a project. The current sender of a scientific statement is supposed to be acquainted with previous statements concerning its referent (bibliography) and only proposes a new statement on the subject if it differs from the previous ones. Here, what I have called the "accent" of each performance, and by that token the polemical function of a game, takes precedence over the "meter." This diachrony, which assumes memory and a search for the new, represents in principle a cumulative process. Its "rhythm," or the relationship between accent and meter, is variable.

These properties are well known. But they are worth recalling for two reasons. First, drawing a parallel between science and nonscientific (narrative) knowledge helps us understand, or at least see, that the former's existence is no more—and no less—necessary than the latter's. Both are composed of sets of statements; the statements are "moves" made by the players within the framework of generally applicable rules; these rules are specific to each particular kind of knowledge, and the "moves" judged to be "good" in one cannot be of the same type as those judged "good" in another, unless it happens that way by chance.

It is therefore impossible to judge the existence or validity of narrative knowledge on the basis of scientific knowledge and vice versa; the relevant criteria are different. All we can do is gaze in wonderment at the diversity of discursive species, just as we do at the diversity of plant or animal species. Lamenting the "loss of meaning" in postmodernity boils down to mourning the fact that knowledge is no longer principally narrative. Such a reaction does not necessarily follow. Neither does an attempt to derive or engender (using operators like development) scientific knowledge from narrative knowledge, as if the former contained the latter in an embryonic state.

Nevertheless, language species, like living species, are interrelated, and their relations are far from harmonious. The second point justifying this quick reminder on the properties of the language game of science concerns, precisely, its relation to narrative knowledge. I have said that narrative knowledge does not give priority to the question of its own legitimation and that it certifies itself in the pragmatic of its own transmission without having recourse to argumentation and proof. This is why its incomprehension of the problems of scientific discourse is accompanied by a certain tolerance; it approaches such discourse primarily as a variant in the family of narrative cultures. The opposite is not true. The scientist questions the validity of narrative statements and concludes that they are never subject to argumentation or proof. He classifies them as belonging to a different mentality: savage, primitive, underdeveloped, backward, alienated, composed of opinions, customs, authority, prejudice, ignorance, ideology. Narratives are fables, myths, legends, fit only for women and children. At best, attempts are made to throw some rays of light into this obscurantism, to civilize, educate, develop. This unequal relationship is an intrinsic effect of the rules specific to each game. We all know its symptoms. It is the entire history of cultural imperialism from the dawn of Western civilization. It is important to recognize its special tenor, which sets it apart from all other forms of imperialism: it is governed by the demand for legitimation.

8. The Narrative Function and the Legitimation of Knowledge

Today the problem of legitimation is no longer considered a failing of the language game of science. It would be more accurate to say that it has itself been legitimated as a problem, that is, as a heuristic driving force. But this way of dealing with it by reversing the situation is of recent date. Before it came to this point (what some call positivism), scientific knowledge sought other solutions. It is remarkable that for a long time it could not help resorting for its solutions to procedures that, overtly or not, belong to narrative knowledge. This return of the narrative in the non-narrative, in one form or another, should not be thought of as having been superseded once and for all. A crude proof of this: what do scientists do when they appear on television or are interviewed in the newspapers after making a "discovery"? They recount an epic of knowledge that is in fact
whole不可思议。They play the role of the narrative game: its interpretation remains consistent with the results for the narrative. The story concerns the relationship of science to popular

content. Its concern is based on that fact which, it uses to obtain the public material. We are anticipating goodwill. But we proceed as though we should keep in mind that the passage is not about science, but only in that they have expressed their need for history. For history, is outlined above—more of a role for something else in the West, in order to clarify its status?

The passage is about science. But we proceed as though we should keep in mind that the passage is not about science, but only in that they have expressed their need for history. For history, is outlined above—more of a role for something else in the West, in order to clarify its status?

The passage is about science. But we proceed as though we should keep in mind that the passage is not about science, but only in that they have expressed their need for history. For history, is outlined above—more of a role for something else in the West, in order to clarify its status?

The passage is about science. But we proceed as though we should keep in mind that the passage is not about science, but only in that they have expressed their need for history. For history, is outlined above—more of a role for something else in the West, in order to clarify its status?

The passage is about science. But we proceed as though we should keep in mind that the passage is not about science, but only in that they have expressed their need for history. For history, is outlined above—more of a role for something else in the West, in order to clarify its status?
9. Narratives of the Legitimation of Knowledge

We shall now look at the way the concept of a narrative is used in the various descriptions of the process of legitimating knowledge. One way to do this is by examining how narratives of knowledge are constructed and how they are used in different cultural contexts. Narratives of knowledge are often used to justify and legitimize the authority of knowledge, but they can also be used to challenge and subvert existing power structures. In this section, we will explore the role of narratives of knowledge in the construction of new forms of authority and the challenge of existing forms of knowledge and authority.

Humanists and variously present in the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment, the Stuart and the Newtonian worlds, are used to legitimating knowledge and its authority. The humanists' model of the human is imbued with the idea that knowledge is derived from reason and experience, and that it is therefore accessible to all. This model of knowledge and its authority is contrasted with that of scientific knowledge, which is derived from empirical evidence and is therefore more objective. This contrast is evident in the way that the two models of knowledge are used to support different political and social agendas.

In the West, as a way to solving the problem of legitimating knowledge, the political legitimacy of knowledge is derived from the political authority of the state. In the East, the political legitimacy of knowledge is derived from the political authority of the church. In both cases, knowledge is used to support the political agenda of the dominant group.

The exploitation of the narrativization of knowledge has been significant in the creation of new authorities. It is natural in a narrative problem, for the constituent elements of a new authority to be described through the use of narratives of knowledge. The narratives of knowledge are used to legitimize the new authority and to justify its actions.

The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitimation of knowledge. The subject of this section is the legitim
breeding ground for the officers of the State and secondarily, for the managers of civil society, it did so because the nation as a whole was supposed to win its freedom through the spread of new domains of knowledge to the population, a process to be effected through agencies and professions within which those cadres would fulfill key functions. The same reasoning is a fortioc valid for the foundation of properly scientific institutions. The State resorts to the narrative of freedom every time it assumes direct control over the training of the "people," under the name of the "nation," in order to point them down the path of progress.108

With the second narrative of legitimation, the relation between science, the nation, and the State develops quite differently. It first appears with the founding, between 1807 and 1830, of the University of Berlin,109 whose influence on the organization of higher education in the young countries of the world was to be considerable in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

At the time of the University's creation, the Prussian ministry had before it a project conceived by Fichte and counterproposals by Schleiermacher. Wilhelm von Humboldt had to decide the matter and came down on the side of Schleiermacher's more "liberal" option.110

Reading Humboldt's report, one may be tempted to reduce his entire approach to the politics of the scientific institution to the famous dictum: "Science for its own sake." But this would be to misunderstand the ultimate aim of his policies, which is guided by the principle of legitimation we are discussing and is very close to the one Schleiermacher elucidates in a more thorough fashion. Humboldt does indeed declare that science obeys its own rules, that the scientific institution "lives and continually renews itself on its own, with no constraint or determined goal whatsoever." But he adds that the University should orient its constituent element, science, to "the spiritual and moral training of the nation."109 How can this Bildungsbildung be the result of learning? Are not the State, the nation, the whole of humanity indifferent to knowledge for its own sake? What interests them, as Humboldt admits, is not knowledge itself but culture and action.110

The minister's advice thus faces a major conflict, in some ways reminiscent of the split introduced by the Kantian critique between knowing and willing: it is a conflict between a language game made of denotations answerable only to the criterion of truth, and a language game governing ethical, social, and political practice that necessarily involves decisions and obligations, in other words, utterances expected to be just rather than true and which in the final analysis lie outside the realm of scientific knowledge.

However, the unification of these two sets of discourse is indispensable to the Bildung aimed for by Humboldt's project, which consists not only in the acquisition of learning by individuals, but also in the training of a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society. Humboldt therefore invokes a Spirit (what Fichte calls Life), animated by three ambitions, or better, by a single, threefold aspiration: "that of deriving everything from an original principle" (corresponding to scientific activity), "that of relating everything to an ideal" (governing ethical and social practice), and "that of unitifying this principle and this ideal in a single idea" (ensuring that the scientific search for true causes always coincides with the pursuit of just ends in moral and political life). This ultimate synthesis constitutes the legitimate subject.

Humboldt adds in passing that this triple aspiration naturally inheres in the "intellectual character of the German nation."110 This is a concession, but a discrete one, to the other narrative, to the idea that the subject of knowledge is the people. But in truth this idea is quite distant from the narrative of the legitimation of knowledge advanced by German idealism. The suspicion that men like Schleiermacher, Humboldt, and even Hegel harbor towards the State is an indication of this. If Schleiermacher fears the narrow nationalism, positivism, utilitarianism, and positivism that guide the public authorities in matters of science, it is because the principle of science does not reside in those authorities, even indirectly. The subject of knowledge is not the people, but the speculative spirit. It is not embodied, as in France after the Revolution, in a State, but in a System. The language game of legitimation is not state-political, but philosophical.

The great function to be fulfilled by the universities is to "lay open the whole body of learning and expound both the principles and the foundations of all knowledge." For "there is no creative scientific capacity without the speculative spirit."111 "Speculation" is here the name given the discourse on the legitimation of scientific discourse. Schools are functional; the University is speculative, that is to say, philosophical.112 Philosophy must restore unity to learning, which has been scattered into separate sciences in laboratories and in pre-university education; it can only achieve this in a language game that links the sciences together as moments in the becoming of spirit, in other words, which links them in a rational narration, or rather metanarration. Hegel's Encyclopaedia (1817-27) attempts to realize this
10. Delegation

In contemporary society, the regulation of the mass media is a critical issue. The mass media, especially television and the Internet, play a significant role in shaping public opinion. The control of the mass media by powerful individuals or organizations can lead to the dissemination of biased information and the suppression of free speech. Therefore, it is essential to establish a system of checks and balances to ensure the independence of the media and the freedom of expression.

The role of the government in regulating the mass media is often controversial. Some argue that government intervention is necessary to protect the public from harmful content, while others believe that such intervention violates the principles of freedom of speech and press. In a democracy, the balance between freedom of expression and public interest must be carefully maintained.

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a federal law that grants the public the right to access government information. This law is crucial in ensuring transparency and accountability in government operations. However, the implementation of FOIA can be challenging, as some government agencies may resist disclosing information that could be damaging to their image or to the interests of powerful individuals or organizations.

In conclusion, the regulation of the mass media is a complex issue that requires careful consideration. It is essential to strike a balance between freedom of expression and public interest, and to ensure that the media remain independent and free from government control.

References:


Further Reading:

be seen as an effect of the redeployment of advanced liberal capital-
ism after its interest in the application of Keynesianism during the
period 1930-60, a renewal that has eliminated the communist alter-
native and valorized the individual enjoyment of goods and services.

Anytime one of the other of these hypotheses, we would still have to detail the correlation between the tendencies mentioned and the decline of the unifying and legitimat-

ing power of the grand narratives of speculation and emancipation.

It is, of course, understandable that both capitalist renewal and
prosperity and the disorienting upsurge of technology would have an
impact on the status of knowledge. But in order to understand how

contemporary science could have been susceptible to those effects
long before they took place, we must first locate the seeds of “dele-
gitimation” and nihilism that were inherent in the grand narratives
of the nineteenth century.

First of all, the speculative apparatus maintains an ambiguous rela-
tion to knowledge. It shows that knowledge is only worthy of that
name to the extent that it reduplicates itself (“lifts itself up,” *beht
sich auf,* is sublated) by citing its own statements in a second-level
discourse (autonomy) that functions to legitimate them. This is as
much as to say that, in its immediacy, denotive discourse bearing on
a certain referent (a living organism, a chemical property, a physi-
cal phenomenon, etc.) does not really know what it thinks it knows.
Positive science is not a form of knowledge. And speculation feeds

on its suppression. The Hegelian speculative narrative thus harbors a
certain skepticism toward positive learning, as Hegel himself admits.123

A science that has not legitimated itself is not a true science; if
the discourse that was meant to legitimate it seems to belong to a
pre-scientific form of knowledge, a “volgar” narrative, it is de-
moted to the lowest rank, that of an ideology or instrument of
power. And this always happens if the rules of the science game that
discourse denounces as empirical are applied to science itself.

Take for example the speculative statement: “A scientific state-
ment is knowledge if and only if it can take its place in a universal
process of engendering.” The question is: Is this statement knowledge
as it is in itself or can it take its place in a universal process of
engendering. Which it can. All it has to do is to presuppose that
such a process exists (the Life of spirit) and that it is itself an expres-

sion of that process. This presupposition, in fact, is indispensable to
the speculative language game. Without it, the language of legitima-
tion would not be legitimate, it would accompany science in a

noseive into nonsense, at least if we take idealism’s word for it.

But this presupposition can also be understood in a totally differ-
cent sense, one which takes us in the direction of postmodern culture:
we could say, in keeping with the perspective we adopted earlier,
that this presupposition defines the set of rules one must accept in
order to play the speculative game.124 Such an appraisal assumes first
that we accept that the “positive” sciences represent the general
mode of knowledge and second, that we understand this language to
imply certain formal and axiomatic presuppositions that it must
always make explicit. This is exactly what Nietzsche is doing, though
with a different terminology, when he shows that “European nihil-
ism” resulted from the truth requirement of science being turned
back against itself.125

There thus arises an idea of perspective that is not far removed, at
least in this respect, from the idea of language games. What we have
here is a process of delegitimation fueled by the demand for legiti-

mation itself. The “crisis” of scientific knowledge, signs of which have
been accumulating since the end of the nineteenth century, is not
born of a chance proliferation of sciences, itself an effect of progress
in technology and the expansion of capitalism. It represents, rather,
an internal erosion of the legitimacy principle of knowledge. There is
as much as to say that, in its immediacy, denotive discourse bearing on
a certain referent (a living organism, a chemical property, a physi-
cal phenomenon, etc.) does not really know what it thinks it knows.
Positive science is not a form of knowledge. And speculation feeds

on its suppression. The Hegelian speculative narrative thus harbors a
certain skepticism toward positive learning, as Hegel himself admits.123

A science that has not legitimated itself is not a true science; if
the discourse that was meant to legitimate it seems to belong to a
pre-scientific form of knowledge, a “volgar” narrative, it is de-
moted to the lowest rank, that of an ideology or instrument of
power. And this always happens if the rules of the science game that
discourse denounces as empirical are applied to science itself.

Take for example the speculative statement: “A scientific state-
mation is knowledge if and only if it can take its place in a universal
process of engendering.” The question is: Is this statement knowledge
as it is in itself or can it take its place in a universal process of
engendering. Which it can. All it has to do is to presuppose that
such a process exists (the Life of spirit) and that it is itself an expres-

sion of that process. This presupposition, in fact, is indispensable to
the speculative language game. Without it, the language of legitima-
tion would not be legitimate, it would accompany science in a

noseive into nonsense, at least if we take idealism’s word for it.

But this presupposition can also be understood in a totally differ-
cent sense, one which takes us in the direction of postmodern culture:
we could say, in keeping with the perspective we adopted earlier,
that this presupposition defines the set of rules one must accept in
order to play the speculative game.124 Such an appraisal assumes first
that we accept that the “positive” sciences represent the general
mode of knowledge and second, that we understand this language to
imply certain formal and axiomatic presuppositions that it must
always make explicit. This is exactly what Nietzsche is doing, though
with a different terminology, when he shows that “European nihil-
ism” resulted from the truth requirement of science being turned
back against itself.125

There thus arises an idea of perspective that is not far removed, at
least in this respect, from the idea of language games. What we have
here is a process of delegitimation fueled by the demand for legiti-

mation itself. The “crisis” of scientific knowledge, signs of which have
been accumulating since the end of the nineteenth century, is not
born of a chance proliferation of sciences, itself an effect of progress
in technology and the expansion of capitalism. It represents, rather,
an internal erosion of the legitimacy principle of knowledge. There is
as much as to say that, in its immediacy, denotive discourse bearing on
a certain referent (a living organism, a chemical property, a physi-
cal phenomenon, etc.) does not really know what it thinks it knows.
Positive science is not a form of knowledge. And speculation feeds

on its suppression. The Hegelian speculative narrative thus harbors a
certain skepticism toward positive learning, as Hegel himself admits.123

A science that has not legitimated itself is not a true science; if
the discourse that was meant to legitimate it seems to belong to a
pre-scientific form of knowledge, a “volgar” narrative, it is de-
moted to the lowest rank, that of an ideology or instrument of
power. And this always happens if the rules of the science game that
discourse denounces as empirical are applied to science itself.

Take for example the speculative statement: “A scientific state-
mation is knowledge if and only if it can take its place in a universal
process of engendering.” The question is: Is this statement knowledge
as it is in itself or can it take its place in a universal process of
engendering. Which it can. All it has to do is to presuppose that
such a process exists (the Life of spirit) and that it is itself an expres-

sion of that process. This presupposition, in fact, is indispensable to
the speculative language game. Without it, the language of legitima-
tion would not be legitimate, it would accompany science in a

noseive into nonsense, at least if we take idealism’s word for it.

But this presupposition can also be understood in a totally differ-
cent sense, one which takes us in the direction of postmodern culture:
we could say, in keeping with the perspective we adopted earlier,
that this presupposition defines the set of rules one must accept in
order to play the speculative game.124 Such an appraisal assumes first
that we accept that the “positive” sciences represent the general
mode of knowledge and second, that we understand this language to
imply certain formal and axiomatic presuppositions that it must
always make explicit. This is exactly what Nietzsche is doing, though
with a different terminology, when he shows that “European nihil-
ism” resulted from the truth requirement of science being turned
back against itself.125

There thus arises an idea of perspective that is not far removed, at
least in this respect, from the idea of language games. What we have
here is a process of delegitimation fueled by the demand for legiti-
mation itself. The “crisis” of scientific knowledge, signs of which have
been accumulating since the end of the nineteenth century, is not
born of a chance proliferation of sciences, itself an effect of progress
in technology and the expansion of capitalism. It represents, rather,
an internal erosion of the legitimacy principle of knowledge. There is
as much as to say that, in its immediacy, denotive discourse bearing on
a certain referent (a living organism, a chemical property, a physi-
cal phenomenon, etc.) does not really know what it thinks it knows.
Positive science is not a form of knowledge. And speculation feeds

on its suppression. The Hegelian speculative narrative thus harbors a
certain skepticism toward positive learning, as Hegel himself admits.123

A science that has not legitimated itself is not a true science; if
the discourse that was meant to legitimate it seems to belong to a
pre-scientific form of knowledge, a “volgar” narrative, it is de-
moted to the lowest rank, that of an ideology or instrument of
power. And this always happens if the rules of the science game that
discourse denounces as empirical are applied to science itself.

Take for example the speculative statement: “A scientific state-
mation is knowledge if and only if it can take its place in a universal
process of engendering.” The question is: Is this statement knowledge
as it is in itself or can it take its place in a universal process of
engendering. Which it can. All it has to do is to presuppose that
such a process exists (the Life of spirit) and that it is itself an expres-

sion of that process. This presupposition, in fact, is indispensable to
the speculative language game. Without it, the language of legitima-
tion would not be legitimate, it would accompany science in a
11. Research and its Legislation through Performativity

Let us return to science and begin by examining the pragmatics of research. In essence, a multiplicity of methods and a range of complex phenomena underpin the

10. The Postmodern Condition

Intersections involved in ethical, social, and political practice. As we

9. The Postmodern Condition

interventions of science, technology, and policy. The need for a reflection on the nature of science, especially in the context of modernity and postmodernity, is

8. The Postmodern Condition

and the nature of the institutions of science and technology. These institutions are no longer seen as neutral or value-free, but are deeply embedded in cultural, social, and political contexts. The role of scientists and engineers is not simply to discover and transmit knowledge, but to shape and influence the world in which they operate. The relationship between science and society is complex and often fraught with tension, as scientific advancements can have profound implications for ethical, social, and political issues.

7. The Postmodern Condition

of science and technology. The postmodern condition refers to a period of time in which the boundaries between science, technology, and society are blurred, and traditional concepts of truth, knowledge, and authority are challenged. The postmodern condition is characterized by a lack of certainty and a proliferation of perspectives, as well as a critique of the grand narratives that have historically underpinned scientific and technological development.

6. The Postmodern Condition

The language of the postmodern condition is not just a reflection of the complex and multifaceted nature of modernity, but a contributor to it. The language of the postmodern condition is characterized by its fluidity, its resistance to fixed meanings, and its embrace of paradox and contradiction. The language of the postmodern condition is not merely a descriptive tool, but a productive force, shaping the way we think about the world and our place in it.

5. The Postmodern Condition

Here, the effect of dividing science into cognitive or non-cognitive modes is felt most profoundly. The two statements are incommensurate, and the attempt to align them in a single, comprehensive framework is misguided. The idea of a single, comprehensive framework is a mirage, a convenient fiction that allows us to escape the complexity of the real world. The language of the postmodern condition recognizes this complexity and embraces it, rather than trying to suppress it.

4. The Postmodern Condition

The way in which language is used is not merely a reflection of the way in which reality is understood, but a constitutive part of the process of discovery itself. The language of the postmodern condition is not just a tool for describing the world, but an active participant in the construction of reality. The language of the postmodern condition is not just a mirror, but a shaper of the world.

3. The Postmodern Condition

The way in which language is used is not merely a reflection of the way in which reality is understood, but a constitutive part of the process of discovery itself. The language of the postmodern condition is not just a tool for describing the world, but an active participant in the construction of reality. The language of the postmodern condition is not just a mirror, but a shaper of the world.

2. The Postmodern Condition

The way in which language is used is not merely a reflection of the way in which reality is understood, but a constitutive part of the process of discovery itself. The language of the postmodern condition is not just a tool for describing the world, but an active participant in the construction of reality. The language of the postmodern condition is not just a mirror, but a shaper of the world.

1. The Postmodern Condition

The way in which language is used is not merely a reflection of the way in which reality is understood, but a constitutive part of the process of discovery itself. The language of the postmodern condition is not just a tool for describing the world, but an active participant in the construction of reality. The language of the postmodern condition is not just a mirror, but a shaper of the world.
This necessitates a reformulation of the question of the legitimacy of the methods at which at least some of them are accepted. In general, it is not possible to generalize this situation. This applies to more or less all of the methods we have discussed. Since it is impossible to generalize this situation, it can be accepted that all formal systems have inherent limitations. This applies to more or less all of the methods we have discussed. This means that the methods must be accepted or rejected criterion by criterion. Since it is impossible to generalize this situation, it can be accepted that all formal systems have inherent limitations. This applies to more or less all of the methods we have discussed. This means that the methods must be accepted or rejected criterion by criterion. Since it is impossible to generalize this situation, it can be accepted that all formal systems have inherent limitations. This applies to more or less all of the methods we have discussed. This means that the methods must be accepted or rejected criterion by criterion.
of the community of experts.147 The language game method I have followed here can claim a modest place in this current of thought. The other fundamental aspect of research, the production of proof, takes us in quite a different direction. It is in principle part of an argumentation process designed to win acceptance for a new statement (for example, giving testimony or presenting an exhibit in the case of judicial rhetoric).148 But it presents a special problem: it is here that the referent ("reality") is called to the stand and cited in the debate between scientists. I have already made the point that the question of proof is problematical since proof needs to be proven. One can begin by publishing a description of how proof was obtained, so other scientists can check the result by repeating the same process. But the fact still has to be observed in order to stand proven. What constitutes a scientific observation? A fact that has been registered by an eye, an ear, a sense organ?149 Senses are deceptive, and their range and powers of discrimination are limited. This is where technology comes in. Technical devices original as prosthetic aids for the human organs or as physiological systems whose function it is to receive data or condition the context.150 They follow a principle, and it is the principle of optimal performance: maximizing output (the information or modifications obtained) and minimizing input (the energy expended in the process).151 Technology is therefore a game pertaining not to the true, the just, or the beautiful, etc., but to efficiency: a technical "isow" is "good" when it does better and/or expends less energy than another. This definition of technical competence is a late development. For a long time inventions came in fits and starts; the products of chance research, or research as much or more concerned with the arts (teknai) than with knowledge: the Greeks of the Classical period, for example, established no close relationship between knowledge and technology.152 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the work of "spectators" was still a matter of curiosity and artistic innovation.153 This was the case until the end of the eighteenth century.154 And it can be maintained that even today "wildcat" activities of technical invention, sometimes related to bricolage, still go on outside the imperatives of scientific argumentation.155 Nonetheless, the need for proof becomes increasingly strong as the pragmatics of scientific knowledge replaces traditional knowledge or knowledge based on revelation. By the end of the Discourse on Method, Descartes is already asking for laboratory funds. A new problem appears: devices that optimize the performance of the human body for the purpose of producing proof require additional expenditures. No money, no proof—and that means no verification of statements and no truth. The games of scientific language become the games of the rich, in which whoever is wealthiest has the best chance of being right. An equation between wealth, efficiency, and truth is thus established.

What happened at the end of the eighteenth century, with the first industrial revolution, is that the reciprocal of this equation was discovered: no technology without wealth, but no wealth without technology. A technical apparatus requires an investment; but since it optimizes the efficiency of the task to which it is applied, it also optimizes the surplus-value derived from this improved performance. All that is needed is for the surplus-value to be realized, in other words, for the product of the task performed to be sold. And the system can be scaled in the following way: a portion of the sale is recycled into a research fund dedicated to further performance improvement. It is at this precise moment that science becomes a force of production, in other words, a moment in the circulation of capital.

It was more the desire for wealth than the desire for knowledge that initially forced upon technology the imperative of performance improvement and product realization. The "organic" connection between technology and profit preceded its union with science. Technology became important to contemporary knowledge only through the mediation of a generalized spirit of performativity. Even today, progress in knowledge is not totally subordinated to technological investment.156 Capitalism solves the scientific problem of research funding in its own way: directly by financing research departments in private companies, in which demands for performativity and recomercialization orient research first and foremost toward technological "applications"; and indirectly by creating private, state, or mixed-sector research foundations that grant program subsidies to university departments, research laboratories, and independent research groups with no expectation of an immediate return on the results of the work—this is done on the theory that research must be financed at a loss for certain length of time in order to increase the probability of its yielding a decisive, and therefore highly profitable, innovation.157 Nation-states, especially in their Keynesian period, follow the same rule: applied research on the one hand, basic research on the other. They collaborate with corporations through an array of agencies.158 The prevailing corporate norms of work management
The procedure operates within the following framework, since research, development, and institutionalization of the policy are not independent of each other. The relationship between policy and research is often characterized by a virtuous cycle, where research informs policy and policy guides research. This cycle is not always smooth, and there can be periods of tension and conflict. For example, if research indicates that a policy is ineffective, policymakers may resist changing the policy, or vice versa. In such cases, the role of advocacy and the ability to influence policy is crucial.

The dynamics of the relationship between policy and research can be influenced by various factors, such as political pressure, funding availability, and the political climate. In some cases, researchers may find it difficult to influence policy due to their position within the academic or research community. However, when researchers can effectively communicate their findings and the implications of their work, they can contribute to the development of more effective policies.

It is important to note that the relationship between policy and research is not always linear. In some cases, policies can lead to unintended consequences, which may then require further research to understand and address. Therefore, the interaction between policy and research is a complex and dynamic process that requires ongoing attention and adaptation.
If we accept the notion that there is an established body of knowledge that has been traditionally imparted in the educational system, the question then becomes: What is the role of the educational system in imparting this knowledge? The answer to this question is complex and multifaceted, involving considerations of the role of the educational system in imparting knowledge, the nature of knowledge itself, and the relationship between the educational system and the broader societal context.

The educational system is often seen as a mechanism for transmitting knowledge from one generation to the next, but this view is increasingly being challenged. The rapid pace of technological change and the growing complexity of the world mean that the knowledge imparted in the educational system is becoming increasingly outdated. In addition, the traditional form of education, which is often centered around rote learning and memorization, may not be the most effective way to impart knowledge in a world that is characterized by constant change.

There is a growing realization that the educational system needs to be more flexible and responsive to the needs of the modern world. This requires a rethinking of the way that knowledge is imparted, as well as a recognition of the role of the educational system in preparing students for the demands of the 21st century.

The challenge, then, is to develop a system of education that is able to impart knowledge in a way that is both effective and relevant to the needs of the modern world. This requires a commitment to innovation and change, as well as a willingness to rethink the role of the educational system in society as a whole.
advancement (since it can only improve the performance of the system as a whole). With the exception of radiology, the student's role is not given as an experiment in social psychology, but is instead a victim of the consequences of the system. Such an experiment offers no escape from the expectation that it will only worsen the situation for the student, even if the test of the performance principle does not always provide a fair test of the performance of the system.

The principle of accountability that is to be assumed by the system is that it will not be able to determine the performance of the system because it is not given an opportunity to measure the performance of the system. The principle of accountability that is to be assumed by the system is that it will not be able to determine the performance of the system because it is not given an opportunity to measure the performance of the system.

On the contrary, the university's responsibility for the system is an essential part of the university's responsibility for the system. The university's responsibility for the system is an essential part of the university's responsibility for the system. The university's responsibility for the system is an essential part of the university's responsibility for the system.

As long as the goal of the university is not to be a perfect model, the university must attempt to achieve a perfect model. As long as the goal of the university is not to be a perfect model, the university must attempt to achieve a perfect model. As long as the goal of the university is not to be a perfect model, the university must attempt to achieve a perfect model. As long as the goal of the university is not to be a perfect model, the university must attempt to achieve a perfect model.
by social scientists. In particular, it has been established that the framework of a given model or task, its advantages seem least when the need for proliferation is greatest. It is difficult to isolate what is attributable to the model and what is attributable to the implementation of a new approach in the real world. Even though this is true, it is not easy to determine what is attributable to the new approach. However, even if this does not occur, it is still difficult to isolate what is attributable to the real-world implementation. To do so, one needs to separate the framework of an approach from the implementation of an approach in the real world. To do this, one needs to develop the framework of an approach in the real world and develop the implementation of an approach in the real world. The framework of an approach is the part of the approach that is independent of the real-world implementation. The implementation of an approach is the part of the approach that is dependent on the real-world implementation. In this way, one can better understand the model's advantages and disadvantages. However, it is still difficult to isolate what is attributable to the model and what is attributable to the implementation. The model's advantages may be attributable to the model itself, and the implementation's disadvantages may be attributable to the implementation itself. Therefore, it is important to separate the framework of an approach from the implementation of an approach in the real world to better understand the model's advantages and disadvantages.