GLOBAL ORDER AND LOCAL RESISTANCE: STRUCTURE, CULTURE, AND RATIONALITY IN THE BATTLE OF SEATTLE

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INTRODUCTION

Globalization means that today's markets, cultures, and politics operate not only within countries but also among them. A common and complementary set of global interests (e.g., neoliberalism), identities (e.g., Westernization), and institutions (e.g., democracy) are solidifying in today's world. Some, like Fukuyama, applaud these developments and see them as the end of history.

Others see the developments as bad. Structure represses difference, the dissidents argue, and the drive toward unity devalues and marginalizes, and silences and excludes, those who deny the normality, consensus, and coherence of the new totality. The globalization of interests, identities, and institutions has therefore spawned a variety of grievances against the new global order. Believing that globalization comes at a price and that they are the losers (and given hysteresis, experience their pain more intensely than the winners experience their joy), diverse groups in civil society seek protection against certain cross-border flows and the institutions encouraging them. The dissidents believe, moreover, that all structures are fragmented, protean, and incomplete, and hence that all structures can be deconstructed. Globalization is therefore not inevitable and irreversible but can be diverted or stopped. Since antiglobalization activists see themselves as agents who shape outcomes, globalization has produced social struggles and political conflicts that challenge the consolidation, stability, and performance of newer democracies embracing globalization and of older democracies moving toward globalization.

Although globalization is contested by those coming from different normative standpoints, one empirical consequence of globalization seems unmistakable: While the cold war was characterized by the localization of global conflicts - national struggles became proxy wars fought between the United States and the Soviet Union - the new world order is characterized by the globalization of local conflicts - resistance movements today increasingly frame, interpret, and attribute their grievances to neoliberal globalization and its governing institutions. In a world composed of states, protest is always influenced by national economies and governments and yet is always deflected by the global context.

To demonstrate this last point, we study a global social movement (GSM) that has emerged over the last decade to challenge the dominant model of economic globalization. People with different material interests, group identities, and global ideals feel threatened by free trade and the World Trade Organization (WTO), specifically, and the policies and institutions of neoliberalism, more generally. The Battle of Seattle, in which activists fought the WTO, was thus a conflict over global governance: institutions designed by rational actors from above - international institutions in global orders and developmental coalitions in embedded states - were challenged from below by rational actors who constructed their own novel global institution - a rainbow protest coalition that networked different group claims into a common global struggle. In addition, the rainbow coalition innovated a template for social protest – a major protest campaign at meetings of Multilateral Economic Institutions (MEIs) tied to simultaneous solidarity actions around

the globe. Since the mid-1990s several "Battles of Seattles" have thus occurred (e.g., at G-8 meetings in 1998, 1999, and 2001; IMF/World Bank Meetings in Washington D.C. and Prague in 2000; and Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in Quebec in 2001). To explain how this rainbow protest coalition mobilized, we explain what was behind it: the challenges to embedded liberalism (Ruggie) and the institutional conflicts and structural contradictions of the Neoliberal Institutional Trilemma or NIT (Rodrik) that are producing differerent types of people opposed to globalization and thereby driving processes of social movement (NGO, INGO) formation in global civil society. We thus work with a funnel of causality (Table 1) linking structure to culture to rationality, or connecting global institutions to antiglobalization orientations to protest activities, thereby showing how the global political economy (structure) produces differences in (culture) in and dilemmas for (rationality) the antiglobalization protest coalition.

Table 1:
Explaining the Battle of Seattle



The paper is organized as follows. Part I discusses the Battle of Seattle. Part II begins our explanation with structure. It shows that there were many Battles of Seattles, fought over time and in various cities around the world. The Battle of Seattle was thus part of a series of protests against the international institutions in today's global order and developmental coalitions in today's embedded states. Part III turns to culture. The rationally constructed global order threatens different material interests, social identities, and global ideals. To understand how people with these diverse antiglobalization orientations converged into a global protest coalition that challenged global institutions (i.e., the reproduction of the structure), Part IV turns to rationality. What mobilization

strategies did the rainbow protest coalition use? We explore how the Seattle coalition mobilized its supporters and overcame its collective action problem of a diverse global social movement. This is the pivotal section of the paper: previous parts move backward to culture and institutions and subsequent parts move forward to the intended and unintended consequences of the protest coalition's agency.

Part V thus considers factional challenges to the rainbow protest coalition. We raise the question, Will there be there endless Battles of Seattles? Part VI draws some conclusions about the centrality of protest coalitions to global order and local resistance.

Table 2:

Reported Protests, Protesters and Arrests in the Battle of Seattle



Date	Protest Events	Arrests	Protesters
11/22/99	1	3	36
11/23/99	0	0	0
11/24/99	1	0	5
11/25/99	0	0	0
11/26/99	3	0	200
11/27/99	2	6	153
11/28/99	4	0	1175
11/29/99	11	9	18277
11/30/99	38	68	50000
12/1/99	20	500	7600
12/2/99	7	0	6650
12/3/99	5	0	2320
12/4/99	1	0	200
12/5/99	1	0	300

I. THE BATTLE OF SEATTLE: N29-D3, 1999

Table 2 shows the number of protest events, arrests, and protesters during the Battle of Seattle.[1] While these numbers are useful, let us narrate the actions.[2]

On N29 (the protesters' term for Monday, November 29, 1999) a coalition of 2,200 labor, environmental, economic justice, religious, student, and other activists marched in a Sierra Club demonstration against the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings occurring in Seattle. That evening the coalition led by Jubilee2000 (a group that wants to forgive developing countries' debts) held a march that drew 10,000-14,000 participants.

Protest expanded rapidly on N30. Approximately 9,000 dockworkers of the West Coast International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) shut down major ports along the West coast for 4-8 hours. 700-800 Boeing unionists and many Seattle taxi drivers staged a sympathy strike. Meanwhile, two marches by a reported 8,000 to 10,000 protesters converged on downtown Seattle in the early morning and blocked intersections, impeding WTO delegate mobility from the Westin, Sheraton, and Hilton hotels near the Washington State Convention and Trade Center. By late morning anarchist groups began vandalizing highly visible corporate and financial targets – boutiques along Sweatshop Row (Nordstrom's, The Gap, Old Navy, Banana Republic, Nike, and Adidas) and Starbucks and McDonalds – in the downtown area. A massive 20,000-30,000 person AFL-CIO labor rally ended in the early afternoon and was followed by another mass march.

The smaller protests and demonstrations occurring simultaneously with the street sit-ins and marches created an atmosphere in which it appeared that anti-WTO activists had successfully occupied downtown Seattle. The opening ceremony of the WTO conference in the Paramount Theater was cancelled, handing the protesters a major early victory.

By late afternoon, the authorities, at the urging of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (trapped in her Seattle hotel) and Attorney General Janet Reno, decided to crackdown on the protesters before President Clinton's arrival in Seattle. Police in full riot gear used tear-gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets, and stun-grenades to disperse activists from the downtown area. They were highly effective: After making around 50 arrests, by nightfall they were engaged only in small skirmishes in the outlying neighborhoods to which they had pushed the activists. In the early evening Governor Gary Locke, Mayor Paul Schell, and Police Chief Norm Stamper declared a state of civil emergency that involved a curfew from 7pm to 7am, a 20-block (later extended to 46 block) "no protest zone," and the calling of 200 National Guard and 300 state troopers to the streets of Seattle.

Demonstrations, sit-ins, and arrests continued D1 and D2. On the evening of D3 the WTO leadership announced that they did not have enough consensus on key trade

issues to sign the agreement they had planned to approve in Seattle. Activists celebrated in the streets.

In sum, the Battle of Seattle between Monday, November 30 and Friday, December 3, 1999 (N30-D3) involved around 3,000 official delegates and 2,000 journalists outnumbered by 50,000 demonstrators who, organized in over 500 protest groups, were responsible for a 4-day closure of the retail district in downtown Seattle, $3 million in property damage, and a WTO meeting that broke up in failure. While some recent demonstrations in the U.S. (e.g., the 750,000-person march for a nuclear freeze in New York City in June of 1982, the million-person marches in Washington, D.C.) have drawn more people and some have been more violent (e.g., the L.A. riots), the Battle of Seattle is unique in recent American history. Not since the antiwar protests of the late 1960s has America seen such a large and diverse coalition of dissidents sustain several days of protest in a major city in the face of the criminalization of protest and the massive deployment of police, sheriff, FBI, and national guard units.

II. STRUCTURE

We will first consider some stylized facts about other Battles of Seattles. We then advance a structural explanation of antiglobalization protest and show its limitations.

A. Stylized Facts: The Battles of Seattles

How should we think about and then explain the Battle of Seattle? In other words, what is the Battle of Seattle a case of and how do we develop a theory of the case?

The events in Seattle are paradigmatic of a type of social conflict in the modern world. Rather than a narrow, one-shot, and local affair - protests limited in participants, time, and space - there are, in fact, two sets of Battles of Seattles being fought by a rainbow coalition: A continuing series of protests against global institutions and simultaneously organized protests in cities in the North and the South.

Table 3:
The Campaign for Global Justice -
A Global Social Movement Vs. Multilateral Economic Institutions

episode no	start date	location	international meeting	participants
1.	Jan-94	Washington D.C.	WB Meeting	
2.	23-Aug-96	London, England	WTO	200
3.	06-Dec-96	Singapore, Singapore	WTO Meeting	50
4.	15-Oct-97	Geneva/India	WTO Meeting	5000
5.	27-Nov-97	Vancouver, Canada	APEC Meeting	3000
6.	07-Dec-97	Kyoto, Japan	UNCCC Meeting	20000
7.	26-Jan-98	Washington D.C.	IMF Meeting	
8.	11-Feb-98	Tapei, Taiwan	WTO Integration	5000
9.	01-Apr-98	Montreal and Paris	MAI	500
10.	16-Apr-98	Washington D.C.	IMF/WB Meetings	50
11.	11-May-98	Kiev, Ukraine	EBRD	10
12.	16-May-98	Birmingham and world	G-8 Summit	3000
13.	02-Oct-98	Washington D.C.	IMF/WB Meeting	200
14.	11-Mar-99	Geneva	WTO Meeting	128
15.	12-Jun-99	Cologne and World	G-8 Meeting	50000
16.	07-Sep-99	Auckland, New Zealand	APEC Meeting	400
17.	15-Sep-99	Seattle and world	WTO Meeting	100000
18.	26-Sep-99	Washington D.C.	IMF Meeting	50
19.	31-Oct-99	Toronto, Canada	FTAA Meeting	300
20.	24-Nov-99	New Delhi, India	World Bank	300
21.	24-Nov-99	Manila, Philipines	ASEAN Meeting	
22.	25-Nov-99	Paris, France	WTO Meeting	5000
23.	28-Nov-99	Mexico City	NAFTA	500
24.	11-Jan-00	Washington D.C.	IMF/WB Meeting	25000
25.	30-Jan-00	Davos, Switzerland	WTO Meetings	500
26.	13-Feb-00	Bangkok, Thailand	UNCTAD Meeting	4000
27.	08-May-00	Chiang Mai, Thailand	ADB Meeting	4000

28.	04-Jun-00	Windsor and Detroit	OAS Meetings	5000
29.	10-Jun-00	Brussels, Belgium	UNICE Meeting	1500
30.	11-Jun-00	Calgary, Canada	World Petroleum Congress	3000
31.	21-Jul-00	Okinawa, Japan	G-8 Meeting	5000
32.	06-Sep-00	New York	UN Summit	
33.	11-Sep-00	Melbourne, Australia	WEF Meetings	12000
34.	25-Sep-00	Prague, Czech	IMF Meetings	20000
35.	08-Oct-00	Seoul, South Korea	ASEM Meeting	40000
36.	23-Oct-00	Montreal, Canada	G20 meeting	5000
37.	16-Nov-00	Cincinnati, Ohio	TABD Meeting	1000
38.	06-Dec-00	Nice, France	EU Meeting	60000
39.	25-Jan-01	Davos, Switzerland and Porto Alegre, Brazil	WEF Meeting	20000
40.	18-Feb-01	Istanbul, Turkey	G20 Meeting	70
41.	26-Feb-01	Cancun, Mexico	WEF Meeting	1000
42.	15-Mar-01	Santiago, Chile	IADB Meeting	500
43.	17-Mar-01	Naples, Italy	GF Meeting	20000
44.	24-Mar-01	Stockholm, Sweden	EU Meeting	3500
45.	29-Mar-01	Montreal, Canada	FTAA Meeting	700
46.	06-Apr-01	Buenos Aires, Argentina	FTAA Meeting	7000
47.	19-Apr-01	Quebec City, Canada	FTAA Summit	30000
48.	29-Apr-01	Washington D.C.	IMF/WB Meeting	1000
49.	09-May-01	Honolulu, Hawaii	ADB Meeting	
50.	15-Jun-01	Gothenburg, Sweden	EU Meeting	
51.	25-Jun-01	Barcelona, Spain	WB Meeting	
52.	30-Jun-01	Salzburg, Austria	WEF Meeting	
53.	20-Jul-01	Genoa, Italy	WB Meeting	
54.	28-Sep-01	Washington D.C.	IMF Meeting	

Legend:

ADB Asian Development Bank
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
ASEM Asia European Meeting
EU European Union
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas
G20 20 Largest Economies in World
G8 Eight Largest Economies in World
GF Global Forum
IADB Interamerican Development Bank
IMF International Monetary Fund
MAI Multilateral Agreement on Investment
OAS Organization of American States
TABD Transatlantic Business Dialogue
UN United Nations Meeting
UNCCC United Nations Conference on Climate Change
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNICE Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe
WB World Bank
WEF World Economic Forum
WPC World Petroleum Conference
WTO World Trade Organization

The Battle of Seattle was therefore merely the most visible episode – the tip of the iceberg – in a series of protests that pits proponents of "top-down-globalization," that is, sponsors of multilateral economic institutions (MEI) associated with efforts to create a neoliberal world order, against advocates of "bottom-up-globalization," that is, activists in a global social movement (GSM) who contest neoliberalism.[3] As Table 3 shows, this GSM has used the political opportunities created by international meetings of such MEIs as the WTO, IMF, and WB to protest neoliberal globalization. The Battle of Seattle was thus preceded by many other protests, for example, against a G-8 meeting in Cologne; it was followed by many more protests, for example against meetings of the IMF/WB in Washington D.C., the IMF in Prague, the EU in Nice, and the April 2001 FTAA meeting in Quebec City.

Table 4:
Cities With Protest Events During the Battle of Seattle Episode

USA	NORTH	SOUTH
New York, New York	Australia	Cambodia
Montpelier, Vermont	Brisbane	Phan Phen
Boston, MA	Melbourne	India
	Canada	Punjab
Grand Rapids, Michigan	Vancouver	Patna
Philadelphia,	Ottowa	Bihar
Pennsylvania	Toronto	Calcutta
Scranton, Pennsylvania	Edmonton	Hyderabad
	Toronto	Andhra Pradesh
Washington D.C.	Montreal	Guntur
Baltimore, Maryland	Czech Republic	Sharapatnam
Nashville, Tennessee	Prague	Bangalore
Memphis, Tennessee	France	Anjar
Morgantown, West	Paris	New Delhi
Virginia	Bayonne	Mexico
Louisville, Kentucky	Rennes	Mexico City
	Le Puy-en-Velay	Pakistan
Chapel Hill, North	Manosque	Muzafer Ghar
Carolina	Bourges	Philippines
Hattiesburg, Mississippi	La Rochelle	Manila
Atlanta, Georgia	Narbonne	Bacolod
	La Reunion	Iloilo
Austin, Texas	Marseilles	South Africa
Tucson, Arizona	Toulouse	Capetown
	Lyon	Sri Lanka
Anaheim, California	Nantes	Colombo
Santa Rosa, California	Bourdeaux	
Santa Cruz, California	Grenoble	
Port Hueneme, California	Le Mans	
Los Angeles, California	Dijon	
San Francisco, California	Strasbourg	
Long Beach, California	Germany	
Oakland, California	Berlin	
Tocama, Washington	Teubingen	
	Great Britain	
	Oxford (England)	
	London (England)	
	Totnes (England)	
	Halifax (England)	
	Leeds (England)	
	Manchester (England)	
	Cardiff (Wales)	

	Bangor (Wales) Holland Amsterdam Hong Kong Iceland Ireland Limerick Israel Tel Aviv Italy Padua Milan Rome Japan Tokyo Spain Madrid South Korea Seoul Switzerland Geneva	

While Battles of Seattles were distributed over time, they were also distributed over space. As Table 4 shows, over two dozen cities in the U.S., approximately four dozen cities in sixteen countries in the North, and over a dozen cities in seven countries in the South experienced Battles of Seattles - protest events explicitly designed to coincide with the events in Seattle. Antiglobalization protest, in short, was globalized.

B. The Neoliberal Institutional Trilemma

Although the Battle of Seattle was accompanied by protests in nearly 100 other cities around the world, and even though it was preceded by months of planning and years of anti-globalization protests, the events in Seattle were largely unexpected outside of the protest community. The policy makers associated with the new neoliberal global order - the WTO, WB, and IMF – were shocked by the level of antiglobalization protest. The theorists of the new neoliberal global order - rational choice theorists in political science and related theorists in economics – also underestimated the extent, intensity, and duration of antiglobalization protests. The theorists' reactions are important because globalization is supported from above by an intellectual vision as much as it is driven from below by a spontaneous and decentralized market. Globalization, that is, involves a conscious process of restructuring and reconstituting the global political economy - molding international, regional, national, and local institutions to serve the increasing economic integration of the world.

An example of this program may be found in the WB's 1997 *World Development Report: The State in a Changing World*. This document embraces many ideas from the New Institutional Economics and thus represents the latest update of mainstream development thinking,. As the report (p. 11) says: **"Globalization is a threat to weak or capriciously governed states. But it also opens the way for effective, disciplined states to foster development and economic well-being, and it sharpens the need for effective international cooperation in pursuit of global collective action."** We will now parse this statement in a way consistent with the entire text.

The underlying argument of contemporary neoliberal thought is that the causes of economic development can be found in markets with the correct institutional underpinnings – i.e., states that adopt the proper role in development. North, Weingast, and Bates (see Bueno de Mesquita and Root, Bates 2001) argue that institutions are constructed to increase economic prosperity or wealth – they have, in other words, distributive purposes. The correct institutional underpinnings to markets assure credible commitments to property rights. States that cannot enforce contracts and secure property rights provide insufficient foundations for markets and are thus plagued by redistributive struggles that prevent national economic growth. Marxists always thought that trick under capitalism was to keep capitalists, entrepreneurs, and the bourgeoisie investing and that this task is accomplished by reducing the risks of the state expropriating, confiscating, or taxing away the profits from investments. Neoliberals agree and therefore trace the great comparative and historical divergence in the economic performance of states – the great differences in wealth between, say, Germany and

Argentina, to competition that weeds out inferior institutions and rewards successful institutions with survival. In countries that remain extremely poor, in other words, the transaction costs of abandoning inefficient institutions must be relatively high compared to the costs in states that have made a successful transition to more efficient institutions. These neoliberals therefore study the creation, evolution, and consequences of the stable and efficient institutional underpinnings of cooperative exchange and production.

Since international and domestic violence wastes resources and increases the risks of investing in capital stocks, credible commitments to property rights entail controlling violence. This leads to two additional ways to parse the WB's statement.

A strand of neoliberal thought maintains that world peace can be promoted by international agreements backed by international institutions. (Neo)realism always focused on power and coercion and (neo)liberalism always emphasized voluntary agreements. As the debate in the international relations literature between Waltz and his followers and Keohane and his followers evolved, neorealism and neoliberalism developed into the neo-neo synthesis (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1999). The argument is that peace under a system of sovereign states, although always at risk due to states seeking absolute and relative advantage, can be advanced by the sort of liberal international institutionalism championed by Woodrow Wilson. International institutions that assure free international trade thus also assure the world peace that is the foundation of free trade.

And there is a strand of neoliberal thought that seeks the causes of social order, political authority, and internal domestic stability. The idea is that globalization has undoubted economic benefits but also produces domestic costs in terms of losers and in terms of turbulence in the world economy - production trends, macroeconomic cycles, and financial shocks - that challenge national economies. Given the downside of globalization, can a state have domestic tranquility without authoritarian levels of social control, totalitarian amounts of cultural hegemony, and dictatorial methods of maintaining political power? The answer, of course, is that the correct institutional arrangement is democracy. Only a democracy can manage economic openness and allow states to seize the opportunities and to reduce the costs of globalization. It does this by managing conflict. Democracy is in fact a social contract among groups that mediates distributive conflicts in civil society, thereby producing the consultation, compromise, cooperation, and consensus which result in policy bargains (e.g., macroeconomic policies) that are stable, timely, coherent, efficient, and effective. The new democracies in the South, as well as the older ones in the North, can therefore co-opt civil society into the new neoliberal world order so that citizen-voters can see its benefits of peace and prosperity. This absence of internal violence, along with world peace, assures credible commitments to property rights.

There is a crucial link to the other two desiderata: The ability of capital to produce prosperity via long-term investment rests on its legitimation via an authority system (democracy) that can produce credible commitments to investors (i.e., they can keep their profits). Democracy and markets, in turn, underlay international institutions supporting

peace – the democratic peace and liberal internationalism arguments so fashionable in the current international relations literature. Conversely, Leviathan - authoritarian domination in which winners rule over losers - is antithetical to world peace because authoritarian states fight one another. It is also antithetical to prosperity because Leviathan is so strong that it cannot make credible commitments about property rights. And it is antithetical to domestic stability because authoritarian states rule by force and fraud; they will be resisted by their people; in the end a new ruling group will also capture power by force and fraud; and, force and fraud, in turn, prevent long-term investment and thus hurt prosperity.

We thus have three interrelated institutions that manufacture three interrelated public goods: states embedded in the global order create national economic prosperity, which is supported by international institutions that create world peace and democracy that creates stable civil societies. Neoliberals thus have three desiderata: world peace or external security, economic prosperity or the growth of wealth, and domestic stability or internal order. Institution builders such as the Prince thus face a Machiavellian state (elites interested in maintaining and expanding their power) in a Hobbesian world (anarchy of states) and thus must build an international order, a political economy, and an authority system. Looked at from the point of view of the people rather than the powerful, citizens demand that governments supply institutions to maximize external security (peace not war), maximize efficiency (growth not stagnation), and minimize social control (representation not repression).

Entire social scientific research programs follow. Global peace results from international institutions (the liberal institutionalism argument) that encourage free trade in global markets (the Pax Kapital or economic openness argument) and political democracy (the democratic peace argument). Economic prosperity results from political democracy (the social contract argument) and free markets (the property rights argument) that are supported by international institutions (the Wilsonian argument). Finally, political stability results from the national economic prosperity that comes from the free international trade engaged in by a democratic state. In all three social science literatures, neoliberals argue the static proposition that structure influences performance and the dynamic argument that a liberal economy, democratic polity, and peaceful foreign policy develop in concert over time.

Policy analysis also follows. Neoliberals claim that international institutions can provide externally-induced discipline for states by forcing them to make credible commitments to democracy (retain civil liberties) and markets (keep economic and political reforms). The "hopeful proposition" that "democracy, the market and growth can go together in developing and transition economies" is thus "strongly ensconced" in U.S. foreign policy and in MEIs. Free trade regimes in fact threaten the protectionist state that is the basis of authoritarianism. NAFTA, for example, has helped erode the base of one-party rule in Mexico

Nonetheless, the neoliberals are advancing a Fukuyama-like argument: The end of history, the last social system the perpetual polity, is a neoliberal world order – a

democratic peace supported by and supporting democracy and markets. Solingen (1998: 288) thus wonders about the all-good-things-go-together" or "synergy illusion." Can institutions move in different directions, have their separate logics, and contain processes that in tension with one another?

Table 5:
The Neoliberal Institutional Trilemma (Ruggie and Rodrik)



We shall call the illusion, displayed in Table 5, the Neoliberal Institutional Trilemma (NIT), or the impossible trinity of an integrated global economy (strong MEIs), independent states (strong developmental coalition that can make and implement national economic policies), and active civil societies (conventional democratic politics that allows protectionist groups to influence the state). The problem is that while states want international institutions to promote economic efficiency, mass publics demand that their governments safeguard them. Neoliberals therefore can have two but not three things at once.

> **Yesterday.** Independent states + active civil societies = Bretton Woods compromise. Under weakly integrated national economies, relatively independent nation states had conventional political parties that could satisfy the demands of civil society for protection against the global economy. Traditional mass politics thereby limited activist protest against limited economic globalization.
>
> **Tomorrow.** Integrated national economies + active civil societies = global federalism. Under completely integrated national economies, active civil societies could bypass the state and take their demands for protection against the global economy directly to global governance structures. Global democracy, under this vision, could also thereby limit activist protest against extensive economic globalization.
>
> **Today.** Integrated national economies + independent states = a golden straightjacket. Under integrating national economies, independent nation states are constrained to pursue neoliberal policies. Since conventional political parties

> do not satisfy demands for protection against the global economy, civil societies circumvent the golden straightjacket imposed on conventional mass politics by engaging in activist protest against extensive economic globalization.

Rodrik (p. 352) thus formalizes Ruggie's arguments about embedded liberalism as follows:

> If we want democratically active civil societies, we can have either integrated national economies or independent states.
>
> If we want integrated national economies, we can have either independent states or democratically active civil societies.
>
> If we want independent states, we can have either integrated national economies or democratically active civil societies.

Hence, there are two important tradeoffs:

> For a given level of integrated national economies, the more independent the states, the less active the democratic civil societies.
>
> For a given level of independent nation states, the more integrated the national economy, the less active the democratic civil society.

Many critics therefore wonder whether neoliberal institutions can indeed secure peace, prosperity, and stability. The critics suggest that cooperation among different interests to produce international organizations, economic markets, and political democracy are insufficient explanations for their existence because these institutions are based on and support exploitation and inequality, power and domination, hierarchy and control. International regimes of openness, for example, are a function of the most powerful states that create them. The result of institution-building is as likely to be social conflict *about* these institutions as it is to be social order *because* of these institutions. A series of questions thus need to be asked: Why should neoliberal institutions end redistributive conflicts? Are not conflicts over institutions as endless as the conflicts within any particular institution that might be designed? Don't the powerful and the powerless fight each other with all means possible regardless of the institutional arrangement? And how could such a neoliberal order come into being without conflicts involving the dismantling of older institutional arrangements and the creation of new ones?

And here is where antiglobalization protest becomes relevant: *If neoliberalism is the best of all possible worlds, why were so many people in Seattle complaining?* The answer is indeed *institutions*. The Battle of Seattle was a fight about the WTO and global governance. The anti-WTO protesters thus disputed neoliberal claims about the institutions that constitute the best of all possible worlds. While neoliberals did not try to explain events like the Battle of Seattle, and it can be argued that neoliberals might see

the protests as short-run inconveniences, at a deeper level the events reveal how the contradictions in their ideas are the source of the disruption of their plans.

More specifically, while the neoliberal global order might lead to peace (although critics claim that competition among capitalist states is more likely than cooperation among them), and might even lead to prosperity (although critics claim that in the race to the bottom, the rich get richer and few benefits trickle down to the poor), the neoliberal global order has produced political instability because it generates redistributive conflicts over the democracy of its institutions.

Neoliberal rhetoric about democracy exceeds the neoliberal grasp because neoliberal globalization puts democracy in a golden straightjacket, constructed by international and state institutions, that forces political parties to the median voter while opening up civil society to the proliferation of special interests. In a democracy, that is, neoliberalism contracts political (electoral) space - openness to international trade forecloses Keynesian macroeconomic policies and welfare state social policies - while neoliberalism expands social (civil society) space - issues of trade, neoliberalism, and capitalism involve more and more constituencies. The spread of democracy, at least a rhetorical part of NIT, has also contributed to the rise of civil society through the call for participation, accountability, and transparency. As cosmopolitan and international consciousness rise, the policy agenda widens even further as more voices demand access.

In sum, neoliberals are so concerned about cooperation among states to achieve peace and prosperity that they fail to recognize how nonelite participation can disrupt global governance. They are, in short, overly optimistic about the political sustainability under democracy of MEIs and state-led developmental coalitions supporting neoliberalism: Since democracy offers civil society the public space to lobby the state for the private and public goods that neoliberals detest, neoliberals cannot eat their democratic cake and also have their MEIs and state-led developmental coalitions that support economic globalization. Democracy is thus only a late, partial, and somewhat inconsistent addition to the neoliberal institutional equilibrium.

This analytical argument about the political contradictions of NIT may be best understood by supplying some historical context. The nineteenth century is often thought to be the high-point of pure liberalism – the laissez-faire, self-regulating market. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, liberal economic and political institutions were challenged by reformist and revolutionary movements. The argument made against liberalism was that global markets are subject to uncontrollable trends, cycles, and shocks and are therefore volatile and unmanageable. As markets disintegrate, moreover, they destabilize the economy, society, culture, and politics.

Two institutions were devised to replace pure liberalism and provide needed public goods: The gold standard encouraged free trade and economic openness among states and the liberal state managed internal (class) conflict within states. Both institutions failed. The interwar years saw protectionist economic conflicts among states and illiberal social movements that produced democratic instability.

After the war, the gold standard and the liberal state developed into what Ruggie called embedded liberalism.[4] The gold standard evolved into the Bretton Woods system to manage free trade among states. Behind this open global trading system was the idea that states must create global institutions to regulate an international regime of openness. The liberal state evolved into the Keynesian state and the welfare state. Such a state, that is, was supposed to stabilize aggregate demand (Keynesian demand management to help the unemployed) and to compensate via side-payments the losers from free trade (welfare state to help the poor). "Keynesian social interventions therefore can be interpreted as side payments to domestic actors hurt by the multilateral trade regime established at Breton Woods" (Hart and Prakash 2000: 101). Or, "Societies that expose themselves to greater amounts of external risk demand (and receive) a larger government role as shelter from the vicissitudes of global markets" (Rodrik 1997: 53). The modern democratic state in the West thus developed in the postwar period to cushion the deleterious effects of global markets. It was therefore recognized that liberalization promotes allocative efficiency but support for it rests on a sense of distributive justice; people support net welfare increases so long as mechanisms of redistribution are in place. Keynesian welfare states, in short, dampen protests against purely market-driven allocations of resources.

Postwar western democracies thus tried to combine market and state, economic exchange and social cohesion, the advantages of free trade plus the advantages of protection against the market. The result was Keynes at home and Smith abroad - an illiberal domestic economy in a liberal world economy.

The short story since the early 1980s has been neoliberalism. Beginning with Thatcherism and Reaganism, economic globalization has challenged the embedded liberalism social contract. Western states, to one degree or another, have lessened their dependence on Keynesian demand management and have undergone a retrenchment of their welfare states. Monetarism has thus seemingly defeated Keynesianism and flexible Anglo-Saxon capitalism appears to have defeated Eurosclerosis and East Asian cronyism.

In sum: In both the North and the South, neoliberal globalization upsets social contracts and political pacts which are often not replaced by legitimate, stable, and effective internationalist governing coalitions. As Solingen (p. 52) writes, "the net result of the political dynamics of nondistributive internationalist coalitions can be summed up in a paradox: such coalitions – prodded by international economic institutions – may plant the seeds of their own destruction when they pursue myopic self-interests." Those who benefited from earlier bargains protest their states' new developmental coalitions that have abandoned protectionism and embraced neoliberal globalization. State-level internationalist coalitions pursuing neoliberal developmental policies thereby often trigger the most major and visible outbreaks of state-level protest. France and India experienced the most protests in Table 4 because these countries historically are statist industrializers who are now undergoing painful neoliberal adjustment. The implication is clear: Internationalist governing coalitions can produce illegitimate governments, social conflicts, coalitional instability, and authoritarian tendencies – that is, democratic

instability – when confronted by economic crises and constraints that induce neoliberal development policies. Unless they broaden the beneficiaries of neoliberal globalization, internationalist governing coalitions will lose political support.

The anti-WTO protesters, unlike the neoliberals, understand that institutions produce the benefits of global peace and national economic prosperity (if these are indeed the benefits) only at the cost of social movements in civil society that aim to overturn those institutions. As the global order constrains the prosperity-seeking internationalist but democratic state to pursue neoliberal policies, or to overturn the embedded liberalism compromise, the NIT fragments. The contradictions between global order and the state are then played out in the third sphere where protest groups in global and national civil society undermine democratic stability. The political and economic institutions that are rationally constructed to assure prosperity help produce the political instability that damages prosperity. The unintended consequences of institution building thus overwhelm their designers' intentions, eventually trapping them in an iron cage of their own making.

Globalization therefore generates resistance movements in two ways. First: Deepening economic integration and interdependence creates new global, regional, national, and local cleavages that shape new forms of conflict. Global authority, critics therefore claim, leads to marginalization, exclusion, domination, discrimination, oppression, exploitation, and stratification. These in turn lead to redistributive conflicts, zero-sum struggles, winners/losers framing, inequality, fractionalization, polarization, and ultimately local resistance to the global order. Second: The new institutions of global governance that are being created to manage the global economy are altering local-national-regional-global linkages and thereby generating conflicts over the new rules. And these forces produce dissent, as we will show below, because dissidents use the rationally-constructed institutions to rationally solve their collective action problems.[5]

C. Critique

While this line of reasoning – given independent states, international economic integration begets democratically activist civil societies that protest economic globalization - is broadly compelling, there are three very important caveats about the activism of civil society in the wake of the decay of embedded liberalism. First, people also protest *for* neoliberalism – populist neoliberal coalitions, in other words, exist. While support for neoliberalism is usually organized from above, Solingen (p. 24) notes that internationalist reform from below can include "organized reformist political groups facing sclerotic state agencies resistant to change, as in Itamar Franco's Brazil and Leonid Kravchuk's Ukraine." Supporters of neoliberal globalization can thus also take to the streets. In the Asian fiscal crisis, for example, Haggard reports that a progressive, market-oriented coalition often generated populist middle-class street protests in support of economic reformist leaders and parties (e.g., Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia, Kim Dae Jung in South Korea, Megawati in Indonesia, Chuan Leekon in Thailand, and Ramos in Philippines). This coalition sought the introduction of market reforms and business

regulations (accountable and transparent government-business relations, more competition, an end to subsidies) as an antidote to mismanaged neoliberalism (deregulation that brought corruption, cronyism, and nepotism). Change was justified in terms of good government, democracy, and fairness and supported by minority electoral parties seeking to challenge the dominant parties that maintain hegemony through the rent-seeking system that they designed. Haggard notes that these movements are similar to the U.S. progressives of the early twentieth century. And going further back in history, one can note that protests for free trade include American colonists in 1773 at the Boston Tea Party. Aaronson (chap 2) points out that "no taxation without representation" meant no British-imposed tariffs on Americans; it was a protest against British trade policies, especially taxes on imported goods, that continued the 1764 nonimportation boycott. And protest for free trade also occurred in Britain: the Corn Laws (repealed in 1846), which taxed grain imports and thus raised the costs of food, hurt urban workers and favored the land-owning aristocracy.[6]

Second, people do not always protest *against* neoliberalism: democratic civil societies do not always resist neoliberal policies brought about by independent states under economic interdependence and globalization. Weyland and Roberts demonstrate that the examples of Menchem in Argentina, Collor in Brazil, and Fujimora in Peru show that populism is not only associated with lower-class backlash against austerity, inequalities, and the market insecurities brought about by neoliberalism. Liberalism and populism are not incompatible and some neoliberals are neopopulists. Such neoliberal populism can elicit mass heterogeneous support by mobilizing the unorganized poor (who lack the capacity to rent-seek) in the informal sector of cities. The poor may well oppose the special interests and clout of business groups and all organized groups in civil society because protectionism imposes costs on the unorganized groups in civil societies. Neopopulist leaders, on the other hand, have an incentive to weaken the populist leaders and followers tied in governing parties that disperse these benefits - the existing political class of established patronage-oriented political parties tied to the import-substituting network of rent-seekers. By ending hyperinflation and providing targeted antipoverty benefits to unorganized poor, neopopulist entrepreneurs appeal to the victims of import substitution who reject the established order of privileged beneficiaries of the system. Neopopulists and their followers are thus antiorganizational, majoritarian, individualistic, and democratic. They support a top-down approach to governing and implementing reforms: install the free-market from above via strong state rooted in a personalistic leaders. Neopopulist leaders, in sum, can succeed in democratic politics even under the breakdown of embedded liberalism by attacking market-distorting, rent-seeking groups that are barriers to economic efficiency and distributional fairness.

Third, other types of political economies also generate protest. The protectionist regimes replaced by neoliberalism, for example, were characterized by macroeconomic populism - large fiscal deficits, price freezes, and real exchange rate overvaluation – that also generated economic hardships and wage inequalities that, in turn, generated "political instability, coups, and violence" (Dornbusch and Edwards, p. 8).

The trilemma is therefore overestimated as an inevitable iron law expressing political-economic determinism. Millions – indeed billions – of people are not ready, willing, and able to confront what Hardt and Negri call Empire. The question of timing – globalization and neoliberalism are arguably decades-old phenomenon (the IMF and WB are Bretton-Woods institutions that have been retrofitted) but globalized antiglobalization protests are a much more recent phenomenon – remains. And a great deal of the energy behind globalization that is causing the pains of economic adjustment comes from MNCs that are restructuring global networks of production and not from MEIs that are restructing international institutions. It is nevertheless true that the neoliberal center *often* does not hold and that the resulting protest against economic globalization *can* intensify the inherent tensions of the NIT.

However, the three institutions discussed above - international institutions in global orders, developmental coalitions in embedded states, and protest coalitions in democratic civil societies – affect the globalization of protest through the agency of the people involved. These institutions, in other words, add up to the issue of global governance and hence are the interrelated parts of a larger structural understanding of the events in Seattle – but only after people are brought back in.

III. CULTURE

As we turn from structure to action, from international regimes and developmental coalitions to the protest coalitions that oppose them, we should paraphrase Max Weber: "This much I deem necessary to say about the external conditions of THE BATTLE OF SEATTLE. But I believe that actually you wish to hear of something else, namely, of the *inward* calling for RESISTANCE."[7] I first consider group grievances and then turn to several master protest frames and a single master protest target.

A. Group Grievances

While the supporters of neoliberal globalization coalesce into globalizing/internationalist developmental coalitions dedicated to reform, their opponents merge into statist/nationalist protectionist or backlash coalition committed to the status-quo or even restoring the status-quo ante.[8] In her excellent study of the reactions to economic globalization, Solingen (p. 3) argues that exploring these two coalitions uncover the fault lines "of an integrating global political economy" thereby "capturing the main themes" (p. 4) of today's global order. In other words, "the distributional consequences of economic liberalization and integration into global markets and institutions forges this key axis of coalitional politics everywhere, where proponents and foes of integrative policies amalgamate around two basic blocs with contrasting grand strategies" for domestic policy and international affairs (p. 10).

Globalizing and backlash coalitions grow out of the many material cleavages in domestic politics: land (farmers) vs. labor (workers) vs. capital (finance, industrial)

(Moore, Gourevitch, Katzenstein); mobile, tradable, internationally competitive, export-oriented factors of production vs. immobile, nontradable, internationally noncompetitive, import-competing factors (Rogowski); sector-specific factors of production (Frieden); and industrial/post-industrial/post-Fordist class politics (Esping-Anderson). Theorists in comparative and international political economy have thus identified many ways in which preexisting domestic cleavages generate the diverse conflicts that occur under the exogenous impacts of new global patterns of trade, neoliberalism, and capitalism.

Yet "Man does not live by bread alone" (*Leviticus*). Policy preferences are not only about market-derived interests but also about nonmaterial values and beliefs. Models focused exclusively on short-run material interests therefore can not explain the diversity of political coalitions: "The coalitional cleavage around economic liberalization is not the only political cleavage but is certainly a common and prominent one; this cleavage tends to attract other cleavages that often cluster around its fundamental fault lines" (Solingen, p. 61). Analysts have thus identified nonmaterial cleavages that affect preferences about globalization: materialist/postmaterialist (Inglehart 1977), traditional/modern/postmodern (Inglehart 1997), socialist left-capitalist right/left libertarian-right authoritarian (Kitschelt), secularism/fundamentalism (Marty and Appleby), and liberalism/ethnicity (Huntington).

Preferences regarding globalization therefore result from complex interactions between international and domestic cleavages as mediated by social, political, and cultural institutions: "The domestic impact of economic liberalization and international institutions is far more complex and unpredictable than stipulated by any single theory" (Solingen, p. 61). The movement from the structure of the neoliberal world to the action of protest is not 1:1. Economic reductionism, in particular, fails as social and cultural forces help mobilize neoliberal and antineoliberal coalitions. Marxist parsimony also fails: Neoliberalism is not the hegemonic ideology of a dominant political, economic, social, and cultural ruling elite opposed by the oppressed, excluded, and powerless "people."

Who then protested against neoliberal globalization in Seattle?[9] In other words, which groups were part of a protest coalition against the WTO rather than part of an internationalist coalition supporting the WTO? Solingen (p. 32) suggests that protectionist coalitions "encompass an eclectic group that colludes in challenging different aspects of internationalist agendas." Three broad categories of resistance, as shown in Table 6, were present: Material interests, social identities, and global ideals.

Table 6:
Types of Protesters in the Battle of Seattle

Material Interests		
Organized labor	66 %	30,000
Rural peasantry	.1 %	50
Urban poor	.1 %	50
Social Identities		
Nationalist/indigenous/ethnic	1 %	500
Religious/spirituality	2 %	1000
Gender	.4 %	200
Global Ideals		
Environment	11 %	5000
Peace	.2 %	100
Human rights	1 %	500
Economic justice	7 %	3000
Anarchists	4 %	2000
Mixed		
Students	7 %	3000

Material Interests

As Solingen (p. 22) writes, "we may begin the analysis of coalitional responses to internationalization through an understanding of 'qui bono' (who gains) and who loses from economic liberalization." Since the neoliberal world is driven by economics, one would suspect that people with economic grievances would be well represented in Seattle. We defined protests based on material interests as involving groups that primarily resist perceived threats to their existing or future economic well-being. These are the constituencies who enjoy state jobs, subsidies, and rents. Organized labor, rural peasants, and the urban poor often think of themselves as materially threatened by globalization.

Organized Labor. Post World War II labor rights have diminished with the growth of international labor competition, industrial restructuring, and corporate downsizing. Organized labor is now in a much weaker bargaining position vis-à-vis economic elites. This may account for the unprecedented large contingent of AFL-CIO labor unions in Seattle, such as the *United Steel Workers of America*, *International Longshore and Warehouse Union*, *The Union of Needle Trades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE)* and the *Teamsters* protesting along with unions from the *Canadian Labor Congress*. Labor in fact represented two-thirds of the protesters in Seattle.

Rural Peasantry and Farmers. In the developing world, the peasantry has been adversely affected by foreign foodstuff imports, the on-going commercialization of agriculture, and the implementation of capital-intensive machinery. The authority of the state and its local and international supporters is thus challenged today by peasant upheavals (e.g., the Zapatistas in Chiapas). Peasant-based groups represented in Seattle include *BAYAN International*, *People's Global Assembly*, *La Asamblea de Autoridades Zapotecas y Chinantecas de la Sierra (AZACHIS)*, *La Via Campesina*, and *Focus on the Global South.*

Urban Poor. Globalization has also led to increasing rates of rural-to-urban and South-to-North migration, which have expanded the ranks of the urban poor. Since the urban poor in the South experience globalization directly as their states adopt structural adjustment policies that cut existing social benefits and subsidies for health services and basic food items, they press the state for anti-poverty programs to deal with the distributional problems associated with neoliberal globalization: pauperization, marginalization, and growing inequality. In Seattle, the Zimbabwe-based *International South Group Network* expressed concern over how WTO's anti-state subsidy policies threaten food security in developing countries but leave research and development subsidies in the North untouched.

Some of the globalization literature argues that neoliberal economics hurts all types of poor and laboring peoples. Besides a token presence of the rural peasantry and urban poor, our evidence shows that labor, particularly U.S. labor unions, were the only set of material interests represented in the Seattle protests.

Social Identities

Solingen (p. 22) also writes: "Internationalization poses threats not merely to material interests but also to cultures, identities, and values, and to the interests of political entrepreneurs endangered by both types of threats. Thus coalitions are not merely about alternative positions vis-à-vis economic liberalization and price convergence but also about alternative integrated interpretations of the political-economic and strategic context as its affects domestic coalitional balances." Dissent in Seattle was indeed also based on social identities that result primarily from personal identification with a group. Strong feelings of attachment and connectedness to an ascribed collectivity bring about a sense of common fate. When such groups perceive unjust treatment, members of the collectivity are pushed towards group claim-making. We distinguish three types of social identities that have figured prominently in the literature.

Nationalist/ethnic/indigenous. A key component of the new global order contributing to identity-based protest is the breakdown of large poly-ethnic nation-states and the development of movements of irredentism. Whereas groups once identified with the larger nation-state, they now identify with real or imagined subnational groups. The deepening of ethnic cleavages also might be related to increasing economic inequalities as well as to the destruction of traditional neighborhoods and communities brought about

by globalization. Indigenous communities representing the *Kuna* of Panama expressed concern in Seattle over cultural globalization practices such as Western tourism and Western science (e.g., appropriation of biological resources) that threaten sacred islands. The *Indigenous Environmental Network*, *Seventh Generation Fund, Abya Yala Fund, Tulalip Peoples,* and *Ayamara* from Bolivia demonstrated similar concerns in Seattle.

Religious/spiritual. Religious fundamentalisms – in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Taoism – have challenged the individualism, materialism, and secularism of Americanism, westernism, and globalism. Religious groups seem to be especially concerned about the effects of globalization on the third world poor and those with a strong social justice mission were active in Seattle. *Christian Aid* of England is concerned about the underrepresentation of former third world countries within the WTO compared to the corporate lobbying groups and associations of advanced capitalist countries**.** *Jubilee2000* is a coalition of religious groups (including the *Washington Association of Churches*) demanding an end to third world debt. Other groups that drew on their religious beliefs to denounce the WTO in Seattle include local Native American tribes and Feminist spiritual groups. These groups expressed the concern that the commodification of nature, a fundamental tenet of economic globalization ideology, threatens their religious symbols. Paganistic-type spiritual groups, such as the *Wiccans* from San Francisco, and a variety of other indigenous spiritual groups view globalization as a direct attack on their religious symbols and icons in the natural environment and expressed these concerns in Seattle.

Gender/sexuality. The rise of gender and sexuality in politics – women and gays, lesbians, and bisexuals – has also challenged grand strategies of development from below by stressing the politics of diversity and pluralism. Globalization is challenging traditional gender roles in both the North and the South. In the South globalization brings more women into the formal labor force to work in low-wage manufacturing export zones. While exploitive and repressive labor conditions abound in these light industrial plants, young women at the same time gain more freedom from the patriarchal family and more economic power vis-à-vis male partners. In the North, women are increasingly entering the full-time labor force and engaging in new conflicts over compensation and promotion policies that are gender-biased. Gender-based identity groups in Seattle, such as the *Eighth Day Center,* expressed concern over how WTO mandates could override local affirmative action policies that target female-headed small businesses. The lesbian-based *Dyke Action* was also concerned about the WTO and women's rights.

Some of the postmodernism literature argues that strong identification with old and new collectivities are increasing under globalization. Our evidence, however, shows that identity-based movements, such as nationalist/ethnic/indigenous movements, spiritual/religious movements, and gender/sexuality movements, constituted only 3-4% of the protesters in Seattle. Identity-movements, those that stress subnationality, spirituality, and sexuality, that is, were not well represented.

Global Ideals

Still other resistance movements primarily pursue universal, transcendental, or global ideals. Some people advocate for other peoples as globalization makes them aware of how far-away problems are their problems too. Environmentalists seeking to limit state-induced economic growth, peace activists seeking to control state use of military force, human rights advocates seeking to broaden and deepen democracy, economic justice advocates seeking to reduce inequality between the North and the South, and anarchists seeking to dismantle all forms of hierarchical social order perceive neoliberal globalization as a threat. They represented 23% of the protesters in Seattle.[10]

Environment. Neoliberal globalization raises questions about the quality of life that bring environmental concerns to the forefront. Environmental groups in several advanced capitalist nations are upset over WTO policies that have weakened domestic environmental laws. In Seattle major environmental groups included *Friends of the Earth, Rainforest Action Network, Sea Turtle Restoration Project, Humane Society, Earth Justice, Basil Action Network, Amazon Watch, Green Parties, Earth First!* and the *Sierra Club*. These groups clamored about how the WTO dismissed their environmental concerns about domestic clean air laws, endangered species protection, and deforestation.

Peace. With increasing global economic integration and interdependence, not only are goods and services traded more smoothly across national boundaries, but new opportunities are opened up for the sale and exchange of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction. Cold War munitions stockpiles from the superpowers and their former client states now circulate around the world in a veritable arms-trafficking global garage sale. The *War Resister's League, Veterans for Peace, Northwest Disarmament Coalition, Positive Futures Network*, and *Campaign Against the Arms Trade* demanded that the WTO adopt stringent measures and sanctions against such trade. They expect the end of the Cold War to produce a peace dividend for the peoples of the world.

Human Rights. Human rights groups are outraged by the way that neoliberal globalization encourages the use of cheap labor under repressive regimes and/or looks to such regimes as a source of cheap raw materials and potential markets. Groups such as *Falun Gong, Students for a Free Tibet*, and *United Students Against Sweatshops* protested in Seattle against what they perceived to be labor repressive countries - Burma, Nigeria, Indonesia, and China - as well as against the specific corporations - Nike, the GAP, and Old Navy - doing business there.

Global Justice. Global justice advocacy groups are moved by what they perceived as declining material conditions for developing countries in the South and the related growth of prosperity of the developed North. Believing that neoliberal globalization has negative impacts on the developing world (e.g., increasing unemployment and poverty), they have been activated by the centralized nature of the WTO and have made it a prime target for protest. The protests in Seattle against the WTO saw a wide-array of economic justice groups based in advanced capitalist states,

such as the *Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), Jubilee 2000, Global Exchange*, and *50 Years is Enough,* protest on behalf of the global poor.

Anarchists. While anarchist movements have historically valued a society of mutual cooperation and assistance, and thereby resisted the encroachment of large-scale, national capitalism and state-building, under neoliberal globalization they are mobilized against globalized capital and related structures of internationalized governance. Anarchists from Oregon, Washington, and other parts of the Western United States came to Seattle to protest. Anarchist groups such as the *Black Block* and the *Anarchist Action Collective* vandalized symbols of corporate capitalism in downtown Seattle (e.g., large banks) as well as retail chains that represent globalized Western culture - GAP, Disney, and McDonalds.

Protest groups advocating global ideals represented over 20% of the dissidents in Seattle. The Seattle coalition thus combined a majority concerned with themselves – what I referred to as material interests – with minority concerned with the well-being of the entire world – what I referred to as global ideals - in approximately a 3:1 ratio.

Mixed

Not all groups in Seattle fit squarely into one of our three categories.

Students. Unemployed and underemployed students, intellectuals, scientists, and scholars are often dependent on the state and frequently oppose neoliberal globalization on a number of grounds. Students, for example, often protest around issues involving ultimate values while at the same time strongly identifying with their temporary group location as students. About 7% of protesters in Seattle were students that fit into a mixed category. In Seattle, *Evergreen State College Students* and the *Radical Cheerleaders* protested against the WTO's liberalization of international trade at what they perceived as the expense of labor standards, the environment, and democracy. The *United Students Against Sweatshops* protested in Seattle because anti-sweat shop procurement laws operative at the local or regional level may be nullified by WTO rulings.

B. Master Protest Frames

This attempt to separate the Seattle coalition into its component grievances and groups seems to violate the spirit of the protests. The protesters claim that coalition has replaced community and that claim-making has become multifaceted and interrelated. They thus criticized the identity politics of the 1970s and 1980s where labor fought for workers, women fought for women, environmentalists fought for whales, human rights advocates fought for prisoners, consumer activists fought for consumers, and global justice advocates fought for the poor. Under this one cause-one group approach to dissent, groups with different goals and agendas, histories and traditions, and strategies

and tactics rarely cooperated with one another because individuals and collectivities were thought to have essential – stable and universal – identities.

The Battle in Seattle was indeed able to disrupt the WTO's meeting because of the ability of multiple groups harboring anti-WTO grievances to combine their resources and networks, recruit protest participants, and join together in a rainbow protest coalition. Instead of one or a few groups challenging neoliberal globalization, multiple and simultaneous protests in Seattle created a sense of widespread dissatisfaction. Moreover, the movement was sustained through the week of N29 – D3 by the activists' ability to recreate their protest coalition at a major rally each day. No matter the theme of a particular demonstration, a variety of anti-WTO groups participated. For example, while those decked in Sea-Turtle costumes participated heavily in the AFL-CIO march and steelworker rallies, a large number of steelworkers attended the Jubilee2000 anti-Third World Debt Rally on N29.

Moreover, many of the protesters in Seattle did belong to multiple protest groups and each protest group did contain many different types of people.[11] As mobilization against neoliberal globalization proceeded, all three categories were thus combined.[12] One reason is analytical: Since a GSM, by definition, operates cross-nationally, its constituent groups that mobilize primarily on the basis of material interests (e.g., workers, the poor) and social identities (e.g., women, Christians) must also in some sense pursue global ideals. Another reason is empirical: Global ideals can be satisfied by national regulations to protect workers, indigeneous peoples, and the environment; those who advocate Kantian ideals build social ties with like-minded people whose material interests are threatened; and global justice advocates acquire material interests and social ties in the protest organizations they build.

While there are difficulties with a typology that shifts the focus to the parts and away from the whole, our typology does reveal the diverse nature of the Seattle Coalition – a phrase which has become synonymous with rainbow coalition. Moreover, the typology forces us to address an important question: How did the many different groups orient themselves collectively to the protest in Seattle? Social movements, for example the women's movement, are often split into factions that stress material interests, social identities, and global ideals. The protesters maintain that several aspects of today's world - trade, neoliberalism, globalization, global democracy, multinational corporations, and capitalism – provide general frames that unite group grievances. These frames were disseminated (largely via the WWW) by NGOs in the months preceding the event.

Trade. One important general frame was "fair trade and not free trade," a more politically appealling frame than "protectionism." Since international trade shifts domestic resources of capital and labor to more productive outlets and thereby causes pain to those facing its consequences, protectionism, it has been said, is as American as apple pie. It has been estimated, for example, that quotas on imported sugar costs US consumers $10 billion a year. If sugar growers have lobbied Congress for their cause, should we not expect groups who oppose free trade to take the streets to advance their "protectionist" causes as "fair trade"?

While the US's historical experience with protectionism is in fact rich, the 1970s was characterized globally by the increased use of local-content rules, antidumping provisions of GATT, economic regionalism, and voluntary export restraints. These new tariff barriers were more informal, lacked transparency, and were based on unilateral administrative discretion to achieve bilateral strategically managed trade. As the 1970s experienced the growth of new trade issues, public opinion and policy rhetoric in fact shifted away from free trade and towards protectionism. International trade became a Pandora's box of special requests by interest groups who wanted to use trade policy as social policy to regulate and protect themselves and others. Proponents of protectionism thus claim that trade policy can protect the environment from the abuse of natural resources, human rights from authoritarian governments, consumers from unsafe foods and drugs, workers from competition from low-wage countries, businesses from unfair trade practices, family farmers from the loss of their way of life, and ethnic groups from challenges to their values and beliefs. Economic nationalist and mercantilist regulations, moreover, are often seen as a strategy for national independence, self-sufficiency, and prosperity. Protectionism, goes the argument, ultimately protects all of society and thereby assures social stability. The "New Trade Agenda" therefore contains a wider range of policy issues and the "New Protectionism" has found more politicized constituencies than in the past. As more people see free trade as having multiple costs, politicians attempted to use trade policy as a multipurpose tool to achieve their constituencies' many economic and noneconomic objectives.

The politicization of trade, which united the rainbow protest coalition, accelerated during the 1990s for several reasons. First, the New Protectionism in the 1970s set a precedent against free trade. Second, as Gilpin (2000: 107) points out, trade increased during the 1980s and the WTO was created to increase it even more:

> The GATT and the WTO have dealt principally with 'border' (or external) barriers to trade. Differences in national economic policies, corporate structures, and private business practices were not considered very important in the early post-World War II era characterized by low levels of integration among national economies. However, with increased interdependence and the integration of trade with FDI, these differences in national economies have become considerably more significant in determining international competitiveness and trade patterns.

As international trade penetrated ever more deeply into domestic affairs, or as the second image and the second image reversed become intertwined, powerful interests, identities, and institutions were affected. Since trade affects everything and everyone, trade issues during the 1990s become everyone's policy issues.

Third, as trade increased, so did the US trade deficit. This led to more protectionism: the number of exporters who wanted foreign markets increased as did import-competing businesses who wanted protection (Krugman p. 122). Fourth, the political foundations of an open world economy weakened. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the US was more free to think about its own economic interests rather than

those of the world economy. Government leaders can no longer tell constituencies about the need for national unity in foreign economic policy. With an economic hegemon less interested in playing its traditional role, unilateralism and concerns for national economic security override international economic cooperation. Fifth, the politicization of trade issues in the US was given a boost by Ross Perot's presidential campaigns. Finally, the politicization of trade may be traced to the managed or strategic trade policies of the Clinton administration.[13] The media fixated on what Krugman calls the false ideology of competitive internationalism. The New Democrats' rhetoric of international economic competition thus led to protectionism that provided an opening to those who wanted an even further politicized trade policy.[14]

In sum, the enemies of free trade usually make strange bedfellows. During the battles over NAFTA and GATT, the White House thus referred to the protectionists Ralph Nader, Patrick Buchanan, Jerry Brown, and Ross Perot as the "Halloween Coalition." Perot's anti-NAFTA coalition linked "blue collar union members; white collar middle managers and small businessmen; family and community oriented immigrants; and grass-roots environmental critics" (Aaronson, p. 135). A bit further back in US history, the coalition behind the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which used trade as a weapon to promote Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union, included Barry Goldwater, Ed Koch, George Meany, and Henry (Scoop) Jackson (Aaronson, p. 82). All this reinforces the underlying theme of Rogowski (1989): International commerce begets counterintuitive coalitions. We may add that "fair trade" is a general protest frame to unite the heterogeneous alliance.

Neoliberalism. While the Seattle coalition may be traced to the mobilizing potential of trade issues during the 1990s, a larger historical context is also responsible for putting together an eclectic protest coalition: the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System (BWS) and the rise of neoliberalism. Gilpin (2000: 66-7) writes:

> At the time of the BWS founding, economists assumed that the domestic and international economic realms were in large part independent of one another. They believed that national economies were closed economies, and they even regarded them as empty boxes connected by trade flows and exchange rates. The GATT was given responsibility for trade flows, and the IMF for exchange rates. Because economists considered trade, finance, and other areas of economic activity to be separate from one another, the rules and policies dealing with each economic area were mainly considered independently of one another, and policy changes in one area were not expected to have any significant effect on others.
>
> By the 1980s, almost every major feature of the Bretton Woods System had changed, was changing, or was being challenged. With increased interdependence among national economies, differences in the ways that nations regulated and conducted business inside their own borders became more important and indeed a major source of economic friction. International financial flows, foreign direct investment, and services had multiplied and had become

> more intertwined both internally and externally so that policy coordination among nations had become imperative but also more difficult to achieve.

Neoliberal globalization, in other words, has widespread ramifications for domestic politics, economics, society, and culture.

Under the BWS, moreover, there was a domestic consensus on what Ruggie called the embedded liberalism compromise: politicians compensate the losers from free trade with full unemployment and social welfare policies. Embedded liberalism brought labor, for example, into the political fold and thereby allowed governing coalitions to pursue international economic cooperation. The decline of embedded liberalism and the rise of neoliberalism has meant the loss of national sovereignty over economic policy making. Once the losers from free trade also lost their domestic support system, they sought regulation and protection against free trade policies. Przeworski's "valley of transition" to a neoliberal world, in other words, accumulates many enemies of reform. Since neoliberal globalization challenges long-standing social contracts (corporatism) and impersonal markets challenge currently existing communal norms (ethnic and religious group values), many different types of people oppose the global convergence of prices and markets, institutions, and norms. Since they benefit in many complex ways from the protectionist state, these heterogeneous protesters resist the neoliberal developmental coalitions in states embedded in today's globalized international order. Anti-neoliberalism thus provided another general protest frame to unite the different activists in Seattle.

Globalization. Globalists claim that our world is now characterized by complexity (everything affects everything else) and chaos (small changes somewhere produces large effects somewhere else). Issue areas are no longer separable and decomposable but interpenetrated and interdependent.

The protest coalition therefore was diverse because so many people believe that globalization now affects most things in the world. Globalization is blamed for everything, from acid raid to the oppression of women, from the loss of indigenous people's way of life to cultural emptiness. Some feel that this perspective is misinformed and dangerous: Globaloney produces globaphobia (Burtless, Lawrence, Litan and Shapiro 1998). Krugman (p. 78-9), for example, reminds Americans that "we are not the world," arguing that we should not overstate the importance of global markets, that Americans are not pawns of world economic forces, and that some things do have domestic causes. Exaggerated fears of globalization lead to protectionism: "The public, misguided into believing that international trade is the source of all our problems, might turn protectionist – undermining the real good that globalization has done for most people here and abroad." Nevertheless, anti-globalization was another general protest frame in Seattle.

Global Democracy. While there has been a dramatic rise of NGOs and INGOs concomitant with the growth of global governance, the development of international forums where such groups can lobby for their policies has lagged. While the WB has

brought many of these groups into its policy-making process, trade is an area where there is currently no institutional relationship with NGOs and INGOs. The WTO is a new institution that has not yet represented (or co-opted) its constituencies (or opponents).

The lack of international institutions to facilitate bargaining, just like the decline of domestic embedded liberal institutions, leads to failures of political markets: few compensation mechanisms exist to shift resources from the winners to the losers – and as we have seen, the number of losers has increased. The Seattle coalition was therefore so diverse and heterogeneous not only because their opponents are so numerous and powerful, but also because mechanisms of responsibility and accountability do not currently exist. To put it bluntly: Protesters in Seattle challenged the major institutions behind neoliberal globalization - international institutions in global orders and developmental coalitions in embedded states - in the streets because they lacked representation in institutionalized forums.

Globalization, to repeat, drives resistance via first-order effects on distributive conflicts and second-order effects on deconstructing existing distributive arrangements and putting new institutions in their place. Since global political institutions lag behind global civil society, global democracy became another major general theme of the protests.

Multinational Corporations. International trade in services and manufacturing goods has expanded rapidly, and this trade is wrapped up with the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs). Major corporations now have a global reach. These exceedingly powerful organizations direct resources and affect people's lives in a negative way. Opposition to corporate power was another general frame to which the diverse set of groups in Seattle could appeal.

Capitalism. The eclectic nature of the Seattle protest coalition may be traced beyond grievances about trade and neoliberalism to deep-seated grievances about capitalism itself. This framing of group grievances of course continues a long standing critique of capitalism. Schumpeter (1950: 84), for example, suggested that capitalism creates a "gale of creative destruction." The new, adaptable, and efficient destroy the old – old sectors, technologies, environments, peoples, values, beliefs, and institutions. While capitalism leads to efficient wealth creation, it therefore also redistributes wealth. The winners and losers become its enemies and friends: while proponents claim that capitalism creates a rising tide that lifts all boats, opponents claim that for most people capitalism creates a race to the bottom.

C. A Master Target

The WTO became the master target for all the general protest frames – trade and neoliberalism, globalization and global democracy, and multinational corporations and capitalism – that troubled the activists. The WTO represents a new form of institutionalization in the current period of globalization. Founded in 1994, the WTO

seeks to regulate world trade policy with the aim of reducing trade barriers among nations. Compared to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that preceded it, the WTO has more power. Protesters thus charge that under the WTO:

> Democracy is hurt. Democratic governments cede their authority over public policy - the welfare state and the macroeconomic management that characterized the embedded liberalism compromise. Critics thus claim that "so far no democratically achieved environmental, health, food safety or environmental law challenged at the WTO has been upheld. As of 1999, all of these challenges have been declared 'barriers to trade'" (Paupp 2000: xxix). Hence, the fear is that the WTO supersedes, suspends, and overrules national constitutions, domestic interests, and state sovereignty and thereby overrules domestic laws that were originally put into place through democratic procedures and/or past social movement struggles.
>
> Authoritarianism is encouraged. The WTO is not transparent: It meets in secret "green rooms" where small panels of appointed judges produce rulings on trade conflicts that have consequences for large populations. The WTO, in other words, is an undemocratic institution that limits participation by denying access to citizen groups from civil society and thereby fosters unrepresentative and secretive decision-making.
>
> Trade policies help corporations. Member countries are forced to repeal their laws aimed at protecting the environment and public health because the WTO is interested in ending all political controls over economic markets. The elimination of controls serves primarily the interests of large-scale transnational corporations and the wealthiest countries of the world because it facilitates corporate greed.
>
> Trade policies hurt people. By promoting sweat shops and lower than minimum wage jobs abroad, the WTO squeezes American workers and threatens the US standard of living. And it does this without raising the standard of living in poor countries. The WTO thus perpetuates the political, social, economic, and cultural domination of the North over the South.

One or more of the above frames was easily adopted by the groups protesting on the streets of Seattle. Environmentalists, gender-based groups, and human rights groups all referred to the WTO's overriding of domestic laws in their ideological frameworks and mobilization appeals. Labor, anarchists, and other political groups used the "WTO as Capitalist/Corporate Instrument/Corporate Globalization" thesis to either mobilize constituents or cast doubts on the WTO's ability to reform itself. Finally, many economic justice and consumer groups stressed the nondemocratic nature of the WTO. This frame proved particularly powerful in U.S. political culture where activists on the streets had a field day with actions such as the "Boston W Tea O" party and the Sierra Club's catchy slogan "no globalization without representation" (Smith 2001).

The protesters charged, in sum, that the WTO is largely an unknown – nameless and faceless - international organization that is about to rule the whole planet by taking over the global political economy. Just like the villain in the new Star Wars movie *Episode I* was the evil Trade Federation, the enemy in the Battle of Seattle was the wicked World Trade Organization.

IV. RATIONALITY

I have so far argued that structural contradictions –NIT – generated many grievances about material interests, social identities, and global ideals; that the different groups coalesced under general protest frames about trade and neoliberalism that expanded to frames about globalization and global democracy and finally to frames about multinational corporations and capitalism; and that the diverse frames coalesced around the WTO as a master protest target. With this understanding of the structural and cultural roots of the Seattle coalition in mind, we now turn to the central problem of action: how did a politics of difference permit unity?

In this section, I first outline action's problem situation – a Global Rebel's Dilemma. I then discuss the rationality of the participants and then offer two major and several minor solutions to the Rebel's Dilemma adopted by the participants. Most importantly, I shall show how dissidents used several aspects of structure to solve their collective action problem: MEIs became focal points, state-led development coalitions generated federal groups, linkages among trade issues offered selective incentives, cultural diversity mobilized preexisting organizations, INGOs were the patrons of dissent, engaging MNCs and MEIs increased estimates of the probability of success, global civil society (the WWW) reduced organizational costs, and the losers under globalization formed an exclusionary club.

A. The Problem Situation: A Global Rebel's Dilemma

How did activists mobilize all the different antigloblization groups around the entire world? A GSM must solve the biggest collective action problem – the Rebel's Dilemma (Lichbach 1995) - of them all: Citizens of the world unite![15] The activists were trying to solve the problems of the wretched of the earth, spending their time and money, and risking personal injury and jail, to collaborate with others around the globe who do not share their national culture or even language. And what is particularly amazing about this GSM is not that it operates across countries (many INGOs do that); nor that it is a network of policy wonks who work on an issue area across countries (many transnational advocacy coalitions do that); what is amazing is that this GSM is a global protest movement (GPM) that mobilizes citizens across different countries for protesting at meetings of MEIs – a demanding form of INGO collective activism that is exceedingly rare. Yet, compared to protest against a state, the benefits are more diffuse, the chances of success more remote, and the role of the individual less significant. And compared to other global actors - states who can mobilize coercive power, firms who can mobilize

economic power, and even international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) who can regularly interact with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), an activist GSM is resource-poor (Fox and Brown). How did this global protest coalition coordinate the events in Seattle? How did it coordinate the protests in Seattle with related protests in cities in the North and the South? And how did it coordinate all these protests with over four dozen previous and subsequent attacks on MEIs?[16]

Surely we have a Rebel's Dilemma here that is worth exploring. But before we address these questions, we must address a prior question that has been raised by the primary GSM-skeptic, Sid Tarrow: Are these collective action problems so severe that we cannot even say that this remarkable series of protests is part of a GSM?[17] Is it better seen as a short-term tactical alliance?

Before the Battle of Seattle a number of important social movement organizations labeled themselves as "global." Examples include the San Francisco-based human rights and economic justice group Global Exchange and the Nader-influenced Citizen's Global Trade Watch. Other groups in Seattle such as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) had many years of experience working on international solidarity/human rights issues that focus on a particular country or region. Immediately after the Battle in Seattle a number of groups involved in the protests or sympathetic to them created an informal coalition called the "Mobilization for Global Justice" with the goal of organizing demonstrations against the IMF and WB in April 2000 in Washington D.C. Hundreds of SMOs and NGOs signed on to the call by the Mobilization for Global Justice to protest in D.C. Since the first quarter of 2000, on listservs, in the mainstream and activist press, and in protest demonstrations the larger social movement has been referred to as the "global justice movement."

Over time, therefore, many of the participants involved in NGOs and INGOs that work on global environmental, economic justice, and human rights issues have come to think of themselves as part of a GSM that campaigns for global justice. More importantly, activists have taken sustained and coordinated cross-national protests against MEIs - the Battle of Seattle stands midway in their campaign - pushing neoliberal globalization. We conclude that the activists have indeed overcome their differences in interests, identities, and institutions to the point where it is fruitful to say that the collectivity has moved from a global diaspora to a GSM.

B. Rationality

While the diverse nature of the Seattle coalition is understandable, its contradictions - the collective action problems of combining people with different material interests, social identities, and global ideals so that they can act on a global scale - are immense. How did anti-WTO activists mobilize and sustain their diverse rainbow coalition? We suggest that the members of the protest coalition, just like the people who are constructing the neoliberal institutions that the protesters oppose, were quite rational actors.

First, many of the protesters in the Battle of Seattle knew what they were saying. The WTO provided, as indicated earlier, a clear agenda and a frame for issues that yielded, as *Fortune* magazine (May 12, 2000) remarked, a "Grand Unified Theory of Protest." Evidence gleaned from interviews with elite activists indicate that many protesters were knowledgeable about the substantive issues and that they wanted to communicate their ideas through emails, flyers, articles, books, teach-ins, and numerous other forms of grassroots education.

Activist web sites, moreover, often reflected recent academic criticisms of MEIs (Anderson 2000, Haggard 2000). After the Asian fiscal crisis, for example, progressive institutionalists like Jagdish Bhagwati, Jeffrey Sachs, and Joseph Stiglitz argued that MEIs have been too myopic; since conditionality agreements have the perverse effect of undoing liberalism, the solution is for international institutions to take a longer-term view and adopt a more supportive stance toward development. Minimal institutionalists like Martin Feldstein and Francis Fukuyama argued that MEIs have been too ambitious and intrusive; since giving money to corrupt states creates moral hazard problems, the solution is to scale back international institutions and let the market work. And reformist institutionalists like Paul Krugman, Stephen Haggard, Bob Keohane, and Etel Solingen argued that MEIs cannot stop distributive conflicts; by designing global institutions that are a bit more open and representative, however, violent and disruptive conflicts can be channeled into more legitimate outlets in much the same way that democracies channel conflict in the domestic sphere.

The protesters thus reflected the considerable academic debate about economic development. With respect to development theory, state-led development (import substitution industrialization) in the 1950s was replaced by the Washington Consensus on market-led development (getting the prices, policies, and institutions right) in the late 1980s which, by the mid 1990s, was replaced by a softened version of neoliberalism. Political scientists, moreover, have disputed the economists' approaches, and vice versa.

And the protesters reflected the economic policy debate. The WB has criticized the IMF's handling of the Asian fiscal crisis. Some have referred to the very public disagreements among prominent economists as the Washington Confusion rather than the Washington Consensus, another demonstration that there are no one-handed economists. In its current 1999-2000 *World Development Report: Entering the 21st Century*, the WB offers a "holistic approach to development" called the "Comprehensive Development Framework" (CDF). This pragmatic approach takes account of plethora of things: macroeconomic policy and trade, government regulation, corruption, social safety nets, health, education, infrastructure, the environment, rural and urban strategies, the private sector, and gender – in short, the usual suspects now include the kitchen sink. The "holistic approach" to development is therefore really a chicken-soup theory of development – *it couldn't hurt*.

The protest coalition therefore reflected the many issues raised by the WB. The protesters in the Battles of Seattle were simply part of contemporary academic

discussions, policy dialogues, and political struggles in which neoliberalism has weakened and no one any longer offers simple answers.

In sum, many activists knew why they were protesting. The leaders were certainly not ignorant, irrational, and opportunist thugs, rioters, gang members, looters, and vandals.

Second, the protest organizers in the Battle of Seattle knew what they were doing. The evidence shows that the protests were not spontaneous but well organized. Dissidents were organized *during* the episode. From most eyewitness reports it appears that the anti-WTO coalition had a more sophisticated logistical plan on how to disrupt the meetings than the police had to prevent them from doing it. Major protest-supporting organizations, such as the Direct Action Network (DAN) and the Ruckus Society, developed detailed maps indicating where the WTO delegates would reside and where and when the major events would take place. The actual distribution of contentious activity, moreover, showed carefully built interconnections among action-phases of the events. Between N29 and D2, the sit-ins, marches, teach-ins, and meeting disruptions that were occurring simultaneously were chronicled by a daily tabloid (World Trade Observer), a press center (Independent Media Center), and numerous photo journalists and movie makers. Moreover, the protesters were very strategic, moving from intersection to intersection to block traffic and to prevent people from entering or leaving key hotels and the Paramount Theater. Cell phones and pagers proved effective mechanisms of command and control that enabled activists to facilitates the movement's mobility from place to place.

As the chronology in the accompanying footnote shows, dissidents also put together their diverse protest coalition by organizing *before* the episode.[18] The groups discussed above used the months preceding Seattle to mobilize people and resources within their respective networks and organizations. By the middle of November these disparate groups were acting in concert. Anti-fur and anti-sweatshop protests took place in Seattle the week before N30. In the middle of November the DAN and the Ruckus Society were holding training sessions for a variety of social movement activists. Students, churches, labor unions, and environmentalists were similarly organized.

C. Two Major Solutions to the Global Rebel's Dilemma

Two institutions in NIT, or two aspects of the structural origins of the rainbow protest coalition, provide clues as to how the third institution – civil society - solves its collective action problem. The global institutions behind the global order provide activists with targets of political opportunity (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1997). The highly visible meetings of MEIs sharpen awareness of the interconnections among seemingly unrelated global problems, thereby fostering a global protest coalition among groups with different agendas. The WTO's meeting, in short, was a focal point of protest (Lichbach 1995: Section 4.1) because the WTO provides a face and a target for those concerned with trade, neoliberalism, globalization and other issues.

The second institution – state-led development coalitions implementing neoliberalism - generates a wonderful example of how Mancur Olson's "federal group" (Lichbach 1995: Section 6.3.3) solution can operate at the global level: NGOs (e.g., U.S. labor unions) with different types of state-level grievances against neoliberal development policies have joined INGOs to think and act globally.[19] To explain how the federal-group approach allowed protests in cities in the North and the South to accompany the Battle of Seattle, let us return to the WTO.

The WTO is an international institution, comprised of member states, whose primary purpose is to facilitate international trade by breaking down such domestic barriers as the tariffs and subsidies that impede the exchange of goods and services across national boundaries. Once the WTO creates a policy, however, member states are responsible for administering it. They need not "rubber-stamp" the WTO: States have the power to shape WTO policy as well as the option to withdraw from the organization (although they would pay a heavy price).

Resistance movements with grievances against the WTO therefore attribute harmful WTO policies to the WTO as a whole and to the states that implement those policies. National institutions in addition to international organizations are thus seen as venues to express anti-WTO sentiments. Resistance movements target their nationally-based governing coalitions, moreover, because citizens and NGOs lack political representation and formal standing in the WTO and because governments are gauging the level of discontent brought by WTO policies.

Our evidence, as indicated earlier when we discussed trade as a general frame for the protests, indeed reveals that U.S. labor and environmental groups in Seattle were not only protesting the WTO in general but were specifically protesting against the U.S. government's neoliberal agenda. These groups were upset over U.S. passage of NAFTA and its consequences felt six years later. Organized labor continued to be upset over job losses. Environmentalists were upset over Mexican tuna fishing policies that fail to protect dolphins. Human rights groups and labor did want the U.S. to open up trade with China. Seattle protesters, in sum, united against the pro-free trade stance of the U.S. Consequently, in the months preceding the WTO conference President Clinton made a number of symbolic gestures, for example suggesting that the WTO incorporate labor and environmental standards in its constitution. These overtures can be viewed as conciliatory moves in an election year to labor and environmental groups that compose a major faction of the Democratic Party's coalition.

Protest against the WTO outside of the U.S. in the North took a similar federal-group pattern: It was based on local grivances and targeted national and international institutions. We offer two examples of protests in the North that coincided with the Battle of Seattle.

London, England. On November 30 protests began outside the Canadian embassy on Trafalgar Square. Political activists and construction worker unions (called

the Construction Safety Campaign) demonstrated against the Canadian government's use of the WTO to sanction European Union nations for banning asbestos in construction materials. The crowd continued marching through nearby streets, occasionally blockading traffic by sitting-in at key intersections.

In a separate action university students held a demonstration outside of Citibank to protest the global trend of transferring student funding from state-subsidized low interest grants to personal loans with private banks. Citibank is reportedly one of the largest holders of students' loan debt.

At 2:30pm Nigerian exiles and British environmental activists performed street theatre outside the Magistrates Court in Convent Garden. A mock "international people's court" was held against Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and Mark Moody-Stuart of Shell Oil. The two were charged with human rights and environmental abuses in Nigeria (http://www.oilcompanies.org/trial/).

Later in the afternoon, at 5 p.m., nearly 2,000 activists at Euston Station confronted police in a protest over privatization of the rail system. The rally was organized by Reclaim the Streets, the London Strike Support Group, and the Campaign Against Tube Privatization to highlight the links between the free trade agenda of the WTO and the privatization of public transport in Britain. The event was endorsed by the London Transport Council of the Rail Maritime and Transport Union (RMT), whose speaker detailed the opposition to subway privatization and consequent public safety issues.

Although the main focus of the rally was transport, there were also speakers covering a wide array of issues - genetically modified foods, global arms trade, and global capitalism - linked to the WTO and the system of global economic governance. The Genetic Engineering Network illustrated how free trade rules make it impossible for people to choose what they eat, putting them in the hands of corporations that "push genetically modified organisms (GMOs) down their throats." The Campaign Against the Arms Trade highlighted the links between politicians and the global arms market. While admitting that the WTO did not control the worlds arms production, the speaker went on to place the blame for the world's conflicts on companies like the UK's GEC Marconi, the Labour government's unethical arms policy, and corporate greed. A Reclaim The Streets speaker discussed the importance of placing the WTO in the context of capitalism and its effects and he praised growing international solidarity and protest. After the speeches ended at 7pm, protesters rioted with police and blocked traffic. 38 people were arrested.

Geneva, Switzerland. Several actions occurred in Geneva in the weeks around the Seattle WTO protests. On November 16 the WTO headquarters was occupied by 27 activists, while another 30 protesters blockaded traffic outside the building for two hours until they were removed by police. The occupiers unraveled a banner stating, "No Commerce, No Organization: Self-Management!" Another banner unfurled outside from the top of the building read, "WTO kills people – Kill the WTO!"

On November 27, two columns of demonstrators, almost 2000 farmers and 3000 city dwellers from all over Switzerland, met in the center of Geneva in the afternoon to march on the WTO's headquarters. The farmers, who gathered in front of the United Nations' building, were mobilized by Swiss farmers' associations (small farmers of the Union des Producteurs Suisses, but also the larger Union des Paysans Suisses and the Chambers of Agriculture). These farmers' organizations had fought against the founding of the WTO. Meanwhile, city people, called by a group called Coordination against the Millennium Round, gathered in the heart of the international banking district. This starting point had been chosen to show that the international banking system is at the center of neoliberal globalization. Demonstrators, who had come from Berne, Basel, Lausanne, and other cities, included supporters of People's Global Action (PGA), the ATTAC network, and of some twenty other organizations and associations. The civil servants' union also mobilized because they believed that the future of public education and health services was endangered by neoliberal globalization.

On December 3 activists cut power to the WTO headquarters in Geneva. They released a communiqué that "criticized the work of the trade organization, stating that it had no consideration for people."

In sum, the protests in cities in the North reflected anti-neoliberal globalization concerns about the domestic and international arenas. While the examples above demonstrate a concern for how the WTO will override such domestic policies as preventing genetically modified food imports, activist coalitions in the North also harbor grievances about the ill-effects of globalization in the South on human rights and the environment.

Protests against neoliberal globalization also occurred in the South. We again offer two examples.

Manila, Philippines. On November 24 anti-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) demonstrators were beaten by riot police and had water cannon spray used against them during a protest rally outside the Philippine International Convention Center in Manila, the venue for the 3rd ASEAN informal summit and preparatory meetings. The rally was held against ASEAN's fast track trade and investment liberalization.

On November 30, 8,000 unionists and activists protested against Philippine membership in the WTO outside of the US embassy and the presidential palace in Manila. The demonstrators, who chanted slogans against the WTO's meeting in Seattle,

were worried that trade liberalization would lead to an inundation of cheap food imports that would cost peasants needed income. On the same day a guerrilla group machine-gunned a Shell corporate office in the morning hours.

On December 3, protesters tried to force their way into the gates of the US Embassy in Manila for a "lightning rally" against the violent dispersal and arrests of protesters at the WTO meeting in Seattle. The dispersal of WTO protesters sparked protests and condemnation in Manila and other parts of the world.

Bangalore, India. Several thousand farmers from districts in Karnataka gathered in Bangalore to protest against the Third Ministerial conference of the WTO in Seattle. They were joined by activists from several leftist organizations and unions. At the end of the demonstration they issued a "Quit India" notice to Monsanto, urging the company to leave the country or face non-violent direct action against its activities and installations. A similar notice was issued to the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), which has permitted Monsanto to do its research on its premises. Protesters also called on the Indian government to withdraw from the WTO.

The demonstration started at the central train station at 10:30 and headed towards Mahatma Gandhi's statue to hold a public meeting. The police tried to stop the demonstrators from entering the park where Gandhi's statue is situated, but the KRRS farmers went into the park anyway. Activists, who told the police that they do not need anyone's permission to visit the statue, shouted slogans against the WTO, free trade, and Monsanto. They sat down in front of the statue and unfolded large banners and placards stating "We Don't Want Monsanto's Bullshit" and "Keep Organic Free from Genetic Engineering." (**http://www.oneworld.org/campaigns/wto/wtoindia.html** ; **http://www.agp.org**).

The cases of Manila and Bangalore demonstrate that while globalization-induced grievances are attributed to both domestic policy-makers and international institutions, globalization-induced protest in the South maintains a strong domestic focus. Anti-globalization protesters, such as unionists, peasants, and political activists, are primarily concerned about the local negative consequences of neo-liberal policies.

The brief bit of history that we therefore need to explain the protests in the South is that the Washington Consensus has challenged, to one degree or another, protectionist states who adopted import substitution forms of industrialization. Under globalization, neoliberal development policies championed by the IMF and the WB encourage developing states to embrace free trade, economic markets, and political democracy. Hence, at the same time that the Campaign for Global Justice is occurring, state-level protests are accompanying austerity programs imposed by MEIs.[20] People in the South are thus protesting the privatization, deregulation, dollarization, cuts in public spending, and price hikes demanded by MEIs. While international institutions can support internationalist governing coalitions, they can also produce the unintended domestic consequences that empower backlash protest coalitions.

The institutions behind the first two solutions to the Global Rebel's Dilemma are two sides of the same coin. Actions of the GSM are correlated with state-focused protests because both are part of the same syndrome of resistance to the new institutions – the WTO and state-level internationalist developmental coalitions - of the neoliberal global order. In other words, national governance structures (the second explanation) interact with international institutions (the first explanation) to generate, via a federal-group solution, a global protest movement and domestic-centered protest.[21] In fact, one can argue that both sets of protests have a common origin: When NAFTA went into effect in January 1994, the uprising by Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico quickly garnered world-wide support via the Web.

D. Several Minor Solutions to the Global Rebel's Dilemma

The complexity of the coalition offers a clue to a third solution: linking a variety of trade issues together in a protest coalition permits selective incentives (Lichbach 1995: Section 6.5.3) to the different constituencies. The global public good of resisting neoliberal globalization, in other words, is parsed into the local public goods of jobs, the environment, human rights, etc. The international protectionist coalition indeed solves its collective action problem of acting globally by thinking locally.

Multilevel protest leads to a fourth way this GSM solves its collective action problem: Since it is easier to solve a collective action problem among organizations than among people (at the organizational level, a collective action problem is usually referred to as a coalition problem), the GSM is really a movement of movements, a network of networks, and an organization of organizations (Lichbach 1995: Section 5.2.3). To demonstrate how the GSM was able to create such a heterogeneous protest coalition by bringing existing formal and informal local, national, regional, and global NGOs and INGOs to Seattle, return to the typology of groups introduced earlier: the in-place organizational and communication networks we discussed help explain how the protest coalition was brought to Seattle. These networks also help explain how the simultaneous protests that appeared in various cities around the globe were organized in solidarity with the Seattle demonstrations.[22]

But how was the organization of organizations organized? For nearly two years before the Seattle WTO conference anti-free trade groups were organizing, meeting, and engaging in anti-globalization actions on an international scale, such as during Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) meetings, G-8 meetings, and pre-Seattle WTO meetings in 1998 and 1999.[23] Three key international organizational networks include the People's Global Assembly (PGA), the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC), and Reclaim the Streets (RTC).

> PGA was formed in 1997 to contest "capitalist free trade" programs and the WTO. PGA is made up of left-wing groups and political parties from dozens of developing and developed countries - the Philippines, India, South Korea,

Mexico, Brazil, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Europe, North America, and Sri Lanka. A major international PGA forum was held in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India in August 1999. The participating PGA groups played a pivotal role in the anti-WTO protests that took place in developing nations in solidarity with the Seattle demonstrations. The PGA website (http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/) translates into seven languages.

ATTAC is an organization with strong network ties in Switzerland and France. It was formed in France in June of 1999 and is connected to the French labor confederation (CGT). ATTAC-related organizations were very influential in the anti-WTO protests that took place in France during November of 1999. ATTAC's website (http://www.attac.org) translates into four languages.

RTC was formed in England in the mid-1990s as a radical environmental movement that seeks to transform urban industrial spaces into environmentally friendly oases. They occupy city centers and paved streets, planting gardens, riding bikes, and destroying automobiles while simultaneously creating an atmosphere of an outdoor music festival. The movement has support in several cities throughout Great Britain.

Anarchist networks in Europe and the U.S. have also played an important role in developing international communication networks. They have (ironically) helped organize protests against immediate targets of globalized corporate capitalism (e.g., International Banks, Retail Chains, and Fast Food Outlets).

The GSM thus solves its collective action problem by drawing on existing movements, networks, coalitions, and organizations. Some of these – like environmental groups – can trace their roots in global activism back at least two decades. By establishing long-term connections between INGOs and NGOs working on women's issues, the environment, peace, human rights, labor, etc., national civil societies are slowly being woven into a global civil society. The GSM is part of this process.

As so often appears in the history of dissent, a fifth solution to the Rebel's Dilemma provides an exogenous boost to the process: Patrons from the authorities came to the assistance of those who protest authority (Lichbach 1995: Section 6.2). In this case, MEIs have helped mobilize the different types of antiglobalization dissidents. NGO-state connections have promoted INGO-MEI connections which, in turn, have promoted the INGO-INGO connections that characterize the GSM. One way MEIs have provided indirect support to the protesters is by sponsoring international conferences that national NGOs and INGOs attend (e.g., peace activists and women's activists in various countries are funded to go to an IGO-sponsored meeting). Another way that IGOs have supported NGOs and INGOs is by supplying them with relief and development funds. By bypassing inefficient national or local governments, they have indirectly subsidized antiglobalization protest (Florini p. 8). There is a paradox here: Just as MEIs are democratizing by opening up to participation by NGOs and INGOs, the protests have intensified.

A sixth solution to the Rebel's Dilemma used by the protesters in Seattle was to draw on their history of interactions with corporations, states, and MEIs to stress that they will once again succeed. Antiglobalization protests therefore matter – and the authorities know this better than some academics - because they affect institutions: MNCs, developmental coalitions, and international bodies.

"Blaming and shaming" MNCs have thus been effective. The successes reported against MNCs include:

- Royal Dutch/Shell was prevented from disposing of oil rights in North Sea.
- Nike was forced to deal with poor labor conditions in developing countries.
- Nestli was prevented from selling powered baby milk in poor countries by a UN agreement on a code of conduct for baby food sales.
- Monsanto bowed to global concerns about genetically engineered organisms and agreed to accept the Cartagena Protocal to the Convention of Biological diversity.
- Protests against the Bridgestone/Firestone closing in the U.S. begat world-wide protests by Bridgestone/Firestone plants around the world which led to hiring workers back.
- Bechtel corporation, which bought a public water system in a Bolivian city, backed down and sold the system.
- Pfizer agreed to sell AIDS medication to South Africans cheaply.

Successes reported against individual governments include:

- French chefs mobilized to preserve local food traditions.
- Indian farmers mobilized against corporate control of seeds.
- After France undertook nuclear tests in 1995, NGOs launched a campaign against French wine that led Chirac to back down from future testing.

Finally, Aaronson (p. 175) maintains that critics of trade agreements have been successful: "They have changed the content and structure of trade agreements." The successes reported against MEIs include:

- The 1990s campaign to outlaw land mines succeeded.
- In 1994 protesters at a WB meeting forced the WB to rewrite its overall goals and rethink its general operating procedures.

• In 1998 a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) – a draft treaty to harmonize rules on foreign investment under OECD - was squashed by protesters.

• WB ended funding for India's Narmada Dam when 900 NGOs in 37 countries supported a campaign to defund the Bank unless it cancelled its support for the project. The international opposition and the transnational alliance, moreover, led to the establishment of the World Dams Commission to review the performance of large dams.

• The international microcredit movement, supported by major donor institutions around the world, now provides microlending to poor entrepreneurs who lack collateral for bank loans.

These examples are repeated throughout the activists' literature (e.g., Brecher, Costello and Smith 200: 26-7) and web sites. The repetition implies that the protesters have very consciously adopted the "probability of success" solution to their Global Rebel's Dilemma.

Further evidence on this point is that several related strategies were employed. Protesters pointed out that success is relatively easy: all they have to do is block WTO decisions rather than solve intractable global problems. They could win, in other words, by reinforcing the natural tendency toward policy gridlock on global issues. Moreover, protesters pointed to their past successes in shutting down meetings and breaking up negotiations.[24] They also pointed out that NGOs and INGOs are often now included in IMF and WB deliberations. Protests have also succeeded, they maintained, in promoting democracy by forcing decision-makers to make decisions more openly and to publicize the results. Public affairs offices, for example, now explain and discuss global policy issues with interested citizens. Another strategy was to chant "the whole world is watching!" and stress that getting out their "message" is a form of success that has long-run payoffs. Protesters also maintained that protest has changed the rhetoric of public officials and the political discourse within which global issues are discussed. Another strategy was to rationalize losses as lessons for the future. For example, protesters suggested that the failed campaign against NAFTA in the early 1990s influenced public opinion and showed local people that they need to globalize their struggle, gain international allies, and build networks of activists who would protest in future.

The Web, by lowering the organizing costs of protest (Lichbach 1995: Section 3.2), offers a seventh way the different groups were pulled together: By forging cheap and easy connections among activists in many countries, the Web has facilitated world civil society and thus has gone a long way toward solving the Rebel's Dilemma on a global scale. Why free ride when "easy riding on the Internet" is available (Tarrow 1998: 233)?

Many anti-WTO protesters were indeed aware of their organizational problems and how the Web could address them. The protesters thus recognize the value of organizing, albeit through Web networks[25] rather than though the face-to-face

communities (although Churches still did some of this) and hierarchies (although unions still did some of this) used by dissidents in earlier global eras. Their literature thus often explicitly rejects the identity-oriented arguments of the new social movement literature of a decade ago and stresses networking as an organizational technique. It is therefore interesting to recall that identity-oriented groups were poorly represented in Seattle.

This last observation leads to a final solution to the anti-WTO Rebel's Dilemma: political limitations on mobilization. The protest coalition in Seattle was not a coalition of all those opposed to neoliberal globalization. Who was not part of this exclusionary club (Lichbach 1995: Section 6.3.1)?

Members of former statist developmental coalitions often pay the costs of the new openness. After a revolutionary seizure of power revolutionary parties often built up protectionist states against the international order and sought to delink their states from the international economy. The public sector complex associated with such states includes state-owned enterprises and banks; public-private enterprises thriving in protected industries; the military, especially arms importing and arms producing; state bureaucracies, especially those connected to planning, industrial policy, capital controls and import licensing; and ruling parties associated with the state. The losers under neoliberal globalization thus include all those who received the rents from the public spending curtailed by austerity programs: the military, labor unions, and employees of state-owned enterprises. Combinations of these groups were the basis of clientage, corruption, and populism under the old regime:

the military+bureaucrats = military-industrial complex
the labor unions+bureaucrats = state-owned enterprise complex

Internationalist developmental coalitions are thus typically threatened by the losers from the socialist left and the nationalist right – the unions (who can strike) and the military (who can coup) – wanting to protect the dirigiste developmental state against a reform-minded internationalizing center. Coalitions against neoliberalism are thus often marriages of convenience that join advocates of economic nationalism with proponents of national security. Both fear the loss of national sovereignty: While the left, concerned with social justice (i.e., its rents), fears the loss of national sovereignty to MNCs, the right, concerned with national power (i.e., its rents), fears the loss of national sovereignty to international institutions.

In terms of U.S. politics,[26] for example, centrist democrats and centrist republicans (Gore-Bush), who would form any winning coalition to support the WTO, are threatened by Nader on the left (human-rights advocates and environmentalists) and Buchanan on the right (WASP nationalists concerned with military security). Nader complains that MNCs hurt social equity and Buchanan that they hurt national power.

Table 7 sets a less materialist variation of this argument in policy space. It shows that there are two sets of winners and losers under globalization: the winners and losers under economic (neoliberal) globalization and the winners and losers under cultural

(postmodern) globalization. The two dimensions are connected because mobility, diversity, and fluidity in consumption, production, exchange, marketing, and firm organization help deconstruct national, ethnic, and religious boundaries:

> Postmodernist discourses appeal primarily to the winners in the process of globalization and fundamentalist discourses to the losers. In other words, the current global tendencies toward increased mobility, indeterminacy, and hybridity are experienced by some as a kind of liberation but by others as an exacerbation of their suffering. Certainly, bands of popular support for fundamentalist projects - from the Front National in France and Christian fundamentalism in the United States to the Islamic Brothers - have spread most widely among those who have been further subordinated and excluded by the recent transformations of the global economy and who are most threatened by the increased mobility of capital. (Hardt and Negri p. 150)

Preferences about an open economy and an open culture thus generate preferences about an open polity:

> Open/Closed Economy + Open/Closed Culture ✍ Open/Closed Polity

The two winners under globalization may be the same: a global economy supports a postmodern culture, or the ideology of the world market is postmodernism (e.g., Gore). And the two losers may be the same: workers threatened by global economies and global postmodern values (e.g., Buchanan). And it is possible to win on one dimension but lose on the other (e.g., Bush and Nader).

Table 7:
The Antiglobalization Movement in Policy Space



Consider, for example, the right. For Buchanan, the shift toward delegating decision-making power to such international bodies as the UN, NATO, and the WTO raises issues of patriotism and national independence. Moreover, global labor competition and international migration add to feelings of unease for segments of the falling middle class and working class in the U.S. that often support the right. National politicians such as Buchanan thus admonish the dangers of free trade and international government to U.S. sovereignty. Buchanan in particular rails against "global government and an undemocratic new world order," suggesting that the WTO threatens U.S. sovereignty and hence that it should be abolished.

The protesters in Seattle did not try to mobilize authoritarian movements of the nationalist right.[27] Buchanan and his anti-WTO followers – right wing military and extremist groups - were thus the dogs that did not bark in Seattle. Although Buchanan expressed some sympathy for the protesters, the activists in the streets of Seattle were politically and culturally closer to Nader. To put it bluntly, the protesters were just not Buchanan's type of people.[28]

A related type of resistance to neoliberal globalization – religious fundamentalism - was also not present in Seattle. In the neoliberal world order, resistance movements often define themselves in opposition to global secularist values. Two examples are illuminating. Hammas incorporates 19th century European national ideology into its religious program in explicit contradiction to idea of Islamic umma: here, tradition reworked with modernist elements produces a vehement new mix. All attempts to incorporate the ethnic demands of the Israeli Sepharidim within Israeli politics failed, as long as those demands were articulated in their own, i.e. ethnic terms; when those demands were formulated in "universalist" (for Israel) terms, i.e. of religion, Shas gained legitimacy and succeeded as never before. Fundamentalist movements sometimes develop racist and nationalist values based on resentment against the West and its principles embodied in international regimes. They often believe that the globalists are agents of western capitalism, Zionism, and international banking.

A third type of resistance did not appear in the streets of Seattle: inward-looking bourgeoisies (import-competing firms with close ties to the state, industrial bankers tied to protected industries, sectors vulnerable to international market conditions) are also materially threatened by neoliberal globalization. These groups also often develop ideologies emphasizing nationalism, militarism, statism, protectionism, and the idealization of cultural values (e.g., Germany in 19th century).

A final type of dissident who did not appear in the Seattle protests is the politician who benefits from the public sector complex associated with protectionist states. The politicians that led such states became part of what Tilly called the state's protection racket: Since they exchanged benefits (tributes and rents) with their rent-seeking welfare/warfare coalitions, they are also threatened by neoliberal globalization.[29] It is therefore interesting to note that local, state, and national officials played little role in Seattle.

Table 8:
National Origins of Participants in the Battle of Seattle

Canada:	**3,000-5,000**
Seattle and Washington State:	**20,000-25,000**
Greater US:	**15,000-20,000**
NonCanadian Outside US:	**1,000-3,000**

If there were political limitations to the protest coalition, Table 8 shows that there were also geographic limitations. Although the Battle of Seattle was an antiglobalization protest, most participants were Americans and Canadians from the Seattle area. While it is hard to estimate, most of the nonCanadian and nonAmerican participants, moreover, were from the North rather than the South. Globalization, in this geographic sense, did not reach very far into the antiglobalization camp.[30]

All protest coalitions, to conclude, are limited and no protest coalition can be based on a Grand Unified Theory of Protest. All have difficulty mobilizing across class, status, and power boundaries. While the GSM might have had the biggest collective action problem of them all, they did try to avoid creating the strangest bedfellows in world history. Seattle's protest coalition thus solved its Rebel's Dilemma in part by limiting its goals and mobilizing only part of the antiglobalization camp.

In sum: The Seattle protesters employed solutions to the Rebel's Dilemma that were suited to the structural constraints they faced. The protesters used the focal point of MEI meetings to reach out to a variety of groups; a federal group structure as an umbrella for the groups; selective incentives and local public goods to keep the various groups happy; preexisting organizations in their diverse communities to mobilize followers; MEI patrons to provide resources so that INGOs and NGOs can network; the Web to lower the transaction costs of bringing together a diverse set of groups; and an exclusionary club to limit the problem of mobilizing a potentially even larger set of anti-WTO activists.

V. ENDLESS BATTLES OF SEATTLES?

Nagging doubts about the sustainability of the rainbow Seattle coalition have been expressed by the participants themselves. Cockburn and St. Clair (2000: 5) ask "How, for example, were French farmers supposed to remain in solidarity with Teamsters from Tacomma?" Or, even better, how can a movement continue to bring together "French Farmers, Korean greens, Canadian wheat growers, Mexican environmentalists, Chinese dissidents, Ecuadorian anti-dam organizers, U'wa tribespeople from the Columbian rainforest and British campaigns against genetically modified foods" (p. 28)? Such a diverse movement has to contend with four major splits: material interests vs. global ideals, global ideals vs. social identities, North vs. South, and radicals vs. reformists.

The first split is material interests and global ideals. As the activists (Brecher, Costello and Smith; Cockburn and St. Clair) recognize, labor is the most likely to defect from the protest coalition. There are three reasons. First, material interests can be bought off more easily than global ideals. Second, labor disagrees with environmentalists: teamsters and turtles often must choose between jobs and trees. Labor also disagrees with global justice advocates: while labor unions in the North want to include labor and environmental conditions in WTO rules, governments and NGOs in the South have attacked such rules as vehicles for Northern protectionism and Northern-imposed costs on the people of the South. Third, we should be suspicious of labor because of its checkered history with respect to free trade and immigration issues. From the late 1940s through the mid 1970s, organized labor tended to support free trade and U.S. corporate expansion abroad; as part of an alliance with corporations, it sought markets for U.S. goods. During the Cold War, the New Left thus often complained about the Big Government-Big Capital-Big Labor populist alliance that supported the U.S.'s right-wing anticommunist foreign policy. In the 1980s, organized labor turned more economically nationalist: It sought protection for U.S. markets through tariffs and other trade barriers and expressed little concern for issues beyond the protection of unionized workers' jobs. In the 1990s, as evidenced by Seattle, U.S. unions have become more concerned with global protections for labor, especially for workers in the South, and with environmentalism. But workers in the North and South, as well as Teamsters and Turtles, often have different agendas.

A second split is between global ideals and social identity. Some writers - Huntington, Barber, and Kaplan – remind us that resistance to neoliberal globalization has traditionally included the middle ground of social (e.g., communal, ethnic, or religious) groups. Since social identity is more likely to be the basis of protest against a particular state's neoliberal development policies than against the entire world's neoliberal project, it was marginal in the streets of Seattle. Weber, and such modern-day social theorists as Seligman, might say that while the inward calling for resistance in Seattle heroically tried to balance an ethics of conviction (ultimate goals) with an ethics of responsibility (instrumental means), a GSM sustained by WWW networks cannot substitute for the ethical life shared in communities. And while some in this GSM might think of themselves as an emerging Global New Left (GNL), fighting present-day versions of the crises - depression, fascism, and war – that plague capitalism – this GNL has major contradictions or collective action problems to overcome: Can the combination of material self-interest and global ideals, individualism and universalism, via associations and networks in cyberspace be the long-term basis of global civil society? In other words, is a GSM a contradiction in terms? Can a global movement be truly "social"? Unlike an associative group, the collective identity of a communal group is contingent on the existence of a significant "other." And can a social movement be truly "global"? Social ties that involve everyone, in the North and the South, ultimately involve no one. Islamic fundamentalism and Zionism have endured as GSMs, but the GNL's rainbow coalition may be as short-lived as the European and U.S. peace movement of the 1980s.

A third split is between the North and South. The WTO meetings in Seattle broke up, ironically, over fears among developing countries that the U.S. would impose environmental and labor standards on them that would undermine their competitiveness. In other words, it broke up because some feared that the protests would succeed. In general, states in the South are worried about their political capacity; Northern-led protest, they fear, might lead to more conditionality agreements imposed by Northern-led international institutions and, in general, another actor that complicates direct North-South state-level bargaining. States in the South are vulnerable to international institutions and thus ultimately vulnerable to states in the North and their civil societies (especially the U.S.). Since cheap labor and low regulatory standards is the comparative advantage of many developing countries, the only practical way for these countries to develop is to export goods produced by low wages and pollution-generating production processes. Hence, it is unfair of protesters from the North to demand that countries in the South adopt the rules of the North – high wages and strong regulations for labor, food safety, and the environment. Such rules restrict developing country exports and danage their prospects for economic growth. Third world environmentalists, moreover, often see opportunities in NAFTA: there are outside incentives to get regulations on the books and enforce them. NAFTA thus increases their standing, empowering local activists because government takes their issues seriously. First world environmentalists, on the other hand, only see dangers in NAFTA: it lowers global standards. Finally, Northern states had the regulatory and welfare states that were part of the embedded liberalism compromise and it is therefore hypocritical of the North to deny states in the South these types of political economies.

Reformers versus Radicals

A final split that will be hard to reconcile is the split over tactics: Conventional, unconventional, and violent protest have been advocated. While this split coincides with a split between moderate reformers, who want to change the WTO because they believe that trade can be reconciled with social objectives, and radical revolutionaries who want to close the WTO because they believe capitalism kills, we begin with the tactical issue.

On the streets of Seattle reformers and radicals for the most part cooperated. The main divergence centered on tactical choices during two key moments on November 30. First, factions within the anarchist movement decided to vandalize symbols of corporate power and capitalist globalization in the retail and financial district of downtown. These acts created within-coalition conflict between certain anarchists and the nonviolent civil disobedience activists in the environmental and economic justice movements. While foundation-supported NGOs and civil-society boosters endorsed legal, official, police-sanctioned and thus orderly parades, those who endorsed unconventional protest wanted to illegally block entrances and streets so that delegates could not meet. In the future, will the movement proceed in the way Nader proceeds – by peaceful protest, public education, scientific research, and public relations – or in the way the Black Bloc and self-proclaimed “street warriors” proceed - by illegal and violent forms of direct action?

The other tactical conflict erupted during the massive labor march. Parade marshals channeled union demonstrators away from the downtown occupation. Cockburn and St. Clair (2000: 22) thus complained that labor never marched from the Space Needle to the Convention Center, clogging the streets and peacefully preventing WTO delegates from meeting:

> The labor chiefs talked tough but accepted a cheap deal. They would get a Wednesday meeting with Bill Clinton, with the promise that at future such WTO conclaves they would get 'a seat at the table'[in James Hoffa Jr.'s phrase]. So instead of joining the throngs bent on shutting down the opening of the WTO, the big labor rally took place at noon around the Space Needle, some fifteen to twenty blocks from the convention center where the protesters on the front lines were taking their stand. Speaker after speaker took to the podium to address the crowd. None of them mentioned that only blocks away the cops were battering hundreds of demonstrators who were risking their lives to keep the WTO from launching its meetings. When the labor march finally got under way around 1PM, its marshals directed most of the marchers away from the battle zones down by the convention center. They didn't want to add fuel to the fire or put their members at risk.

However, some workers broke off from the march and joined the more confrontational activists. While "the main march withdrew in respectable good order and the demonstrators dispersed peacefully to their hotels" (p. 63), "several phalanxes of union marchers skirted their herders and headed up 4th avenue to the battlegrounds at Pine and Pike. Most of the latter seemed to be from the more militant unions, the Steelworkers, IBEW (electrical workers) and the Longshoremen" (p. 30).

The radical/reformist split, in other words, appeared in the labor movement. As George Becker, President of the United States Steel Workers Union and AFL-CIO Vice President said at the IMF/World Bank Protests in Washington D.C.. (In Daryl Lindsey Salon.com April 18, 2000):

> We went to Seattle for a lot of different reasons. We went up there because of trade, these kids went there for human rights and environmental things and we came together. We were all fighting the same war. It's like fighting a war – you don't look too close at your allies.

But the radical-reformist split in the Seattle coalition involved more than labor. Most of the groups joining the Battle in Seattle arrived from reformist and radical paths. Even within the same social sector or movement there was variation in the paths to participation: some groups wanted to push for new advantages within the WTO system; some groups wanted to protect current advantages and/or avoid their erosion (i.e., privatization, deindustrialization, sovereignty, environmental standards); other groups wanted to fundamentally restructure capitalism and forms of governance; and still other groups with issues tangential to world trade wanted to take advantage of the media spotlight.

Below in Table 9 we designate "reformers" as those groups who seek to change the WTO by making it more democratic, transparent, and/or pushing it to adopt friendly labor and environmental policies. Though critical of existing WTO practices, reformers would like to see change within the existing institution. Many reformist NGOs were also invited to attend the official WTO meetings. "Radicals" are those groups that focus their claim making on the need to abolish the WTO and/or the fundamental restructuring of its practices, including the call for a moratorium on the expansion of the WTO until existing policies are reviewed in terms of their negative impact on labor and the environment. Both reformers and radicals mobilized tens of thousands of people to protest in Seattle and participate in disruptive action.[31]

Table 9.
Reformers and Radicals in the Battle of Seattle Coalition

Goals	Groups	Radicals	Reformers
Material	Labor	UAW, USWA, CLC, IUE, ICFTU, ILWU	AFL-CIO Leadership, UNITE, IAM
Material	Peasants	Peoples Global Action (PGA), Confederation Payassane	
Material	Urban Poor		
Identity	Gender	Dyke Action, Eighth Day Center	
Identity	Religious	Wiccans and Reclaiming	Jubilee2000, Washington Council of Churches, United Methodist Church
Identity	Nationalist/Indigenous	Kuna Youth Movement, The Indigenous Environmental Network, Seventh Generation Fund, Abya Yala Fund	
Ideal	Anarchist	Black Block, ACME, IWW, Anarchist Action Collective	
Ideal	Economic Justice	Global Exchange, Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, Council of Canadians, 50 Years is Enough	
Ideal	Environmental	Greenpeace, Earth First!, Rainforest Action Network (RAN)	Sierra Club, Humane Society, WWF, Friends of the Earth, Audubon
Ideal	Human Rights	Global Exchange, CISPES	Falun Gong, Students for a Free Tibet
Ideal	Peace Groups		War Resisters' League
Mixed	Students	WASFAWN, USASW, University of Washington, Canadian Student Federation, Central Seattle Community College	

Material Interests

Labor

Reformist Unions. The AFL-CIO leadership and some of its constituent unions such as UNITE demanded that the WTO include labor standards. During the October 1999 Los Angeles AFL-CIO national convention a unanimous resolution was passed demanding that the WTO develop labor standards. On October 25, AFL-CIO executive president John Sweeney and The Union of Needle Trades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) President, Jay Mazur, signed the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations' (ACTPN) letter approving the Clinton administration's negotiation agenda at the Seattle WTO Ministerial. The letter called for the establishment of "a working party in the WTO on core labor standards and trade." This move marked a clear divergence within the labor movement between those unions that supported such a gesture and those that preferred to radically restructure the WTO. ACTPN member Lenore Miller, president of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, refused to sign the letter in protest. The International Association of Aerospace Workers (IAM) supported a social clause within the WTO.

Though the AFL-CIO leadership does not agree with many WTO policies, it can be viewed as taking a reformist position, however, in that it seeks changes *within* the institutions of the WTO. Its reform-minded demands included establishing a working group on labor and trade within the WTO; making WTO procedures more transparent and accountable to the public; addressing environmental problems (i.e., not overturning national safeguards and legitimate regulations protecting public health and the environment); and rejecting proposals to reopen the Antidumping Agreement (e.g., importation of less expensive industrial materials such as steel). The AFL-CIO also called on the WTO to adopt a social clause which would incorporate labor standards in future trade negotiations including prohibitions against child and prisoner labor, against discrimination, and against the rights of workers to organize unions and bargain collectively (Bacon 1999 in www.wtowatch.org/library). Indeed, much of the AFL-CIO's Seattle investment in large-scale mobilization centered on getting these demands adopted at the Seattle meetings.

Bill Jordan, head of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), called on the WTO to take into consideration the newly proposed labor statutes or globalization would fail.

Radical Unions. These include the United Steel Workers of America, International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE), the Teamsters, and the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). These unions' grievances ranged from the threat of job loss to a critique of capitalism in general. For example, Teamster president James Hoffa criticized the AFL-CIO's decision to sign the ACTPN letter supporting the U.S. negotiating agenda, saying that the WTO should not be expanded because, "the trade panelists at the WTO take steps everyday that would

subvert rights that are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution" (Barry 1999 in www.wtowatch.org/library). The Canadian Labour Congress took a similar position and wanted to "change the entire trade regime" (Bacon 1999). The ILWU and UAW leaders had no confidence that the WTO had the capacity or will to enforce labor standards (David Bacon Labornet 3/04/00). The ILWU, Teamsters, UAW, and the Federal Workers Union all refused to endorse Al Gore's candidacy at the fall 1999 AFL-CIO Convention.

A number of public sector unions were also present in the streets of Seattle. They included the Canadian Postal Workers, Canadian Librarian Association, AFSSCME, United States Postal Workers, and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). These unions worry about the deregulation of the service sector in WTO member states.

Other third world labor federations from Malaysia, India, Mexico, and South Africa were not present in Seattle – except a few representatives. However, some unions within these federations view the call for labor standards within the WTO as a veil for protectionism by Northern unions.

In sum, while labor speeches were full of radical anti-WTO rhetoric, few union leaders were willing to call for the WTO's definitive and immediate demise, rhetoric that could be found in the framing of more radical political groups (i.e., anarchists and socialists). Unions for the most part wanted to see at least labor and environmental clauses adopted and at most a radical restructuring of WTO procedures.

Peasants

For obvious cost-related reasons, peasant groups turned out in small numbers in Seattle. Most peasant groups mobilized around WTO issues were radical in that they would probably prefer to abolish it. This includes the peasant-based organizations within the People's Global Action (PGA), Movimiento Sem Terra (Brazil), and a variety of rural groups in India (e.g., National Alliance of People's Movements), Philippines, and Mexico. Since 1998 the PGA has played a major role in anti-WTO mobilization around the globe. The French peasant organization Confederation Paysanne also seeks the dissolution of the WTO and centered its grievances on the importation of genetically modified agricultural products.

Social Identities

Religious

Religious Reformers. Most church groups were reformist. Jubilee2000 - the largest religious-based organization present - called for a cancellation of the third world debt by wealthy countries (i.e., G-7). Jubilee2000 (Northwest chapter) also held the largest march besides the labor march during the Battle for Seattle. Church groups did

assist anti-WTO groups of all persuasions by providing food and shelter in downtown parishes such as the United Methodist Church. Religious groups also played an important role as a node whereby labor, student, environmental, and radical political groups could create network ties and sustain their anti-WTO coalition. For example, the United Methodist Church joined with Friends of the Earth, the Teamsters, and the United Steel Workers of America in a loose coalition called the Citizens Trade Campaign in order to mobilize for Seattle.

Religious Radicals. There were a few small radical religious-based groups present in Seattle. Claims-making by pagan groups from Eugene and San Francisco such as Reclaiming and the Wiccans participated in several anti-WTO actions. These spiritual groups adorned many of the protest events by holding a variety of rituals during marches and demonstrations. Radical religious groups were concerned about how WTO practices speed up the rate of environmental destruction, which fundamentally violates the sanctity of pagan religious symbols and objects rooted in the natural world. Pagans protesting in Seattle framed the WTO as an expansion of ecologically devastating economic systems. Pagan-based protests were also present at the Anti-APEC demonstrations in Auckland, New Zealand in September 1999.[32]

Nationalist/Indigenous

Many indigenous groups are radical and against international tourism and the biological appropriation of cultural practices (medicinal and herbal) by the corporate biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries.

Gender

Most gender-based groups were radical and concerned with how WTO policies might over turn domestic affirmative action laws. More generally, they worried about women's rights and a potential increase in the exploitation of women in the developing world (e.g., in export processing zones).

Global Ideals

Environmental

Environmental Reformers. Environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and the Humane Society were upset over WTO policies that override domestic environmental laws (e.g., air quality standards, endangered species acts, and types of fishing nets). However, it is not clear that they want to abolish the WTO if it were to adopt environmentally friendly policies. The Sierra Club did play a pivotal role in pre-protest mobilization and held one of the first major protests of the week on November 29.

Environmental Radicals. Rain Forest Action Network (RAN), Earth First!, and Earth Island Institute would like to abolish the WTO. These groups view the WTO as a legitimating force for global capitalism and multinational corporations. Indeed, RAN played a pivotal role in coordinating (in coalition with the Direct Action Network) the mass sit-ins on N30. Environmentally destructive practices would continue unabated in a world trade regime governed by the WTO. The Basil Action Network and Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund called for a moratorium on new WTO policies until existing statues are re-examined.

Human Rights

Some human rights groups share similar types of concerns as environmentalists in terms of the WTO's dismantling of domestic laws that sanction countries with internationally recognized human rights abuses (e.g., Massachusetts' law banning trade/products from Burma). Such actions take away successful strategies and tactics in which human rights groups have invested years of energy, resources, and time. Falun Gong wanted to prevent China's entry into the WTO because of China's human rights abuses. The Students for a Free Tibet also used the WTO meetings as a "media event" - a low-cost means to generate international publicity for issues that were not narrowly about trade. Most human rights groups were reformist, except for those that connect economic justice to human rights, (e.g., the anti-sweatshop, child, and prison labor movements).

Peace Groups

Peace groups were small in numbers and primarily reformist. For example the War Resisters' League (WRL) opposes WTO policy to exempt military spending from its agreements. The WRL views this as condoning the international arms trade and military escalation in the developing world.

Economic Justice

The majority of economic justice groups can be categorized as radical. They see the WTO as an instrument to further neo-liberal globalization at the expense of the poor of the Third World. Global Exchange has launched a number of campaigns against sweatshops and labor conditions in the rural and urban third world. 50 Years is Enough spent the late 1990s organizing against the World Bank and IMF, including setting the blueprint for the larger anti-globalization movement by protesting at the meetings of MEIs. Groups such as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) are concerned with Labor in Central America, especially problems of labor organizing in free trade zones, run-away shops, and public sector privatization. The WTO is viewed as promoting trade policies that are unfriendly to Third World labor movements. The Council of Canadians (which mobilized a reported 2000 to 3000

Canadians to travel to Seattle) fears that the WTO is speeding up the privatization of public services and industries in Canada.

Anarchists

Anarchist groups (ACME, Black Block, IWW) fit squarely in the radical camp. They see the WTO as the latest incarnation of large-scale capitalism and governance that violates anarchist commitments to local participatory democracy.

Mixed Groups

Most student groups can be labeled as radical in that they believe the WTO must be abolished. Many students were mobilized via the teach-ins and "road shows" of the more radical factions of the movement such as the International Forum on Globalization, the Canadian Student Federation, Ruckus Society, and Art and Revolution. The overwhelming majority of students came from local Washington colleges and universities, west coast (including Canada) universities, the Coalition for Campus Organizing, and a variety of student-based organizations such as United Students Against Sweatshops.

These four splits are potentially dangerous to the movement because they are cumulative: Northern radicals who do not come from the labor movement vs. everyone else. Yet movements are often split between radicals and reformists and in negotiations with authorities the bad cops help the good cops strike better deals (i.e., if you don't deal with Martin Luther King you will soon be dealing with Malcom X).

As we mentioned earlier, Tarrow has already expressed the suspicion that these sorts of overlapping splits are endemic to a globalized movement: The bonds holding a GSM together are contingent - short-term and tactical, rather than constitutive – long-term and strategic. This GSM is indeed a loose and fluid transnational "relay" linking tighter and more stable pre-existing NGOs and INGOs. However, these contingent bonds and relays have been strong enough to allow it to solve its collective action problem. They remain strong enough to allow us to predict (we first wrote these lines on January 5, 2001) that another large-scale anti-MEI protest will occur in Quebec City in April, 2001.[33]

While the end of the Battles of Seattles is not yet in sight, the breadth of the protest coalition remains an open question. If Battles of Seattles continue but the rainbow Seattle coalition breaks up, who will care about the protests? Unless future Battles of Seattles continue to attract a diverse set of allies and replicate the rainbow Seattle coalition, their political significance will diminish. Future research should explore the composition of the protest coalition as much as its actions: the events, episodes, and campaigns are most visible to the media but they are not the real story.

VI. CONCLUSION:
PROTEST COALITIONS, GLOBAL ORDER, AND LOCAL RESISTANCE

As Stanley Fish wrote in connection with another recent protest against the global order – the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington,

> irrational actors are by definition without rhyme or reason, and there's no point in reasoning about them on the way to fighting them. The better course is to think of these men as bearers of a rationality we reject because its goal is our destruction. If we take the trouble to understand that rationality, we might have a better chance of figuring out what its adherents will do next and preventing it.

This sage advice from a leading postmodernist is consistent with our guiding question: Were the protests in Seattle rational? Or even better, How were they rational? Our evidence indeed demonstrates that the Battle of Seattle was preceded by months and even years of planning that allowed a rainbow protest coalition to conduct protests in nearly 100 cities around the world, protests that were only the latest round in an ongoing campaign against neoliberal globalization.

At the most general level, this paper thus offered a rational choice theory of resistance against authority. On the authority side, we argued that institutions are rationally constructed to solve the public goods problem of maximizing wealth by assuring credible commitments to property rights. Institution-builders thus take account of global peace and domestic stability. On the resistance side, we argued that rebels rationally solve their collective action problem by strategizing within the opportunities and constraints of the institutional framework fashioned by authorities. As rational dissidents challenge rational authorities, domestic and international stability hang in the balance.

We thus explored the problematique of global order and local resistance through the lens of how neoliberal globalization generated the Battle of Seattle, setting a rational choice explanation of the antiglobalization movement within a broad institutional analysis of the global political economy. The argument was thus developed historically and concretely, going beyond theorists and their texts and appealing to systematically gathered evidence about actors and their actions in specific global contexts.

As Table 10 shows, our understanding of the events was also multilayered. Adopting an outside-inside explanatory strategy, we moved from structure to culture to rationality. Following the structuralists, we looked for contradiction; following the culturalists, we looked for difference; and following the rationalists, we looked for dilemma. We thus traced the antiglobalization orientations of different protest groups – those concerned with material interests, social identities, and global ideals – and different protest frames – trade and neoliberalism, globalization and global democracy, and MNCs and capitalism - to state-level developmental coalitions embedded in international

institutions and operating under political democracy. Protest against neoliberal globalization fragments the NIT and the neoliberal center does not hold. Dissidents are successful because they use aspects of structure to solve their Global Rebel's Dilemma: MEIs become focal points, state-led development coalitions generate federal groups, linkages among trade issues offer selective incentives, cultural diversity mobilizes preexisting organizations, INGOs are the patrons of dissent, engaging MNCs and MEIs increase estimates of the probability of success, global civil society (the WEB) reduces organizational costs, and the losers under globalization form an exclusionary club.

Table 10:
Explaining the Battle of Seattle

Structure ✍ Culture ✍ Rationality

Structure: Global Institutions
International institutions
- supporting integrated national economies

Developmental coalitions
- in independent but embedded states pursuing neoliberalism

Democracies
- with politically active civil societies

Culture: Antiglobalization Orientations
Group grievances
- Material Interests
- Social Identities
- Global Ideals

Protest frames
- Trade and neoliberalism
- Globalization and global democracy
- MNCs and Capitalism

Rationality: Global Rebel's Dilemma
Major solutions
- MEIs and focal points
- State-led developmental coalitions and federal groups

Minor solutions
- Linkage among trade issues and selective incentives
- Cultural diversity and preexisting organizations
- INGOs and the patronage of dissent
- Engaging MNCs and MEIs and estimates of the probability of success
- Global civil society (WEB) and organizational costs
- Losers under globalization and exclusionary clubs

Now the political question is whether the GNL also fragments. While no one has yet demonstrated a monopoly of truth about the best of all possible future worlds, it seems that the GNL will be able to produce several more Battles of Seattles before its collective action problems undo it and some other, currently unanticipated, form of resistance emerges to challenge structure.

The research question is whether all current protest coalitions against neoliberal globalization are equally likely to fragment. One can only wonder whether a similarly diverse coalition was put together in other cities around the globe during the Battle of Seattle, in other anti-MEI protests before and after Seattle, and in state-focused antiglobalization protests. In other words, how did the 50,000-person protest coalition in the Battle of Seattle differ from the 60,000-person protest coalition in Nice France and how do both differ from national-level protest coalitions against structural adjustment that appear so often in Argentina and Brazil?

While the explanations advanced here fit the single "case" – the Battle of Seattle that occurred from November 29 to December 3, 1999, we need to examine protest coalitions formed in the other cities during the Battle of Seattle and in previous and subsequent attacks on MEIs. As we compare protest coalitions across Battles of Seattles, our primary prediction is:

International Institutions + Developmental Coalitions ✍ Protest Coalition + Protest

We thus have two dependent variables to explain:

> the level of antiglobalization protest in a country, or the likelihood that a city has antiglobalization protests; and
>
> the composition of the antiglobalization protest coalition, or the likelihood that a group affected by globalization joins antiglobalization protests.

We also have two basic explanatory variables that yield two sets of testable hypotheses. The first set focuses on international institutions:

> Different international institutions generate different levels of antiglobalization protest. INGO-MEI relationships thus affect the level of protest: The relatively new WTO has done a much worse job of integrating social movements into its structure than the WB, and the IMF falls somewhere in the middle. Protest directed against the WTO should therefore be relatively more extensive and diverse.[34]
>
> Different international institutions generate different antiglobalization protest coalitions. INGO-MEI relationships thus also affect who protests: Groups most concerned with trade issues (e.g., labor) will join protests against the WTO while groups most concerned with global inequality (e.g., global justice) will join protests against the IMF and WB.

Some countries, however, have experienced much more protest against neoliberalism than others: If globalization is so powerful a force, as some seem to suggest, how can we explain the great variety of state-level responses?[35] The second set of hypotheses thus focuses on the context, structure, and policies of developmental coalitions in states:

> The earlier and the stronger the neoliberal globalization in a country in the South, the less its current antiglobalization protest. Counterfactually, extensive protest occurs as states abruptly shift from a strong state/ISI past. While this scenario fits Southern protest in India, it does not entirely fit the protest we documented in the Philippines. Social identities and global ideals supplement material interests.
>
> Different types of neoliberalization policies generate different antiglobalization protest coalitions. Economic adjustment programs (e.g., privatization, deregulation, welfare state retrenchment), trade policies (e.g., those threatening the environment, human rights, or food safety), and financial openness (e.g., debt and current crises in Russia and Asia) thus influence who protests: The more a neoliberal policy affects a group in a country, the greater the likelihood that the group will join an antiglobalization protest coalition in that country.
>
> Antiglobalization protest will occur among nations, cities, and groups most tied to the WWW.
>
> States whose political, social, and economic institutions do a better job of managing neoliberal globalization will not have Battles of Seattles, and when such battles do occur they will involve less diverse protest coalitions. Do, for example, presidential systems, independent central banks, and corporatist civil societies generate less or more extensive and less or more diverse antiglobalization protest?

These speculations and others will be the subject of future work.

As we continue to explain antiglobalization protests, we will develop a better understanding of the general nature of protest in the new global order. The endless Battles of Seattles represent an new type of social conflict in the postmodern era, and it is their significance and novelty that draw us to them. Battles of Seattles involve several innovative features[36]:

> Absence of fully articulated and coherent platforms, ideologies, philosophies, or metanarratives that can serve as alternative visions to the West, U.S., neoliberalism, or the Washington consensus.
>
> The absence of established, mass-based political parties in the protests.
>
> Crisis and collapse, in terms of vision and organization, in particular of the Left, including the absence of such political programs and social movements as

> Marxism, communism, socialism, social democracy, the Keynesian welfare state, and embedded liberalism.
>
> Protest campaigns as media campaigns: the politics of the spectacle designed around the presentation and manipulation of information; hence local conflicts are framed globally to catch the eye of CNN and BBC.
>
> The search for alternative medias liberated from corporate and national monopolies.
>
> In place of violent conflict, the search for dialogue: political communication struggles to create a public space to discuss democracy, justice, and pluralism, on the one hand, and power, authority, and control, on the other.
>
> No interest in making a national revolution to capture state power.
>
> The goal is to transform civil society: create horizontal and vertical, interlinked and multilayered (local, regional, national, global) enclaves by engaging in concrete local projects that forge social solidarity; and develop alternative, grassroots, and sustainable economies that permit alternative paths of democratic development (Burbach 2001: 93).
>
> Prominence of young people in the movement in the face of the alienation of the masses of young people from any form of politics.
>
> Attempt to change the world democratically from the bottom-up and rejection of centralist, top-down, elitist leadership.
>
> No clear strategy, rationale, or logic of protest action: emphasis on experience, experimentation, and praxis.

While these features may indeed be important to Battles of Seattles, what strikes us as most significant is that the protesters Think Globally and Act Globally. The activists, that is, developed a novel protest frame – opposition to neoliberal globalization – and a novel organizational form to implement it - a rainbow protest coalition that networked different types of group claims into a common global struggle. Antiglobalization protests thus manifest two novelties: a rainbow protest coalition acting globally. In other words, the hardest Rebel's Dilemma (Lichbach 1995) of them all to solve - a globalized collective action problem - is solved by the hardest collectivity of them all to sustain – a rainbow coalition.

How widespread and enduring are these innovations? Three interrelated sets of questions are relevant for future research.

> **The globalization of grievances.** Do today's resistance movements increasingly frame, interpret, and attribute their grievances to neoliberal globalization and its

governing institutions? Are the complaints directed against neoliberalism, globalization, corporate power, or capitalism itself? Or are the enemies the West and the U.S.? In other words, why exactly do the protesters reject the strategy, rationale, and logic of the contemporary social, political, cultural, and economic order?

The diversity of the protest coalition. Has protest today been decentered? Has the multiplicity of social groups and the fragmentation of social classes produced different levels or targets of grievances that come together in rainbow protest coalitions against neoliberal globalization? How do activists coalesce a potpourri of single-issue grievances and groups into an overall movement? How does such a wide variety of groups come together on a given issue – the WTO or the IMF - to challenge global authority?

The globalization of action. How do activists mobilize all these diverse groups around the entire world? Can a Global Rebel's Dilemma continue to mobilize a rainbow protest coalition, or is there a tradeoff of the extent for the diversity of protest, a tradeoff of coalition and community? Will these tensions undo the protests, or will there be endless Battles of Seattles?

A careful comparison of Battles of Seattles can also help answer these questions.

Footnotes

[1] Protest events were defined as actions of three or more people outside of government directed at the state or at global economic and political elites. These events were distinguished by the fact that they occurred at different times or in different locations around the city of Seattle. Each collective action was treated as a discrete event. Examples included sit-ins, marches, obstruction of traffic, hanging propaganda banners from buildings, and public rallies. Protest events had a very fluid nature in the streets of Seattle with protest participants involved in multiple protest events during a twenty-four hour period. Data collection involved real-time monitoring of internet activist websites, list servers, and newspapers that have provided conflict researchers a rich new set of information. For details, see Almeida and Lichbach. Like all the data in this paper, the chart was recently compiled and is subject to revision.

[2] Studies of the Battle of Seattle include Danaher and Burbach 2000; Cockburn and St. Clair 2000; Brecher, Costello and Smith 2000; Levi and Olson 2000; Smith 2000; Thomas 2000; and Bircham and Charlton 2001. The film *Showdown in Seattle: Five Days that Shook the WTO* is also very useful.

[3] Studies of GSMs have exploded. For some recent contributions, see Millennium 1994; Wapner 1996; Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997; Ayres 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Fox and Brown 1998; Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin 1998; della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht 1999; Cohen and Rai 2000; Florini 2000; O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte, and Williams 2000; Guidry, Kennedy and Zald 2000; Starr 2000; Edwards and Gaventa 2001; Hamel, Lustiger-Thaler, and Mayer 2000; Gordon and Turner 2000; and Imig and Tarrow 2001.

[4] Two important precursors to Ruggie were Polanyi, who maintained that self-regulating markets require a state, and Gershenkron, who maintained that late-developing market economies require an even stronger state.

[5] The world-systems literature offers a compatible structural explanation: The increased integration of the global market has thus produced a GSM that calls for other cross-border flows - transnational civic culture, civil society, and democratic governance – to transform the networks, organizations, and institutions of global governance. While this literature lacks a meso-level understanding of the institutions and mechanisms involved, the evidence does supports one of its important themes: Since neoliberalism is global, protest against neoliberalism is also global. More generally, particular types of bids for global hegemony beget particular forms of counterhegemonic or antisystemic movements that call for change (Chase-Dunn 1989). In other words, global orders have characteristic arrangements; the particular structure of global politics (e.g., institutions, power distribution) produces particular forms of international cooperation to contain anti-systemic movements, conflicts, and regime changes; these forms of global governance, in turn, facilitate and suppress dissent; characteristic patterns of resistance therefore emerge in response to characteristic global orders and protest is tied to particular world-historical

eras; finally, protests that reveal the weakness of the institution builders – the Battle of Seattle struck at the U.S., the supposedly hegemonic power, begets intensified protests.

[6] Protest for neoliberalism could be a temporary expedient to loosen the hold of particularly statist political economies (e.g., communist states in Eastern Europe, kleptocracies in sub-Saharan Africa). As the pains of structural adjustment increase, the protesters could turn against neoliberalism.

[7] Max Weber began his classic essay "Science as a Vocation" by writing: "We political economists have a pedantic custom, which I should like to follow, of always beginning with the external conditions." After briefly discussing the organization of science in academia, Weber then wrote: "This much I deem necessary to say about the external conditions of the academic man's vocation. But I believe that actually you wish to hear of something else, namely, of the *inward* calling for science."

[8] While Solingen is concerned with how the struggle between these two coalitions influence international conflict and cooperation, I explore how the struggle influences domestic governance.

[9] Who are the members of internationalist coalitions? In addition to the usual suspects (e.g., competitive export-oriented enterprises, highly skilled workers, professionals, ministries of finance, independent central banks, managers of export-processing zones, and trade ministries), Solingen notes that minority ethnic nationalist parties become allies of internationalist coalitions when they are targets of hegemonic ethnic or religious movements. Her examples include Lebanese and Egyptian Christians, Alawite Turks, Rwandan Tutsis, and Iraqui Kurds.

[10] There were also some consumer groups, particularly from the US, stressing general ideals.

[11] Hence, there is a problem in applying this typology to groups as organizational wholes rather than to their factions or even to their individual members.

[12] Support for free trade also combines categories. Those who opposed the Corn Laws in Britain wanted material benefits for British cotton manufacturers, to strengthen the bourgeoisie class, and to serve Britain's national interest.

[13] Bhagwati (1998, 2000) argues that Clinton mismanaged globalization in several ways. First, he promoted Japanaphobia.

> "President Clinton came to the White House, rooting to go for Japan's jugular, literally surrounded by Japanophobes who cried foul at every opportunity. Japan was regarded by them as the mighty Superman and the evil Lex Luthor rolled into a fearsome juggernaut. Demonized, Japan was accused repeatedly by the administration during President Clinton's first time of being a wicked trader whose exports were predatory and imports exclusionary." (Bhagwati 2000: 73)

Second, he promoted NAFTA, a regional preferential trade area, instead of multilateral trade regimes. Thus, anti-NAFTA protests became anti-WTO protests, a different issue entirely. As Bhaghawti puts it:

> "Bilateral and regional trade agreements enable the protectionists to zero in on this form of trade liberalization by converting nontrade into trade issues. Thus, if Mexico is being brought into freer trade with us the protectionists will go to town and say, with apparent plausibility, that Mexico is not entitled to free trade with us because 'Mexico is not a democracy,' or 'Mexico has a bad environmental standards,' or 'Mexico's labor laws are not adequate'. In short, any warts, real or imaged, on Mexico's face become weapons to destroy a trade pact with it... few protectionists thought it fruitful to attack the Uruguay Round on such nontrade grounds: it would have been much harder to do so, with too many countries and too many issues at stake and with no easy way to zero in therefore on one country's warts and exploit them to advantage." (p. xx)

> "One serious legacy of NAFTA (whose advisability to a multilateralist such as myself is suspect anyway) was the plague it visited on future trade liberalization, by accentuating and politicizing these fears." (p. 88; for others problems, see pp. 252).

Third, he promoted bilateralism instead of multilateralism, especially with China:

> "Then came the U.S.-China accord, cynically timed just two weeks before Seattle. If there is any country that arouses ire among the antiglobalization groups, it is China. So Clinton was waving the red flag - pun intended - before the raging NGO bulls, making Seattle's success ever more problematic. Why wasn't the accord with China announced after Seattle instead?" (Bhagwati 2000: 286)

Fourth, he promoted trade sanctions against poor countries:

> "Finally, just as the poor countries were properly objecting to the setting of a Working Party on "labor rights" - defined in a cynically protectionist fashion so as to target the poor countries exclusively - and were seeking to shift the question to an appropriate agency such as the International Labor Organization, Clinton arrived and said that he wanted trade sanctions against the poor countries on the issue. That blew it." (Bhagwati 2000: 286).

Fifth, he promoted the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI):

> "It is hard to tell the lobbies seeking to push their agendas into the WTO to get off its back even as the MAI is sought to be worked into the WTO. It was bad enough to work Intellectual Property Protection - an issue of enforcement of asserted property rights against essentially poor nations rather than of trade when

> all gain - into the WTO as the Uruguay Round Closed. But with IPP and the MAI both in, it would be hard to refute the charge that what is good for "capital" at the WTO is not considered good for "labor" or for "nature." (Bhagwati 2000: 314)

Sixth, he promoted an obsession with fair trade and not free trade. Bhagwati (2000: 75) writes that "the ceaseless refrain of "unfair trade" has itself produced a public perception that free trade by us is both economically unwise and politically naïve. And so has the public support for free trade been seriously undermined." Finally, he promoted anti-globalization. Bhagwati (2000: 286) argued that "Clinton joined in the anti-globalization frenzy, endlessly repeating the witless sound bite that "globalization needs a human face," implying as its flip side that it lacks one.

Part of the reason for Clinton's reticence is the he is a politician who reflects the popular switch of support for free trade. In the 1960's, the North saw free trade (integration into world economy) as an advantageous opportunity and the South saw free trade as a malevolent constraint. In 2000, the North sees it as malevolent (due to the decline of wages of unskilled labor and due to high unemployment levels) and the South sees it as advantageous (due to the example of the Asian tigers).

[14] This issue framing, according to Krugman, proves a Gresham's law of politics: bad arguments drive out good ones.

[15] Maybe not the biggest. It is often argued that an internationalizing, liberal, pro-reform coalition is more fragile than an anti-reform protectionist coalition. The former is a classic case of distributed benefits and concentrated costs that makes it hard to organize collective action in support of the public good of liberalizing a political economy. The later has less trouble organizing because vested interests enjoy sector-specific benefits that provide selective incentives to beneficiaries with ties to the government sector (that can, moreover, help mobilize their patronage network). But this an argument about domestic coalitions and globalized protectionist coalitions have collective action problems that domestic reform coalitions do not. Perhaps the following table, where the entries indicate the difficulty of putting together a coalition, holds:

	domestic	international
protectionist	easy	hardest
globalizing	hard	harder

International coalitions are thus always more difficult to put together than their corresponding domestic ones, but globalizing coalitions are more difficult to put together domestically whereas protectionist coalitions are harder to fashion internationally.

[16] There is another way to pose the dissident's collective action problem: "Overall, the terms of the bargain struck by partners in a coalition of statist, populist, nationalist, and confessional forces may lead to the 'paradox of vote trading,' in which logrolling leaves the partners worse off than they would have been without trading votes" (Solingen p. 53).

[17] Related questions involve the existence of global civil society (Albert, Brock, and Wolf 2000) and international norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). It is also important to note that identifying nationally-based social movements is challenging. There are always a variety of individuals and a plurality of organizations that differ in size, orientation, goals, ideology, resources, organizational forms, actions, etc. For example, where and when did the US women's movement begin? Who should we now count among its members? Objective, subjective, attitudinal, and behavioral criteria may be used.

[18]

Anti-WTO Organizing Activities for Seattle in 1999

Date	**Organizing Event**
1/26/99	Public Citizens' Global Trade Watch sends email to "**thousands** of supporters" to come to Seattle and protest WTO conference. "That email, and others from allied organizations, began ricocheting around the globe the moment Seattle was selected to host the World Trade Organization Talks. Soon there were dozens of "listservs," or e-mail discussion groups, devoted to devising ways to disrupt the event.
2/99	A group of **40 to 50** local Seattle Sea Turtle advocates from the Humane Society and Animal Welfare Institute begin to make Sea Turtle Costumes for WTO Convention. At least 17 separate "turtle making parties" are held in Seattle and in the San Juan Islands. They make 240 costumes. (Seattle Times 12/19/99).
2/99	"SF Art and Revolution [a member of the Direct Action Network (DAN)] put out a letter in February looking for other people/groups who wanted to make big street theater and mass direct action at the WTO with us. We asked organizers and groups that we have a good connection to and experience with to network together with us." (www.agitprop.org/artandrevolution/wto/dan.html)
6/99	Labor Mobilization Committee begins meeting in Seattle to plan worker walk-out on November 30. (WASFAWN 10/29/99, www.seattlewto.net/walkout/pressrelease.html).
8/99	AFL-CIO sets up office in Seattle to coordinate anti-WTO activities. Office has a small logistics team to organize the mass march on Nov. 30. (Cleveland Free Times Dec.8-14, 1999).

9/6/99	"Since Labor Day a cadre of Seattle activists has worked to create the IMC [Independent Media Center] in the Glen Hotel. Now the place is filled with computers, telephones, special transmission lines, and state-of-the-art streaming technologies." The streaming was donated by encoding.com, a Seattle Internet company. (Dean Paton, Christian Science Monitor 12/3/99).
9/99	"Local labor leaders in Seattle took WTO education material from the national AFL-CIO and drafted organizers from each trade to tailor it for fellow workers. Brochures and fliers were printed for each union. Volunteer organizers…were designated for each work site, and they were prepared with five-minute, 15-minute and half-hour WTO spiels to give their fellow workers at the soft drink machine, in the cafeteria. What resulted was not only a dramatic increase in awareness of global trade issues but also a dramatic increase in union mobilization." (LA Times 12/4/99 A18).
9/15/99	Beginning today the Ruckus Society will be at the Pragtri Farm just outside of Arlington, Washington to teach 160 activists from around the world how to use direct-action protest tactics during WTO conference in Seattle [Called the "Globalize This! Action Camp"]. … Courses include how to reconnoiter areas for protests; how to blockade objects and streets; how to perform effective political theater; and how to coordinate massive, non-violent movements of humans against an issue." (Seattle Post-Intelligencer 9/15/99). Ruckus also teaches classes on using the internet for protest mobilization at this camp. The Rainforest Action Network is also sponsoring the camp. This camp was only for progressive, experienced protesters – "advanced camp."
9/27/99	"San Francisco's Art and Revolution Collective took off to start a three-week Road Show from Vancouver, BC to Santa Cruz." (Denis Moynihan Z Magazine Dec. 8, 1999) [Theater protest group mobilizing for Seattle protests] The three week Resist the WTO Roadshow will educate about the WTO and help organize people to speak out against it. It will stop in communities up and down the West Coast, from Vancouver, BC to Santa Cruz from September 27 to October 16, 1999. The Roadshow will offer a unique combination of information, culture and inspiration to help people to take action. It will do public performances and teach-ins, as well as visiting schools, universities, churches, community groups and unions. (Art and Revolution Website – agitprop.org).

10/28/99	Anti-WTO caravan begins in New York. The caravan "includes men and women from Bangladesh, Bolivia, Canada, Germany, India, Israel, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, the United States and West Papua. The participants are people who have been directly impacted corporate globalization, and represent environmental, human rights, workers, fishing and farming movements. They represent movements fighting sweatshops in New York, corporate takeover of family farming in India, the destruction of indigenous communities in West Papua and the rape of the land by oil companies in Nigeria.""The caravan will be stopping in about 20 communities, including large cities, small towns, and Native American reservations. It will start in New York on October 28 and arrive in Seattle on November 24.

10/29/99	Workers and Students for a Walkout Network (WASFAWN) in Seattle release press statement about mobilizing efforts: "Labor organizations and student groups are organizing for a city-wide walkout on November 30, 1999 against the WTO. The issue of contention is the 3rd Ministerial of the World Trade Organization, which many charge is a threat to the rights of workers, consumers, students and the environment. … The group means business - it has produced dozens of leaflets, distributed 2,000 walkout flyers at Bumbershoot, 5,000 walkout flyers to workers around the city, brought a representative from the National Labor Committee for a speech at the University of Washington, and it's members even got the Washington State Labor Council to pass a resolution opposing the WTO when it wasn't even on the agenda. The call for a walkout has spread to other areas as well. Jason Adams of Workers and Students for a Walkout Network (WASFAWN) stated that "at this point what we have is students at least **10 high schools** and **5 colleges**, as well as **dozens of non-union worksites** organizing to either walkout or call in sick on November 30." Adams says that the group has been meeting weekly, and will continue to meet to network and plan for the anti-WTO action. He also said that an email listserve and website had been set up to facilitate public discussion of a walkout at http://walkout.listbot.com. In a slightly tamer tone, the AFL-CIO has been putting out flyers calling for their members to "take the day off" November 30 or "miss the party." Ron Judd, of the King County Labor Council, stated in an October 13 Washington Post article that the AFL-CIO intends to attract tens of thousands of Seattle's workers to a mass labor march and rally at 10 am on Tuesday, November 30 - a working day. In order to get there, the working day will have to be interrupted somehow, and many feel that spontaneous walkouts or sick-ins will occur. The union federation is renting out every building at the Seattle Center, (which has enough room to seat over 100,000 workers) for the day to make room for a mass labor rally and march to the Washington State Convention and Trade Center where WTO delegates will be meeting. According to Sally Soriano of People for Fair Trade/NO to WTO even the Washington Council of Churches is asking their congregations to take the afternoon off on November 30 to be part of what will probably be the largest protest ever held on U.S. soil against "free trade.'"(WASFAWN 10/29/99, www.seattlewto.net/walkout/pressrelease.html).
11/99	"The early signs were there: For two weeks prior to the protest, people flooded the Denny Way "Welcome Center" DAN [Direct Action Network] set up to orient incoming protesters, and Sunday evening nonviolence trainings drew **100 people**." (Seattle Weekly December 2-8, 1999).

11/99	"State labor federations in Wisconsin and Minnesota are flying in jetloads of their members, Teamsters will be busing in from Tennessee and a multi-car train will carry trade unionists from Portland up the coast. The Steelworkers have rented more than 1,000 hotel rooms in nearby Tacoma and are planning a national caravan to Seattle." (John Nichols, The Nation, 12/6/99 p.6).
11/4/99	A Cross-country Toronto-to-Seattle caravan begins and stops in dozens of cities and towns, meeting with activists across the country, and working to raise awareness about the dangers the WTO poses to democracy, social justice and human rights. The caravan ends in Seattle to join the massive protest against WTO. (Oshan Anand, www.seattlewto.org/n30/roundup.html)
11/14/99	Local Freedom Socialist Party sponsors public seminar, "The WTO: A License to Loot," in Seattle on planning WTO protests with a "Marxist analysis." (Globalizethis.com website).
11/20/99	Direct Action Network (DAN) has warehouse east of downtown Seattle where it is training activists a week before November 30th. The training includes civil-disobedience and Earth First!-style Lock-downs of immovable human barricades (L.A. Kaufman, Salon.com 11/30/99, see also www.agitprop.org)
11/27/99	Massive teach-in by the International Forum on Globalization at the 2,500 seat Benaroya auditorium in Seattle [Anti-WTO Teach-in]. (Denis Moynihan Z Magazine Dec. 8, 1999)
11/28/99	From Nov. 28-29 a "People's Assembly Against Imperialist Globalization" is held in Seattle with 150 delegates from 12 countries. (Art Garcia LA Change Links 1/2000, see also Blind Spot 11/29/99).
11/28/99	In the evening Jubilee 2000 holds church service at Saint James Cathedral with nearly a **thousand** in attendance. Sermon is about social justice and redistributing global wealth (Blind Spot No.2 11/30/99).
11/29/99	NY Times states that over **500 organizations** have poured into Seattle to protest WTO (NY Times 11/29/99). "More than **2,000** nongovernmental organizations – mostly anti-WTO interests with strong social agendas and international ties - registered for the summit, according to trade officials." (LA Times 12/5/99 A18).

11/29/99	Many teach-ins take place around downtown Seattle (Cleveland Free Times Dec.8-14, 1999).
12/1/99	Teach-in is held at Plymouth Congregational Church on "Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS). Discuss corporate power and the biotechnology industry. (Blind Spot No.4 12/2/99).
12/1/99	Indigenous People's Forum on WTO held at Seattle University at 6 p.m. Main theme is protection of indigenous intellectual property rights. (www.seattle99.org).
12/1/99	In the evening the Farmer's Forum is held with 200 farmers and farm-workers from around the world. They protest WTO agricultural policies. (Blind Spot No.4 12/2/99).
12/1/99	La Raza Center and the Methodist Church serve as sanctuaries "where activists can eat, rest and rejuvenate and come back for the protests." (Art Garcia LA Change Links 1/2000).

[19] As Risse-Kappen has argued, domestic structures (culture, society, market, and state) provide static and dynamic political opportunities that shape transnational interactions. NGOs with state-level grievances can help solve the agency problem of a GSM. They can function, that is, as intermediary organizations linking INGOs who operate in world capitals with local grass-roots organizations who operate in villages in the countryside.

[20] The major issue now is privatization. In the past, the Washington Consensus, particularly structural adjustment programs that emphasize shock therapy, produced food riots. Moreover, the earlier protests were more driven by foreign debt repayments whereas today's protests are driven by economic integration. See Walton 1989; Walton and Ragin 1990; Walton and Seddon 1994; Bienen and Gersovitz 1985, 1986; Remmer 1986.

[21] International regimes, moreover, often strengthen the influence of the most powerful states that create them; hegemonic prerogatives produce protests against international equity.

[22] International bandwagons played a minor role. Protesters outside of the U.S. may have gotten an extra kick by the success of Seattle, but our data to date clearly shows the international protest peaking on November 30 (including big protests in Europe on the 27-29) - not after it. A focal point of protest, on the other hand, played a major role: The activists knew "N30" was the date to carry out their actions just as they did on "J18" in 1999 against the G-8 and in May 98 against the WTO in Geneva.

[23] Our example protest cities in the North and the South all have histories of anti-WTO protest. Geneva was the site of the first mass demonstrations against the WTO sponsored by the PGA; during a conference in May 1998, 4,500 participated in protests in the city. India witnessed earlier anti-WTO protests as well as served as a site for a major anti-WTO international conference in August of 1999. The Philippines served as the secretariat to early anti-WTO organizing attempts.

[24] The successes of the Battle of Seattle have entered into protest history: Tuesday - shut down opening ceremony; Wednesday - prevent Clinton from addressing the WTO delegates; and Friday - cancel closing ceremony and adjourn in disorder without an agenda for the next round of meetings.

[25] Ruggie (1994a: 521) notes the general prevalence of networks in today's global economy.

[26] Solingen (p. 38) offers another example: the Egyptian Socialist Labor Party and the Palestinian PFLP and DFLP align with Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.

[27] How do nationalist (ethnic, religious) demands on the state get wrapped up with the opposition to internationalist pressures for neoliberalism? Majority ethnic nationalist parties are tied to the state because states form populist and protectionist distributive coalitions tied to import substitution forms of industrialization. They often oppose neoliberalism because it challenges the ethnic/religious network of welfare associations, schools, professional networks that are supported by government rent-seeking and corrupt political parties catering to their clientele.

[28] Though not on the streets, CNN made him a spokesman for WTO opponents (Danaher and Burbach, p. 62).

[29] Solingen (p. 44) even argues that protectionism that begets sanctions plays into the hands of politicians, another reason why they are often part of protectionist coalitions: "Sanctions raise the domestic price of the sanctioned import. The affected government steps in to organize trade in that sector as a monopsonist, helping it to capture some of the economic rents generated by the sanctions. Rationed goods become a political resource in the hands of the sanctioned government. Beneficiaries of sanctions import-competing produces – now become more concentrated and can exert greater political influence."

[30] Participants in the Battle of Seattle were overwhelmingly white, but we have been unable to produce estimates of the presence of whites and of people of color. Danaher and Burbach (2000: 74-81) offer an interesting discussion of the problems of mobilizing people of color into a predominately white protest movement. The class composition is not as hard to guess at: labor unions mobilized workers and those concerned with global ideals were probably mostly upper middle-class.

[31] Here as elsewhere, I thank Paul Almeida for providing valuable descriptions of important events and actors.

[32] One group of witches reportedly placed a "hex" on the building in which the APEC conference took place in Auckland.

[33] Not all collective action problems need to be solved by "community" and "hierarchy." Nonrational choice theorists of protest consistently underestimate the success of "market" and "contract" solutions (Lichbach 1995).

[34] This is the flip-side of using patrons to solve the Rebel's Dilemma: While helpful in the short-run, in the long-run patronage deradicalizes a movement. As the *Economist* (Cockburn and St. Clair 2000: 65) reported after Seattle: "Now the NGOs are surprisingly quiet about the World Bank. The reason is that the Bank has made a huge effort to coopt them." Many work for the Bank and half the Bank's projects have NGO involvement.

[35] Keohane and Milner 1996 provide excellent examples of the linkage between domestic and international politics - the "two-level game," "second-image and second-image reversed," or "open economy politics" perspective.

[36] Two other features of protest nowadays are often mentioned:

> Involvement of protest movements centered around identities - race, gender, religion - that are opposed to modernity; location, history, and culture frame these identities; and, correspondingly, an absence of universal actors like the proletariat or the peasantry in the protests.
>
> A greater degree of protest, and consequent decline of global governability, than ever before: under the new world disorder, global chaos, clash of civilizations, coming anarchy, and Jihad vs. McWorld, resistance has become more extensive (widespread, common, and frequent), intense (violent and destructive), and enduring (persistent).

We have shown that the first is empirically incorrect, and in fact runs against the logic of mobilization based on a rainbow coalition rather than on essentialized identities; the second refers to another form of protest in today's globalized world: ethnic conflicts and religious fundamentalisms that more directly involve state power.

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