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\fi-360\li720\jclisttab\tx720 }{\listname ;}\listid374046435}}{\*\listoverridetable{\listoverride\listid374046435\listoverridecount0\ls1}}{\info{\title Some Consequences of}{\author Leroy F. Searle}{\operator Leroy F. Searle}
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Some Consequences of Four Incapacities }{\f1\fs16\cgrid0 I }{\i\fs16\cgrid0 53}{\fs16\cgrid0 
\par }}{\*\pnseclvl1\pnucrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl2\pnucltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl3\pndec\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl4\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta )}}
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\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl9\pnlcrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}\pard\plain \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\adjustright \fs20\cgrid {\fs24\cgrid0 
\par }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 Some Consequences of
\par Four Incapacities
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx946\tx1122\adjustright {\i\fs24\cgrid0 P2}{\i\fs24\sub\cgrid0 7}{\i\fs24\cgrid0 :\tab }{\fs24\cgrid0 Journal of Speculative Philosophy }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 2 (1868):140\emdash 57. [Also published in W2:211
\emdash 42 and in CP 5.264-317
\par 
\par 
\par 
\par 
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\tx600\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Descartes is the father of modern philosophy, and the spirit of Cartesianism\emdash that which principally distinguishes it from the scho\-
lasticism which it displaced\emdash may be compendiously stated as follows:
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\tx600\tx788\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 1}{\i\fs24\cgrid0 .\tab  }{\fs24\cgrid0 It teaches that philosophy must begin with universal doubt; whereas scholasticism had never questioned fundamentals.

\par 2.}{\b\fs24\cgrid0 \tab  }{\fs24\cgrid0 It teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the individual consciousness; whereas scholasticism had rested on the tes\-timony of sages and of the Catholic Church.
\par }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 3}{\fs24\cgrid0 .\tab  The multiform argumentation of the middle ages is replaced by a single thread of inference depending often upon inconspicuous premises.
\par 4.\tab   Scholasticism had its mysteries of faith, but undertook to explain all created things. But there are many facts which Cartesianism not only does not explain, but renders absolutely inexplicable, unless to say that \ldblquote God makes them so
\rdblquote  is to be regarded as an explanation.
\par }\pard\plain \s20\fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\tx600\adjustright {In some, or all of these respects, most modern philosophers have been, in effect, Cartesians. Now without wishing to return to scholasti\-
cism, it seems to me that modern science and modern logic require us to stand upon a very different platform from this.
\par }\pard\plain \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx360\adjustright \fs20\cgrid {\b\fs24\cgrid0 1. }{\fs24\cgrid0 We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study }{
\b\fs24\cgrid0 //29//  }{\fs24\cgrid0 of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 can }{\fs24\cgrid0 
be questioned. Hence this initial scepticism will be a mere self-dec
eption, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up. It is, therefore, as useless a preliminary as going to the North Pole would be 
i
n order to get to Constantinople by coming down regularly upon a meridian. A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not
 on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philos\-ophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\tx788\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 2.\tab }{\fs24\cgrid0 The same formalism appears in the Cartesian criterion, which amounts to this: \ldblquote Whatever I am clearly convinced of, is true.
\rdblquote  If I were really convinced, I should have done with reasoning, and should require no test of certainty. But thus to make single individuals abso\-lute judges of truth is most pernicious. The result is that metaphysi\-
cians will all agree that metaphysics has reached a pitch of certainty far beyond that of the physical sciences; \emdash 
only they can agree upon nothing else. In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory has been broached, it is considered to be on probation until this agreement is reached. After it is 
reached, the question of certainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one left who doubts it. We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 
community }{\fs24\cgrid0 of philosophers. Hence, if disciplined and candid minds carefully exam\-ine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself.
\par }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 3.}{\fs24\cgrid0 \tab Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its meth\-
ods, so far as to proceed only from tangible premises which can be subjected to careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which is no st
ronger than its weak\-est link, but a cable whose fibres may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.
\par }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 4.}{\fs24\cgrid0 \tab Every unidealistic philosophy supposes some absolutely inex\-plicable, unanalyzable ultimate; in short, something resulting from mediation itself not susceptible of mediation. Now that anything }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 is }{
\fs24\cgrid0 thus inexplicable can only be known by reasoning from signs. But the only justification of an inference from signs is that the conclusion explains the fact. To suppose 
the fact absolutely inexplicable, is not to explain it, and hence this supposition is never allowable.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 In the last number of this journal will be found a piece entitled "Questions concerning certain Faculties claimed for Man,\rdblquote  which has been written in thi
s spirit of opposition to Cartesianism. That criti }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //30//}{\fs24\cgrid0   cism of certain faculties resulted in four denials, which for conve\-nience may here be repeated:
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\tx600\tx788\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 1}{\i\fs24\cgrid0 .\tab }{\fs24\cgrid0 We have no power of Introspection, but all knowledge of the internal world is derived by hypothet
ical reasoning from our knowl\-edge of external facts.
\par }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 2.\tab }{\fs24\cgrid0 We have no power of Intuition, but every\rquote  cognition is deter\-mined logically by previous cognitions.
\par }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 3}{\fs24\cgrid0 .\tab We have no power of thinking without signs.
\par }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 4}{\fs24\cgrid0 .\tab We have no conception of the absolutely incognizable.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx90\tx600\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
These propositions cannot be regarded as certain; and, in order to bring them to a further test, it is now proposed to trace them out to their consequences. We may first consider the first alone; then trace the consequences of the first and second; t
hen see what else will result from assuming the third also; and, finally, add the fourth to our hypo\-thetical premises.
\par In accepting the first proposition, we must put aside all prejudices derived from a philosophy which bases our knowledge of the external world on our self-consciousness. We can admit no statement concern\-
ing what passes within us except as a hypothesis necessary to explain what takes place in what we commonly call the external world. More\-over when we have upon such grounds assumed one fac
ulty or mode of action of the mind, we cannot, of course, adopt any other hypothesis for the purpose of explaining any fact which can be explained by our first supposition, but must carry the latter as far as it will go. In other words, we must, as far as
 we can do so without additional hypotheses, reduce all kinds of mental action to one general type.
\par The class of modifications of consciousness with which we must commence our inquiry must be one whose existence is indubitable, and whose laws are best known
, and, therefore (since this knowledge comes from the outside), which most closely follows external facts; that is, it must be some kind of cognition. Here we may hypothetically admit the second proposition of the former paper, according to which there is
 no absolutely first cognition of any object, but cognition arises by a continuous process. We must begin, then, with }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 a process }{\fs24\cgrid0 of cogni\-
tion, and with that process whose laws are best understood and most closely follow external facts. This is no other than the process of valid inference, which proceeds from its premise, }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 A}{\fs24\cgrid0 , to its conclusion, }{
\i\fs24\cgrid0 B, }{\fs24\cgrid0 only if, as a matter of fact, such a proposition as }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 B }{\fs24\cgrid0 is always or usually true when such a proposition as }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 A }{\fs24\cgrid0 
is true. It is a consequence, then, of the first two principles whose results we are to trace out, that we must, as far as we can, without any other supposition than that the mind reasons, reduce all mental action to the formula of valid reasoning.
\par But does the mind in fact go through the syllogistic process? It is certainly very doubtful whether a conclusion\emdash as something existing }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //31//}{\fs24\cgrid0  in the mind independently, like an image\emdash 
suddenly displaces two premises existing in the mind in a similar way. But it is a matter of constant experience, that if a man is made 
to believe in the premises, in the sense that he will act from them and will say that they are true, under favorable conditions he will also be ready to act from the conclusion and to say that that is true. Something, therefore, takes place within the org
anism which is equivalent to the syllogistic process.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 A valid inference is either }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 complete }{\fs24\cgrid0 or }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 incomplete. }{\fs24\cgrid0 
An incomplete inference is one whose validity depends upon some matter of fact not contained in the premises. This implied fact might have been stated 
as a premise, and its relation to the conclusion is the same whether it is explicitly posited or not, since it is at least virtually taken for granted; so that every valid incomplete argument is virtually complete. Complete arguments are divided into }{
\i\fs24\cgrid0 simple }{\fs24\cgrid0 and }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 complex. }{\fs24\cgrid0 
A complex argument is one which from three- or more premises concludes what might have been concluded by successive steps in reasonings each of which is simple. Thus, a complex inference comes to the same thing in the end as a succession of 
simple inferences.
\par A complete, simple, and valid argument, or syllogism, is either }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 apodictic }{\fs24\cgrid0 or }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 probable. }{\fs24\cgrid0 
An apodictic or deductive syllogism is one whose validity depends unconditionally upon the relation of the fact inferred to the facts posited in the p
remises. A syllogism whose validity should depend not merely upon its premises, but upon the existence of some other knowledge, would be impossible; for either this other knowledge would be posited, in which case it would be a part of the premises, or it 
would be implicitly assumed, in which case the inference would be incomplete. But a syllogism whose validity depends partly upon the }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 non-existence }{\fs24\cgrid0 of some other knowledge, is a }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 probable }{\fs24\cgrid0 
syllogism.
\par A few examples will render this plain. The two following arguments are apodictic or deductive:
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\tx788\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 1}{\i\fs24\cgrid0 .\tab }{\fs24\cgrid0 
No series of days of which the first and last are different days of the week exceeds by one a multiple of seven days; now the first and last days of any leap-year are different days of the week, and therefore no leap-y
ear consists of a number of days one greater than a multiple of seven.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 2. }{\fs24\cgrid0 Among the vowels there are no double letters; but one of the double letters }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 (w) }{\fs24\cgrid0 
is compounded of two vowels: hence, a letter com\-pounded of two vowels is not necessarily itself a vowel.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx328\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
In both these cases, it is plain that as long as the premises are true, however other facts may be, the conclusions will be true. On the other hand, suppose that we reason as follows:\emdash \rdblquote 
A certain man had the Asiatic cholera. He was in a state of collaps
e, livid, quite cold, and without perceptible pulse. He was bled copiously. During the process he came out of collapse, and the next morning was well enough to be about. Therefore, bleeding tends to cure the cholera.\rdblquote  This is a fair }{
\b\fs24\cgrid0 //32//}{\fs24\cgrid0  probable inferen
ce, provided that the premises represent our whole knowledge of the matter. But if we knew, for example, that recoveries from cholera were apt to be sudden, and that the physician who had reported this case had known of a hundred other trials of the remed
y without communicating the result, then the inference would lose all its validity.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\tx600\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
The absence of knowledge which is essential to the validity of any probable argument relates to some question which is determined by the argument itself. This question, like
 every other, is whether certain objects have certain characters. Hence, the absence of knowledge is either whether besides the objects which, according to the premises, possess certain characters, any other objects possess them; or, whether besides the c
h
aracters which, according to the premises, belong to certain objects, any other characters not necessarily involved in these belong to the same objects. In the former case, the reasoning proceeds as though all the objects which have certain characters wer
e known, and this is }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 induction; }{\fs24\cgrid0 in the latter case, the inference proceeds as though all the characters requisite to the determination of a certain object or class were known, and this is }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 hypothesis. }{
\fs24\cgrid0 This distinction, also, may be made more plain by examples.
\par Suppose we count the number of occurrences of the different let\-ters in a certain English book, which we may call }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 A. }{\fs24\cgrid0 Of course, every new letter which
 we add to our count will alter the relative number of occurrences of the different letters; but as we proceed with our counting, this change will be less and less. Suppose that we find that as we increase the number of letters counted, the relative numbe
r of e\rquote s approaches nearly 11 \'bc }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 per cent }{\fs24\cgrid0 of the whole, that of the t\rquote s 8 \'bd }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 per cent, }{\fs24\cgrid0 that of the a\rquote s 8 }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 per cent, }{\fs24\cgrid0 that of the s
\rquote s 7 \'bd }{\fs24\sub\cgrid0  }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 per cent, }{\fs24\cgrid0 &c. Suppose we repeat the same observations with half a dozen other English writ\-ings (which we may designate as }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 B, C, D, E}{\fs24\cgrid0 , }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 
F, G}{\fs24\cgrid0 ) with the like result. Then we may infer that in every English writing of some length, the different letters occur with nearly those relative frequencies.
\par Now this argument depends for its validity upon our }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 not }{\fs24\cgrid0 knowing the proportion of letters in any English writing besides }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 A, B, C, D, E}{\fs24\cgrid0 , }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 F, }{\fs24\cgrid0 and }{
\i\fs24\cgrid0 G}{\fs24\cgrid0 . For if we know it in respect to }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 H, }{\fs24\cgrid0 and it is not nearly the same as in the others, our conclusion is destroyed at once; if it is the same, then the legitimate inference is from }{
\i\fs24\cgrid0 A, B, C, D, E}{\fs24\cgrid0 , }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 F, G}{\fs24\cgrid0 , and }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 H, }{\fs24\cgrid0 and not from the first seven alone. This, therefore, is an }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 induction.
\par }{\fs24\cgrid0 Suppose, next, that a piece of writing in cypher is presented to us, without the key. Suppose we find that it contains something less than 26 characters, one of which occurs about }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 11 per cent }{\fs24\cgrid0 
of all the times, another 8\'bd }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 per cent, }{\fs24\cgrid0 another 8 }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 per cent, }{\fs24\cgrid0 and another 7 \'bd  }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 per cent. }{\fs24\cgrid0 Sup\-pose that when we substitute for these }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 
e, t, a, }{\fs24\cgrid0 and }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 s, }{\fs24\cgrid0 respectively, we are able to see how single letters may be substituted for each of the other characters so as to make sense in English, provided, however, }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //33//}{
\fs24\cgrid0  that we allow the spelling to be wrong in some cases. If the writing is of any considerable length, we may infer with great probability that this is the meaning of the cipher.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx476\tx788\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 The validity of this argument depends upon there being no other known characters of the writing in cipher which would have any weight in the matter; for if there are
\emdash if we know, for example, whether or not there is any other solution of it\emdash this must be allowed its effect in supporting or weakening the conclusion. This, then, is }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 hypothesis.
\par }{\fs24\cgrid0 All valid reasoning is either deductive, inductive, or hypothetic; or else it combines two or more of these characters. Deduction is pretty well treated in most logical text-books; b
ut it will be necessary to say a few words about induction and hypothesis in order to render what follows more intelligible.
\par Induction may be defined as an argument which proceeds upon the assumption that all the members of a class or aggregate have all the characters which are common to all those members of this class con\-
cerning which it is known, whether they have these characters or not; or, in other words, which assumes that that is true of a whole collection which is true of a number of instances take
n from it at random. This might be called statistical argument. In the long run, it must generally afford pretty correct conclusions from true premises. If we have a bag of beans partly black and partly white, by counting the relative pro\-
portions of the two colors in several different handfuls, we can approx\-
imate more or less to the relative proportions in the whole bag, since a sufficient number of handfuls would constitute all the beans in the bag. The central characteristic and key to induction is, tha
t by taking the conclusion so reached as major premise of a syllogism, and the proposition stating that such and such objects are taken from the class in question as the minor premise, the other premise of the induction will follow from them deductively. 
Thus, in the above example we concluded that all books in English have about 11 \'bc }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 per cent }{\fs24\cgrid0 of their letters e\rquote s. From that as major premise, together with the proposition that }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 A, B, C, D, E}{
\fs24\cgrid0 , }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 F, }{\fs24\cgrid0 and }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 G}{\fs24\cgrid0  are books in English, it follows deductively that }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 A, B, C, D, E}{\fs24\cgrid0 , }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 F, }{\fs24\cgrid0 and }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 G}{
\fs24\cgrid0  have about 11 }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 \'bc  per cent }{\fs24\cgrid0 of their letters e\rquote s. Accordingly, induction has been defined by Aristotle as the inference of the major premise of a syllogism from its minor premise and conclu\-sion.}{
\fs16\cgrid0 1}{\fs24\cgrid0   The function of an induction is to substitute for a series of many subjects, a single one which embraces them and an indefinite number of others. Thus it is a species of \ldblquote reduction of the manifold to unity.
\rdblquote 
\par Hypothesis may be defined as an argument which proceeds upon the assumption that a characte
r which is known necessarily to involve a certain number of others, may be probably predicated of any object which has all the characters which this character is known to involve. Just as induction may be regarded as the inference of the major prem- }{
\b\fs24\cgrid0 //34//}{\fs24\cgrid0 
 ise of a syllogism, so hypothesis may be regarded as the inference of the minor premise, from the other two propositions. Thus, the example taken above consists of two such inferences of the minor premises of the following syllogisms:
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx209\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
\par {\pntext\pard\plain\hich\af0\dbch\af0\loch\f0 1.\tab}}\pard \fi-630\li720\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx209\tx328\jclisttab\tx720{\*\pn \pnlvlbody\ilvl0\ls1\pnrnot0\pndec\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta .}}\ls1\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
 Every English writing of some length in which such and such char\-acters denote }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 e, t, }{\fs24\cgrid0 a, and }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 s, }{\fs24\cgrid0 has about 11 \'bc }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 per cent }{\fs24\cgrid0 of the first sort of marks, 8 \'bd
 of the second, 8 of the third, and 7 \'bd of the fourth;
\par }\pard \fi-360\li720\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx209\tx476\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 This secret writing is an English writing of some length, in which such and such characters denote }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 e, t, a, }{\fs24\cgrid0 and }{
\i\fs24\cgrid0 s, }{\fs24\cgrid0 respectively:
\par }\pard \fi-360\li720\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx476\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 92 \\f "Symbol" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f3\fs24}}}{\fs24\cgrid0 This secret writing has about 11 \'bc }{\i\fs24\cgrid0  per cent }{\fs24\cgrid0 
of its characters of the first kind, 8\'bd of the second, 8 of the third, and 7 \'bd of the fourth.
\par 
\par }\pard \fi-630\li720\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx209\tx328\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 2.}{\b\fs24\cgrid0 \tab  }{\fs24\cgrid0 
A passage written with such an alphabet makes sense when such and such letters are severally substituted for such and such characters.
\par }\pard \fi-360\li720\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx209\tx476\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 This secret writing is written with such an alphabet.
\par }\pard \fi-360\li720\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx476\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 92 \\f "Symbol" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f3\fs24}}}{\fs24\cgrid0 This secret writing makes sense when such and such substitutions are made.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx476\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx209\tx476\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
The function of hypothesis is to substitute for a great series of predicates forming no unity in themselves, a single one (or small number) which involves them all, together (perhaps) with an indefinite
 number of others. It is, therefore, also a reduction of a manifold to unity.* Every deductive syllogism may be put into the form
\par 
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx198\tx470\adjustright {\cgrid0 *Several persons versed in logic have objected that I have here quite misapplied the term }{\i\cgrid0 hypothesis, }{\cgrid0 and that what I so desi
gnate is an argument from }{\i\cgrid0 analogy. }{\cgrid0 2}{\b\cgrid0  }{\cgrid0 It is a sufficient reply to say that the example of the cipher has been given as an apt illustration of hypothesis by Descartes (Rule l0. }{\i\cgrid0 Oeuvres choisies: }{
\cgrid0 Paris, 1865, page 334), by Leibniz (}{\i\cgrid0 Nouveaux}{\cgrid0  }{\i\cgrid0 Essais, }{\cgrid0 lib. 4, ch. 12,}{\b\cgrid0  }{\cgrid0 \'a713, Ed. Erdmann. p. 383 }{\i\cgrid0 b). }{\cgrid0 and (as I learn from D. Stewart; }{\i\cgrid0 Works, }{
\cgrid0 vol. 3, pp. 305}{\b\cgrid0  }{\cgrid0 et seqq.)3 by Gravesande, Boscovich, Hartley, and G. L. Le Sage. The term }{\i\cgrid0 Hypothesis }{\cgrid0 has been used in the following senses:\emdash 1. For the theme or proposi\-tion forming 
the subject of discourse. 2. For an assumption. Aristotle divides }{\i\cgrid0 theses }{\cgrid0 or propositions adopted without any reason into definitions and hypotheses.}{\fs16\cgrid0 4}{\cgrid0 
   The latter are propositions stating the existence of something. Thus the geometer says, \ldblquote Let there be a triangle.\rdblquote  3. For a condition in a general sense. We are said to seek other things than happiness }{\i\cgrid0 ex}{\cgrid0  }{
\i\cgrid0 hypotheseos }{\cgrid0 conditionally. The best republic is the ideally perfect, the second the best on earth, the third the best under the circumstances.  Freedom is the }{\i\cgrid0 hypotheseos }{\cgrid0 
or condition of democracy.  4. For the antecedent of a hypo\-thetical proposition.  5. For an oratorical question which assumes facts.  6. In the Synopsis of Psellus,5 for the reference of a subject to the things it denotes.  7. Most commonl
y in modern times, for the conclusion of an argument from consequence and consequent to antecedent. This is my use of the term.  8. For such a conclusion when too weak to be a theory accepted into the body of a science.
\par I give a few authorities to support the seventh use:
\par Chauvin.--Lexicon Rationale, 1st Ed.\emdash "Hypothesis est propositio, quae assomitur ad probandam aliam seritatem incognitam. Requirunt multi, ut haec hypothesis vera esse cognoscatur, etiam antequam appareat. an alia cx ex deduci possint. Veru
m aiunt alii, hoc unum desiderari. ut hypothesis pro vera admittatur, quod nempe ex hac talia deduci\-tur, quae respondent phaenomenis. et satisfaciunt omnibus difficultatibus, quae hac parte in re, et in is quae de ea apparent, occorrebant.\rdblquote 6

\par Newton.--"Haectenus phaenomena coelorum et mans nostri per vim gravitatis ex\-posui, sed causam gravitatis nondum assignavi. . ... . Rationem vero harum gravitatis  }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //35//}{\b\cgrid0   }{\cgrid0 
proprietatum ex phaenomenis nondum potui deducere, et hypotheses non fingo. Quic\-quid enim ex phaenomenis non deducitur, }{\i\cgrid0 hypothesis }{\cgrid0 
vocanda .... In hac Philosophia Propositiones dedueuntur cx phaenomenis. et redduntur generales per inductionem.\rdblquote  }{\i\cgrid0 Principia. Ad n.\rquote 
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx323\tx572\adjustright {\i\cgrid0 Sir }{\cgrid0 Wm. }{\i\cgrid0 Hamilton.--:Hypothesis, }{\cgrid0 that is, propositions which are assumed with proba\-bility
, in order to explain or prove something else which cannot otherwise be explained or }{\i\cgrid0 proved."\emdash Lectures on Logic }{\cgrid0 (Am. Ed.). p. 188.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx334\tx623\adjustright {\cgrid0 \ldblquote The name of }{\i\cgrid0 hypothesis }{\cgrid0 is more emphatically given to provisory suppositions, which serve to explain the phenomena in so far 
as observed, but which are only asserted to be true, if ultimately\rquote  confirmed by a complete induction."\emdash lbid.. p. 364.
\par \ldblquote When a phenomenon is presented which can be explained by no principle afforded through experience, we feel discontented and uneasy; and 
there arises an effort to discover some cause which may, at least provisionally, account for the outstanding phenomenon; and this cause is finally recognized as valid and true, if, through it,}{\b\cgrid0  }{\cgrid0 
the given phenomenon is found to obtain a full and perfect explanation. The judgment in which a phenomenon is referred to such a problematic cause, is called a }{\i\cgrid0 Hypothesis.\rdblquote -  }{\cgrid0 Ibid., pp. 449, 450.}{\b\cgrid0   }{\cgrid0 
See also }{\i\cgrid0 Lectures on Metaphysics, }{\cgrid0 p. 117.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx334\tx572\adjustright {\i\cgrid0 J. S. Mill.\emdash \rdblquote An }{\cgrid0 hypothesis is any supposition which we make (either without actu
al evidence, or on evidence avowedly insufficient), in order to endeavor to deduce from it conclusions in accordance with facts which are known to be real; under the idea that if the conclusions to which the hypothesis leads are known truths, the hypothes
is itself either must be, or at least is likely to be true}{\i\cgrid0 .\rdblquote \emdash Logic }{\cgrid0 (6th Ed.), vol. 2, p. 8.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx323\tx583\adjustright {\i\cgrid0 Kant.\emdash \rdblquote If all the consequents of a cognition are true, the cognition itself is true\'85  }{\cgrid0 
It is allowable, therefore, to conclude from consequent to }{\i\cgrid0 a}{\cgrid0  reason, but withou
t being able to determine this reason. From the complexus of all consequents alone can we conclude the truth of a determinate reason. . . . The difficulty with this }{\i\cgrid0 positive }{\cgrid0 and }{\i\cgrid0 direct }{\cgrid0 mode of inference }{
\i\cgrid0 (modus ponens) }{\cgrid0 is that the totality of the consequents cannot be apodeictically recognized, and that are therefore led by this mode of inference only to a probable and }{\i\cgrid0 hypothetically }{\cgrid0 true cognition }{\i\cgrid0 
(Hypotheses). \ldblquote \emdash Logik }{\cgrid0 by Jasche, }{\i\cgrid0 Werke, }{\cgrid0 ed. Rosenkranz and Schubert, vol. 3, p. 221.}{\b\cgrid0 
\par }\pard\plain \s21\fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx334\tx572\adjustright \fs20 {\ldblquote A hypothesis is the judgment of the truth of a reason on account of the sufficiency of the consequents. \ldblquote \emdash Ibid., p. 262.
\par }\pard\plain \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx334\tx572\adjustright \fs20\cgrid {\i\cgrid0 Herbart.\emdash \rdblquote We }{\cgrid0 
can make hypotheses, thence deduce consequents, and afterwards see whether the latter accord with experience. Such suppositions are termed hypothe\-ses.\rdblquote -Einleitung; Werke, vol. 1, p. 53.}{\fs16\cgrid0 8}{\cgrid0  
\par }{\i\cgrid0 Beneke}{\cgrid0 .\emdash \rdblquote Affirmative inferences from consequent to antecedent, or hypotheses.\rdblquote \emdash  }{\i\cgrid0 S stem der Logik, }{\cgrid0 vol. 2, p. 103.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx198\tx470\adjustright {\cgrid0 There would be no difficulty in greatly multiplying these citations.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx1309\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx1309\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 If }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 A, }{\fs24\cgrid0 then }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 B;
\par }{\fs24\cgrid0 But }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 A:
\par }{\fs24\cgrid0 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 92 \\f "Symbol" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f3\fs24}}}{\i\fs24\cgrid0 B.
\par }\pard \qc\fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx1309\adjustright {\i\fs24\cgrid0 
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx328\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 And as the minor premise in this form appears as antecedent or reason of a hypothetical proposition, hypothetic inference may be called rea\-
soning from consequent to antecedent.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\tx600\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 The argument from analogy, which a popular writer upon logic}{\fs24\super\cgrid0 9}{\fs24\cgrid0 
 calls reasoning from particulars to particulars, derives its validity from its combining the characters of induction and hypothesis, being analyzable either into a deduction or an induction, or a deduction and a hypothesis.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx328\tx572\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
But though inference is thus of three essentially different species, it also belongs to one genus. We have seen that no conclusion can be legitimately derived which could not have been reached by successions }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //36//  }{\fs24\cgrid0 
of arguments having two premises each, and implying no fact not asserted.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\tx600\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
Either of these premises is a proposition asserting that certain objects have certain characters. Every term of such a proposition stands either for certain objects or for certain characters. The conclu\-
sion may be regarded as a proposition substituted in place of either premise, the substitution being justified by the fact stated in the other premise. The conclusion is accordingly derived from either premise by substituting either a new subject for the 
subject of the premise, or a new predicate for the predicate of the premise, or by both substitu\-
tions. Now the substitution of one term for another can be justified only so far as the term substituted represents only what is represented in the term replaced. If, therefore, the conclusion be denoted by the formula,
\par 
\par }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 S}{\fs24\cgrid0  is }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 P}{\fs24\cgrid0 ;
\par 
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx328\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 and this conclusion be derived, by a change of subject, from a premise
\par which may on this account be expressed by the formula,
\par 
\par }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 M }{\fs24\cgrid0 is }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 P,
\par 
\par }{\fs24\cgrid0 then the other premise must assert that whatever thing is represented
\par by }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 S}{\fs24\cgrid0  is represented by }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 M, }{\fs24\cgrid0 or that
\par 
\par Every }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 S}{\fs24\cgrid0  is an }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 M,
\par 
\par }{\fs24\cgrid0 while, if the conclusion, }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 S}{\fs24\cgrid0  is }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 P, }{\fs24\cgrid0 is derived from either premise by a
\par change of predicate, that premise may be written
\par 
\par }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 S }{\fs24\cgrid0 is }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 M;
\par 
\par }{\fs24\cgrid0 and the other premise must assert that whatever characters are implied
\par in }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 P }{\fs24\cgrid0 are implied in }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 M}{\fs24\cgrid0 , or that
\par 
\par Whatever is }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 M }{\fs24\cgrid0 is }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 P.
\par 
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx328\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 \tab \tab In either case, therefore, the syllogism must be capable of expression
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx328\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 in the form,
\par }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 S }{\fs24\cgrid0 is }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 M; M }{\fs24\cgrid0 is }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 P:}{\fs24\cgrid0 
\par }{\fs24\cgrid0 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 92 \\f "Symbol" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f3\fs24}}}{\i\fs24\cgrid0 S }{\fs24\cgrid0 is }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 P}{\fs24\cgrid0 .
\par 
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\tx600\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
Finally, if the conclusion differs from either of its premises, both in subject and predicate, the form of statement of conclusion and premise may be so altered that they shall have a common term. This can always be done, for if }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 P }{
\fs24\cgrid0 is the premise and }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 C }{\fs24\cgrid0 the conclusion, they may be stated thus:
\par 
\par The state of things represented in }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 P }{\fs24\cgrid0 is real,
\par and
\par The state of things represented in }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 C }{\fs24\cgrid0 is real.
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx476\tx788\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 //37//  }{\fs24\cgrid0 In this case the other premise must in some form virtually assert that every state of things such as is represented by }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 C }{
\fs24\cgrid0 is the state of things represented in }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 P.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx476\tx788\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 All valid reasoning, therefore, is of one general form; and in seek\-
ing to reduce all mental action to the formula of valid inference, we seek to reduce it to one single type.
\par An apparent obstacle to the reduction of all mental action to the type of valid inferences is the existence of fallacious reasoning. Every argument implies the truth of a general principle of inferential proce\-
dure (whether involving some matter of fact co
ncerning the subject of argument, or merely a maxim relating to a system of signs), according to which it is a valid argument. If this principle is false, the argument is a fallacy; but neither a valid argument from false premises, nor an exceedingly weak
, but not altogether illegitimate, induction or hy\-pothesis, however its force may be over-estimated, however false its conclusion, is a fallacy.
\par Now words, taken just as they stand, if in the form of an argument, thereby do imply whatever fact may be necessary to make the argu\-
ment conclusive; so that to the formal logician, who has to do only with the meaning of the words according to the proper principles of inter\-pretation, and not with the intention of the speaker as guessed at from other indications, t
he only fallacies should be such as are simply ab\-
surd and contradictory, either because their conclusions are absolutely inconsistent with their premises, or because they connect propositions by a species of illative conjunction, by which they cannot under any circumstances be validly connected.
\par But to the psychologist an argument is valid only if the premises from which the mental conclusion is derived would be sufficient, if true, to justify it, either by themselves, or by the aid of other proposi\-tions 
which had previously been held for true. But it is easy to show that all inferences made by man, which are not valid in this sense, belong to four classes, viz.: 1. Those whose premises are false; 2.}{\b\fs24\cgrid0  }{\fs24\cgrid0 
Those which have some little force, though only a little
; 3. Those which result from confusion of one proposition with another; 4. Those which result from the indistinct apprehension, wrong application, or falsity, of a rule of inference. For, if a man were to commit a fallacy not of either of these classes, h
e would, from true premises conceived with perfect distinctness, without being led astray by any prejudice or other judg\-
ment serving as a rule of inference, draw a conclusion which had really not the least relevancy. If this could happen, calm consideratio
n and care could be of little use in thinking, for caution only serves to insure our taking all the facts into account, and to make those which we do take account of, distinct; nor can coolness do anything more than to enable us to be cautious, and also t
o prevent our being affected by a passion in inferring that to be true which we wish were true, or which }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //38// }{\fs24\cgrid0 we fear may be true, or in following some other wrong rule of infer\-
ence. But experience shows that the calm and careful consideration of the same distinctly conceived premises (including prejudices) will in\-
sure the pronouncement of the same judgment by all men. Now if a fallacy belongs to the first of these four classes and its premises are false, it is to be presumed that the procedure of the mi
nd from these premises to the conclusion is either correct, or errs in one of the other three ways; for it cannot be supposed that the mere falsity of the premises should affect the procedure of reason when that falsity is not known to reason. If the fall
a
cy belongs to the second class and has some force, however little, it is a legitimate probable argument, and belongs to the type of valid inference. If it is of the third class and results from the confusion of one proposition with another, this confusion
 
must be owing to a resemblance between the two propositions; that is to say, the person reasoning, seeing that one proposition has some of the characters which belong to the other, concludes that it has all the essential characters of the other, and is eq
uivalent to it. Now this is a hypothetic inference, which though it may be weak, and though its conclusion happens to be false, belongs to the type of valid inferences; and, therefore, as the }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 nodus }{\fs24\cgrid0 
of the fallacy lies in this confusion, the procedure of the
 mind in these fallacies of the third class conforms to the formula of valid inference. If the fallacy belongs to the fourth class, it either results from wrongly applying or misapprehending a rule of inference, and so is a fallacy of confusion, or it res
u
lts from adopting a wrong rule of inference. In this latter case, this rule is in fact taken as a premise, and therefore the false conclusion is owing merely to the falsity of a premise. In every fallacy, therefore, possible to the mind of man, the proced
ure of the mind conforms to the formula of valid inference.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\tx600\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
The third principle whose consequences we have to deduce is, that, whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as 
a sign. But it follows from our own existence (which is proved by the occurrence of ignorance and error) that everything which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves. This does not prevent its being a phenomenon of something without u
s, just as a rainbow is at once a manifestation both of the sun and of the rain. When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign. Now a sign has, as such, three references: 1st, it is a sign }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 to }{
\fs24\cgrid0 some thought which interprets it; 2d, it is a sign }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 for }{\fs24\cgrid0 some object to which in that thought it is equivalent, 3d, it is a sign, }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 in }{\fs24\cgrid0 
some respect or quality, which brings it into connection with its object. Let us ask what the three correlates are to which a thought-sign refers.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx572\tx742\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 1}{\i\fs24\cgrid0 .\tab }{\fs24\cgrid0 When we think, to what thought does that thought-sign which }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //39// }{\fs24\cgrid0 
is ourself address itself? It may, through the medium of outward expression, which it reaches perhaps only after considerable internal development, come to address itself to thought of another pers
on. But whether this happens or not, it is always interpreted by a subsequent thought of our own. If, after any thought, the current of ideas flows on freely, it follows the law of mental association. In that case, each former thought suggests something t
o
 the thought which follows it, i.e. is the sign of something to this latter. Our train of thought may, it is true, be interrupted. But we must remember that, in addition to the principal element of thought at any moment, there are a hundred things in our 
m
ind to which but a small fraction of attention or consciousness is conceded. It does not, therefore, follow, because a new constituent of thought gets the uppermost, that the train of thought which it displaces is broken off altogether. On the contrary, f
rom our second principle, that there is no intuition or cognition not determined by previous cognitions, it follows that the striking in of a new experience is never an instantaneous affair, but is an }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 event }{\fs24\cgrid0 
occupying time, and coming to pass by a continuous
 process. Its prominence in consciousness, therefore, must probably be the consummation of a growing process; and if so, there is no sufficient cause for the thought which had been the leading one just before, to cease abruptly and instantaneously. But if
 
a train of thought ceases by gradually dying out, it freely follows its own law of association as long as it lasts, and there is no moment at which there is a thought belonging to this series, subsequently to which there is not a thought which interprets 
or repeats it. There is no exception, therefore, to the law that every thought-sign is translated or interpreted in a subsequent one, unless it be that all thought comes to an abrupt and final end in death.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx317\tx600\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 2.}{\b\fs24\cgrid0  }{\fs24\cgrid0 The next question is: For what does the thought-sign stand\emdash  what does it name\emdash what is its }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 
suppositum? }{\fs24\cgrid0 The outward thing, un\-doubtedly, when a real outward thing is thought of. But still, as the thought is determined by a previous thought of the same object
, it only refers to the thing through denoting this previous thought. Let us suppose, for example, that Toussaint is thought of, and first thought of as a }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 Negro, }{\fs24\cgrid0 but not distinctly as a man. If this distinctness is after\-
wards added, it is through the thought that a }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 Negro }{\fs24\cgrid0 is a }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 man; }{\fs24\cgrid0 that is to say, the subsequent thought, }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 man, }{\fs24\cgrid0 
refers to the outward thing by being predicated of that previous thought, }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 Negro, }{\fs24\cgrid0 which has been had of that thing. If we afterwards think of Toussaint as a general, then we think that 
this Negro, this man, was a general. And so in every case the subsequent thought denotes what was thought in the previous thought.
\par }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 3. }{\fs24\cgrid0 The thought-sign stands for its object in the respect which is thought; that is to say, this respect is the immediate object of conscious- }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //40// }{\fs24 
ness in the thought, or, in other words, it is the thought itself, or at least what the thought is thought to be in the subsequent thought to which it is a sign.
\par }\pard\plain \s16\fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx385\tx657\adjustright {We must now consider two other properties of signs which are of great importance in the theory of cognition. Since a sign is not identi\-
cal with the thing signified, but differs from the latter in some respects, it must plainly have some characters which belong to it in itself, and have nothing to do with its representative function. These I call the }{\i material }{
qualities of the sign. As examples of such qualities, take in the word \ldblquote man\rdblquote  its consisting of three letters\emdash in a picture, its being fiat and without relief. In the second place, a sign must be capable of being connected
 (not in the reason but really) with another sign of the same object, or with the object itself. Thus, words would be of no value at all unless they could be connected into sentences by means of a real copula which joins signs of the same thing. The usefu
lness of some signs\emdash as a weathercock, a tally, &c.\emdash 
consists wholly in their being really connected with the very things they signify. In the case of a picture such a connection is not evident, but it exists in the power of association which connects the picture with the brain-sign which la\-
bels it. This real, physical connection of a sign with its object, either immediately or by its connection with another sign, I call the }{\i pure demonstrative application }{of the sign. Now the representative function of a sign
 lies neither in its material quality nor in its pure demonstra\-tive application; because it is something which the sign is, not in itself or in a real relation to its object, but which it is }{\i to a thought, }{
while both of the characters just defined belong t
o the sign independently of its addressing any thought. And yet if I take all the things which have certain qualities and physically connect them with another series of things, each to each, they become fit to be signs. If they are not re\-
garded as such they are not actually signs, but they are so in the same sense, for example, in which an unseen flower can be said to be }{\i red, }{this being also a term relative to a mental affection.
\par Consider a state of mind which is a conception. It is a conception by virtue of having a }{\i meaning, }{
a logical comprehension; and if it is applicable to any object, it is because that object has the characters contained in the comprehension of this conception. Now the logical comprehension of a thought is usually said to consist of th
e thoughts contained in it; but thoughts are events, acts of the mind. Two thoughts are two events separated in time, and one cannot literally be contained in the other. It may be said that all thoughts exactly similar are regarded as one; and that to say
 that one thought contains another, means that it contains one exactly similar to that other. But how can two thoughts be similar? Two objects can only be }{\i regarded }{
as similar if they are compared and brought together in the mind. Thoughts have no existence except in the mind; only as they are regarded do they }{\b //41// }{exist. Hence, two thoughts cannot }{\i be }{
similar unless they are brought together in the mind. But, as to their existence, two thoughts are separated by an interval of time. We are too apt to imagine
 that we can frame a thought similar to a past thought, by matching it with the latter, as though this past thought were still present to us. But it is plain that the knowledge that one thought is similar to or in any way truly representative of another, 
cannot be derived from immediate perception, but must be an hypothesis (unquestionably fully justifiable by facts), and that therefore the formation of such a representing thought must be dependent upon a real effective force behind con\-
sciousness, and not 
merely upon a mental comparison. What we must mean, therefore, by saying that one concept is contained in another, is that we normally represent one to be in the other; that is, that we form a particular kind of judgment,* of which the subject signifies o
ne concept and the predicate the other.
\par }\pard\plain \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx408\tx680\adjustright \fs20\cgrid {\fs24\cgrid0 No thought in itself, then, no feeling in itself, contains any others, but is absolutely simple and unanalyzable; and to say that it is com\-
posed of other thoughts and feelings, is like saying that a movement upon a s
traight line is composed of the two movements of which it is the resultant; that is to say, it is a metaphor, or fiction, parallel to the truth. Every thought, however artificial and complex, is, so far as it is immediately present, a mere sensation witho
ut parts, and therefore, in itself, without similarity to any other, but incomparable with any other and absolutely }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 sui generis.}{\fs24\cgrid0 \'86}{\i\fs24\cgrid0   }{\fs24\cgrid0 
 Whatever is wholly incomparable with anything else is wholly inexplicable, because explanation consists in bringing things un
der general laws or under natural classes. Hence every thought, in so far as it is a feeling of a peculiar sort, is simply an ultimate, inexplicable fact. Yet this does not conflict with my postu\-
late that no fact should be allowed to stand as inexplicable; for, on the one hand, we never can think, \ldblquote This is present to me,\rdblquote 
 since, before we have time to make the reflection, the sensation is past, and, on the other hand, when once past, we can never bring back the quality of the feeling as it was }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 in and for itself }{\fs24\cgrid0 or know what it was like }{
\i\fs24\cgrid0 in itself }{\fs24\cgrid0 or even discover the existence of this quality except by a corollary from our general theory of ourselves, and then not in its idiosyncrasy, but only as something present. But, as something present, feelings are all
 alike and require no explanation, since they contain only what is universal. So that nothing which we can truly predicate of feelings is
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx408\tx680\adjustright {\cgrid0 
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx408\tx680\adjustright {\cgrid0 *A judgment concerning a minimum of information, for the theory of which see my paper on Comprehension and Extension, in the }{\i\cgrid0 
Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, }{\cgrid0 vol. 7, p. 426. [W2:70\emdash 86.]
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx334\tx572\adjustright {\cgrid0 \'86Observe that I say }{\i\cgrid0 in itself }{\cgrid0 
I am not so wild as to deny that my sensation of red to-day is like my sensation (If red yesterday. I only say that the similarity can }{\i\cgrid0 consist }{\cgrid0 only in the physiological force behind consciousness,\emdash 
which leads me to say, I recognize this feeling the same as the former one, and so does not consist in a community of sensation.}{\fs24\cgrid0 
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx334\tx572\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 //42// }{\fs24\cgrid0 left inexplicable, but only something which we cannot r
eflectively know. So that we do not fall into the contradiction of making the Mediate immediable. Finally, no present actual thought (which is a mere feeling) has any meaning, any intellectual value; for this lies not in what is actually thought, but in w
h
at this thought may be connected with in representation by subsequent thoughts; so that the meaning of a thought is altogether something virtual. It may be objected, that if no thought has any meaning, all thought is without meaning. But this is a fallacy
 
similar to saying, that, if in no one of the successive spaces which a body fills there is room for motion, there is no room for motion throughout the whole. At no one instant in my state of mind is there cognition or representation, but in the relation o
f my states of mind at different instants there is.* In short, the Immediate (and there\-fore in itself unsusceptible of mediation\emdash the Unanalyzable, the Inex\-
plicable, the Unintellectual) runs in a continuous stream through our lives; it is the sum total of consciousness, whose mediation, which is the continuity of it, is brought about by a real effective force behind consciousness.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx408\tx680\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Thus, we have in thought three elements: 1st, the representative function which makes it a }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 representation; }{\fs24\cgrid0 2d, the pure denotati
ve appli\-cation, or real connection, which brings one thought into }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 relation }{\fs24\cgrid0 with another; and 3d,}{\fs24\sub\cgrid0  }{\fs24\cgrid0 the material quality, or how it feels, which gives thought its }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 quality. }
{\fs24\cgrid0 \'86
\par That a sensation is not necessarily an intuition, or first impression of sense, is very evident in the case of the sense of beauty; and has been shown, upon page 15,}{\b\fs24\cgrid0  }{\fs24\cgrid0 in the case of sound. When the sensation beauti\-
ful is determined by previous cognitions, it always arises as a predicate; that is, we think that something is beautiful. When
ever a sensation thus arises in consequence of others, induction shows that those others are more or less complicated. Thus, the sensation of a particular kind of sound arises in consequence of impressions upon the various nerves of the ear being combined
 
in a particular way, and following one another with a certain rapidity. A sensation of color depends upon impressions upon the eye following one another in a regular manner, and with a certain rapidity. The sensation of beauty arises upon a manifold of ot
h
er impressions. And this will be found to hold good in all cases. Secondly, all these sensations are in themselves simple, or more so than the sensations which give rise to them. Accordingly, a sensation is a simple predicate taken in place of a complex p
redicate; in other words, it fulfils the function of an hypothesis. But the general
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx408\tx680\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx425\tx623\adjustright {\cgrid0 *Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx697\adjustright {\cgrid0 \'86On quality, relation, and representation, see }{\i\cgrid0 Proceedings of the American Academy of }{\cgrid0 Arts }{\i\cgrid0 and Sciences, }{\cgrid0 vol. 7, p. 293.}{
\b\cgrid0  }{\cgrid0 (Item above, pp. 1\emdash 10.]}{\fs24\cgrid0 
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx413\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 //43// }{\fs24\cgrid0 principle that every thing to which such and such a sensation belongs, has such and such a complicated series of predicates, is not one deter\-
mined by reason (as we have seen), but is of an arbitrary nature. Hence, the class of hypothetic inferences which 
the arising of a sensation resembles, is that of reasoning from definition to definitum, in which the major premise is of an arbitrary nature. Only in this mode of reasoning, this premise is determined by the conventions of language, and expresses the occ
a
sion upon which a word is to be used; and in the formation of a sensation, it is determined by the constitution of our nature, and expresses the occasions upon which sensation, or a natural mental sign, arises. Thus, the sensation, so far as it represents
 some\-thing, is determined, according to a logical law, by previous cogni\-
tions; that is to say, these cognitions determine that there shall be a sensation. But so far as the sensation is a mere feeling of a particular sort, it is determined only by an inex
plicable, occult power; and so far, it is not a representation, but only the material quality of a repre\-
sentation. For just as in reasoning from definition to definitum, it is indifferent to the logician how the defined word shall sound, or how many lette
rs it shall contain, so in the case of this constitutional word, it is not determined by an inward law how it shall feel in itself. A feeling, therefore, as a feeling, is merely the }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 material quality }{\fs24\cgrid0 of a mental sign.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx413\tx685\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 But there is no feeling which is not also a representation, a predi\-
cate of something determined logically by the feelings which precede it. For if there are any such feelings not predicates, they are the emo\-tions. Now every emotion has a subject. If a man is angry, he is saying to himself tha
t this or that is vile and outrageous. If he is in joy, he is saying \ldblquote this is delicious.\rdblquote  If he is wondering, he is saying \ldblquote this is strange.\rdblquote  In short, whenever a man feels, he is thinking of }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 
something. }{\fs24\cgrid0 Even those passions which have no definite object\emdash as melancholy\emdash  only come to consciousness through tinging the }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 objects of thought. }{\fs24\cgrid0 
That which makes us look upon the emotions more as affections of self than other cognitions, is that we have found them more dependent upon our accidental situation at the momen
t than other cognitions; but that is only to say That they are cognitions too narrow to be useful. The emotions, as a little observation will show, arise when our attention is strongly drawn to complex and inconceivable circumstances. Fear arises when we 
c
annot predict our fate; joy, in the case of certain indescribable and peculiarly complex sensations. If there are some indications that something greatly for my interest, and which I have anticipated would happen, may not happen; and if, after weighing pr
obabilities, and inventing safeguards, and straining for further in\-formation, I find myself unable to come to any fixed conclusion in reference to the future, in the place of that intellectual hypothetic inference which I seek, the feeling of }{
\i\fs24\cgrid0 anxiety }{\fs24\cgrid0 arises. When something }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //44// }{\fs24\cgrid0 happens for which I cannot account, I }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 wonder. }{\fs24\cgrid0 
When I endeavor to realize to myself what I never can do, a pleasure in the future, I }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 hope. }{\fs24\cgrid0 \ldblquote I do not understand you,\rdblquote  is the phrase of an angry man. The inde\-scribable, the ineffable, 
the incomprehensible, commonly excite emo\-
tion; but nothing is so chilling as a scientific explanation. Thus an emotion is always a simple predicate substituted by an operation of the mind for a highly complicated predicate. Now if we consider that a very 
complex predicate demands explanation by means of an hypothe\-sis, that that hypothesis must be a simpler predicate substituted for that complex one; and that when we have an emotion, an hypothesis, strictly speaking, is hardly possible\emdash 
the analogy of the p
arts played by emotion and hypothesis is very striking. There is, it is true, this difference between an emotion and an intellectual hypothesis, that we have reason to say in the case of the latter, that to whatever the simple hypothetic predicate can be 
applied, of that the complex predicate is true; whereas, in the case of an emotion this is a proposition for which no reason can be given, but which is determined merely by our emo\-
tional constitution. But this corresponds precisely to the difference betwee
n hypothesis and reasoning from definition to definitum, and thus it would appear that emotion is nothing but sensation. There appears to be a difference, however, between emotion and sensation, and I would state it as follows:
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx345\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 There is some reason to thin
k that, corresponding to every feeling within us, some motion takes place in our bodies. This property of the thought-sign, since it has no rational dependence upon the meaning of the sign, may be compared with what I have called the material quality of t
h
e sign; but it differs from the latter inasmuch as it is not essentially necessary that it should be felt in order that there should be any thought-sign.  In the case of a sensation, the manifold of impressions which precede and determine it are not of a 
k
ind, the bodily motion corresponding to which comes from any large ganglion or from the brain, and probably for this reason the sensation produces no great commotion in the bodily organism; and the sensation itself is not a thought which has a very strong
 influence upon the current of thought except by virtue of the information it may serve to afford. An emotion, on the other hand, comes much later in the development of thought\emdash I mean, further from the first beginning of the cognition of its object
\emdash  and the thoughts which determine it already have motions correspond\-ing to them in the brain, or the chief ganglion; consequently, it pro\-
duces large movements in the body, and independently of its representative value, strongly affects the current of thought. The ani\-
mal motions to which I allude, are, in the first place and obviously, blushing, blenching, staring, smiling, scowling, pouting, laughing, weeping, sobbing, wriggling, flinching, trembling, being petrified, sighing, sniffing, shrugging, groaning, hear
tsinking, trepidation, }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //45// }{\fs24\cgrid0 
swelling of the heart, etc., etc. To these may, perhaps, be added, in the second place, other more complicated actions, which nevertheless spring from a direct impulse and not from deliberation.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx345\tx572\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 That which distinguishes both s
ensations proper and emotions from the feeling of a thought, is that in the case of the two former the material quality is made prominent, because the thought has no rela\-
tion of reason to the thoughts which determine it, which exists in the last case and 
detracts from the attention given to the mere feeling. By there being no relation of reason to the determining thoughts, I mean that there is nothing in the content of the thought which explains why it should arise only on occasion of these determining th
o
ughts. If there is such a relation of reason, if the thought is essentially limited in its application to these objects, then the thought comprehends a thought other than itself; in other words, it is then a complex thought. An incomplex thought can, ther
efore, be nothing but a sensation or emo\-tion, having no rational character. This is very different from the ordinary doctrine, according to which the very highest and most meta\-
physical conceptions are absolutely simple. I shall be asked how such a conception of a }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 being }{\fs24\cgrid0 is to be analyzed, or whether I can ever define }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 one, two, }{\fs24\cgrid0 and }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 three, }{
\fs24\cgrid0 without a diallele. Now I shall admit at once that neither of these conceptions can be separated into two others higher than itself; and in that sense, therefore, I fully a
dmit that certain very metaphysical and eminently intellectual notions are absolutely simple. But though these concepts cannot be defined by genus and difference, there is another way in which they can be defined. All determination is by negation; we can 
f
irst recognize any character only by putting an object which possesses it into comparison with an object which possesses it not. A conception, therefore, which was quite universal in every respect would be unrecognizable and impossible. We do not obtain t
he conception of Being, in the sense implied in the copula, by observing that all the things which we can think of have something in common, for there is no such thing to be observed. We get it by reflecting upon signs\emdash words or thoughts;\emdash 
we observe that different predicates may be attached to the same subject, and that each makes some conception applicable to the subject; then we imagine that a subject has something true of it merely because a predicate (no matter what) is attached to it,
\emdash and that we call Being. The conception of being is, therefore, a conception about a sign\emdash a thought, or word;\emdash 
 and since it is not applicable to every sign, it is not primarily universal, although it is so in its mediate application to things. Being, therefore, may be defined; it may be defined, for example, as that which is com\-
mon to the objects included in any class, and to the objects not in\-cluded in the same class. But it is nothing new to say that metaphysical conceptions are primarily and at bottom thoughts about words
, or thoughts about thoughts; it is the doctrine both of Aristotle (whose }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //46// }{\fs24 categories are parts of speech) and of Kant (whose categories are the characters of different kinds of propositions).}{
\par }\pard\plain \s19\fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx255\adjustright {Sensation and the power of abstraction or attention may be re\-
garded as, in one sense, the sole constituents of all thought. Having considered the former, let us now attempt some analysis of the latter. By the force of attention, an emphasis is put upon one of the objective elements of consciousness. This emphas
is is, therefore, not itself an object of immediate consciousness; and in this respect it differs en\-tirely from a feeling. Therefore, since the emphasis, nevertheless, con\-
sists in some effect upon consciousness, and so can exist only so far as it affects our knowledge; and since an act cannot be supposed to deter\-
mine that which precedes it in time, this act can consist only in the capacity which the cognition emphasized has for producing an effect upon memory, or otherwise influencing subsequent thought.
 This is confirmed by the fact that attention is a matter of continuous quantity; for continuous quantity, so far as we know it, reduces itself in the last analysis to time. Accordingly, we find that attention does, in fact, produce a very great effect up
o
n subsequent thought. In the first place, it strongly affects memory, a thought being remembered for a longer time the greater the attention originally paid to it. In the second place, the greater the attention, the closer the connection and the more accu
\-
rate the logical sequence of thought. In the third place, by attention a thought may be recovered which has been forgotten. From these facts, we gather that attention is the power by which thought at one time is connected with and made to relate to though
t at another time; or, to apply the conception of thought as a sign, that it is the }{\i pure demonstrative application }{of a thought-sign.
\par Attention is roused when the same phenomenon presents itself repeatedly on different occasions, or the same predicate in different subjects. We see that }{\i A }{has a certain character, that }{\i B }{has the same, }{\i C }{
has the same; and this excites our attention, so that we say, }{\i \ldblquote These }{have this character.\rdblquote  Thus attention is an act of induction; but it is an induction which does not increase our knowledge, because our "these\rdblquote 
 covers nothing but the instances experienced. It is, in short, an argu\-ment from enumeration.
\par Attention produces effects upon the nervous system. These effects are habits, or nervous associations. A habit arises, when, having had the sensation of performing a certain act, }{\i m, }{on several occasions }{\i a}{, }{\i b, c, }{
we come to do it upon every occurrence of the general event, }{\i l, }{of which }{\i a}{, }{\i b, }{and }{\i c }{are special cases. That is to say, by the cognition that
\par }\pard\plain \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\tx90\tx255\adjustright \fs20\cgrid {\fs24 
\par }\pard\plain \s17\fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx255\adjustright {Every case of a, }{\i b, }{or }{\i c, }{is a case of }{\i m,
\par }\pard \s17\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx255\adjustright {is determined the cognition that
\par }\pard\plain \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx345\tx572\adjustright \fs20\cgrid {\fs24\cgrid0 Every case of }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 l}{\fs24\cgrid0  is a case of }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 m}{\fs24\cgrid0 .
\par }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx204\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 //47// }{\fs24\cgrid0 Thus the formation of a habit is an induction, and is therefore neces\-sarily connected with attention or abstraction. Voluntary actions re\-
sult from the sensations produced by habits, as instinctive actions result from our original nature.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx345\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 We have thus seen that every sort of modification of conscious\-ness\emdash Attention, Sensation, and Understanding\emdash 
is an inference. But the objection may be made that inference deals only with general terms, and that an image, or absolutely singular representation, cannot therefore be inferred.
\par \ldblquote Singular\rdblquote  and \ldblquote individual\rdblquote  are equivocal terms. A singular may mean that which can be but in one place at one time. In this sense it is not opposed to general. }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 The sun }{\fs24\cgrid0 
is a singular in this sense, but, as is explained in every good treatise on logic, it is a general term. I may have a very general conception of Hermolaus Barbarus,}{\cgrid0 10}{\fs24\cgrid0 
 but still I conceive him only as able to be in one place at one time. When an image is said to be singular, it is meant that it is absolutely determinate in all respects. Every possible character, or the negative thereof, must be true of such an image
. In the words of the most eminent expounder of the doctrine, the image of a man \ldblquote must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny; a straight, or a crooked; a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man.\rdblquote }{\cgrid0 11 }{\fs24\cgrid0 
 It must be of a man with his mouth open or his mouth
 shut, whose hair is precisely of such and such a shade, and whose figure has precisely such and such proportions. No statement of Locke has been so scouted by all friends of images as his denial that the \ldblquote idea\rdblquote 
 of a triangle must be either of an obtuse-angled, right-angled, or acute-angled triangle.}{\cgrid0 12  }{\fs24\cgrid0 In fact, the image of a triangle must be of one, each of whose angles is of a certain number of degrees, minutes, and sec\-onds.
\par This being so, it is apparent that no man has a }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 true }{\fs24\cgrid0 image of the road to his o
ffice, or of any other real thing. Indeed he has no image of it at all unless he can not only recognize it, but imagines it (truly or falsely) in all its infinite details. This being the case, it becomes very doubtful whether we ever have any such thing a
s an image in our imagination. Please, reader, to look at a bright red book, or other brightly colored object, and then to shut your eyes and say whether you }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 see }{\fs24\cgrid0 that color, whether brightly or faintly\emdash 
whether, indeed, there is anything like sight there. Hume and the other followers of Berkeley maintain that there is no difference between the sight and the memory of the red book except in \ldblquote their different degrees of force and vivac\-ity.
\rdblquote  \ldblquote The colors which the memory employs,\rdblquote  says Hume, \ldblquote are faint and dull compared with those in which our original perceptions are clothed."}{\cgrid0 13}{\fs24\cgrid0 
 If this were a correct statement of the difference, we should remember the book as being less red than it is; whereas, in fact, we remember the color with very great precision for a few m
oments [please to test this point, reader], although we do not see any thing like  }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //48//  }{\fs24\cgrid0 it.  We carry away absolutely nothing of the color except the }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 conscious\-ness that we could recognize it. }{
\fs24\cgrid0 As a further proof of this, I will request the reader to try a little experiment. Let him call up, if he can, the image of a horse\emdash not of one which he has ever seen, but of an imagi\-nary one,\emdash 
and before reading further let him by contemplation* fix the image in his memory\'85.. Has the reader done as requested? for I protest that it is not fair play to read further without doing so.\emdash 
 Now, the reader can say in general of what color that horse was, whether grey, bay, or black. But he probably cannot say }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 precisely }{\fs24\cgrid0 of what shade it was. He cannot state this as exactly as he could just after having }{
\i\fs24\cgrid0 seen }{\fs24\cgrid0 such a horse. But why, if he had an image in his mind which no more had the general color than it had the particular shade, has the latter vanished so instantaneously from his memory while the former still remains? I
t may be replied, that we always forget the details before we do the more general characters; but that this answer is insufficient is, I think, shown by the extreme disproportion between the length of time that the exact shade of something looked at is re
membered as compared with that instantaneous oblivion to the exact shade of the thing imagined, and the but slightly superior vividness of the memory of the thing seen as compared with the memory of the thing imagined.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx408\tx720\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 The nominalists, I suspect, confound t
ogether thinking a triangle without thinking that it is either equilateral, isosceles, or scalene, and thinking a triangle without thinking whether it is equilateral, isos\-celes, or scalene.
\par It is important to remember that we have no intuitive power of
\par }{\cgrid0 
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx470\tx816\adjustright {\cgrid0 *No person whose native tongue is English will need to be informed that contem\-
plation is essentially (1) protracted (2) voluntary, and (3) an action, and that it is never used for that which is set forth to the mind in this act. A foreigner can convince himself of this by the proper study of English writers. Thus, Locke }{
\i\cgrid0 (Essay concerning Human Understanding, }{\cgrid0 Book II, chap. 19, \'a7 1) says, \ldblquote If it [an idea] be held there [in view] long under attentive consideration, \lquote tis }{\i\cgrid0 Contemplation\rdblquote ;}{\cgrid0  and again }{
\i\cgrid0 (Ibid., }{\cgrid0 Book II, chap. 10, \'a71), \ldblquote Keep\-ing the }{\i\cgrid0 Idea, }{\cgrid0 which is brought into it [the mind] for some time actually in view, which is called }{\i\cgrid0 Contemplation.\rdblquote  }{\cgrid0 
This term is therefore unfitted to translate }{\i\cgrid0 Anschauung, }{\cgrid0 for this latter does not imply an act which is necessarily p
rotracted or voluntary, and denotes most usually a mental presentation, sometimes a faculty, less often the reception of an impression in the mind, and seldom, if ever, an action. To the translation of }{\i\cgrid0 Anschauung }{\cgrid0 
by intuition, there is, at least, no such i
nsuperable objection. Etymologically the two words precisely correspond. The original philosophical meaning of intuition was a cognition of the present manifold in that character; and it is now commonly used, as a modern writer says, \ldblquote 
to include all the products of the perceptive (external or internal) and imaginative faculties; every act of consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an }{\i\cgrid0 individual, }{\cgrid0 
thing, act, or state of mind, presented under the condition of distinct existence in space and time.\rdblquote }{\fs16\cgrid0 14}{\cgrid0  Finally, we have the authority of Kant\rquote s own example for translating his }{\i\cgrid0 Anschauung }{\cgrid0 by 
}{\i\cgrid0 Intuitus;}{\fs16\cgrid0 15}{\i\cgrid0  }{\cgrid0 and, indeed, this is the common usage of Germans writing Latin. Moreover, }{\i\cgrid0 intuitiv }{\cgrid0 frequently replaces }{\i\cgrid0 anscbauend }{\cgrid0 or }{\i\cgrid0 anschaulich. }{
\cgrid0 If this constitutes a misunderstanding of Kant, it is one which is shared by himself and nearly all his countrymen.}{\fs24\cgrid0 
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx470\tx816\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 //49//  }{\fs24\cgrid0 
distinguishing between one subjective mode of cognition and another; and hence often think that something is presented to us as a picture, while it is
 really constructed from slight data by the understanding. This is the case with dreams, as is shown by the frequent impossibility of giving an intelligible account of one without adding something which we feel was not in the dream itself. Many dreams, of
 which the waking memory makes elaborate and consistent stories, must probably have been in fact mere jumbles of these feelings of the ability to recognize this and that which I have just alluded to.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx391\tx668\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 I will now go so far as to say that we have no images eve
n in actual perception. It will be sufficient to prove this in the case of vision; for if no picture is seen when we look at an object, it will not be claimed that hearing, touch, and the other senses, are superior to sight in this respect. That the pictu
re is not painted on the nerves of the retina is absolutely certain, if, as physiologists inform us, these nerves are nee\-dle-points pointing to the light and at distances considerably greater than the }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 minimum visibile. }{\cgrid0 16}{
\b\fs24\cgrid0  }{\fs24\cgrid0 The same thing is shown by our not
 being able to perceive that there is a large blind spot near the middle of the retina. If, then, we have a picture before us when we see, it is one constructed by the mind at the suggestion of previous sensations. Supposing these sensations to be signs, 
the understanding by reason\-
ing from them could attain all the knowledge of outward things which we derive from sight, while the sensations are quite inadequate to forming an image or representation absolutely determinate. If we have such an image or pictur
e, we must have in our minds a representation of a surface which is only a part of every surface we see, and we must see that each part, however small, has such and such a color. If we look from some distance at a speckled surface, it seems as if we did n
o
t see whether it were speckled or not; but if we have an image before us, it must appear to us either as speckled, or as not speckled. Again, the eye by education comes to distinguish minute differences of color; but if we see only absolutely determinate 
i
mages, we must, no less before our eyes are trained than afterwards, see each color as particularly such and such a shade. Thus to suppose that we have an image before us when we see, is not only a hypothesis which explains nothing whatever, but is one wh
ich actually creates difficulties which require new hypotheses in order to explain them away.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx408\tx668\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 One of these difficulties arises from the fact that the details are less easily distinguished than, and forgotten before, the general circum\-stances. Upon this the
ory, the general features exist in the details: the details are, in fact, the whole picture. It seems, then, very strange that that which exists only secondarily in the picture should make more impression than the picture itself. It is true that in an old
 painting the details are not easily made out; but this is because we know that the  }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //50//  }{\fs24\cgrid0 
blackness is the result of time, and is no part of the picture itself. There is no difficulty in making out the details of the picture as it looks at present; the o
nly difficulty is in guessing what it used to be. But if we have a picture on the retina, the minutest details are there as much as, nay, more than, the general outline and significancy of it. Yet that which must actually be seen, it is extremely difficul
t to recognize; while that which is only abstracted from what is seen is very obvious.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx391\tx668\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
But the conclusive argument against our having any images, or absolutely determinate representations in perception, is that in that case we have the materials in each suc
h representation for an infinite amount of conscious cognition, which we yet never become aware of. Now there is no meaning in saying that we have something in our minds which never has the least effect on what we are conscious of knowing. The most that c
an be said is, that when we see we are put in a condition in which we are able to get a very large and perhaps indefinitely great amount of knowledge of the visible qualities of ob\-jects.
\par Moreover, that perceptions are not absolutely determinate and sin\-gular is obvious from the fact that each sense is an abstracting mecha\-
nism. Sight by itself informs us only of colors and forms. No one can pretend that the images of sight are determinate in reference to taste. They are, therefore, so far general that they 
are neither sweet nor non-sweet, bitter nor non-bitter, having savor or insipid.
\par The next question is whether we have any general conceptions except in judgments. In perception, where we know a thing as exist\-ing, it is plain that there is a judgment that 
the thing exists, since a mere general concept of a thing is in no case a cognition of it as existing. It has usually been said, however, that we can call up any concept without making any judgment; but it seems that in this case we only arbitrarily suppo
s
e ourselves to have an experience. In order to conceive the number 7, I suppose, that is, I arbitrarily make the hypothesis or judgment, that there are certain points before my eyes, and I judge that these are seven. This seems to be the most simple and r
ational view of the matter, and I may add that it is the one which has been adopted by the best logicians. If this be the case, what goes by the name of the association of images is in reality an association of judg\-
ments. The association of ideas is said to proceed according to three principles\emdash 
those of resemblance, of contiguity, and of causality. But it would be equally true to say that signs denote what they do on the three principles of resemblance, contiguity, and causality. There can be no question that anything }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 is }{
\fs24\cgrid0 a sign of whatever is associated with it by resemblance, by contiguity, or by causality: nor can there be any doubt that any sign recalls the thing signified. So, then, the association of ideas consists in this, that a judgment occasions ano
ther judgment,  }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //51//  }{\fs24\cgrid0 of which it is the sign. Now this is nothing less nor more than infer\-ence.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx572\tx2358\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Everything in which we take the least interest creates in us its own particular emotion, however slight this may be. This emotion is a sign and a predicate 
of the thing. Now, when a thing resembling this thing is presented to us, a similar emotion arises; hence, we immediately infer that the latter is like the former. A formal logician of the old school may say, that in logic no term can enter into the concl
usion which had not been contained in the premises, and that therefore the suggestion of something new must be essentially different from infer\-
ence. But I reply that that rule of logic applies only to those arguments which are technically called completed. We can and do reason\emdash  
\par Elias was a man;
\par }{\fs24\cgrid0 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 92 \\f "Symbol" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f3\fs24}}}{\fs24\cgrid0 He was mortal.
\par 
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx215\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 And this argument is just as valid as the full syllogism, although it is so only because the major premise of the latter happens to be true. If to pass from the judgment 
\ldblquote Elias was a man\rdblquote  to the judgment \ldblquote Elias was mortal,\rdblquote  without actually saying to one\rquote s self that \ldblquote All men are mortal,\rdblquote  is not inference, then the term \ldblquote inference\rdblquote 
 is used in so restricted a sense that inferences hardly occur outside of a logic-book.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx215\tx487\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 What is here said of association by resemblance is true of all associa\-tion. All association is by signs. Everything has its subjective or emo\-
tional qualities, which are attributed either absolutely or relatively, or by conventional imputation to anything which is a sign of it. And so we reason,
\par 
\par The sign is such and such;
\par }{\fs24\cgrid0 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 92 \\f "Symbol" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f3\fs24}}}{\fs24\cgrid0 The sign is that thing.
\par 
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx215\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 This conclusion receiving, however, a modification, owing to other considerations, so as to become\emdash  
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx360\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 \tab The sign is almost (is representative of) that thing.
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx215\tx487\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
\par }\pard\plain \s22\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx360\adjustright {\tab We come now to the consideration of the last of the four principl
es whose consequences we were to trace; namely, that the absolutely incognizable is absolutely inconceivable. That upon Cartesian princi\-
ples the very realities of things can never be known in the least, most competent persons must long ago have been convi
nced. Hence the breaking forth of idealism, which is essentially anti-Cartesian, in every direction, whether among empiricists (Berkeley, Hume), or among noologists (Hegel, Fichte). The principle now brought under discus\-
sion is directly idealistic; for, since the meaning of a word is the conception it conveys, the absolutely incognizable has no meaning  }{\b //52//  }{
because no conception attaches to it. It is, therefore, a meaningless word; and, consequently, whatever is meant by any term as \ldblquote the real\rdblquote  is cogni
zable in some degree, and so is of the nature of a cognition, in the objective sense of that term.
\par }\pard\plain \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx391\tx668\adjustright \fs20\cgrid {\fs24\cgrid0 
At any moment we are in possession of certain information, that is, of cognitions which have been logically derived by induction and hypothesis from previous cognitions which are less general, less dis\-
tinct, and of which we have a less lively consciousness. These in their turn have been derived from others still less general, less distinct, and less vivid; and so on back to the ideal* first, which is quite si
ngular, and quite out of consciousness. This ideal first is the particular thing-in-itself. It does not exist }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 as such. }{\fs24\cgrid0 
That is, there is no thing which is in-itself in the sense of not being relative to the mind, though things which are relative to the min
d doubtless are, apart from that relation. The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite series of inductions and hypotheses (which though infinite }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 a parte ante logice, }{\fs24\cgrid0 
is yet as one continuous process not without a beginning }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 in time) }{\fs24\cgrid0 are of two kinds, the true and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects are }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 real }{\fs24\cgrid0 and those whose objects are }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 
unreal. }{\fs24\cgrid0 And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected our\-
selves. Now the distinction for which alone this fact logically called, was between an }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 ens }{\fs24\cgrid0 relative to private inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 ens }{\fs24\cgrid0 
such as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, informa\-
tion and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially in\-volves
 the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge. And so those two series of cognitions\emdash the real and the unreal\emdash 
consist of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the community will always continue to reaf\-
firm; and of those which, under the same conditions, will ever after be denied. Now, a proposition whose falsity can never be discovered, and the error of which therefore is absolutely incognizable, contains, upon our principle, absolutely no erro
r. Consequently, that which is thought in these cognitions is the real, as it really is. There is nothing, then, to prevent our knowing outward things as they really are, and it}{\b\fs24\cgrid0  }{\fs24\cgrid0 
is most likely that we do thus know them in numberless cases, although we can never be absolutely certain of doing so in any special case.
\par }\pard\plain \s21\fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx391\tx668\adjustright \fs20 {*By an ideal, I mean the limit which the possible cannot attain.
\par }\pard\plain \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx391\tx668\adjustright \fs20\cgrid {\b\fs24\cgrid0 //53//
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx391\tx668\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 But it follows that since no cognition of ours is absolutely determi\-nate, generals must have a r
eal existence. Now this scholastic realism is usually set down as a belief in metaphysical fictions. But, in fact, a realist is simply one who knows no more recondite reality than that which is represented in a true representation. Since, therefore, the w
ord \ldblquote man\rdblquote  is true of something, that which \ldblquote man\rdblquote 
 means is real. The nominalist must admit that man is truly applicable to something; but he believes that there is beneath this a thing in itself, an incognizable reality. His is the metaphysical figment. Mode
rn nominalists are mostly superficial men, who do not know, as the more thorough Ros\-
cellinus and Occam did, that a reality which has no representation is one which has no relation and no quality. The great argument for nominalism is that there is no man u
nless there is some particular man. That, however, does not affect the realism of Scotus; for although there is no man of whom all further determination can be denied, yet there is a man, abstraction being made of all further determination. There is a rea
l difference between man irrespective of what the other deter\-minations may be, and man with this or that particular series of deter\-minations, although undoubtedly this difference is only relative to the mind and not }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 in re. }{
\fs24\cgrid0 Such is the position of Scotus.* Occam\rquote s great objection is, there can be no real distinction which is not }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 in re, }{\fs24\cgrid0 
in the thing-in-itself; but this begs the question, for it is itself based only on the notion that reality is something independent of representative relation.\'86
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx215\tx487\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Such being the nature of reality in general, in what does the real\-ity of the mind consist? We have seen that the content of conscious\-
ness, the entire phenomenal manifestation of mind, is a sign resulting from inference. Upon our principle, therefore, that the absolut
ely incognizable does not exist, so that the phenomenal manifestation of a substance is the substance, we must conclude that the mind is a sign developing according to the laws of inference. What distin\-
guishes a man from a word? There is a distinction dou
btless. The material qualities, the forces which constitute the pure denotative application, and the meaning of the human sign, are all exceedingly complicated in comparison with those of the word. But these differ\-
ences are only relative. What other is th
ere? It may be said that man is conscious, while a word is not. But consciousness is a very vague term. It may mean that emotion which accompanies the reflection that we have animal life. This is a consciousness which is dimmed
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx198\tx447\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
\par }\pard\plain \s22\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx450\adjustright {\tab }{\fs20 * \ldblquote Eadem natura est, quae 
in existentia per gradum singularitatis est determinata, et in intellectu, hoc est ut habet relationem ad intellectum ut cognitum ad cognoscens, est indeterminata.\rdblquote \-\emdash }{\i\fs20 Quaestiones Subtillissimae, }{\fs20 lib. 7, qu. 18.}{\fs16 17

\par }\pard\plain \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx450\adjustright \fs20\cgrid {\cgrid0 \tab \'86See his argument }{\i\cgrid0 Summa logices, }{\cgrid0 part 1}{\b\i\cgrid0 , }{\cgrid0 cap. 16.}{\fs16\cgrid0 18
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx198\tx447\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 //54//
\par }\pard \ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx408\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 when animal life is at its ebb in old age, or sleep, but which is not dimmed when the spiritual life is at its ebb; which is the more lively the better }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 animal }
{\fs24\cgrid0 a man is, but which is not so, the better }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 man }{\fs24\cgrid0 he is. We do not attribute this s
ensation to words, because we have reason to believe that it is dependent upon the possession of an animal body. But this consciousness, being a mere sensation, is only a part of the }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 material quality }{\fs24\cgrid0 
of the man-sign. Again, consciousness is sometimes used to signify the }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 I think, }{\fs24\cgrid0 or unity in thought; but this unity is nothing but consistency, or the recognition of it. Consistency be\-
longs to every sign, so far as it is a sign; and therefore every sign, since it signifies primarily that it is a sign, signifies its own consist\-
ency. The man-sign acquires information, and comes to mean more than he did before. But so do words. Does not electricity mean more now than it did in the days of Franklin? Man makes the word, and the word means nothing which the man has 
not made it mean, and that only to some man. But since man can think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might turn round and say: \ldblquote 
You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought.\rdblquote  In fact, therefore, men and words reciprocally educate each other; each increase of a man\rquote 
s information involves and is involved by, a corresponding increase of a word\rquote s information.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx391\tx668\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Without fatiguing the reader by stretching this parallelism too far, it is sufficient to say that there is no element whatever of man\rquote s con\-
sciousness which has not something corresponding to it in the word; and the reason is obvious. It is that the word or sign which man uses }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 is }{\fs24\cgrid0 the man himself. For,
 as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign; so, that every thought is an }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 external }{\fs24\cgrid0 
sign, proves that man is an external sign. That is to say, the man and the external sign are identical, in the same sense in which the words }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 homo }{\fs24\cgrid0 and }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 man }{\fs24\cgrid0 
are identical. Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the thought.
\par It is hard for man to understand this, because he persists in identi\-fying himself with his will, his power over the animal organism, with brute force. Now the organism is only an instrument of thought. But the identity of a man consists in the }{
\i\fs24\cgrid0 consistency }{\fs24\cgrid0 of what he does and thinks, and consistency is the intellectual character of a thing; that is, is its expressing something.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx360\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it is, only 
by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the existence of thought now, depends on what is to be  }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //55//  }{\fs24\cgrid0 
hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community.
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx345\tx572\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 
The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is man,
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx345\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 \tab \tab \tab }{\cgrid0 proud man,
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx1621\adjustright {\cgrid0 Most ignorant of what he\rquote s most assured,
\par }\pard \fi360\ri1474\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx90\tx1627\adjustright {\cgrid0 His glassy essence.}{\fs16\cgrid0 19
\par }}