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Perceptual
Realism
Interpreting
the Winter War of 1939
By Julia Abelev
University
of Washington, Seattle
Why
did the Soviet Union choose to invade Finland in 1939? Perceptual
realism attempts to provide an answer. The theory accepts realism’s
assumptions regarding interpreting
the Winter War of 1939 power dynamics, but
makes individuals the
independent variables that interpret the balance of power and security
threats. In this way, realism explains the context that incited
tension, while the cognitive biases of Soviet leaders led them to
choose war. I test the explanatory power of perceptual realism through
two lines of inquiry: 1) whether the Soviets demonstrated
misperception; and 2) whether misperception, not realism alone,
explains their policies. The evidence supports the first hypothesis,
but not the latter. Power dynamics alone explain the Winter War, while
individuals influenced only the preparations for the
conflict.
.pdf
Completing the Powell Doctrine
Theorizing
Post-War Instability in Iraq
By Jessice Willard
University
of Washington, Seattle
When
the Bush administration launched the
Gulf War in 1991, they followed the guidelines of an intervention
strategy that would later be dubbed the Powell Doctrine. This strategy
demanded the use of overwhelming force to achieve clear military and
political goals that could be quickly and obviously achieved. When the
basic tenants of the Powell Doctrine were employed strategically in the
Gulf War to reverse the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the benefits of the
Doctrine became clear. The war was quick, decisive, did not cost the
intervening coalition very many lives, and helped the US protect its
vital national oil interests in the Middle East. In many ways, the Gulf
War validated the benefits the Powell Doctrine. However, Iraq was
plagued by instability after the Gulf War. The economy and
infrastructure were crippled and harsh sanctions and military
interference only exacerbated the problems. Internationally, Iraq was
labeled a rogue state and relegated to diplomatic inferiority. Many of
these problems, it turns out, link directly back to the military and
political strategies dictated by the Powell Doctrine. First, the use of
overwhelming force decimated Iraq’ s infrastructure. Then, the United
States’ adherence to the strict objectives outlined prior to the
conflict prevented it from helping repair the damage inevitable in war,
especially one employing overwhelming force. Finally, the pre-war
vilification of Iraq, specifically Saddam, isolated Iraq so completely
that post-war interactions were impossible. Separately, but especially
together, these failings surely caused a majority of the instability in
Iraq after the Gulf War. It turns out, therefore, that despite its
benefits the Powell Doctrine does not fully account for the effects of
war and will likely exacerbate instability as it did in Iraq in 1991.
.pdf
The Effect of Liberal Opinion on
Post-War British Interventions
By
Jeff Ostrove
University
of Washington, Seattle
British
military interventions changed
qualitatively after the
Second World War. According to realism, this transformation should be
rooted ultimately in a difference between pre and post-war British
power. However, an analysis of domestic British opposition to the 1956
invasion of Suez indicates that ethical, not realist considerations may
be responsible for less aggressive British foreign policy. Much of the
British public opposed the Suez intervention because of a perception
that it violated liberal norms of international law. This finding
suggests that public opinion is informed by non-realist considerations,
and that these attitudes may powerfully affect international relations.
.pdf
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