I have been teaching at the University of Washington since 1987. In that time, our city and region have been obsessed with growth—with measuring it, planning for it, celebrating it, resisting it, complaining about it, assigning blame for it, and coping with its consequences. Yet growth is not new in the history of our city. As the accompanying figures illustrate, growth has been a constant in Seattle.

The table and graph are based on U.S. Census figures, which are recorded every 10 years. Like most historians, I am a big fan of the U.S. Census, because it provides information that is simply foundational for understanding the past. However, using the census to gauge urban growth has its limitations. When measured over each decade, the growth of Seattle seems almost steady and predictable. But we know firsthand that is not how growth is experienced. It tends to arrive in fits and starts, and in total disregard for the schedule of federal census takers, which the U.S. Constitution (article 1, section 2) sets at every 10 years.

Today we are undergoing one of the most intense bursts of growth in recent memory, with news reports and personal anecdotes documenting the intensity of changes. Our population expands; our housing prices climb, and people find they cannot afford to live here; cranes dot the landscape as more and more new buildings go up (and they do literally go up—everything is more vertical than before); increasing density changes neighborhoods. Then there is the traffic: improvements to our transportation system cannot keep pace with the influx of newcomers or with the construction boom around the city. Buses are full, highways are backed up, congestion spills over to all the other streets of the city, and delays for roadwork multiply. None of these conditions is really well accounted for in the decennial numbers produced by the U.S. Census.

Our current growth spurt seems quite overwhelming and burdensome. In fact, however, the city has been through some very intense spurts of growth before. What we are experiencing now is in some ways more typical than atypical. One of my main points tonight is that cities change constantly, and rapid growth has been one of the regular changes affecting Seattle. At least as intense as our current rapid expansion, I think, were the sustained initial burst of urbanization from 1880 to 1910 and the tremendous expansion launched by World War II. These two historical spurts, along with our current burst of growth, represent what I call pandemonium moments in the history of Seattle. That term suggests chaos—and the experience of rapid growth certainly has seemed chaotic. People living through the changes felt that the city had gotten out of control, that things had taken a turn for the worse. But another word for these moments would be transformative. Each major quantitative change correlated to a city that was qualitatively different from before. In other words, rapid growth helped to redefine what the city was, and what it meant, and how power was exercised.

Thus another goal tonight is to consider the evolving nature and function of Seattle in historical perspective, using our three pandemonium moments as pivot points. What was urban life like—or supposed to be like—in different eras? What roles did the city play—around Puget Sound, in the larger region, on behalf of the nation, and in relation to the world? And how did these roles change with changes to the city’s size? In answering these questions, we need to think about stability and change in relation to the diversity of the city’s population. In other words,
exploring stability and change in Seattle’s history offers an opportunity to think broadly about our city’s past, to come to terms with long-term trends and key events, and to rethink the conclusions of earlier historians.

To illuminate the meanings of stability and change in Seattle, I propose to place its pandemonium moments into conversation with voices from pioneer Seattle. In my view, while historians have not always done a great job explaining rapid change in the city, they have devoted pages and pages to the founding generation of Seattle—the so-called pioneers. In fact, the very first histories of Seattle focused almost exclusively on pioneer figures; many were actually written by the pioneers, or by their sons and daughters. Not surprisingly, those accounts treated pioneers with reverence. They credited the founding generation almost entirely for “the supremacy of Seattle,” its “commanding greatness,” its “wholesomeness, prosperity, and stability.”

Eventually, there came along a second generation of Seattle historians who proved more irreverent. Murray Morgan’s Skid Road (1951)—which to my mind remains the best-written overview of Seattle history—offered a fresh look at the founding fathers by examining the city’s history “from the bottom up.” During the 1960s, the local journalist Bill Speidel created the famous underground tour of old Pioneer Square, turning history into commerce. Speidel also wrote his own irreverent account of the pioneers called Sons of the Profits (1967), exposing the greed of the founding fathers. Fittingly, it took a local businessman like Speidel to produce the first Marxist account of early Seattle.

Although the second generation of Seattle historians treated pioneers with less adulation, it did little to reduce the importance of the founding generation. Some of the second generation even adopted the generally uncritical tone that the pioneers and their descendants had used. The foresight and hard work, the patience and virtue of the pioneers, it was claimed, made it inevitable that Seattle would flourish. And according to some, the pioneers’ influence lasted an astonishingly long time. In his elegantly written Seattle, Past to Present (1976), Roger Sale suggests that pioneers had ensured that Seattle would be “a bourgeois city from its first breath.” Nard Jones’s 1972 history of the city describes Seattle’s modern character as a cross between two leading pioneers: the sober and dour Arthur Denny, and the less sober, more gregarious David “Doc” Maynard. According to both the first and the second generations of Seattle historians, the personalities and attitudes and values of figures from the 1850s and 1860s set the urban tone for more than a century. In this view, no amount of pandemonium appeared capable of diminishing the influence of the founding generation.

Tonight, while considering closely the
words and ideas of pioneers and pioneer historians, I wish to offer a more critical perspective on them. In this endeavor I am assisted by the insights of another, third generation of historians who have reexamined Seattle history over the last two decades or so. The city’s founding fathers continue to loom large in some respects, but recent works have brought their story more up to date, treated their words and deeds with more skepticism, and paid considerably more attention to the views and experiences of groups other than the city’s pioneer founders. Recent authors have revised Seattle’s past by placing it within the context of a broader historical literature on race, class, gender, environment, and urbanization. As a result, they have produced more inclusive and more incisive accounts of the city’s history. My own work has benefited accordingly.

While acknowledging my debt to other historians, I would like to note that I have learned much from journalists as well. I am particularly indebted to newspaper accounts for generating a new unit for measuring urban growth. During the 1980s and 1990s, as locals became preoccupied with urban expansion, it became common for reporters to illustrate predicted or actual population gains by explaining their figures in terms of what I call equivalent existing towns, or EETs. Thus one reporter wrote that between 1990 and 1997 the combined population of Snohomish, King, and Pierce Counties had grown overall by 310,000 people—the equivalent of “three Bellevues.” Simiarly, newspapers covering the projected growth of Snohomish County in the late 1980s said to expect the equivalent of “three new cities the size of Everett” by 2010. Or, if one did not mind waiting until 2020, one could anticipate the addition of the equivalent of fourteen Lynnwoods, or a hundred Arlingtons.

Fourteen Lynnwoods? A hundred Arlingtons? Calculating urbanization in terms of EETs is so provocative that one cannot help following suit. But there are costs as well as benefits. Resorting to EETs to characterize population change is probably helpful for some readers. Those who find “310,000 people” too abstract can perhaps picture “three Bellevues” much more readily. However, I must confess to belonging to that segment of the population that has a very literal streak. When I read about EETs I cannot help imagining 3 replica Bellevues (each complete with its own Bellevue Square shopping mall) or 14 replica Lynnwoods (again, each complete with its own Alderwood Mall) plunked down around Puget Sound. Personally, I like Bellevue and Lynnwood, and have no problem with one of each. However, deploying EETs as a way of characterizing metropolitan growth makes it seem as if urban areas expand through a process of cloning already existing towns. Such a depiction not only alarms me as a literalist, leading to a vision of towns being reproduced as if they were Stepford wives. It also concerns me as a historian, because the concept of cloning does not adequately describe the transformations in urban form that pandemonium moments are capable of producing, the qualitative changes generated by quantitative increases.

There is a fundamental tension in accounts of early Seattle. Historians want to write about the beginnings of a significant city, but in doing so must contend with town founders who in most respects had little intimate knowledge of urban life. Let’s think for a moment about pioneers’ qualifications as town builders. Like the vast majority of Americans of the mid-19th century, Seattle pioneers had very little actual experience as urbanites. They arrived on Puget Sound in the 1850s, claimed land grants, laid out a town site . . . and then waited for nearly three decades for a city to appear. They hoped that a town would take hold and grow, but could not afford to count on...
it. So while they waited, they logged and milled and fished and traded and mined and farmed and promoted. The same people who speculated in town lots often worked for wages, or tried their hand at different businesses, attempting to keep afloat until property values increased. Like many westerners of that time, they were novice and part-time urbanites—not really sure what they were doing, and largely dependent on good fortune to help them succeed. Some history books make it sound as if Seattle was from its founding—because of its founders—“a city destined to be great among great cities.” But given how inexperienced the pioneers were with cities, attaining big-city status was no sure thing. The great majority of towns founded in the 19th-century West actually failed.

What Seattle had in its favor was the tremendous economic and territorial expansion of the United States during the late 19th century. Irrespective of what town founders thought or did on the Pacific Coast, industrial capitalism was growing voraciously, demanding raw materials, and integrating far-flung lands into its system. Some Pacific Northwest towns were bound to benefit from these economic forces, but prosperity and permanence would take a good deal of time and luck. Until the right forces aligned, not much hap-

Some Third-Generation Histories
Quintard Taylor, Forging of a Black Community: Seattle’s Central District from 1870 through the Civil Rights Era (1994)

HistoryLink, historylink.org, online encyclopedia of Seattle and Washington history, 1998-present


Matthew Klingle, Emerald City: An Environmental History of Seattle (2007)

Coll Thrush, Native Seattle: Histories from the Crossing-Over Place (2007)

Carl Abbott, How Cities Won the West: Four Centuries of Urban Change in Western North America (2008)

David Williams, Too High and Too Steep: Reshaping Seattle’s Topography (2015)
pended. Seattle’s pioneers actually lived through the least urban phase of the city’s history, the period with little urban transformation. Historians call the years before 1880 Seattle’s “village period.” In other words, pioneer Seattle represented stability, not pandemonium. In fact, the town was so stable that many founders either died or departed before the village became a city. Only a handful of individuals persisted long enough to taste success. And what exactly did success mean? Given their backgrounds and expectations, pioneer Seattleites (again, like most Americans) were poorly equipped to think about Seattle as a city—to understand its evolution as an urban entity. When the town became a city, it turned into something that the pioneers themselves had a hard time recognizing.

In reviewing the relationship between Seattle’s founders and what their town became, it helps to think carefully about vocabulary. Seattle’s founders called themselves pioneers. This is a term that we have used in the history of the American West, but not so much in urban history. The word refers to the first non-Indian settlers in an area. (Native Americans might have called Seattle’s founders invaders or colonizers.) Settlers who identified as pioneers tended to see themselves less as town founders than as agents of American civilization. For example, one of the earliest histories of Seattle explained that the foremost goal of overland migrants such as Arthur Denny and David Denny was “to plant once more and more widely the ideas of progress, liberty, and human advancement.” Nothing was said about planting a major city!

So Seattle’s founders, in describing themselves as pioneers, attached themselves more to America’s westward movement than to the creation of a city. In Seattle’s case, the pioneers did find a town. They meant to produce an urban outcome. They laid out town lots and streets, put property up
for sale, then waited and schemed for others to show up, particularly immigrants and investors who might help the city grow and thereby increase property values. The pioneers’ vision of the town meant that it was above all a real-estate development. As a result, the pioneers’ vision of urban was pretty narrow. For them, Seattle was primarily an economic venture, and its success was defined almost entirely in quantitative terms. When would property values increase? Could Seattle attract enough people and investment to keep ahead of Tacoma? Might it eventually grow enough to surpass Portland, or even come to rival San Francisco? Urban success or failure was mostly a numbers game; there was little imagination devoted to what living in a large city might or ought to be like—other than a vague hope that Seattle would imitate prosperous cities back east. So when Seattle began to achieve numerical success—when the village actually became a city—the pioneers were hardly ready for it. The shortcomings of their vision were exposed by the first pandemonium moment, 1883-1910.

Strictly on the basis of population growth, Seattle became urban during the 1880s. At the start of the decade, its population of 3,533 made it the second-largest town in the territory. Yet it ranked behind Walla Walla, and many felt that Tacoma, which had been selected as the terminus for the Northern Pacific Railway (the first transcontinental line to the Northwest), had the more promising future. Nonetheless, by the end of the decade Seattle would surpass 40,000 residents—increasing more than elevenfold, nearly catching up to Portland, and putting distance between itself and Tacoma. By the time the city became the terminus for the Great Northern Railway—another, much better managed transcontinental railroad—in 1893, its quantitative urban future was assured. In fact, the entire period between 1880 and 1910 saw enormous, sustained growth.
City surpassed Portland in 1910.

Census figures help us grasp the scale of increase over three decades. However, if we rely solely on them, we gloss over the great turbulence of the period. We need to remember events such as the 1889 Seattle fire, the major depression of the mid-1890s, and the gold rushes to the Klondike and Nome between 1896 and 1903. Between the decennial visits by census takers there were marked booms and busts. One writer estimates that Seattle’s population grew by more than 10,000 in the year after the fire, and doubled between 1897 and 1903, to 115,000.\textsuperscript{10} Another way of characterizing those six years of intense growth is to say that Seattle added the equivalent of two Tacomas.

How Seattle tried to keep up physically with such population increases reminds us of why rapid growth seems so calamitous to those living through it. During the first decade of the 20th century, Seattle was, among other things, engaged in regrading the hills surrounding downtown; creating Harbor Island; straightening the channel of the Duwamish River; filling in the tide flats along Elliott Bay; revamping its system of parks, parkways, and playgrounds; hosting a world’s fair that (as a dividend) remodeled the University of Washington campus; and digging a canal to connect Puget Sound with Lake Union and Lake Washington. In the dozen years between 1900 and 1912, furthermore, the city constructed 525 miles of road, paved 200 miles of streets, poured 800 miles of sidewalk, and installed 400 miles of water pipe.\textsuperscript{11} At that point Seattle was hardly finished rebuilding itself, because it next had to completely refigure its streets in order to deal with the quickly increasing use of automobiles and trucks.

In short, Seattle had entered a much more urban—and much more hectic—phase of existence. Yet it was one that the surviving pioneers were not prepared for. One day, the story goes, a ship captain visiting Elliott Bay declared, “You Seattle pioneers are very peculiar people. You want to have a big city but don’t want anyone to live there but yourselves.”\textsuperscript{12} This story may be apocryphal, but it is revealing nonetheless. One of the hallmarks of cities is that they are diverse. They attract or absorb people from different races, different classes, different religions, different nations, and different worldviews. Cities have been magnets over the centuries for people who sought more privacy or tolerance for nonconformity than could be had in rural or small-town settings. Not being experienced urbanites (again, like most white Americans during the mid-19th century), pioneer Seattleites failed to appreciate or embrace the social diversity that a suddenly urbanizing Seattle possessed.

Pioneer Seattleites’ commitment to homogeneity was memorialized in mid-20th-century popular culture. Consider for a moment Here Come the Brides, the TV show that ran from 1968 to 1970 and introduced Seattle’s bluest skies and greenest greens to the rest of America. The show revolves around three brothers—Jason, Jeremy, and Joshua Bolt. The Bolts run a logging company, but their crew constantly complains about the lack of women in the local population. To keep the crew on the job, the Bolts find a way to import potential brides from back east—but have to promise their investor that none leaves Seattle for a year. The show lasted two years by finding amusement and adventure in the experiences of young women and men on the Washington frontier. One episode featured the betrothal of a Chinese woman and man, the latter played by the actor and martial artist Bruce Lee, who attended high school and college in Seattle.

Here Come the Brides was based on an actual incident in Seattle history. The pioneer Asa Mercer (who served as the...
first president of the territorial university) during the 1860s made two trips back to the northeastern states to recruit marriageable women to come settle on Puget Sound. In fact, early Seattle's population as counted in the census was heavily masculine—perhaps between 75 percent and 90 percent male. One pioneer historian explained that without the refining "influence of pure-minded women," the town's many single men were "practically homeless." This definition of homelessness differs from that in our own time. It took for granted a mid-19th-century, middle-class assumption that women were homemakers and men earned income outside the home. In any case, Mercer's imports arrived in Seattle and began performing the roles of wives and teachers and seamstresses that had been intended for them.

Yet there was a racial subtext to this episode. In fact, there were plenty of women in and around Seattle—they were Native or mixed-blood women. Some white men formed relationships with these women, and in many instances started families, but such relationships were not what the founding fathers—eager to have Seattle seem respectable to eastern immigrants and investors—aspired to. Very little detail concerning white men's relations with Native women made it into pioneer histories. In fact, by importing "well-reared white women" from the northeastern states, the early historian Clarence Bagley explained, Seattle hoped to avoid the "disaster" that pioneers feared would arise when "the white and Indian races intermarry." Even though few residents of early Seattle could actually live up to the ideal, pioneers and pioneer historians anticipated that the town should consist primarily of white families. And in fact over time, whites, through legislation, arson, and other means, exerted increasing pressure on Indians to leave Seattle. No phase of local history has connoted stability for Native Americans.

Many Seattle pioneers were equally narrow-minded when it came to class. Cities have often showcased the contradictions of capitalism; they are, one writer says, "engines of prosperity and inequality in equal measure." These traits became readily apparent in the burst of expansion during the 1880s, when rapid growth erased the village the pioneers had known and replaced it with a city bursting at the seams and consumed by racial and class conflict. The entire West Coast suffered an economic downturn during the mid-1880s, with large-scale unemployment. With conditions ripe for unionization, labor organizers exploited the hostility of white workers toward Chinese immigrants. They sought to recruit new union members by campaigning to expel the Chinese. They based their effort on claiming that the Chinese (a) were in the country illegally; (b) could never become citizens and would never ac-
culturate; and (c) hurt white workers by driving down wages and by taking jobs that whites felt belonged to them. Although each of these claims was disputable, many towns around the West responded to the white workers’ unrest by forcibly expelling the Chinese. In November 1885, Tacoma ran its Chinese out of town with very little debate or resistance. Seattle followed suit in February 1886, but attempted to do so in a more cautious way that (according to the pioneers) upheld its commitment to the rule of law. Seattleites contrasted their expulsion with the more lawless “Tacoma Method,” thus aiming to preserve Seattle’s reputation among prospective immigrants and investors.16

What did the pioneers think of all this? Arthur Denny wrote his memoirs just as the labor unrest and anti-Chinese violence unfolded. Like most historians, Denny promised to write “nothing but facts,” as if he were going to keep his opinions out of the story. But he could not help drawing quite opinionated comparisons between his own generation and those whites who had arrived more recently, during the 1880s. Denny heaped praise upon his own cohort of pioneers for their persistence, hard work, and constant sacrifice. By contrast, Denny portrayed workers in 1880s Seattle as “degenerate scrubs, too cowardly to face the same dangers that our pioneer men and women did, and too lazy to perform an honest day’s work if it would procure them a homestead in paradise. They would want the day reduced to eight hours and board thrown in.” Denny continued by suggesting that if recent arrivals had imbibed more of the spirit that then actuated the “old moss backs,” as some reproachfully style the old settlers, we would hear less about a conflict between labor and capital, which in truth is largely a conflict between labor and laziness. We had no eight hour, nor even ten hour days then, and I never heard of any one striking, not even an Indian.17

Writing in The History of Seattle (1916), Clarence Bagley echoed Arthur Denny’s disdain for working-men when he described the mid-1880s. He blamed labor unrest on “the professional agitator,” as if to deny that workers could develop legitimate grievances on their own. In September 1885, Bagley explained, an anti-Chinese congress in Seattle attracted “every socialist and anarchist who could walk or steal a ride. . . . Long-haired men and short-haired women were noticeable by their numbers and their noise.” Unrest and union organizing drew “transient loafers in the lowest slums of the town, labor-imposters, too lazy to work, too cowardly to face the battle of life.”18 Once more, unhappy workers suffered by comparison to the pioneer generation.

In dismissing the complaints of white labor, Arthur Denny and Clarence Bagley seemed incapable of appreciating how the times, and the city, had changed. Seattle’s founding fathers had been able to acquire from the federal government free donation land claims of up to 320 acres. That legislated opportunity—a precursor to the Homestead Act of 1862—had ended in the mid-1850s. Very little good land remained available in the 1880s, either for free or at an affordable price. Most of the best undeveloped acreage was under the control of railroad companies, the result of vast land grants made by Congress during the 1860s. Big corporations were another new presence in the urban Northwest, part and parcel of the expansion of industrial capitalism that made urban Seattle possible in the first place. Denny had staked his claim before corporations became so dominant in the region, and never much felt threatened by them. By contrast, many new urbanites saw corporations as obstacles to their own success. It is not surpris-
ing to us that some of those urbanites would consider union membership a reasonable response to local economic conditions. Yet Denny and Bagley saw labor organizers as illegitimate troublemakers and disparaged union members as lazy. They made little effort to appreciate where white workingmen were coming from. Class divisions clashed with their vision of what Seattle should be.

Arthur Denny disliked what he saw his city becoming, but he could not stem the tide of change. In fact, the era of the pioneers had drawn to a close, and a new phase of Seattle development had opened. The new phase required a new kind of history. In his 1891 History of Seattle, Washington, Frederic J. Grant explained that up to the 1880s pioneers had “made the place.” In keeping with the prevalent “Great Man” historical tradition, Grant treated pioneers “as individual men, with their characteristics and labors apportioned to each.” But Seattle was changing so quickly that its story could no longer be told through the biographies of elite individuals: “The future,” Grant warned, “will estimate its citizens in the aggregate, by numbers of souls, by numbers of dollars, by banking capital, and by ships cleared, or passengers passed from the depots.” Like the pioneers, Grant still measured urban development in quantitative terms—people and dollars and ships and passengers. But he recognized that the rapidly increasing size of the population made it less and less satisfactory to emphasize individuals as the driving forces of development. History now needed to be told “in the aggregate”; the organization—whether the corporation, the union, the institution, or the city itself—now prevailed over individuals. Rapid urbanization dictated that the very nature of history itself change.

I want to turn to another function of the city—its role in American empire. Over the course of the 20th century, Seattle became intimately connected to the projection of American power overseas—whether as a site of military bases, a leading exporter, a manufacturer of aircraft and spacecraft, a source of foreign-policy expertise, or in some other capacity. Like many cities the world over, Seattle is a martial metropolis.

This was not a role that pioneers envisioned for Seattle, and it was not a dimension that pioneer historians emphasized. To be sure, the town’s role in the Indian wars of 1855-56 was highlighted in pioneer accounts of the past. The city founders did contribute to dispossessing the Native Americans. Clarence Bagley contended that in their westward migrations the pioneers remained “conscious that they were carrying the boundary of an empire with them.” However, pioneers and pioneer historians gave very little attention in their accounts to national or international conflicts. They barely mentioned the Civil War or the Spanish-American War, even though each was actually crucial to the city’s development.

In fact, Seattle pioneers identified not other nations but other communities as their main enemies. Early histories portray the town as if it existed in a Darwinian struggle for survival that spanned two or three decades. The rhetoric is eye opening. Devoting an entire chapter to what he describes as “the struggle for existence” between 1860 and 1875, Frederic Grant explained that Seattle’s urban rivals “expected to walk over [Seattle’s] dead body to their own metropolitan splendor.” In this telling Tacoma loomed large as Seattle’s archenemy because it was the regional headquarters of the Northern Pacific Railway company. Grant averred that “the [c]oils of railroad speculation and railroad domination were being woven tight around this young commonwealth” by Tacoma and its “immense monopoly.” The pioneer historian Clarence Bagley concluded, “the spirit of combat has always been strong in the hearts of Seattle people.”

Seeing themselves as at odds with other towns and with railroad companies no doubt served to heighten the idea of sacrifice and toil on the part of pioneers. But the perception of early Seattle as perpetually at war with other towns and with private companies misrepresents the nature of cities. While it is true that towns do compete in a host of ways, it is also the case that towns such as Seattle, Tacoma, Everett, Portland, and San Francisco needed one another. Cities coexist as parts of networks—and no place more prominently than in the vast stretches of the West, the most urbanized part of the United States. Seattle received investments and residents from Portland; it sold raw materials to San Francisco. Its first serious burst of growth coincided with the arrival of the transcontinental railroad in Tacoma in 1883 and the construction of a branch line of that road to Seattle in 1884. Seattle received second-class treatment from the Tacoma-based Northern Pacific Railway, to be sure, but it gained enough from the connection to truly prosper as a city for the first time. In 1893 Seattle itself became the terminus of the Great Northern Railway, an event that tends to be celebrated rather than lamented in pioneer histories. But in making demands on Seattle the Great Northern could be just as imperious as the Northern Pacific, and that rail connection only tightened Seattle’s ties to the more powerful metropolis of Minneapolis–Saint Paul.

To repeat, Seattle was hardly at war with every other community on the Pacific Slope. Rather, it became part of a network of towns and cities that interacted with one another in a host of ways. That network was hierarchical.
Seattle claimed as its own. Exhibits at the fair illustrated the raw materials that extractive industry took from the earth and that Seattle helped to process and ship to the world. Moreover, through statuary and other means the exposition celebrated those individuals who had enabled the city to connect to its far-flung hinterlands. James J. Hill, the capitalist behind the Great Northern Railway, not only delivered a keynote address on Opening Day but also became the subject of a large bronze bust placed on the fairgrounds. In sum, the 1909 fair recognized the economic success of the city pioneers had built.

But the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition was about more than hinterlands and extractive industry. By hosting the exposition, Seattle succeeded in putting itself on a par with other substantial American cities by showing that it was capable not only of commanding the resources required to sponsor a world’s fair but also of attracting.

On the West Coast, San Francisco initially stood at the top, and towns such as Bellingham and Walla Walla ranked toward the bottom. Seattle aimed to move closer to San Francisco than to Walla Walla, and paid special attention to its standing vis-à-vis Tacoma and Portland. During the 1890s, it managed to climb up a few rungs on the ladder. The city’s chief success was promoting itself as the leading metropolis for Alaska and the Yukon at the time of the Klondike and Nome gold rushes. In the space of just a few years, Seattle came to dominate a northern hinterland that rivaled the Columbia River watershed long commanded by Portland.

Pioneers had believed that urban success would stem from acquiring transportation connections and a fertile hinterland. Thus they built their city on a deep-water harbor, toiled to attract railroad lines to the town, and outcompeted other towns for the control of trade to the north and to the west across the ocean. They implemented a successful formula. But leaders of the generation succeeding the pioneers wanted still more growth than transportation nodes and hinterland resources could provide. And they hoped to mitigate the boom-and-bust cycles so integral to extractive industry. That meant getting plugged into additional urban networks and taking on new urban roles.

The Alaska-Yukon-Pacific (AYP) Exposition of 1909, Seattle’s first world’s fair, nicely illustrated the ambitions of two different generations of leaders. The event did not include in its title the name of the host city; instead, “AYP” referred to the hinterlands that...
millions of visitors to the event. It thus claimed a place in a nationwide metropolitan network. Furthermore, through the AYP Exposition Seattle announced that it was mature and important enough to serve as an integral part of American empire, helping to project U.S. military and diplomatic power across the Pacific. In sum, the world’s fair not only recognized Seattle’s relationship to its far western hinterland but also touted its connections to other leading American cities and its assumption of significant national missions.

As in other western towns, civic leaders in Seattle increasingly saw the U.S. government as one resource to be exploited for urban purposes. During the 1890s, communities around Puget Sound entered the competition to secure military bases. Bremerton obtained the nucleus of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyards; the army erected Forts Worden, Flagler, and Casey to defend Admiralty Inlet; and in Seattle the army opened Fort Lawton in 1900.

For both military leaders and the city’s ruling elite, an army base seemed desirable in light of recent history. During the anti-Chinese agitation of the 1880s, federal troops had been summoned to Seattle twice to help quell disorder. They had had to come all the way from Fort Vancouver, and the army had to pay considerable room and board to stay in the city. By building Fort Lawton, the commanding general of the army’s Department of the Columbia explained during the mid-1890s, the army would have troops closer to the “restless, demonstrative, and sometimes turbulent” elements of the local population. This was a period when soldiers and policemen were expected to defend capitalists against labor unrest. No wonder Seattle businessmen were so eager to acquire the base that they arranged for the donation of more than 700 acres of the Magnolia peninsula to the army!

By the time of the AYP Exposition in 1909, of course, Seattleites felt they had left behind the city’s unsettled or frontier phase and entered a more cosmopolitan phase. Fort Lawton stood as a symbol of maturity rather than of the urban immaturity the army had detected 15 years earlier.

By 1934, when this photo was taken, the army saw diminishing value in Fort Lawton. In 1938, it offered to sell the base to the city of Seattle, but the offer was declined.

In July 1900, Fort Lawton was little more than a tent encampment for the First Cavalry. It soon became a cantonment for infantry troops traveling to and from postings around the Pacific. (H. Ambrose Kiehl, Special Collections, UW Libraries, UW 37719)
With Fort Lawton, Seattleites discovered that going into business with the federal government could be challenging, because that government changes its mind at times. The site was initially chosen and designed as an artillery base, intended to help ward off naval invasions of Puget Sound. Shortly after opening, the army changed its function to serving as a cantonment for infantry troops being rotated to and from postings around the Pacific. This change had racial implications. The army at the beginning of the 20th century permitted only white troops to handle artillery, so if the fort had been used as originally intended only white troops would have been stationed there. But when the army changed its mind—without really consulting Seattleites—it became inevitable that African American troops would be stationed there, which occurred in 1909-11 and contributed to friction between the military and Seattle's white population, who saw black soldiers as a threat to property values. Once more, Seattleites were not prepared to embrace the diversity that is part and parcel of urban life.

Although Fort Lawton made Seattle a more integral part of the defense of the United States and boosted the local economy, its primacy was never a sure thing. Once the city of Tacoma donated 70,000 acres to the army during World War I, Fort Lewis quickly surpassed Fort Lawton. In fact, by 1938 the army had decided that Fort Lawton was redundant and offered the base back to the city of Seattle for one dollar. The city turned the offer down, because it could not afford the maintenance. Within a few years Fort Lawton suddenly became valuable again, serving as the country’s second leading processing site for soldiers heading to and from the Pacific theater of World War II. Seattle had entered its second pandemonium moment—and the relationship it had cultivated with the federal government was essential for the new growth spurt.

The sociologist Calvin F. Schmid published this map of Puget Sound population growth in *Social Trends in Seattle* (1944). He provides two population figures for each town in the region—the 1940 census count above, and his estimate for 1943 below, in italics. Thus Seattle had 368,302 in 1940, and an estimated 480,000 in 1943. Tacoma had 109,408 in 1940 and an estimated 140,000 in 1943. Bellevue mysteriously does not appear on the map.
After leveling off during the 1920s and 1930s, Seattle’s population suddenly spiked again during the early 1940s, when the entire Pacific Coast mobilized for World War II. The war was actually a population drain on most states, but California, Washington, and Oregon (in that order) led the nation in demographic increases. Population diversity grew as well, as the region attracted more workers of color than ever before. Washington’s Latino and African American populations grew much more quickly than did that of the state overall.

All of the decade’s population gain occurred in the early 1940s, during World War II, and most went to urban areas. In fact, under the pressures of wartime, the demographic and economic growth was astounding. The Puget Sound region in particular boomed, as the accompanying map illustrates. Most notably, in the space of just a few years Bremerton tripled in size by adding the equivalent of two Bremertons. We can readily identify the employment centers responsible for such growth: the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Fort Lewis, Fort Lawton, and Boeing. Largely because of Boeing, but also because of shipyards, the city of Seattle by itself received $5.6 billion in war contracts during World War II, ranking it third in the nation in per capita war orders. Boeing had 4,000 employees in 1939, but thereafter that figure began to grow as the company filled European orders for the B-17 and other aircraft. In September 1941—before Pearl Harbor—Boeing employed 20,000; by the end of the year, it employed 30,000; and at the peak of production during 1944, it employed on average 50,000 people and amassed yearly sales of $600 million (the value of all Seattle manufacturing in 1939 had been $70 million).

Over the course of the war, the company produced 7,000 B-17s and 1,100 B-29s. To achieve such mass production, manufacturing was dramatically transformed. Many more workers with far fewer skills now produced planes on an assembly line. Women loomed large in production. Prior to the war they had been deemed unqualified for numerous Boeing manufacturing positions; now they were recruited to work at many of the heaviest or dirtiest jobs.

Living conditions in wartime Seattle were catch-as-catch-can. As in other pandemonium moments, many faced considerable hardship, but for two reasons they might have been reluctant to complain too much. First, government propaganda reinforced the idea that people on the home front, like soldiers overseas, simply had to endure their share of wartime sacrifice. Second, the population tended to see wartime conditions as temporary, something to be tolerated only “for the duration.” They believed (mistakenly) that things would return to “normal” during peacetime. Consequently, many residents of Seattle accepted the pandemonium of the early 1940s as a matter of short-term, patriotic sacrifice. They put up with bus and streetcar systems that were overloaded, and housing that was very difficult to find. Apart from government projects, it was nearly impossible to acquire the materials needed for new civilian homes. Because of residential discrimination, African Americans faced some of the greatest challenges. In 1940, the Central District contained roughly 3,700 blacks; by 1945, it held up to 10,000. People lived in abandoned gas stations and old poultry sheds, and they took shifts sleeping in apartment beds. The rapid urban growth of the early 1940s seemed nearly unmanageable.

Seattle’s mobilization refashioned its relationship to Uncle Sam. Increasingly, the city was expected to meet wartime national standards, as federal officials tried to rein in the excesses of pandemonium. Congress sent a committee devoted to congested urban areas to hold hearings. The executive branch dispatched officials tasked with reducing racial tensions so that peoples of color gained fair treatment in the workplace and so that Japanese wartime labor shortages gave women the opportunity to take on new manufacturing jobs. These Kenworth Motor Truck Company employees made components for Boeing B-17s and B-29s. (Webster and Stevens, MOHAI, 1983.10.14851.16)
Americans would be accepted upon their return from wartime incarceration. The military threatened to make the city off-limits to troops if the local police did not get control of prostitutes, who were blamed for an epidemic of venereal disease that threatened the preparedness of servicemen.

That the federal government was trying to manage race relations as well as sexual relations in Seattle points to another qualitative change that had occurred. The city had become a key site for projecting American military power (and other kinds of power) around the world. There would be no going back to the “normal” of 1940. Instead, Seattle found itself mobilized for war not only during the years 1941-45 but also during the Cold War from 1947 to 1991. One price to be paid was heightened federal surveillance, which contributed to the anticommunist crusade in Seattle and Washington State during the late 1940s and early 1950s. The reward was enormous economic and demographic growth, and an economic base that was more diversified than before. The sudden and sustained expansion of the Boeing Company was the most obvious manifestation of that mobilization; the creation or perpetuation of nearby military installations was another outcome. The University of Washington performed its share of defense-related tasks as well.

In the 19th century, Seattle’s founders had helped the city succeed through a host of activities, but their town had also been fortuitously located in a place where industrial capitalism was reaching out to absorb raw materials and traspacific streams of labor. In the mid-20th century, something similar occurred to cement a new phase of urban development. Seattleites again made some of their own luck, but they were also fortunate, in terms of timing and geography, in getting linked to (a) the rise of the United States to global power, especially militarily and economically, and (b) the growing importance of activities, resources, and territories around the Pacific Rim. The city continued to grow briskly.

In becoming a more important player in national mobilization, Seattle had graduated to a different kind of urban network. Contrast its situation with Portland’s. Each city had played the same sort of role from 1890 to 1940, serving as the metropolis for a regional hinterland in an economy devoted to extraction and processing of raw materials. Both cities mobilized during World War II, but most of Portland’s wartime industry disappeared after 1945, and the city basically reverted to its previous existence as the headquarters for a regional economy. By contrast, Seattle remained more or less mobilized indefinitely. It continued its role in the regional economies of Washington and Alaska, but it now was performing significantly more national and transnational duties. Building upon the astonishing growth occasioned by World War II, Seattle leaders moved aggressively to strengthen their ties beyond the Northwest. Much more than did Portland, Seattle won contracts from the Department of Defense; gained appropriations from the U.S. Congress and the state legislature; turned its institution of higher education into an immense economic driver; and upgraded its port facilities. It formed new and improved linkages to other cities across the United States— for example, through better airline connections, more regional corporate headquarters and branch plants, and participation in major-league sports, i.e., networks that connect the nation’s biggest cities. Then it built on those connections to cultivate new and better ties around the globe.

The historian Carl Abbott explains the post-1945 divergence between Portland and Seattle as the difference between a “Northwest city” and a “Pacific city”:

Seattle increasingly participates in the long-range networks of finance, investment, tourism, and trade that link the North American and East Asian core regions of the world economy. It outranks Portland not only in the volume and value of overseas trade, but also in the number of direct overseas flights, number of foreign bank offices, amount of foreign investment, number of professional consular offices, and proportion of foreign born residents. To put it in different terms, Seattle not only became more “major-league” than Portland, but also saw its major-league baseball team strengthen connections to East Asia through both Japanese ownership and a steady influx of Japanese star players.

The two cities now operated in quite different orbits. Just how much had Seattle surpassed its rival to the south? In 1987, one local reporter predicted that by the year 2020 the Puget Sound area’s population would increase by the equivalent of “Portland and its suburbs.”

By the time Seattle became a major-league city, the meaning of the term Seattle had changed. For the first century or so of its history, the name of the city referred primarily to the lands and people inside the municipal boundaries. During the mid-20th century, however, a different meaning emerged. The word Seattle increasingly described an urbanized area that stretched beyond the municipal limits and included different types of places—urban, suburban, rural—located at a distance from the city the pioneers had founded. The U.S. Census Bureau was relatively proactive in responding to the new reality. In 1949 it coined the concept of standard metropolitan areas (or SMAs) to recognize the phenomenon of sprawling urban forms. The 1960 U.S. Census identified the Seattle SMA as King and Snohomish Counties, which included suburbs such as Bellevue and Bothell and communities such as Everett that long had been cities in their own right, but now found themselves defined as part of a larger metropolitan aggregate. In 1983,
the census bureau expanded the urbanized area to include Tacoma and Pierce County. By 1993, it had added Olympia, Bremerton, and Coupeville by creating the Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area, coinciding with Island, King, Kitsap, Pierce, Snohomish, and Thurston Counties. Throughout these decades the phrase central city served to describe Seattle’s relationship to surrounding towns.

The new census designations recognized that urbanization had spread from Seattle to many other parts of the Puget Sound region. This urbanization took different forms. In some places it appeared as heavily residential communities, that is, conventional suburbs, whose residents commuted to jobs in more traditional urban centers such as Tacoma, Everett, and Seattle. But other parts of the urbanized area were highly commercial, or industrial, and attracted their own share of commuters, with some coming from central cities. The towns of Redmond and Renton come to mind. The new way of tabulating census data was a necessary response to suburbanization and urban sprawl—recognition that towns and cities had begun to run together. As population continued to increase, for some purposes it made little sense to just keep measuring things and people only within municipal boundaries.

Seeing a city as an SMA would not have made sense to Seattle pioneers. Although a few large American cities had begun to develop suburbs during the mid-19th century, suburbs as conventionally defined (that is, as residential communities located beyond the borders of central cities) for the most part did not become part of Seattle’s experience until later. What we today regard as Seattle suburbs were in the 19th and early 20th centuries part of Seattle’s extractive hinterlands. People grew hops in Issaquah, cultivated truck farms in Kent and Snohomish, mined coal in Newcastle and Renton, and cut timber in a host of other outlying districts. And to keep smells and pollution away from the city center, certain unpleasant industrial activities increasingly came to be located in neighborhoods outside Seattle.

When adjacent districts became urban enough, one response was for the city to annex them. Let’s think back to how Seattle’s population expanded so spectacularly between 1880 and 1910. When we study this growth more closely, we again recognize that decennial census figures by themselves do not tell the entire story. Growth resulted not just from numerical increase but also from territorial increase during this period. How was it that Seattle’s population multiplied from
80,671 in 1900 to 237,194 in 1910? The excess of births and new arrivals over deaths and departures explains only part of the expansion. The city more than doubled in area between 1905 and 1910 through its annexation of Ballard, West Seattle, Laurelhurst, Georgetown, Ravenna Park, South Park, and Columbia City. Territorial expansion, which led to demographic growth, was another form of rapid change.

In fact, Seattle’s municipal footprint was even greater than its growing municipal boundaries indicated. To achieve a supply of water and power, Seattle took control of most of the Cedar and Tolt River watersheds in eastern King County and parts of the Skagit Valley in Skagit County. Eighty percent of the people in King County buy their water from the city of Seattle, and a handful of towns to the north and south of the central city buy their electricity from Seattle as well. For a long time, Seattle assumed it reigned supreme over outlying communities, and many of those communities had reason to think that Seattle did exert a great deal of leverage over them.

Eventually the tide changed as suburbanization took off. The development of interurban railroads encouraged such suburbs as the Highlands and Alderwood Manor to appear in the first decade of the 20th century. Increased use of and infrastructure for automobiles were also crucial. After 1940 or so the development of new highways, floating bridges, and a reliable ferry system permitted suburban development on a new scale. The Boeing Company’s practice of scattering plants and offices all around the Puget Sound area reinforced the centrifugal pattern.

The changing relationship between Seattle’s and King County’s populations illuminates the trends. With its great expansion during the 1880s, Seattle came to have two-thirds of the county’s population. In 1910, after the burst of annexations, Seattle’s share of the county population peaked at 83 percent. Slowly, the county began to catch up. In 1960, Seattle retained 60 percent of the county’s population; 10 years later, in the middle of the Boeing Bust, the non-Seattle population of King County surpassed the central city for the first time. (And whereas the central city’s population declined between 1960 and 1980, King County’s population continued to grow steadily during the same period.) By the year 2000, Seattle possessed less than one-third of King County’s population. Pioneer histories had spoken about how Seattle attained “commanding greatness” in relation to its hinterlands and other Northwest towns. Now, just within the boundaries of King County, Seattle hoped merely to continue being regarded as first among equals.

Once more, bursts of rapid growth brought Seattle’s changing relationship with its neighbors into clear perspective. And substantially more than before, issues of environmental quality loomed large—not just as a practical matter for a growing population, but also because in this new urban phase folks were increasingly drawn to the metropolitan area because of its natural amenities. Urban and suburban growth after 1940 quickly transformed Lake Washington. By the mid-1950s, the sewage those communities pumped into the lake threatened to destroy it. The Seattle attorney James Ellis spearheaded the drive to create a new agency called Metro that could coordinate the clean-up efforts by reaching across town boundaries, uniting urban and suburban populations, and ensuring proper treatment of sewage. Metro was not Ellis’s first effort to cut through the bureaucratic tangle of different towns and governments in greater Seattle, and it was not the last. During the 1960s he spearheaded the Forward Thrust campaign to build parks and other infrastructure around King County. Ellis did not succeed at everything he tried, but his efforts reflected a growing awareness that, especially when dealing with pollution and trans-

A floating bridge between Mercer Island and Seattle, which opened in 1940, was one of many transportation developments that contributed to the growth of suburbs. (Asahel Curtis, Special Collections, UW Libraries, A. Curtis 65146)
portation, conditions for Seattle had changed. The city was now embedded in a larger metropolitan area in which its residents no longer amounted to a majority. To deal with such issues as growth and environmental quality, it was essential to abandon the attitudes associated with urban supremacy, or with Darwinian struggle, and find ways to get along with neighbors.

Two developments accelerated the process of collaboration. One was a surge of economic growth (or a series of bursts of growth, dependent in part on Boeing, in part on high-tech industry, and in part on the retail sector) after 1980 that led to demographic expansion, which in turn demanded heightened attention to pollution, traffic, and other region-wide concerns. Then the state in 1990 passed the Growth Management Act, which mandated that communities plan for population increase in a more holistic way. The new law required cities and counties to draw urban-growth boundaries. The state anticipated enormous population growth in coming decades—from 2,750,000 in 1990 to 4,140,000 in 2020 (in King, Kitsap, Pierce, and Snohomish Counties—we are now at 3,860,000). The goal was not to stop or limit that growth; rather, the Growth Management Act aimed to channel it into existing urban and suburban places so that rural and wilderness areas on the urban periphery would be protected from development. By 1994 representatives from around King County had hammered out a new comprehensive plan in order to meet the new growth-management standards. Not everybody was happy. Property owners in rural parts of King County in particular resented new restrictions on development of their land. They explored the idea of breaking away from King County in order to be able to write their own growth management plan as the proposed Cedar County, but discovered that the state constitution does not permit a new county to secede from an existing one.

By contrast, Seattlites in the mid-1990s were largely accepting of the new regime. The city generally supported efforts to protect rural lands and wilderness, and it relatively cheerfully agreed to take on more than its share of the new population growth, in part by welcoming greater density in select parts of the city, especially those served (or prospectively served) by an expanding interurban transit system. As it turns out, planning for growth was one thing; living through it has been quite another. In the 1990s, the city was more or less optimistic about being able to absorb large numbers of newcomers. In the last decade or so that optimism has dissolved in the face of very rapid population increase and a city being remade before our eyes. In the years after 2010, we have seen the pace of population growth within the city limits actually surpassing that in King County outside of Seattle—the reversal of a decades-long trend. There are increasingly times—for example, during rush hour, which now lasts at least three hours morning and evening—when urbanites stuck in traffic wish that they could telecommute from Cedar County. In the meantime, to address the assorted problems of growth, the city of Seattle finds itself forming or maintaining long-term alliances with the towns, counties, tribes, and other governmental bodies within the Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area—such as Sound Transit, the merged Ports of Seattle and Tacoma, and the Puget Sound Regional Council. Seattle continues to grow briskly, and it remains the central city of Puget Sound. Yet the city’s population constitutes less than one-third of King County’s, and of course a still smaller fraction of the Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area. One could argue that Seattle retains its greatness but not its supremacy.

There is much that this talk does not cover. Most historians of Seattle, tending to adopt the viewpoints of the urban elite, which has, not coincidentally, left behind the most sources, have accepted the idea that growth was both inevitable and an unquestioned measure of success. Yet some would ask whether we should be doing more to limit, or even halt, growth, or at least deflect it in some other direction. Along those lines, it could prove instructive to inquire more deeply into a social and economic system that places such a premium on sustained growth, especially in light of the ecological concerns and economic inequities of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

Addressing such questions is beyond the scope of this lecture. However, I do want to note that Seattle has experienced many periods when growth was absent. Some of Seattle’s most traumatic moments as a community, according to every generation of historians, have occurred during periods of sharp contraction, when the process of growth was reversed. These were pivot points of a different sort: the Indian wars of 1855-56 and their aftermath, when the nascent town of Seattle and nearby rural developments stagnated for a decade; the rapid demobilization at the conclusion of World War I, which exacerbated the
polarization of classes and led to the Seattle General Strike of 1919; and the Boeing Bust of 1968-72, when in-state employment at the aerospace company fell from 101,000 to 38,000 in the space of a few years. Historians generally have treated these downturns as calamities.

And as exceptions. The overall pattern has been expansion rather than contraction, stemming in part from Seattleites’ design and in part from factors that lie mostly beyond local control. If one sees growth as a generally positive thing, then Seattle has been fortunate to be in the right place at the right time over and over again during its relatively brief history. In the 19th century, it situated itself astride the pathways that funneled such raw materials as fish and lumber and coal to manufacturers and markets around the world. In the 20th century, it benefited from the nation’s rise to globalism, from the increasing attention devoted to resources and nations around the Pacific Ocean, and from a complex set of factors capable of producing high-tech employment.

What about the 21st century? Although historians are not well qualified to predict the future, let me offer a couple of speculations. Seattle has been growing for many decades, and that growth seems likely to continue. Of course, a natural disaster could interfere with growth, but it would need to be the right kind of natural disaster. A volcano or an earthquake or a tsunami could instantaneously destroy much of what has been built. On the other hand, climate change represents a different type of disaster. Cities such as Seattle contribute to climate change through their carbon emissions, and they are vulnerable to rising sea levels and changing weather patterns. In other words, they are part of the problem. Yet at the same time many look to urban centers as solutions, too. C40 Cities, a global collaboration of municipalities devoted to addressing climate change, notes that “urban density can actually create the possibility for a better quality of life and a lower carbon footprint through more efficient infrastructure and planning.” In other words, cities such as ours can help create a greener world. They cannot do so through sprawl; we cannot afford to replicate Arlington one hundred times. Instead, a greener city needs to acquire more density, build more efficient transit systems, produce less waste, and so on—all things that Seattle is trying to do, even if at the expense of making change appear more unmanageable.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>King County</th>
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<tr>
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<td>622,175</td>
<td>1,972,113</td>
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<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>668,342</td>
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Increase 2010-14: 59,682 (9.8%) 148,718 (7.7%)

*Source: Data from American Community Survey, U.S. Census Bureau.*

Today many of us feel that we may never escape the current chaos. But some hint that, in an age of climate change, pandemonium could turn into paradise. Those who study the impacts of climate change predict that greater Seattle—once again through a combination of design and luck—will become an even more attractive and populous place to live. The urban area already has appeared on more than one list of cities most likely to withstand—and perhaps even flourish because of—climate change. Why? Climate scientists and urban planners applaud local leaders for policies that take global warming seriously and help the city prepare for it. They agree as well that the coastal region between Anchorage and San Francisco will suffer less from the negative effects of climate change than most other parts of North America. The weather expert Cliff Mass believes that our urban region could become a “climate refuge” for people fleeing problems elsewhere. “All in all, it’s a pretty benign situation for us—in fact, warming up just a little bit might be a little bit welcome around here.” Seattle may once more find itself in the right place at the right time. And as a climate refuge, perhaps even as paradise, the city could well experience additional pandemonium moments.

**John M. Findlay** teaches history of the Pacific Northwest and North American West at the University of Washington, Seattle. He is working on a book that surveys the American West between 1941 and 2001.
8. Ibid., 1:99.
9. Grant, 50.
19. Grant, 17, 18 (qtns.).
21. Grant, 133 (1st qtn.), 17 (2d qtn.), 151 (3d, last qtns.).
22. Bagley, 1:252 (1st qtn.), 1:266 (last qtn.).