{\rtf1\ansi\ansicpg1252\uc1 \deff0\deflang1033\deflangfe1033{\fonttbl{\f0\froman\fcharset0\fprq2{\*\panose 02020603050405020304}Times New Roman;}{\f16\froman\fcharset238\fprq2 Times New Roman CE;}{\f17\froman\fcharset204\fprq2 Times New Roman Cyr;} {\f19\froman\fcharset161\fprq2 Times New Roman Greek;}{\f20\froman\fcharset162\fprq2 Times New Roman Tur;}{\f21\froman\fcharset186\fprq2 Times New Roman Baltic;}}{\colortbl;\red0\green0\blue0;\red0\green0\blue255;\red0\green255\blue255; \red0\green255\blue0;\red255\green0\blue255;\red255\green0\blue0;\red255\green255\blue0;\red255\green255\blue255;\red0\green0\blue128;\red0\green128\blue128;\red0\green128\blue0;\red128\green0\blue128;\red128\green0\blue0;\red128\green128\blue0; \red128\green128\blue128;\red192\green192\blue192;}{\stylesheet{\widctlpar\adjustright \fs20\cgrid \snext0 Normal;}{\s1\qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\keepn\nowidctlpar\tx385\tx634\outlinelevel0\adjustright \sbasedon0 \snext0 heading 1;}{\*\cs10 \additive Default Paragraph Font;}{\s15\qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx345\tx623\adjustright \sbasedon0 \snext15 Body Text 2;}{\s16\qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx249\adjustright \fs20 \sbasedon0 \snext16 Body Text Indent 2;}}{\info {\title Questions Concerning Certain}{\author Leroy F. Searle}{\operator Leroy F. Searle}{\creatim\yr1999\mo11\dy22\hr22\min14}{\revtim\yr1999\mo11\dy22\hr22\min14}{\version2}{\edmins0}{\nofpages13}{\nofwords7399}{\nofchars42178} {\*\company University of Washington}{\nofcharsws51797}{\vern89}}\widowctrl\ftnbj\aenddoc\hyphcaps0\viewkind4\viewscale100 \fet0\sectd \psz1\sbknone\linex0\sectdefaultcl {\header \pard\plain \qc\sl-240\slmult0\nowidctlpar\tx249\adjustright \fs20\cgrid { \i\fs16\cgrid0 Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Alan }{\fs16\cgrid0 I 27 \par }}{\*\pnseclvl1\pnucrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl2\pnucltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl3\pndec\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl4\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta )}} {\*\pnseclvl5\pndec\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl6\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl7\pnlcrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl8 \pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl9\pnlcrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}\pard\plain \fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\adjustright \fs20\cgrid {\fs24\cgrid0 \par }\pard \qc\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\i\fs24\cgrid0 Questions Concerning Certain \par Faculties Claimed for Man \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx941\tx1371\adjustright {\i\fs24\cgrid0 P26:\tab }{\fs24\cgrid0 Journal of Speculative Philosophy }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 2 (1868):103\emdash 14. [Also published in W2:193--211 (with related letters and earlier attempts at this article and the two that follow) and in CP 5.213\emdash 63.] Item 2}{\b\i\fs24\cgrid0 }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 is the first of three articles usually referred to as the }{ \fs24\cgrid0 JSP }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 Cognition Series, in which Peirce develops some of the results and consequences of item and attempts \ldblquote to prove and to trace the consequences of certain propositions in epistemology tending toward the recognition of the reality of continuity and of generality and going to show the absurdity of individualism and of egoism. }{\fs24\cgrid0 \ldblquote }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 (In \ldblquote The Law of Mind\rdblquote [Item 23], he indicates that this is an early attempt at develop\-ing his doctrine of synechism.) Peirce\rquote s opposition to Carte\-sianism results in the following four denials: }{\fs24\cgrid0 (1)}{\b\fs24\cgrid0 }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 we have no power of introspection, but all knowledge of the internal world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowl\-edge of external facts, (2) we have no power of intuition, but every cognition is determined logically by previous cogni\- tions, (3) we have no power of thinking without signs, and (4) we have no conception of the absolutely incognizable. \par \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx306\tx527\adjustright {\i\fs24\cgrid0 \tab }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 Question 1. }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 Whether by the simple contemplation of a cognition, indepen\-dent ly of any previous knowledge and without reasoning from signs, we are enabled rightly to judge whether that cognition has been determined by a previous cognition or whether it refers immediately to its object. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx249\tx555\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Throughout this paper, the term }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 intuition }{\fs24\cgrid0 will be taken as signify\- ing a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object, and therefore so determined by something out of the conscious\-ness.* Let me request the reader to note this. }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 Intuition }{\fs24\cgrid0 here will be \par \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx260\tx657\adjustright {\cgrid0 *The word }{\i\cgrid0 intuitus }{\cgrid0 first occurs as a technical term in St. Anselm\rquote s }{\i\cgrid0 Monologium. }{\cgrid0 He wished to distinguish between our knowledge of God and our knowledge of finite things (and, in the next world, of God, also); and thinking of the saying of St. Paul, }{\i\cgrid0 Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate:}{\b\i\cgrid0 }{\i\cgrid0 tunc autem facie ad faciem, }{\cgrid0 he called the former }{\i\cgrid0 speculation }{\cgrid0 and the latter }{\i\cgrid0 intuition.}{\fs16\cgrid0 1}{\cgrid0 This use of \ldblquote speculation\rdblquote did not take root, because that word \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx249\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 \par }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //12// }{\fs24\cgrid0 nearly the same as \ldblquote premise not itself a conclusion\rdblquote ; the only differ\-ence being that pr emises and conclusions are judgments, whereas an intuition may, as far as its definition states, be any kind of cognition whatever. But just as a conclusion (good or bad) is determined in the mind of the reasoner by its premise, so cognitions not judgment s may be determined by previous cognitions; and a cognition not so deter\-mined, and therefore determined directly by the transcendental ob\-ject, is to be termed an }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 intuition. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx555\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Now, it is plainly one thing to have an intuition and another to know intuitiv ely that it is an intuition, and the question is whether these two things, distinguishable in thought, are, in fact, invariably connected, so that we can always intuitively distinguish between an intuition and a cognition determined by another. Every cogn ition, as something present, is, of course, an intuition of itself. But the determi\- nation of a cognition by another cognition or by a transcendental object is not, at least so far as appears obviously at first, a part of the immediate content of that cogni tion, although it would appear to be an element of the action or passion of the transcendental }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 ego, }{\fs24\cgrid0 which is not, perhaps, in consciousness immediately; and yet this transcen\- dental action or passion may invariably determine a cognition of itself, so that, in fact, the determination or non-determination of the cogni\- tion by another may be a part of the cognition. In this case, I should say that we had an intuitive power of distinguishing an intuition from another cognition. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx249\tx555\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 There is no evidence that we have this faculty, except that we seem to }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 feel }{\fs24\cgrid0 that we have it. But the weight of that testimony depends entirely on our being supposed to have the power of distinguishing in this feeling whether the feeling be the result of education, old associa\-tions, etc., or whether it is an intuitive cognition; or, in other words, it depends on presupposing the very matter testified to. Is this feeling infallible? And is this judgment concerning it infallible and so on, }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 ad infinitum? }{\fs24\cgrid0 Supposing that a man really could shut himself up in such a faith, he would be, of course, impervious to the truth, \ldblquote evidence\--proof.\rdblquote \par But let us compare the theory with the historic facts. The power \par }\pard \qj\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx260\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 __________________ \par }{\cgrid0 already had another exact and widely different meaning. In the middle ages, the term \ldblquote intuitive cognition\rdblquote had two principal senses, 1st, as opposed to abstractive cognition, it meant the knowledge of the present as present, and this is its meaning in Anselm; but 2d as no intuitive cognition was allowed to be determined by a prev ious cognition, it came to be used as the opposite of discursive cognition (see Scotus, }{\i\cgrid0 In sententias. }{\cgrid0 lib. a, dist. 3, qu. 9), and this is nearly the sense in which I employ it. This is also nearly the sense in which Kant uses it, the former distinction being expressed by his }{\i\cgrid0 sensuous }{\cgrid0 and }{\i\cgrid0 non-sensuous. }{\cgrid0 (See }{ \i\cgrid0 Werke, }{\cgrid0 herausg. Rosenkrantz, Thl. 2, S. 713, 713 }{\i\cgrid0 41, }{\cgrid0 100, u. s. w.) An enumeration of six meanings of intuition may be found in Hamilton\rquote s }{\i\cgrid0 Reid, }{\cgrid0 p. 759. \par }\pard \qj\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx317\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 \par }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //13// }{\fs24\cgrid0 of intuitively distinguishing intuitions from other cognitions has not prevented men from disputing, very warmly as to which cognitions are intuitive. In the middle ages, reason and external authority were re\- garded as two coordinate sources of knowledge, just as reason and the authority of intu ition are now; only the happy device of considering the enunciations of authority to be essentially indemonstrable had not yet been hit upon. All authorities were not considered as infallible, any more than all reasons; but when Berengarius said that the authorita\-tiveness of any particular authority must rest upon reason, the propo\- sition was scouted as opinionated, impious, and absurd. Thus, the credibility of authority was regarded by men of that time simply as an ultimate premise, as a cognition not determined by a previous cogni\- tion of the same object, or, in our terms, as an intuition. It is strange that they should have thought so, if, as the theory now under discus\-sion supposes, by merely contemplating the credibility of the author\-ity, as a Fakir does his God, they could have seen that it was not an ultimate premise! Now, what if our }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 internal }{\fs24\cgrid0 authority should meet the same fate, in the history of opinions, as that external authority has met? Can that be said to be absolutely certain which many sane, well-informed, and thoughtful men already doubt?* \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx249\tx555\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Every lawyer knows how difficult it is for witnesses to distinguish between what they have seen and what they have inferred. This is \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx317\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx334\tx657\adjustright {\cgrid0 *The proposition of Berengarius is contained in the following quotation from his }{\i\cgrid0 De Sacra Coena "Maximi plane cordis est, per omnia ad dialecticam confugere, quia confugere ad earn ad rationem est confugere, quo qui non confugit, cum secundum rationem sit factus ad imaginem dei, suum bonorem reliquit, nec potest renovari de die in diem ad imaginem dei.\rdblquote }{\cgrid0 2 The most striking characteristic of medieval reasoning, in general, is the perpetual resort to authority. When Fredegisus}{\fs16\cgrid0 3}{\cgrid0 and others wish to prove that darkness is a thing, although they have evidently derived the opinion from nominalistic-Platonistic meditations, they argue the matter thus: \ldblquote God called the darkness, night\rdblquote ; then, certainly, it is a thing, for otherwise before it had a name, there would have been nothing, not even a fiction to name. Abelard thinks it worth wh ile to cite Boethius, when he says that space has three dimensions, and when he says that an individual cannot be in two places at once.}{\fs16\cgrid0 4}{\cgrid0 The author of }{\i\cgrid0 De Generibus et Speciebus, }{\cgrid0 a work of a superior order, in arguing against a Platonic doctrine, says that if whatever is universal is eternal, the }{\i\cgrid0 form }{\cgrid0 and matter of Socrates, being severally universal, are both eternal, and that, therefore, Socrates was not created by God, but only put together, }{\i\cgrid0 \ldblquote quod quantum a vero deviet, palam est.\rdblquote }{\cgrid0 The authority is the f inal court of appeal. The same author, where in one place he doubts a statement of Boethius, finds it necessary to assign a special reason why in this case it is not absurd to do so. }{\i\cgrid0 Exceptio probat regulam in casibus non exceptis.}{ \fs16\cgrid0 5}{\i\cgrid0 }{\cgrid0 Recognized authori\-ties were certainly sometimes disputed in the twelfth century; their mutual contradic\- tions insured that; and the authority of philosophers was regarded as inferior to that of theologians. Still, it would be impossible to find a passage where the authority of Aristotle is directly denied upon any logical question. }{\i\cgrid0 \ldblquote Suns et multi errores eius,\rdblquote }{\cgrid0 says John of Salisbury, }{\i\cgrid0 "qui in scripturis tam Ethnicis, quam fidelibus poterunt inveniri: verum in logica parem babuisse non legitur."}{\fs16\cgrid0 6}{\i\cgrid0 }{\cgrid0 \ldblquote Sed nihil adversus Aristotelem,\rdblquote says Abelard, and in another place, \ldblquote Sed si Aristotelem Peripateticorum principem culparc possumus, quam amplius in hac arte recepimus?\rdblquote }{\fs16\cgrid0 7}{\cgrid0 The idea of going without an authority, or of subordinating authority to reason, does not occur to him. \par }{\fs24\cgrid0 \par }\pard \qj\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx317\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 //14// }{\fs24\cgrid0 part icularly noticeable in the case of a person who is describing the performances of a spiritual medium or of a professed juggler. The difficulty is so great that the juggler himself is often astonished at the discrepancy between the actual facts and the sta tement of an intelli\-gent witness who has not understood the trick. A part of the very complicated trick of the Chinese rings consists in taking two solid rings linked together, talking about them as though they were sepa\-rate\emdash taking it for granted, as it were\emdash then pretending to put them together, and handing them immediately to the spectator that he may see that they are solid. The art of this consists in raising, at first, the strong suspicion that one is broken. I have seen McAlister}{\cgrid0 8}{ \fs24\cgrid0 do this with such s uccess, that a person sitting close to him, with all his faculties straining to detect the illusion, would have been ready to swear that he saw the rings put together, and, perhaps, if the juggler had not professedly practised deception, would have consid ered a doubt of it as a doubt of his own veracity. This certainly seems to show that it is not always very easy to distinguish between a premise and a conclu\- sion, that we have no infallible power of doing so, and that in fact our only security in difficult cases is in some signs from which we can infer that a given fact must have been seen or must have been inferred. In trying to give an account of a dream, every accurate person must often have felt that it was a hopeless undertaking to attempt to disentan gle waking interpretations and fillings out from the fragmentary images of the dream itself. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx249\tx555\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 The mention of dreams suggests another argument. A dream, as far as its own content goes, is exactly like an actual experience. It is mistaken for one. And yet all the world believes that dreams are determined, according to the laws of the association of ideas, &c., by previous cognitions. If it be said that the faculty of intuitively recog\- nizing intuitions is asleep, I reply that this is a mere supposition, without other support. Besides, even when we wake up, we do not find that the dream differed from reality, except by certain }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 marks, }{\fs24\cgrid0 darkness and fragmentariness. Not unfrequently a dream is so vivid that the memory of it is mistaken for the memory of an actual occurrence. \par A child has, as far as we know, all the perceptive powers of a man. Yet question him a little as to }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 how }{\fs24\cgrid0 he knows what he does. In many cases, he will tell you that he never learned his mother-tongue; he always knew it, or he knew it as soon as he came to have sense. It appears, then, that }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 he }{\fs24\cgrid0 does not possess the faculty of distinguishing, by simple contemplation, between an intuition and a cognition deter\-mined by others. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx317\tx595\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 There can be no doubt that before the publication of Berkeley\rquote s book on Vision,}{\cgrid0 9}{\fs24\cgrid0 it had generally been believed that the third dimen\- sion of space was immediately intuited, although, at present, nearly all admit that it is known by inference. We had been }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 contemplating }{\fs24\cgrid0 the }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //15// }{\fs24\cgrid0 object since the very creation of man, but this discovery was not made until we began to }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 reason }{\fs24\cgrid0 about it. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx317\tx555\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Does the reader know of the blind spot on the retina? Take a number of this journal, turn over the cover so as to expose the white paper, lay it sideways upon the table before which you must sit, and put two cents upon it, one near the left-hand edge, and the other to the right. Put your left hand over your left eye, and with the right eye look }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 steadily }{\fs24\cgrid0 at the left-hand cent. Then with your right hand, move the right-hand cent (which is now plainly seen) }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 towards }{\fs24\cgrid0 the left hand. When it comes to a place near the middle of the page it will disap\-pear\emdash you cannot see it without turning your eye. Bring it nearer to the other cent, or carry it further away, and it will reappear; but at that particular spot it cannot be seen. Thus it appears that there is a blind spot nearly in the middle of the retina; and this is confirmed by anat\- omy. It follows that the space we immediately see (when one eye is closed) is not, as we had imagined, a continuous oval, but is a ring, the filling up of which must be the work of the intellect. What more striking example could be desired of the impossibility of distinguish\-ing intellectual results from intuitional data, by mere contemplation? \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx328\tx595\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 A man can distinguish different textures of cloth by feeling; but not immediately, for he requires to move his fingers over the cloth, which shows that he is obliged to compare the sensations of one instant with those of another. \par The pitch of a tone depends upon the rapidity of the succession of the vibrations which reach the ear. Each of those vibrations produces an impulse upon the ear. Let a single such impulse be made upon the ear, and we know, experimentally, that it is perceived. There is, there\- fore, good reason to believe that each of the impulses forming a tone is perceived. Nor is there any reason to the contrary. So that this is the only admissible supposition. Therefore, the pitch of a tone depends upon the rapidity with which certain impressions are successively conveyed to the mind. These impressions must exist previously to any tone; hence, the sensation of pitch is determined by previous cogni\-tions. Nevertheless, this would never have been discovered by the mere contemplation of that feeling. \par A similar argument may be urged in reference to the perception of two dimensions of space. This appears to be an immediate intuition. But if we were to }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 see }{\fs24\cgrid0 immediately an extended surface, our retinas must be spread out in an extended surface. Instead of that, the retina consists of innumerable needles pointing towards the light, and whose distances from one another are decidedly greater than the }{ \i\fs24\cgrid0 minimum visibile.}{\cgrid0 10}{\fs24\cgrid0 Suppose each of those nerve-points conveys the sensation of a little colored surface. Still, what we immediately see must even then be, not a continuous surface, but a collection of spots. Who could discover this by mere intuition? But all the analogies of the nervous }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //16// }{\fs24\cgrid0 system are against the supposition that the excitation of a single nerve can produce an idea as complicated a s that of a space, however small. If the excitation of no one of these nerve-points can immediately convey the impression of space, the excitation of all cannot do so. For, the excitation of each produces some impression (according to the analogies of the nervous system), hence, the sum of these impressions is a necessary condition of any perception produced by the excitation of all; or, in other terms, a perception produced by the excitation of all is determined by the mental impressions produced by the e x citation of every one. This argument is confirmed by the fact that the existence of the perception of space can be fully accounted for by the action of faculties known to exist, without supposing it to be an immediate impression. For this purpose, we must bear in mind the following facts of physio-psychology: 1.}{\b\fs24\cgrid0 }{\fs24\cgrid0 The excitation of a nerve does not of itself inform us where the extremity of it is situated. If, by a surgical opera\- tion, certain nerves are displaced, our sensations from those nerves do not info rm us of the displacement. 2. A single sensation does not inform us how many nerves or nerve-points are excited. 3. We can distinguish between the impressions produced by the excitations of different nerve-points. 4. The differences of impressions produce d by different excitations of similar nerve-points are similar. Let a momen\-tary image be made upon the retina. By No. 2,}{\b\fs24\cgrid0 }{\fs24\cgrid0 the impression thereby produced will be indistinguishable from what might be produced by the excitation of some conceivable single nerve. It is not conceivable that the momentary excitation of a single nerve should give the sensa\- tion of space. Therefore, the momentary excitation of all the nerve-points of the retina cannot, immediately or mediately, produce the sensation of space. The same argument would apply to any unchang\- ing image on the retina. Suppose, however, that the image moves over the retina. Then the peculiar excitation which at one instant affects one nerve-point, at a later instant will affect another. These will con\-vey im pressions which are very similar by 4, and yet which are distin\- guishable by 3. Hence, the conditions for the recognition of a relation between these impressions are present. There being, however, a very great number of nerve-points affected by a very great number of suc\- cessive excitations, the relations of the resulting impressions will be almost inconceivably complicated. Now, it is a known law of mind, that when phenomena of an extreme complexity are presented, which yet would be reduced to }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 order }{ \fs24\cgrid0 or mediate simplicity by the application of a certain conception, that conception sooner or later arises in appli\-cation to those phenomena. In the case under consideration, the con\- ception of extension would reduce the phenomena to unity, and, there\-fore, its genesis is fully accounted for. It remains only to explain why the previous cognitions which determine it are not more clearly appre\- hended. For this explanation, I shall refer to a paper upon a new list }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //17// }{\fs24\cgrid0 of categories, \'a75, merely adding that just a s we are able to recognize our friends by certain appearances, although we cannot possibly say what those appearances are and are quite unconscious of any process of reasoning, so in any case when the reasoning is easy and natural to us, however complex m ay be the premises, they sink into insignifi\-cance and oblivion proportionately to the satisfactoriness of the theory based upon them. This theory of space is confirmed by the circum\- stance that an exactly similar theory is imperatively demanded by the facts in reference to time. That the course of time should be immedi\- ately felt is obviously impossible. For, in that case, there must be an element of this feeling at each instant. But in an instant there is no duration and hence no immediate feeling of durat ion. Hence, no one of these elementary feelings is an immediate feeling of duration; and, hence the sum of all is not. On the other hand, the impressions of any moment are very complicated,\emdash containing all the images (or the ele\- ments of the images) of sense and memory, which complexity is reduc\-ible to mediate simplicity by means of the conception of time.\'86 \par }\pard \qj\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx328\adjustright {\cgrid0 \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx651\adjustright {\i\cgrid0 *Proceedings of the American Academy, }{\cgrid0 May }{\i\cgrid0 14,}{\b\i\cgrid0 }{\cgrid0 1867. [Item above, pp. 1\emdash 10.] \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx334\tx578\adjustright {\cgrid0 \'86The above theory of space and time does not conflict with that of Kant so much as it appears to do. They are in fact the solutions of different questions. Kant, it is true, makes space and time intuitions, or rather forms of intuition, but it is not essential to his theory that intuition should mean more than \ldblquote individual representation.\rdblquote The apprehension of space and time results, according to him, from a mental }{\i\cgrid0 process,\emdash the }{\cgrid0 \ldblquote Synthesis der Apprehension in der Anschauung.\rdblquote (See }{\i\cgrid0 Critik d. reinen Vernunft. }{\cgrid0 Ed. 1781, pp. 98 }{\i\cgrid0 et seq.) }{\cgrid0 My theory is merely an account of this synthesis. \par The gist of Kant\rquote s \ldblquote Transcendental AEsthetic is contained in two principles. First; that universal and necessary propositions are not given in experience. Second, that universal and necessary facts are determined by the conditions of experience in general. By a universal proposition is meant merely, one which asserts something of }{\i\cgrid0 all }{\cgrid0 of a sphere,\emdash not necessarily one which all men believe. By a necessary proposition, is meant one which asserts what it does, not merely of the actual condition of things, but of every possible state of things; it is not meant that the proposition is one which we cannot help believing. Experience, in Kant\rquote s first principle, cannot be used for a product of the objective understanding, but must be taken for the first impressions of sense with consciousness conjoined and worked up by the imagination into images, together with all which is logically deducible therefrom. In this sense, it may be admitted that univer\- sal and necessary propositions are not given in experience. But, in tha t case, neither are any inductive conclusions which might be drawn from experience, given in it. In fact, it is the peculiar function of induction to produce universal and necessary propositions. Kant points out, indeed, that the universality and necessit y of scientific inductions are but the analogues of philosophic universality and necessity; and this is true, in so far as it is never allowable to accept a scientific conclusion without a certain indefinite drawback. But this is owing to the insufficiency in the number of the instances; and whenever instances may be had in as large numbers as we please, }{\i\cgrid0 ad infinitum, }{\cgrid0 a truly universal and necessary proposition is inferable. As for Kant\rquote s second principle, that the truth of universal and necessary propositions is dependent upon the conditions of the general experience, it is no more nor less than the principle of Induction. I go to a fair and draw from the \ldblquote grab-bag\rdblquote twelve packages. Upon opening them, I find that every one contains a red ball. Here is a univ ersal fact. It depends, then, on the condition of the experience. What is the condition of the experience? It is solely that the balls are the contents of packages drawn from that bag, that is, the only thing which determined the experience. was the drawi ng from the bag. I infer, then, according to the principle \par }{\fs24\cgrid0 \par }\pard \qj\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx311\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 //18// }{\fs24\cgrid0 We have, therefore, a variety of facts, all of which are most readily explained on the supposition that we have no intuitive faculty of distinguishing intuitive from mediate cognitions. Some arbitrary hy\- pothesis may otherwise explain any one of these facts; this is the only theory which brings them to support one another. Moreover, no facts require the supposition of the faculty in question. Whoever has studied the nature of proof will see, then, that there are here very strong reasons for disbelieving the existence of this faculty. These will become still stronger when the consequences of rejecting it have, in this paper and in a following one, been more fully traced out. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx306\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 QUESTION 2}{\fs24\cgrid0 . }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 Whether we have an intuitive self -consciousness. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx317\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Self-consciousness, as the term is here used, is to be distinguished both from consciousness generally, from the internal sense, and from pure apperception. Any cognition is a consciousness of the object as repre sented; by self-consciousness is meant a knowledge of ourselves. Not a mere feeling of subjective conditions of consciousness, but of our personal selves. Pure apperception is the self-assertion of THE }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 ego; }{\fs24\cgrid0 the self-consciousness here meant is the recognition of my }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 private }{\fs24\cgrid0 self. I know that }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 I }{\fs24\cgrid0 (not merely }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 the }{\fs24\cgrid0 I) exist. The question is, how do I know it; by a special intuitive faculty, or is it determined by previous cogni\-tions? \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx328\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Now, it is not self-evident that we have such an intuitive faculty, for it has just been shown that we have no intuitive power of distin\- guishing an intuition from a cognition determined by others. There\-fore, the existence or non-existence of this power i s to be determined upon evidence, and the question is whether self-consciousness can be explained by the action of known faculties under conditions known to exist, or whether it is necessary to suppose an unknown cause for this cognition, and, in the latt er case, whether an intuitive faculty of self-consciousness is the most probable cause which can be supposed. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx311\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 It is first to be observed that there is no known self-consciousness to be accounted for in extremely young children. It has already been pointed o ut by Kant* that the late use of the very common word \ldblquote I\rdblquote with children indicates an imperfect self-consciousness in them, and that, therefore, so far as it is admissible for us to draw any conclusion \par }\pard \qj\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx204\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 \par __________________ \par }{\cgrid0 of Kant, that what is drawn from the bag will contain a red ball. This is induction. Apply induction not to any limited experience but to all human experience and you have the Kantian philosophy, so far as it is correctly developed. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx334\adjustright {\cgrid0 Kant\rquote s successors, however, have not been content with his doctrine. Nor ought they to have been. For, there is this third principle: \ldblquote Absolutely universal propositions must be analytic.\rdblquote For whatever is absolutely universal is devoid of all content or determination, for all determination is by nega tion. The problem, therefore, is not how universal propositions can be synthetical, but how universal propositions appearing to be synthetical can be evolved by thought alone from the purely indeterminate. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx436\adjustright {\i\cgrid0 *Werke, }{\cgrid0 vii (2), ii.}{\fs24\cgrid0 \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx226\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 \par }\pard \qj\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx204\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 //19// }{\fs24\cgrid0 in regard to the mental state of those who are still younger, it must be against the existence of any self-consciousness in them. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx311\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 On the other hand, children manifest powers of thought much earlier. Indeed, it is almost impossible to assign a period at which children do not a lready exhibit decided intellectual activity in direc\-tions in which thought is indispensable to their well-being. The com\-plicated trigonometry of vision, and the delicate adjustments of coor\- dinated movement, are plainly mastered very early. There is no reason to question a similar degree of thought in reference to themselves. \par A very young child may always be observed to watch its own body with great attention. There is every reason why this should be so, for from the child\rquote s point of view this body is th e most important thing in the universe. Only what it touches has any actual and present feeling; only what it faces has any actual color; only what is on its tongue has any actual taste. \par No one questions that, when a sound is heard by a child, he thinks, n ot of himself as hearing, but of the bell or other object as sounding. How when he wills to move a table? Does he then think of himself as desiring, or only of the table as fit to be moved? That he has the latter thought, is beyond question; that he has t he former, must, until the existence of an intuitive self-consciousness is proved, remain an arbi\- trary and baseless supposition. There is no good reason for thinking that he is less ignorant of his own peculiar condition than the angry adult who denies that he is in a passion. \par The child, however, must soon discover by observation that things which are thus fit to be changed are apt actually to undergo this change, after a contact with that peculiarly important body called Willy or Johnny. This consideration makes this body still more impor\-tant and central, since it establishes a connection between the fitness of a thing to be changed and a tendency in this body to touch it before it is changed. \par The child learns to understand the language; that is to say, a con\- nection between certain sounds and certain facts becomes established in his mind. He has previously noticed the connection between these sounds and the motions of the lips of bodies somewhat similar to the central one, and has tried the experiment of p utting his hand on those lips and has found the sound in that case to be smothered. He thus connects that language with bodies somewhat similar to the central one. By efforts, so unenergetic that they should be called rather in\- stinctive, perhaps, than tentative, he learns to produce those sounds. So he begins to converse. \par It must be about this time that he begins to find that what these people about him say is the very best evidence of fact. So much so, that testimony is even a stronger mark of fact than }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 the facts themselves, }{\fs24\cgrid0 or rather than what must now be thought of as the }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 appearances }{\fs24\cgrid0 themselves. }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //20// }{\fs24\cgrid0 (I may remark, by the way, that this remains so through life; testimony will convince a man that he himself is mad.) A child hears it said that the stov e is hot. But it is not, he says; and, indeed, that central body is not touching it, and only what that touches is hot or cold. But he touches it, and finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way. Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessar y to suppose a }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 self }{\fs24\cgrid0 in which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives the first dawning of self-consciousness. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx328\tx595\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 But, further, although usually appearances are either only con\-firmed or merely supplemented by testimony, yet there is a certain remarkable class of appearances which are continually contradicted by testimony. These are those predicates which }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 we }{\fs24\cgrid0 know to be emotional, but which }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 he }{\fs24\cgrid0 distinguishes by their connection with the movements of that central person, himself (that the table wants moving, etc.). These judgments are generally denied by others. Moreover, he has reason to think that others, also, have such judgments which are quite denied by all the rest. Thus, he adds to the conception of appearance as the actualization of fact, the concepti on of it as something }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 private }{\fs24\cgrid0 and valid only for one body. In short, }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 error }{\fs24\cgrid0 appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 self }{\fs24\cgrid0 which is fallible. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx328\tx634\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the absolute }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 ego }{\fs24\cgrid0 of pure apperception. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx311\tx634\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Now, the theory which, for the sake of perspicuity, has thus been stated in a specific form, may be summed up as follows: At the age at which we know children to be self-conscious, we know that they have been made aware of ignorance and error; and we kn ow them to possess at that age powers of understanding sufficient to enable them then to infer from ignorance and error their own existence. Thus we find that known faculties, acting under conditions known to exist, would rise to self-consciousness. The o nly essential defect in this account of the matter is, that while we know that children exercise }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 as much }{\fs24\cgrid0 under\- standing as is here supposed, we do not know that they exercise it in precisely this way. Still the supposition that they do so is infinitely more supported by facts, than the supposition of a wholly peculiar faculty of the mind. \par The only argument w orth noticing for the existence of an intuitive self-consciousness is this. We are more certain of our own existence than of any other fact; a premise cannot determine a conclusion to be more certain than it is itself; hence, our own existence cannot have been inferred from any other fact. The first premise must be admitted, but the second premise is founded on an exploded theory of logic. A conclusion cannot be more certain than that some one of the facts which support it is true, but it may easily be mor e certain than any one of those facts. Let us suppose, for example, that a dozen witnesses testify to an occurrence. Then my belief in that occurrence rests on }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //21// }{\fs24\cgrid0 the belief that each of those men is generally to be believed upon oath. Yet the fact te stified to is made more certain than that any one of those men is generally to be believed. In the same way, to the developed mind of man, his own existence is supported by }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 every other fact, }{\fs24\cgrid0 and is, therefore, incomparably more certain than any one of these facts. But it cannot be said to be more certain than that there is another fact, since there is no doubt perceptible in either case. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx385\tx634\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 It is to be concluded, then, that there is no necessity of supposing an intuitive self-consciousness, since self-consciousness may easily be the result of inference. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx606\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 QUESTION 3}{\fs24\cgrid0 . }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 Whether we have an intuitive power of distinguishing between the subjective elements of different kinds of cognitions. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx345\tx617\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Every cognition involves something represented, or that of which we are consciou s, and some action or passion of the self whereby it becomes represented. The former shall be termed the objective, the latter the subjective, element of the cognition. The cognition itself is an intuition of its objective element, which may therefore be c alled, also, the immediate object. The subjective element is not necessarily immediately known, but it is possible that such an intuition of the subjective element of a cognition of its character, whether that of dreaming, imagining, conceiving, believing , etc., should accompany every cognition. The question is whether this is so. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx385\tx634\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 It would appear, at first sight, that there is an overwhelming array of evidence in favor of the existence of such a power. The difference between seeing a color and imagining it is immense. There is a vast difference between the most vivid dream and reality. And if we had no intuitive power of distinguishing between what we believe and what we merely conceive, we never, it would seem, could in any way distinguish them; since if w e did so by reasoning, the question would arise whether the argument itself was believed or conceived, and this must be answered before the conclusion could have any force. And thus there would be a }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 regressus ad infinitum. }{\fs24\cgrid0 Besides, if we do not know that we believe, then, from the nature of the case, we do not believe. \par But be it noted that we do not intuitively know the existence of this faculty. For it is an intuitive one, and we cannot intuitively know that a cognition is intuitive. The question is, therefore, whether it is neces\- sary to suppose the existence of this faculty, or whether then the facts can be explained without this supposition. \par In the first place, then, the difference between what is imagined or dreamed and what is actually experienced, is n o argument in favor of the existence of such a faculty. For it is not questioned that there are distinctions in what is present to the mind, but the question is, whether independently of any such distinctions in the immediate }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 ob\-jects }{ \fs24\cgrid0 of consciousness, we have any immediate power of distinguishing different modes of consciousness. Now, the very fact of the immense }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //22// }{\fs24\cgrid0 difference in the immediate objects of sense and imagination, suffi\- ciently accounts for our distinguishing those faculties; and instead of being an argument in favor of the existence of an intuitive power of distinguishing the subjective elements of consciousness, it is a power\- ful reply to any such argument, so far as the distinction of sense and imagination is concerned. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx260\tx532\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Passing to the distinction of belief and conception, we meet the statement that the knowledge of belief is essential to its existence. Now, we can unquestionably distinguish a belief from a conception, in most cases, by means of a peculiar feeling of conviction; and it is a mere question of words whether we define belief as that judgment which is accompanied by this feeling, or as that judgment from which a man will act. We may conveniently call the former }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 sensational, }{\fs24\cgrid0 the latter }{ \i\fs24\cgrid0 active }{\fs24\cgrid0 belief. That neither of these neces sarily involves the other, will surely be admitted without any recital of facts. Taking belief in the sensational sense, the intuitive power of reorganizing it will amount simply to the capacity for the sensation which accompanies the judgment. This sensa tion, like any other, is an object of conscious\- ness; and therefore the capacity for it implies no intuitive recognition of subjective elements of consciousness. If belief is taken in the active sense, it may be discovered by the observation of external fac ts and by inference from the sensation of conviction which usually accom\-panies it. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx311\tx566\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Thus, the arguments in favor of this peculiar power of conscious\-ness disappear, and the presumption is again against such a hypothesis. Moreover, as the immediate objects of any two faculties must be admit\-ted to be different, the facts do not render such a supposition in any degree necessary. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx606\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 QUESTION }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 4. Whether we have any power of introspection, or whether our whole knowledge of the internal world is derived from the observation of external facts. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx283\tx527\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 It is not intended here to assume the reality of the external world. Only, there is a certain set of facts which are ordinarily regarded as external, while others are regarded as internal. The question is whether the latter are known otherwise than by inference from the former. By introspection, I mean a direct perception of the internal world, but not necessarily a perception of it }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 as }{\fs24\cgrid0 internal. Nor do I mean to limit the signification of the word to intuition, but would extend it to any knowledge of the internal world not derived from external observation. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx317\tx566\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 There is one sense in which any perception has an internal object, namely, that every sensation is partly determined by internal condi\- tions. Thus, the sensation of redness is as it is, owing to the constitu\-tion of the mind; and in this sense it is a sensation of something internal. Hence, we may derive a knowledge of the mind from a }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //23// }{\fs24\cgrid0 consideration of this sensation, but that knowledge would, in fact, be an inference from redness as a predicate of something external. On the other hand, there are certain other feelings\emdash the emotions, for exam\-ple\emdash which appear to arise in the first place, not as predicates at all, and to be referable to the mind alone. It would seem, then, that by means of these, a knowledge of the mind may be obtained, which is not inferred from any character of outward things. The question is whether this is really so. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx345\tx617\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Although introspection is not necessarily intuitive, it is not self-evident that we poss ess this capacity; for we have no intuitive faculty of distinguishing different subjective modes of consciousness. The power, if it exists, must be known by the circumstance that the facts cannot be explained without it.}{\b\fs24\cgrid0 \par }\pard\plain \s15\qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx345\tx623\adjustright {In reference to the above argument from the emotions, it must be admitted that if a man is angry, his anger implies, in general, no determinate and constant character in its object. But, on the other hand, it can hardly be questioned that there is some relative character in the outward thi ng which makes him angry, and a little reflection will serve to show that his anger consists in his saying to himself, \ldblquote this thing is vile, abominable, etc.,\rdblquote and that it is rather a mark of returning reason to say, \ldblquote I am angry.\rdblquote In the same way any emotion is a predica\- tion concerning some object, and the chief difference between this and an objective intellectual judgment is that while the latter is relative to human nature or to mind in general, the former is relative to the particular circumstances and d isposition of a particular man at a par\-ticular time. What is here said of emotions in general, is true in particu\- lar of the sense of beauty and of the moral sense. Good and bad are feelings which first arise as predicates, and therefore are either predi\- cates of the not-I, or are determined by previous cognitions (there being no intuitive power of distinguishing subjective elements of con\-sciousness). \par }\pard\plain \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx385\tx634\adjustright \fs20\cgrid {\fs24\cgrid0 It remains, then, only to inquire whether it is necessary to suppose a particular power of introspection for the sake of accounting for the sense of willing. Now, volition, as distinguished from desire, is noth\- ing but the power of concentrating the attention, of abstracting. Hence, the knowledge of the power of abstracting may be inferred from abstract objects, just as the knowledge of the power of seeing is inferred from colored objects. \par It appears, therefore, that there is no reason for supposing a power of introspection; and, consequently, the only way of investigating a psychological question is by inference from external facts. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx606\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 QUESTION 5}{\fs24\cgrid0 . }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 Whether we can think without signs. \par }\pard\plain \s1\qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\keepn\nowidctlpar\tx385\tx634\outlinelevel0\adjustright {This is a familiar question, but there is, to this day, no better argument in the affirmative than that thought must precede every sign Thi s assumes the impossibility of an infinite series. But Achilles, }{\b //24// }{as a fact, will overtake the tortoise. }{\i How }{this happens, is a question not necessary to be answered at present, as long as it certainly does happen. \par }\pard\plain \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx249\tx498\adjustright \fs20\cgrid {\fs24\cgrid0 If we seek the light of external facts, the only cases of thought which we can find are of thought in signs. Plainly, no other thought can be evidenced by external facts. But we have seen that only by external facts can thought be known at all. The only thought, then, which can possibly be cognized is thought in signs. But thought which cannot be cognized does not exist. All thought, therefore, must neces\-sarily be in signs. \par A man says to himself, \ldblquote Aristotle is a man; }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 therefore, }{\fs24\cgrid0 he is fallible.\rdblquote Has he not, then, thought what he has not sa id to himself, that all men are fallible? The answer is, that he has done so, so far as this is said in his }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 therefore. }{\fs24\cgrid0 According to this, our question does not relate }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 to fact, }{\fs24\cgrid0 but is a mere asking for distinctness of thought. \par From the proposition that ever y thought is a sign, it follows that every thought must address itself to some other, must determine some other, since that is the essence of a sign. This, after all, is but another form of the familiar axiom, that in intuition, i.e. in the immediate pres ent, there is no thought, or, that all which is reflected upon has past. }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 Hinc loquor inde est. }{\fs24\cgrid0 That, since any thought, there must have been a thought, has its analogue in the fact that, since any past time, there must have been an infinite series of times. To say, therefore, that thought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a time, is but an \-other way of saying that every thought must be interpreted in another, or that all thought is in signs. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx306\tx527\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 QUESTION 6}{\i\fs24\cgrid0 . Whether a sign can have any meaning, if by its definition it}{\b\i\fs24\cgrid0 }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 is the sign of something absolutely incognizable. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx283\tx527\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 It would seem that it can, and that universal and hypothetical propositions are instances of it. Thus, the universal proposition, \ldblquote all ruminants are cloven-hoofed, \rdblquote speaks of a possible infini ty of animals, and no matter how many ruminants may have been examined, the possibility must remain that there are others which have not been examined. In the case of a hypothetical proposition, the same thing is still more manifest; for such a propositio n speaks not merely of the actual state of things, but of every possible state of things, all of which are not knowable, inasmuch as only one can so much as exist. \par On the other hand, all our conceptions are obtained by abstractions and combinations of cognitions first occurring in judgments of experi\-ence. Accordingly, there can be no conception of the absolutely incog\- nizable, since nothing of that sort occurs in experience. But the mean\-ing of a term is the conception which it conveys. Hence, a term can have no such meaning. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx300\tx544\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 If it be said that the incognizable is a concept compounded of the }{\b\fs24\cgrid0 //25// }{\fs24\cgrid0 concept }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 not }{\fs24\cgrid0 and }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 cognizable, }{\fs24\cgrid0 it may be replied that }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 not }{\fs24\cgrid0 is a mere syn\-categorematic term and not a concept by itself. \par If I think \ldblquote white,\rdblquote I will not go so far as Berkeley and say that I think of a person seeing,\rdblquote but I will say that what I think is of the nature of a cognition, and so of anything else which can be experi\- enced. Consequently, the highest concept which can be reached by abstractions from judgments of experience\emdash and therefore, the highest concept which can be reached at all\emdash is the concept of something of the nature of a cognition. }{ \i\fs24\cgrid0 Not, }{\fs24\cgrid0 then, or }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 what is other than, }{\fs24\cgrid0 if a concept, is a concept of the cognizable. Hence, not-cognizable, if a concept, is a concept of the form }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 \ldblquote A, }{\fs24\cgrid0 not-} {\i\fs24\cgrid0 A}{\fs24\cgrid0 ,\rdblquote and is, at least, self-contradictory. Thus, ignorance and error can only be conceived as correlative to a real knowledge and truth, which latter are of the nature of cognitions. Over against any cogni tion, there is an unknown but knowable reality; but over against all possible cognition, there is only the self-contradic\-tory. In short, }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 cognizability }{\fs24\cgrid0 (in its widest sense) and }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 being }{\fs24\cgrid0 are not merely metaphysically the same, but are synonymous terms. \par To the argument from universal and hypothetical propositions, the reply is, that though their truth cannot be cognized with absolute certainty, it may be probably known by induction. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx306\tx527\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 QUESTION 7}{\fs24\cgrid0 . }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 Whether there is any cognition not determined by a previous cognition. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx345\tx617\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 It would seem that there is or has been; for since we are in posses\- sion of cognitions, which are all determined by previous ones, and these by cognitions earlier still, there must have been a }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 first }{\fs24\cgrid0 in this series or else our state of cognition at any time is completely deter\- mined, according to logical laws, by our state at any previous time. But there are many facts against the last supposition, and therefore in favor of intuitive cognitions. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx317\tx566\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 On the other hand, since it is impossible to know intuitive ly that a given cognition is not determined by a previous one, the only way in which this can be known is by hypothetic inference from observed facts. But to adduce the cognition by which a given cognition has been determined is to explain the determinati o ns of that cognition. And it is the only way of explaining them. For something entirely out of consciousness which may be supposed to determine it, can, as such, only be known and only adduced in the determinate cognition in question. So, that to suppose that a cognition is determined solely by something absolutely external, is to suppose its determinations incapa\- ble of explanation. Now, this is a hypothesis which is warranted under no circumstances, inasmuch as the only possible justification for a hypothesis is that it explains the facts, and to say that they are ex\- plained and at the same time to suppose them inexplicable is self\--contradictory. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx249\tx498\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 //26// }{\fs24\cgrid0 If it be objected that the peculiar character of }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 red }{\fs24\cgrid0 is not determined by any previous cognition, I reply that that character is not a character of red as a cognition; for if there be a man to whom red things look as blue ones do to me and }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 vice versa, }{\fs24\cgrid0 that man\rquote s eyes teach him the same facts that they would if he were like me. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx283\tx527\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 Moreover, we know of no power by which an intuition could be known. For, as the cognition is beginning, and therefore in a state of change, at only the first instant would it be intuition. And, therefore, the apprehension of it must tak e place in no time and be an event occupying no time.* Besides, all the cognitive faculties we know of are relative, and consequently their products are relations. But the cogni\- tion of a relation is determined by previous cognitions. No cognition not dete rmined by a previous cognition, then, can be known. It does not exist, then, first, because it is absolutely incognizable, and second, because a cognition only exists so far as it is known. \par }\pard\plain \s15\qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx283\tx527\adjustright {The reply to the argument that there must be a first is as follows: In retracing our way from conclusions to premises, or from deter\- mined cognitions to those which determine them, we finally reach, in all cases, a point beyond which the consciousness in the determined cognition is more lively than in the cognition whic h determines it. We have a less lively consciousness in the cognition which determines our cognition of the third dimension than in the latter cognition itself; a less lively consciousness in the cognition which determines our cogni\- tion of a continuous su rface (without a blind spot) than in this latter cognition itself; and a less lively consciousness of the impressions which determine the sensation of tone than of that sensation itself. Indeed, when we get near enough to the external this is the universa l rule. Now let any horizontal line represent a cognition, and let the length of the line serve to measure (so to speak) the liveliness of con\- sciousness in that cognition. A point, having no length, will, on this principle, represent an object quite out of consciousness. Let one hori\- zontal line below another represent a cognition which determines the cognition represented by that other and which has the same object as the latter. Let the finite distance between two such lines represent that they are two di fferent cognitions. With this aid to thinking, let us see whether \ldblquote there must be a first.\rdblquote Suppose an inverted triangle V to be gradually dipped into water. At any date or instant, the surface of the water makes a horizontal line across that triangle. This line represents a cognition. At a subsequent date, there is a sectional line so made, higher upon the triangle. This represents another cognition of the same object determined by the former, and having a livelier conscious\- ness. The apex of the triangle represents the object external to the \par }\pard\plain \s16\qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx249\adjustright \fs20 {*This argument, however, only covers part of the question. It does not go to show that there is no cognition undetermined except by another like it. \par }\pard\plain \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx249\adjustright \fs20\cgrid {\fs24\cgrid0 \par }\pard \qj\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx283\adjustright {\b\fs24\cgrid0 //27// }{\fs24\cgrid0 mind which determines both these cognitions. The state of th e triangle before it reaches the water, represents a state of cognition which contains nothing which determines these subsequent cognitions. To say, then, that if there be a state of cognition by which all subsequent cognitions of a certain object are not determined, there must subse\- quently be some cognition of that object not determined by previous cognitions of the same object, is to say that when that triangle is dipped into the water there must be a sectional line made by the surface of the water lower than which no surface line had been made in that way. But draw the horizontal line where you will, as many horizontal lines as you please can be assigned at finite distances below it and below one another. For any such section is at some distance above t he apex, otherwise it is not a line. Let this distance be }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 a. }{\fs24\cgrid0 Then there have been similar sections at the distances }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 1/2a,}{\fs24\cgrid0 }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 1/4a, 1/8a, 1/16a, }{\fs24\cgrid0 above the apex, and so on as far as you please. So that it is not true that there must be a first. Explicate the logical difficulties of this paradox (they are identi\- cal with those of the Achilles) in whatever way you may. I am content with the result, as long as your principles are fully applied to the particular case of cognitions determining one another. Deny motion , if it seems proper to do so; only then deny the process of determination of one cognition by another. Say that instants and lines are fictions; only say, also, that states of cognition and judgments are fictions. The point here insisted on is not this o r that logical solution of the diffi\-culty, but merely that cognition arises by a }{\i\fs24\cgrid0 process }{\fs24\cgrid0 of beginning, as any other change comes to pass. \par }\pard \qj\fi360\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx283\tx527\adjustright {\fs24\cgrid0 In a subsequent paper, I shall trace the consequences of these prin\-ciples, in reference to the questions of reality, of individuality, and of the validity of the laws of logic. \par }}