Ireland Is Punting

The EU/IMF program stole Ireland's Christmas. Just like in Greece, the people are on the streets to protest. Paul Krugman outlines nicely how the Irish Crisis is – just like the Greek Crisis – a botched goverment action that citizens now have to finance with dramatic spending cuts (and tax increases). 

Just like in Greece, the simple solution would be to give up on the Euro, devalue dramatically and bring back the old Irish currency, the Punt. The costs keeping the Euro a clear – they are outlined in the new EU/IMF package. What are the costs of bringing back the Punt? 

 

Lost In The Shuffle

While gains from trade usually generate increases in national incomes, they do produce winners and loosers. Most countries have government programs that are supposed to address this redistribution of income. In the US President Kennedy introduced the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program administered by the US department of labor. The DOL’s national statistics highlight that 57,000 (280,000) workers were covered in 2015 (2010) by the TAA at a cost of $$235 mil (575 mil). That is about $4000 ($2000) per worker – probably not enough to pay for retraining or any meaningful compensation for job losses. The state data is even more fascinating.

Another Shot Gun Wedding

The Irish Times reports that the EU and IMF have approved the Irish rescue package. Irish Prime Minister Cowen confirmed the European Union has agreed to Irish Government's request for financial aid package from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. While the package is approved, its size is still undetermined (although the Financial Times thinks its around $100-$120 bn). Even Prime Minister Cowan does not seem to know how large the program will be – but he does know it will be smaller than the Greek bailout package

As predicted the arrival of the IMF team and the resulting austerity measures are no marriage made in heaven (see here)  

A woman walks past graffiti at Donnybrook bus station in Dublin today. Photograph: Eric Luke/The Irish Times 

·        The EU/IMF program calls for

                 – corporation tax rate to remain unchanged at 12.5%

·                                 – 10bn euros (£8.5bn) of spending cuts between 2011-2014, and 5bneuros in tax rises

·                                 – minimum wage to be cut by one euro to 7.65 euros per hour

·                                 – 3bn euros of cuts in public investment by 2014

·                                 – 2.8bn euros of welfare cuts by 2014, returning spending to 2007levels

·                                 – reduction of public sector pay bill by 1.2bn euros by 2014

·                                 – the reform of public sector pensions for new entrants with paycut by 10%

·                                 – 24,750 public sector jobs to be cut, back to 2005 level

·                                 – VAT up from 21% to 22% in 2013, then 23% in 2014

·                                 – raise an extra 1.9bn euros from income tax

·                                 – abolition of some tax reliefs worth 755m euros

·                                 – real GDP to grow by an average of 2.75% from 2011 to 2014

            –  unemployment to fall from 13.5% to below 10% in 2014 

Denial Ain’t Just A River In Egypt

Bank Run In Ireland

The Irish government is still playing hard to get. Until yesterday, it  refused to concede that a bail out was needed – and that's remarkable given that the EU/ECB/IMF delegations were already on their way to Dublin. 

This morning the FT reports that that corporate customers have been pulling out their deposits from Irish banks, amid signs of fading confidence in the banking system. Irish Life & Permanent said corporate customers had withdrawn €600m, more than 11% of total deposits, during August and September. The FT report says there is evidence that another deposit crunch is happening right now, as confidence faded that the Irish banking sector is able to fund itself if, and when the ECB scales backs its emergency funding.  But even the  ECB funding had not been sufficient as Irish central bank had to provide €20bn in exceptional liquidity assistance outside the ECB programme. And, wait for it, Brian Lenihan, the Irish finance ministers, tells the world that the Irish banks had no funding difficulties.

Who or Hu Is In Charge?

Floyd Norris of the New York Times outlines (in two parts) the US/Chinese Dilemma:

November 12, 2010, 12:00 PM

Who Sets China’s Monetary Policy?

My column this morning mentions how upset the Chinese are with the Federal Reserve, but it does not discuss one very good reason they have to be upset:Ben Bernanke’s monetary policy is not what China needs these days. It needs to tighten, as is shown by rising inflation there.

So what? China can adopt its own monetary policy, can’t it?

Actually, that is not so easy. Having decided to tie its currency to the dollar, China has effectively allowed the Fed to set monetary policy there as well. But the Fed’s mandate does not extend to protecting the Chinese economy.

The impact of that is muted to some extent by the fact China’s economy is far from open. You and I cannot invest there as easily as we can in, say, Germany. If we could, there would be a surge of capital into China, driving up the value of the Chinese currency. But there is not an impenetrable wall between China and the West, and money does get in. China’s money supply has been rising rapidly. And that is likely to continue as long as it insists on ridiculous undervaluation of the currency.

In the long run, China may have to choose. Its currency can become more reasonably valued by rising against the dollar (and the euro, and the yen, andthe pound, and the won and so on and on) or it can become more reasonably valued through inflation and rising costs that reduce China’s competitiveness. 

and 

 

Who's in Charge of Determining U.S. Interest Rates? It May Be Beijing

May 19, 2005 | May 13, 2005

IN Washington these days, complaining about China has become standard operating procedure. The Bush administration calls on China to allow its currency to rise and Congress talks of punishment if China does not do so.

Be careful what you wish for.

As speeches of low-level Chinese bureaucrats are read with care for hints as to just when China will allow its currency to rise, perhaps it would be better for Americans to ponder the impact of China's current policies. Some might wonder just why the American politicians are upset. The way things work now, China sells to the world most everything the world wants and then buys United States Treasury securities. That helps hold down interest rates and stimulates consumer spending.

You can understand why China might not like to keep doing that forever. Those Treasury securities do not pay much interest, and they are sure to decline in value, measured in Chinese yuan, when that currency rises. But the largest vendor financing program ever has stimulated both the Chinese and American economies. In Washington, the theory is that China's keeping the yuan low increases America's trade deficit. But the benefits to United States exporters from a modest rise in the Chinese currency would most likely be small, while the effect of higher interest rates could be larger if China cut back on its purchases, particularly if other Asian central banks decided that they, too, wanted to sell dollars.

If that were to happen, the impact could be acute in the housing market. Investors in housing stocks have been nervous for some time, happy to see ever-higher profits but worried that the good times must end someday and fearful that they could be left holding the bag when that happens. One stock where those conflicting emotions have played out is Pulte Homes, a home builder active in 27 states. Last fall, its share price fell when it reported problems in Las Vegas, which was perhaps the most overheated market in America. But price cuts there got homes selling again, and the stock has resumed its ascent. Pulte filed its quarterly report with the Securities and Exchange Commission last week, disclosing that its inventory of land continues to grow. Some of that land is owned, while the rest is controlled via purchase options that give Pulte the right to walk away – forfeiting what it paid for the option – if home sales soften.

Kathleen Shanley, a bond analyst at Gimme Credit, points out that Pulte's inventory of land is concentrated in areas where home prices have been rising rapidly and that the company's cash flow is negative, even as profits soar, because of all the land it is buying. Pulte has been borrowing money even as it buys back stock at high prices. When things were at their worst in Las Vegas, Pulte was seeing cancellations of home purchases that amounted to 75 percent of new sales. "The risk of similar, and perhaps more prolonged, regional downturns should not be ignored," Ms. Shanley wrote in a note to clients. Rising interest rates could be a cause of such downturns. Homeowners with fixed-rate mortgages would be relatively immune, although they could find it harder to sell if they needed to, and the flow of cash from mortgage refinancings would dry up.

But many buyers, particularly in some of the hottest markets, have resorted to floating-rate mortgages, some of them paying only interest. Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve chairman, has less power over interest rates than he once did. Perhaps the real decision maker will be Hu Jintao, the Chinese president, as he weighs the pressures to free his currency and stop accumulating Treasury securities. In the words of Robert J. Barbera, the chief economist of ITG/Hoenig, "Hu's in charge here."

 

China’s Rate Hike In The Mundell Fleming Model

Analysis provided by Menzie Chinn on the occasion of China's last rate hike, March 18, 2007.

Attaining Internal and External Equilibrium in China

China raises rates again. What will higher rates do?

From Bloomberg:

China Cools Investment, Fails to Tame Trade Surplus (Update1)

By Nipa Piboontanasawat

March 19 (Bloomberg) — China, which raised interest rates for a third time in 11 months this weekend, is discovering that solving one of its two main economic problems makes the other one worse.

The interest rate increases and other measures are cooling investment in factories, real estate and other fixed assets, allowing Premier Wen Jiabao to claim partial victory in a fight against wasteful spending. At the same time, the trade surplus — which has pumped cash into the economy, fueling inflation and asset bubbles — is ballooning.

The People's Bank of China raised interest rates to the highest in almost eight years on March 17. By curbing investment, Wen has reduced demand for imported steel and cement for factories, exacerbating the trade imbalance and straining ties with the U.S.

"It's difficult to reduce both investment and the trade surplus," said Huang Yiping, chief Asia economist at Citigroup Inc. in Hong Kong. "You can do one but you'll see a rebound in the other."

Wen is concerned that building too many factories will leave the world's fastest-growing major economy vulnerable in a slowdown. The central bank has increased the amount of money lenders must set aside as reserves five times in eight months, sold bills to soak up cash, and restricted property investment.

See also coverage here: FTWSJ, and Macroblog.

Interestingly, the increase in the nominal interest rate is only offsetting, to a certain degree, accelerating inflation. This point is made in Figure 1.

chinamf1.gif 
Figure 1: Nominal (blue) and real one year lending rates (green). Real rates calculated by subtracting off lagged one year CPI inflation rates (quarterly averages of monthly year-on-year inflation rates). Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, and author's calculations.

I find it interesting to think about this issue in the context of the Mundell-Fleming model with low capital mobility. "Low capital mobility" is modeled as a small value for the parameter linking capital flows to interest differentials vis a vis developed market economies. I'll depict this characterization as a "BP=0 schedule" steeper than the LM curve.

winning1.gif

chinamf2.jpg 
Figure 2: Tightening of monetary policy.

Just to review, this is an demand side model, with prices assumed fixed (or sticky) for the period of analysis. The IS curve summarizes the relationship between interest rates and income for which income equals aggregate demand, for a given level of autonomous spending and real exchange rate. The LM curves summarizes the combinations of interest rates and incomes for which a given money supply equals money demand. The BP=0 curve includes all combinations of interest rates and income for which the current account and private capital account sum to zero, for a given real exchange rate. YFE is full employment output. As drawn, under quasi-pegged exchange rates, the country experiences a substantial balance of payments surplus; the LM is held in place by sterilization of reserve accumulation through the sales of monetary stabilization bonds.

The increase in the domestic interest rate (and the imposition of restrictive administrative measures) could be interpreted as a shift inward of the LM schedule. This leads to a reduced GDP at Y1 (or in dynamic terms, a slower growth rate), as desired by the authorities. But at the same time, the combination of reduced output and higher interest rates (now at i1) leads to an exacerbation of the external disequilibrium (a bigger balance of payments surplus, through an increase in the trade balance, and higher capital inflows), thereby illustrating Huang Yiping's assertion.

As many observers have noted, a more rapid appreciation of Chinese yuan — as shown in Figure 3 — could accomplish both aims of slower growth and less external imbalance more efficaciously.

chinamf3.jpg 
Figure 3: Accelerated real exchange rate appreciation.

A stronger yuan shifts up the BP=0 schedule and shifts in the IS schedule due to expenditure switching toward foreign goods (although the strength of this effect is subject to great uncertainty — see Marquez and SchindlerThorbecke and Chinn). Output is reduced down to full employment levels, while equilibrium interest rates fall to i2.

This then poses an interesting question: Why is it the Chinese authorities choose this route? The exchange rate route leads to a larger investment expenditure share, and smaller export sector, while the monetary tightening route leads to a smaller investment share and larger export base. It therefore appears that they value the export sector more than domestic investment. To the extent that Chinese authorities are wary about the quality Chinese capital investment, this might make sense. However, to justify the current (costly) approach, Chinese investment must be very low productivity indeed (which may be true — see Dollar and Wei). Or alternatively a yuan's worth of foreign demand might be perceived as inducing more employment than a yuan's worth of domestic investment.

On the other hand, maybe Chinese authorities are coming around to the need for more drastic appreciation. From Daily News and Analysis:

HONG KONG: Economic policy circles in China and Hong Kong are abuzz with speculation that Chinese authorities are preparing for a one-off 10% appreciation of the renminbi later this year as a "shock treatment" procedure to rein in the country’s soaring trade surplus and beat back currency speculators.

"The intriguing possibility that the authorities might be preparing for a second renminbi revaluation in the 10% range is gaining traction in policy circles," notes UBS chief Asia economist Jonathan Anderson.

How realistic, though?

"In the current environment, it's a small but rising possibility," notes Anderson. However, he acknowledges, this is an "unlikely scenario" – not only because there isn't sufficient political support for such a large discrete move but also because it's not clear that carrying out another revaluation would solve China's trade problem or end the currency speculation. …

So perhaps we may still have to wait a while more for "rebalancing".

 

China Is Putting On The Breaks

TUESDAY, OCT 19, 2010 13:48 ET BY ANDREW LEONARD

 

The Price Of Default

"We [Ireland[ are no longer a sovereign nation in any meaningful sense of that term" says Morgan Kelly, professor of economics at University College Dublin "From here on, for better or worse, we can only rely on the kindness of strangers." Kelly is known as Ireland's "Doctor Doom." He's got a long (depressing) piece on Irelands (mis)fortune entitled If you thought the bank bailout was bad, wait until the mortgage defaults hit home

 

Ireland’s Misery In A Nutshell

Ireland is poised to be the first country to tap into the European Financial Stability  Facility (EFSF)Self Evident has a good abstract of Ireland's demise:

 

Wake up and smell the Irish coffee

Why would Irish taxpayers cough up tens of billions of Euros to foreign banks? As this wonderful article from the Irish Times says:

Given the risk of national bankruptcy it entailed, what led the Government into this abject and unconditional surrender to the bank bondholders? I have been told that the Government’s reasoning runs as follows: “Europe will bail us out, just like they bailed out the Greeks. And does anyone expect the Greeks to repay?” 

Hilarious. But that is only half of the story; it gets better.

Since May, the largest purchaser of Irish government bonds has been the ECB. In fact, they are now the single largest holder of Irish debt. But in mid-October, the ECB suddenly stopped buying.

The Economist:

At a European Union summit last month Germany won agreement to rewrite EU treaties to allow for a permanent scheme to deal with stricken euro-zone borrowers—including, it hopes, a mechanism for an orderly sovereign default. At that summit Jean-Claude Trichet, the head of the European Central Bank, warned EU leaders that talk of debt restructuring was likely to unsettle bond markets and drive up the borrowing costs of troubled euro-zone countries. So it proved.

In other words, the (French) head of the ECB warns Germany that their plan will “unsettle bond markets” and “drive up borrowing costs”. Immediately thereafter, the ECB halts all purchases of Irish bonds, causing Irish bond yields to skyrocket. Holy cow, Trichet is a seer! “So it proved.” Ha, ha.

Basically, the country of Ireland is just a toy for Eurozone technocrat games.

Although things seem to be spinning out of control. Irish bond yields are hitting new records daily, and starting this week, the carnage has been across the curve. Not only is the 10-year near 9%, but even the2-year is approaching 7%.

Oh, and Portugal is in trouble, too.